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Introduction 
 
Part I:  
 
 
1. The aim of this study 
 
Existing studies of the history of diplomatic relations between Japan and 
Western countries relating to the opening of Japan (1854) tend to concentrate on 
a discussion of the role of the great powers, especially Great Britain, the United 
States, France and Prussia. There are only a few works which explore the 
diplomatic relations between Japan and the Netherlands, although the Dutch 
and the Japanese maintained a relationship that predates the opening of Japan 
by some two centuries. Moreover, Japanese-Dutch relations have been 
examined principally from the perspective of cultural rather than diplomatic 
relationships.  
This situation is the outcome of the generally negative opinion of Dutch 
diplomatic power as that of a small power unable to pursue autonomous 
diplomacy. Certainly the Netherlands was a small country in comparison to 
Britain, the United States, France and Prussia. However in this period, the 
Netherlands had vast colonies in Asia, namely the Netherlands East Indies 
(present-day Indonesia), and ranked second only after Britain in the whole 
world in terms of the size of its colonies. Thanks to the efficient management of 
its colonies, the Dutch economy was fairly prosperous at that time. 1  In 
consideration of this point, it can be noted that existing works scarcely deal 
with the Dutch influence in Asia, the role of the Netherlands among other 
Western great powers and its special relationship with Japan. 
Given this state of affairs, it would seem difficult to achieve a clear 
overview of the diplomatic relations between Japan and Western powers, the 
diplomatic relations between Japan and the Netherlands and Dutch diplomacy 
towards the Far East. This is the reason this subject should be analyzed 
thoroughly and discussed at some length.  
                                            
1 Richard T. Griffiths, Industrial Retardation in the Netherlands 1830-1850, Den Haag, 1979, 
p.38. 
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  This thesis will attempt to address and to clarify this deficiency, paying 
particular attention to the following issues and questions in the field of Dutch 
diplomacy towards Japan in the period 1850-1863, predominantly on the basis 
of Dutch primary sources and publications: 
 
1. How can this study lead to a re-interpretation of nineteenth-century modern 
Dutch history? 
2. How did the Netherlands, a small European country, deal with Asian affairs 
compared to other Western powers in Asia?  
3. Why did the Netherlands follow an autonomous and positive diplomacy 
towards Japan after the arrival of the Americans in Japan?  
4. How was the Netherlands able to promote its interests in Japan in the light of 
the long-standing relationship between both countries? 
5. What difficulties were encountered by the Netherlands in dealing with 
Japanese affairs?  
6. Why did the Netherlands prefer to remain in its old settlement Dejima in 
Nagasaki after the opening of Edo (present-day Tokyo) to foreigners? 
7. What plan did the Netherlands have in order to develop its position in the 
Japanese market? 
8. How did the Netherlands promote its interests in Japan with one of the 
largest counties in the world, the USA, as a rival? 
9. How did autonomous, Dutch active diplomacy come to an end? 
 
 
2. Two problems in the history of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and Western powers  
 
 
A. The accepted theory which restrains academic study 
  
At present the number of works about the history of Dutch diplomatic relations 
with Japan is limited to a small number. What is the reason for this situation? In 
answer it can be pointed out that there is an accepted ‘theory’ in these studies. 
This implies that the Netherlands was not a strong power and consequently 
was not able to adopt an autonomous diplomacy in Japanese affairs among 
other major Western powers. Rather, the Netherlands preferred to take care to 
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maintain good relations with them. Superficially, this way of thinking seems 
correct and it also coincides with Dutch diplomacy as it is generally accepted at 
present. It would seem that this accepted theory is the reason that there are only 
a few studies about the Netherlands and the diplomatic relations between Japan 
and Western countries. It should be pointed out that this accepted theory has so 
far not been supported by any academic analysis or discussion.  
 
 
B. The problem of the study of Japan’s foreign relations  
 
Besides the above-mentioned problem, another relevant difficulty can be 
pointed out which impedes this subject. This problem or difficulty can be 
illuminated by the study of the situations both in Japan and in Western 
countries.  
 
1. The problem of the situation of study in Japan 
 
The history of relations between Japan and the Netherlands is contained in 
studies of Japanese history which have relied mainly on Japanese documents as 
their sources.  Detailed works concerning the activities of the consul-generals 
and Western nations in Japan tend to have been written using this kind of 
material, which has been classified and published. Some Japanese literature 
sources are supported by Western documents, especially those kept in the 
Public Record Office in Britain and NARA (United States National Archives 
and Records Administration) in the United States. These works tend mainly to 
concern the activities of a Western person in Japan. Therefore, through these 
works it is possible to understand the local situations, for example what was 
happening in Nagasaki and Yokohama which were open ports, and the 
relations of the Western powers with the Japanese. However, it is difficult to 
comprehend what their governments thought about Japanese affairs and what 
diplomacy they contemplated adopting towards Japan. This circumstance is 
also hampered by the fact that the literature which has attempted a thorough 
examination of governmental documents in Western countries is scarce.  
 
2. The problem of the situation of study in Western countries. 
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In the study of the history of relations between Japan and Western countries, 
most of the literature sources are largely concerned with the relationship 
between Japan and Western great powers, especially Great Britain and the 
United States. As regards Great Britain, the works of Beasly2 and Cortazzi3 are 
very important because they deal with a large number of documents from the 
British Foreign Office. Moreover, many books, diaries and documents have 
been published concerning the consuls-general or envoys to Japan. In the 
United States, the works of Goodman4 and Wiley5 are noteworthy, because 
they examine a large number of documents about American foreign policy. 
Furthermore, there are many detailed studies about documents concerning 
Perry’s (Matthew Calbraith Perry, 1794-1858) expedition to Japan in 1853-1854 
and about the foreign consuls-general. Consequently the United States and 
Great Britain are always emphasized in any discussion of the relationship 
between Japan and the Western countries. 
Another problem with European and American literature on the subject 
is that it emphasizes British-American relations at the local level. As is well 
known, anti-foreign sentiments were strong in Japan after its opening and 
many unfortunate events, such as the murder of foreigners and violent behavior 
against them, occurred at that time. Since the Japanese authorities had no 
effective means such as a police force to solve these problems, the foreign 
powers felt that they needed to co-operate in order to protect their nationals. In 
this context it should be noted that the British Minister maintained close 
contacts with the American Consul-General who was stationed in Edo, rather 
than with the Dutch commissioner who preferred to remain at his headquarters 
in Nagasaki. Such co-operation almost invariably took place at a local level. 
Therefore if one were to rely exclusively on this local perspective, it would be 
difficult to achieve an understanding of the attitude of the European powers 
towards American attempts to acquire a sphere of influence in Asia.6 
                                            
2 W.G. Beasley, The modern history of Japan, London, 1963. W.G. Beasley, Great Britain and 
the opening of Japan 1834-1858, Folkestone, 1995(rep.).  
3 Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), British Envoy in Japan 1859-1972, Folkestone, 2004. 
4 Grant Kohn Goodman, The Dutch Impact on Japan (1640-1853), Leiden, 1967. 
5 Peter Booth Wiley with Ichirô Kôrogi, Yankees in the Land of the Gods – Commodore Perry 
and the Opening of Japan, New York, 1990. 
6 If local co-operation between the foreign powers in Japan was to be emphasized, the 
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      In the Netherlands, there are a limited number of works on Dutch 
diplomacy towards Japan in the 1850s, both in the Netherlands and in Japan, 
that have used the archives of the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs. They 
include J.A. van der Chijs, Neêrlands Streven tot Openstelling van Japan voor den 
Wereldhandel.-uit officieele and grootendeels onuitgegeven bescheiden toegelicht’ 
(Amsterdam, 1867)7, and Miyako Vos, Bakumatsu Dejima Mikôkai Monjo -Donker 
Curtius Oboegaki (‘An Unpublished Document in Dejima in the Last Tokugawa 
Era - A Memory of Donker Curtius’, Shinjinbutsu ôraisha, Tokyo, 1992) which 
is the translation of the memoirs of Donker Curtius, the last trade chief on 
Dejima. Besides these, there are Miyako Vos, Kaikoku Nihon no Yoake (‘The 
Daybreak of the Seaborne Japan’, Shibunkaku shuppan, Tokyo, 2000), which 
contains the translated diaries of Commander Gerhardus Fabius (1806-1888), 
who visited Japan three times and contributed greatly to its modernization, and 
Herman Stapelkamp, Gerhardus Fabius 1806-1888’(Amsterdam, 1999), a 
biography of Fabius. These works are very useful to the study of the history of 
Dutch-Japanese relations during the 1850s. Stellingwerff, for instance, noted 
that ‘Van der Chijs compiled a detailed work. It is, however, based on the Dutch 
documents only. Since then, this subject about the opening of Japan has neither 
been written on in Dutch nor in English. Therefore, the subject is examined in 
English literature especially as one of American affairs.’8 He pointed out that 
                                                                                                                                
Dutch activities in Japan should also be taken into consideration. There is a series of works 
dealing with this aspect available translated from Japanese by M. Vos. See M. Vos, ‘J.K. van 
den Broek no「Oranda to Nihon I」’ in: Nihon no Yôgaku I  (‘Western study in Japan I’), 
Osaka, 1993, and ‘J.K. van den Broek no 「Oranda to Nihon II」’ in: Nihon no Yôgaku II, 
Osaka, 1994, which are translated from ‘Nederland en Japan - Kantteekeningen bij 
offisieusen tekst’ by J.K. van den Broek (‘The Netherlands and Japan – Marginalia in 
official documents’) in: De Tijdspiegel, The Hague, 1861. See in addition M. Vos, ‘Van der 
Broek no Ibun’ (‘A relic of Van der Broek’) in: Nihon Yôgakushi no kenkyû IX, Osaka, 1989, 
and ‘Van der Broek no denshu’ (‘The lesson by Van der Broek’) in: Nihon Yôgakushi no 
kenkyû X, Osaka, 1991, and ‘Van der Broek monchaku jiken (‘Difficulties with Van der 
Broek’) in: Nihon no Yôgaku III, Osaka, 1995.  
7 Translated into Japanese by Kogure Minori. Sheisu, Oranda Nihon kaikokuron, Yûshôdô 
shuppan, Tokyo, 2004. 
8 J. Stellingwerff, Zijne Majesteits Raderstoomschip Soembing overgedragen aan Japan – De drie 
diplomatieke reizen van kapitein G. Fabius ter opening van Deshima en Nagasaki in 1854, 1855 en 
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there are a few Dutch works about this subject. In this light, it is difficult to 
know what those in charge of the Dutch government thought about Japan or 
how they intended diplomacy towards Japan to take shape.  
      It can be argued that the Dutch-Japanese diplomatic relations are 
concerned with Dutch diplomatic and colonial history. In this research, 
however, another accepted theory is put forward: the Netherlands East Indies 
were more important to Dutch Asian affairs than any other business, including 
Japanese affairs; therefore the Netherlands would not permit itself to become 
involved in the political affairs after the opening of Japan. As a result of this line 
of thinking, relations with Japan have not been examined in Dutch diplomatic 
and colonial history. These studies, however, deal with Chinese or Thai affairs. 
Japanese affairs are dealt with by the study of the VOC (Vereenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie; the United Dutch East India Company).  
 
 
3. Problems arising from Dutch-Japanese diplomatic history  
 
Three problems in the study of Dutch-Japanese diplomatic history which result 
in the present situation for the study of Western-Japanese diplomatic history 
can be pointed out. 
1. In general, it is supposed that the Netherlands could not adopt its 
autonomous diplomacy towards Japan after its opening and that it merely 
followed the diplomatic measures adopted by other Western great powers. 
Moreover, this Dutch diplomacy is expressed in the term ‘small power politics’. 
It is commonly applied to the foreign policy of small countries which avoid 
international political tensions as much as possible, preferring to concentrate 
their efforts on profitable economic activities such as shipping and trading.9 
                                                                                                                                
1856, Zutphen, 1988, p.9. 
9 Yokoyama Yoshinori, ‘Nihon no kaikô to Oranda no gaikô- Oranda gaimushô shiron’ 
(‘Japan’s opening and Dutch diplomacy – an essay based on documents of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’) in: Ajia no naka no Nihonshi II: Gaikô to sensô (‘A Japanese 
history in Asia II: Diplomacy and War’), Tôkyôdaigaku shuppankai, 1992. Momose Hiroshi, 
Shôkoku (‘Small power’), Iwanami shoten, 1988. Amery Vandenbosch, The Dutch Foreign 
Policy since 1815: A study in small power politics The Hague, 1959. J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, 
Profits and Principles. A study of Dutch foreign policy, The Hague, 1979. 
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Furthermore, the Netherlands already enjoyed most-favored-treatment in Japan. 
Therefore, it seemed that the Netherlands did not need to take the initiative 
towards Japanese affairs by Western great powers and the Dutch neutrality 
contributed to the good relationships with them.  
2. European and American works mostly describe the history of this subject 
with an emphasis on British-American relations rather than on the British 
relationship with either the Netherlands or with France.10 As a result, the 
wrong impression, namely that the European countries easily accepted the 
strategy of the newly-emerging power in Asia, the United States, has been 
created. This situation is a consequence of the fact that the existing literature on 
the history of relations between Japan and foreign countries after the opening of 
Japan has stressed local matters and incidents in Japan. At that time, 
unfortunate events, such as the murder of foreigners and violent behavior 
against them, occurred at that time, because an anti-foreign movement achieved 
a strong sway there after its opening. Unfortunately, the contemporary 
Japanese authorities could not deal efficiently with these incidents. 
Consequently all foreign nationals had to join forces to try to deal with these 
kinds of incidents. Under such circumstances, it can be imagined that the British 
Consul-General made decisions concerning the Japanese authorities in close 
co-operation with the American Consul-General in Edo, while the Dutch 
Consul-General continued to remain aloof in Nagasaki. This was the upshot of 
the regional situation. Hence, in the present literature, it is difficult to discern 
the European-American rivalry in Asia. 
3. The bulk of the existing literature on the history of relations between Japan 
and foreign countries after the opening of Japan ignores the viewpoint of the 
Netherlands. Some unsound reasoning has resulted from this. For instance, 
Mitani Hiroshi points out that Japan did not yield to Britain, notwithstanding 
the overwhelming military power of the latter, and that Japanese diplomatic 
strategy was successful in saving Japan from a war with the British.11 In Japan, 
there is the theory propounded by Ishii Takashi that the Bakufu’s policy towards 
foreign affairs lacked direction; a standpoint opposed by Mitani. It is, however, 
                                            
10 See these works concerned in Bibliography. 
11 Mitani Hiroshi, Meiji ishin to nationalism – Bakumatsu no gaikô to seiji hendô (‘Meiji 
Restoration and Nationalism - Diplomacy in the Bakumatsu and political change’), 
Yamakawa shuppansha, 1997, p.142  
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clear that the Bakufu certainly lacked skill in it dealings with foreign affairs; it 
should be kept in mind that the Bakufu only just managed to settle the problems 
for the time being mainly thanks to a few talented Japanese. For example, 
Moriyama Einosuke (森山栄之助, 小通詞, 1820-1871) could speak a little 
English. According to Peter Booth Wiley, ‘Under MacDonald’s tutelage, 
Moriyama learned to speak English fluently, using correct grammar and with a 
facility for those letters and syllables that were most difficult for the Japanese. 
In addition to English, Moriyama, according to the Dutch superintendent, 
spoke Dutch better than the superintendent himself.’12 Moreover, ‘The opening 
of trade, however, was spelled out in the official orders for the expedition, and 
it was central to Perry’s mission’, Matthew Calbraith Perry, the commander of 
the American expedition to Japan charged with opening it up, could not talk 
about trade with the Japanese, because they had already been primed with 
Hayashi’s (林復斎 , 1800-1859, 大学頭 head of the university) persuasive 
argument against Perry’s plan.13 Thus, the Bakufu managed to deal with the 
problem for the time being. None the less, it is quite difficult to imagine that the 
Bakufu had a fixed principle and would carry out the political reform necessary 
to the purpose of coping with foreign affairs efficiently. Meanwhile, Ishii 
Takashi explains that the fundamental guideline of British foreign policy 
toward Asia at that time was to exert influence employing as few formal means 
as possible (‘cheap Government’), and that because of this Britain did not use its 
military power against Japan.14  
Examining the question of why no war occurred in Japan at the time of 
its opening, the answer is that the Japanese owed this to the Netherlands. Since 
Japan had maintained relations with the Netherlands for such a long time, the 
European and American powers regarded it as a nation capable of 
communicating with the West. As an example, Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897) 
estimated the Dutch contribution to Japan as follows: 
‘Japan, there seemed reason to believe, was better advised, and better able, 
                                            
12 William S. Lewis and Murakami Naojirô, eds., Ranald MacDonald: The Narrative of His 
Early Life, Spokane: The Eastern Washington State Historical Society, 1923. p.209, 225-227, 
232. See Wiley, Yankees in the Land of the God, p.21. 
13 Wiley, Yankees in the Land of the Gods, p.404. 
14 Ishii Takashi, Meiji ishin to gaiatsu (‘Meiji Restoration and foreign pressure’), Yoshikawa 
kôbunkan, 1993, p.8.  
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perhaps, to understand and appreciate the changes which had completely 
altered the relative positions of Europe and the East. Partly, it would seem, 
from their greater quickness and attitude for seizing the true meaning and 
significance of such facts as come before them; but greatly also owing to 
continued relations they had maintained with the Dutch.’ He also mentions the 
letter from the Dutch king, Willem II (Willem Frederik George Lodewijk, 
1792-1849), to the shogun.15 Britain expected that the Netherlands, its ally on 
the European continent, would prepare the way for the British in Japan. In 
addition, the British Government would possibly save on expenditure beyond 
those parts of Asia where it was already active, while it could. The main reason 
why Britain did not use its military power against Japan was not the principle 
of ‘cheap Government’, nor was it Japanese diplomacy.    
Its overriding consideration was that while its ally the Dutch were 
already negotiating with the Japanese authorities about the opening of Japan, 
the British Government did not see any necessity to expend military power 
against Japan. The British Government sometimes informed the Dutch about its 
plans to display its military power to Japan but this was merely a tactic to 
stimulate the negotiations aimed at the opening of Japan. Conversely, this 
British attitude proves that the Netherlands certainly did have a certain level of 
influence in Asia.16 Furthermore this opinion was shared by other Western 
powers. Thus, the Dutch relationships with Japan and the presence of the 
Netherlands there greatly contributed to the modernization of Japan without 
war. 
 
  
4. Presumptions against presently accepted theories 
 
A. Dutch Imperialism 
 
Was the Netherlands a small country which was not able to adopt an effective 
diplomacy towards Japan among the Western great powers at that time? In any 
answer it must be remembered that the Netherlands had a vast colony, the 
                                            
15 Rutherford Alcock, The Capital of the Tycoon: a Narrative of a Three years’ Residence in Japan, 
2 volumes, New York, 1863, pp.205-206. 
16 Concerning the Dutch-British relations in Asia, see Chapter 2 and 8.  
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Netherlands East Indies, in Asia and consequently it was an important power 
there. Until recently, Dutch foreign policy in Asia has hardly been evaluated. 
However, the development of a new theory of ‘Dutch Imperialism’ in Dutch 
diplomatic and colonial history sheds more light on this aspect and will be 
discussed in greater detail below. Under such circumstances, Asian affairs were 
of crucial importance to the Netherlands.  
 
B. Dutch ‘National Prestige and Economic Interests’ in Japan. 
  
After the opening of Japan, the major Western powers participated in Japanese 
affairs. The Dutch Government, however, did not relinquish its interests in 
Japan. The reason was that Japanese affairs were still very important to the 
Netherlands in order to maintain and expand its influence in Asia in view of its 
position in the Netherlands East Indies. Japan was special to the Netherlands 
because of the fact that it was only the Netherlands among all the Western 
powers which had maintained such a long relationship with Japan during the 
period of Sakoku. This relationship enhanced Dutch prestige as a maritime 
trading country. In this period, the Netherlands possessed a wealth of 
accumulated knowledge concerning Japan. Against this background, it seems 
proper that the Netherlands should want to maintain or indeed strengthen its 
influence in Japan in view of its affairs in Asia. Until its opening, Japan had 
firmly set its face against any approach by foreign countries. After the opening, 
however, Japan adopted a policy of Westernization and completely changed its 
old way of thinking. Therefore, it wanted to communicate with the West and to 
acquire Western goods.  In this situation, in the period around the opening of 
Japan, the Netherlands was making large profits from the Cultivation System in 
the Netherlands East Indies. In order to sell surplus colonial agricultural 
products, it was necessary to look for a new market. Against this background, 
as Japan was close to the Netherlands East Indies, it presented an attractive and 
real new market for the Netherlands.     
 
C. Traditionalism in Japan.  
 
Did Japan regard the Netherlands to be unworthy in comparison to other 
Western great powers after its opening? In fact, the contrary was true; it was a 
fact that Japan preferred to strengthen its special relationship with the 
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Netherlands. Although the country was theoretically open, the old traditional 
way of thinking remained strong in the Bakufu. Moreover, there were many 
daimyôs that were hostile to foreigners. Since it would have been very difficult 
for the Bakufu to carry out any drastic reforms, preference was given to carrying 
out a gradual reform. Therefore, the tempered Dutch advice and support for the 
reforms proved convenient for the Bakufu. In the Bakufu, the opinion reigned 
that it was worth strengthening the relationships with the Netherlands with its 
very extensive colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, although it was 
small-scale in comparison with Britain and the United States. Consequently, 
within the Bakufu there was a plan to introduce Western civilization into Japan 
gradually through the close relationship with the Netherlands. 
Considering these assumptions, it is difficult to imagine either that the 
Netherlands would have been excluded from Japan by other Western large 
powers or that the Netherlands would have contemplated abandoning its 
political and economic interests in the Japanese affairs at any time soon after the 
opening of Japan. Although this seems self-evident, it is necessary to examine 
these subjects academically.  
 
 
5. What proof is needed?  
 
How would it be possible to argue against the present state of studies 
concerning this subject as a result of these accepted theories? The best method is 
to examine the Dutch documents thoroughly; these have scarcely been used in 
most relevant works, whereas American documents are widely used by 
Goodman and Wiley and British documents by Beasly and Cortazzi. 
The documents used in this thesis relating to Japan are documents kept 
in the secret records (Geheim Archief) of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. They 
are categorized under ‘Japanese Affairs’ (Japanse aangelegenheden), but they have 
never been collated into a single file in these archives. Whereas the summaries 
of the regular documents can be seen in the index of the Public Records 
(Openbaar Archief), there is no summary of these secret documents for the period 
studied here. Because the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was ultimately 
responsible for relations with Japan at that time, all Dutch documents 
concerning relations with Japan accumulated in this Ministry. Since the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs also dealt with other overseas matters, it 
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maintained intensive communications with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, which was the main executive 
institution in the trade with Japan. Documents relating to these 
communications can also be found in the archives of the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs. Since the Government of the Netherlands East Indies was in charge of 
trade with Japan, the Governor-General had the authority to deal with any 
commercial problems resulting from this trade. In spite of this system, when 
relations with Japan became increasingly focused on political matters in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the Governor-General had no authority to 
deal with this kind of matter and had to leave decision making to the Ministry 
of Colonial Affairs in The Hague. In researching Dutch diplomacy towards 
Japan during the 1850s, it is therefore indispensable to analyze the documents 
collected by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands.  
Moreover, in this thesis the relationship between Europe and the United 
States in regard to Japan will be examined not from a local but from an 
international viewpoint. In this context it is necessary to examine the Dutch 
perspective in detail. In order to reveal the relevance of this perspective, 
documents which were produced by the political decision makers in the Dutch 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs will be examined. The work by Van der Chijs 
contains many of the same documents which are used in this thesis. However, 
he uses them specifically to underline his aim to show the Dutch contribution to 
Japan’s international relations.17 
Moreover, in this thesis other Dutch materials such as the minutes of the 
Dutch parliament as well as journals and newspapers are also referred to. By 
examining these materials, the views of Dutch persons who were not members 
of the Dutch Government can be discerned. To this can be added the advantage 
                                            
17 See other articles by this author which examine problems in this book from the aspect of 
Dutch diplomacy towards Japan: ‘Bakumatsu oranda tainichi gaikôseisaku no ichishiten 
「Oranda Nihon kaikoku ron」no tegaki genkô kara kôsatsu shita’ (‘An aspect of Dutch 
diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era, with reference to the handwriting of 
Neêrlands Streven’) in: Bulletin of Tsuyama Yôgaku Museum (Itteki - Annals of the Society for 
the History of Western Learning in Japan), Nr. 8, Okayama, 2000, and ‘Van der Chijs no 
「Oranda Nihon kaikoku ron」no seiritsu jijô’ (‘How Van der Chijs wrote Neêrlands Streven, 
with Reference to its Table of Content’s list unpublished’) in: Yôgaku 8 (‘Annals of the 
Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan’), Tokyo, 1999.  
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that it is possible to examine the Dutch Governmental documents critically.  
 
 
Part II: Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era: 
the fundamentals of Dutch foreign policy in Asia  
 
 
Part II aims at re-interpreting Dutch foreign policy in Asia in the nineteenth 
century and outlines the framework of this thesis, which is based mainly on 
recent trends in historical research of Dutch foreign policy. Against this 
background, the chapter will focus on Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the 
late Tokugawa era, a topic which will be examined in detail in this thesis on the 
basis of primary sources. In the course of this examination, a new perspective 
on nineteenth-century Dutch policy towards Japan will emerge and, from this 
perspective, relevant historiographical literature will be re-evaluated. In this 
way, it will be demonstrated that the commonly accepted theory is 
incompatible with the historical data.  
At present, there are few works about Dutch diplomacy in Asia after the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars, with the exception of those related to works about 
Dutch colonial history, especially those dealing with the Netherlands East 
Indies - present-day Indonesia. Works on Dutch diplomacy towards Japan are 
few and far between either in Japan or in the Netherlands. In Japan, this topic is 
discussed only as part of the theory of ‘small power politics’, according to 
which the Netherlands could not, and did not want, to join the power struggle 
between the major European powers. This struggle resulted in a 
balance-of-power system towards which the Netherlands maintained a 
tradition of ‘neutralism’ in its international relations within Europe.18 It seems 
that this theory of ‘small power politics’ in Europe was applied to Asian affairs 
too. In the Netherlands, this theory of ‘small powers politics’, and the 
concomitant idea that the Netherlands was only a small country in Europe, as 
well as the theory of ‘Dutch neutrality’ (discussed below) have always been 
accepted without much criticism. The perspective from which Dutch diplomacy 
is interpreted as an active and autonomous process has been almost entirely 
                                            
18 See Duco Hellema, Neutraliteit & vrijhandel - de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse 
betrekkingen, Utrecht, 2001 and works by Momose, Yokoyama. 
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neglected until recently. 
First, this chapter will examine the formation process of the theory of 
‘Dutch small power politics’ by surveying Dutch diplomatic history after the 
Napoleonic Wars. After this, the recently introduced concept of ‘Dutch modern 
imperialism’ as a concept separate from ‘Dutch colonialism’ will be examined. 
This concept emerged from the study of Dutch colonial history and considers 
the development of Dutch diplomacy as an active rather than a passive process. 
It would appear that it criticizes the concept of ‘simple Dutch small power 
politics’ which has been the accepted theory in most historiographical literature. 
Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to introduce the idea that Dutch 
diplomacy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era should be seen as an active 
process. This is also the central theme of this thesis, and will be applied to a 
re-examination and re-interpretation of existing literature and views.  
 
 
The general view of Dutch diplomatic history after the Napoleonic Wars19 
                                            
19 The explanation of each work in this section is based on C.B. Wels, ‘De historicus en de 
constanten in het buitenlands beleid’ in: Lijn in de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland, 
's-Gravenhage, 1984.  
Furthermore, see the following works about Dutch diplomatic history that deal with this 
period:  
N.C.F. van Sas, ‘De Nederlanden en Europa 1815-1830’ in: Algemene Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden, vol 11 Weesp, 1983, and Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot Nederland, Engeland en 
Europa, 1813-1831, Groningen, 1985. 
See also the following works about Dutch modern diplomatic history: 
C. Smit, Diplomatieke Geschiedenis van Nederland inzonderheid sedert de vesting van het 
koninkrijk, ’s-Gragenhage, 1950. 
Wels, Aloofness and Neutrality, Utrecht, 1982. 
There are many works about Dutch diplomacy by J.C. Boogman, a historian of Utrecht 
University. A useful summary of his research can be found in: Boogman, ‘Achtergronden, 
tendenties en tradities van het buitenlands beleid van Nederland (eind zestiende 
eeuw-1940)’ in: E.H. van den Beugel e.a., Nederlands buitenlandse politiek. Heden en verleden,  
Baarn, 1978. 
M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst van het moderne Imperialisme Koloniën en 
buitenlandse politiek 1870-1902, Amsterdam, 1985 and ‘Het imperialisme van een kleine 
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Classic works on Dutch foreign policy   
 
There appears to be no usable overview of historical research of Dutch foreign 
policy in the nineteenth century. In a discussion of the main features of works 
which treat Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth century, the main keywords 
and concepts which have been used in research on Dutch diplomatic history 
since the early nineteenth century will be identified.  
  To begin with, there is G. W. Vreede’s Een twintigjarige strijd. Volledige 
verzameling vertogen van G.W. Vreede, Utrecht, 1869 (‘A Twenty Years’ War: 
Complete Collected Articles by G.W. Vreede’). Vreede, who during his lifetime was 
an ardent adversary of the Dutch statesman Johan Rudolf Thorbecke 
(1798-1872) within his own country, and of Napoleon III (Charles Louis 
Napoléon Bonaparte, 1808-1873) internationally, supported the basic principle 
of Dutch foreign policy: that of non-commitment (‘afzijdigheidspolitiek’). His 
criticism was aimed particularly at the way in which Dutch foreign relations 
were shaped. In his opinion, the Netherlands should exhibit a more self- 
confident appearance, and taking not only the Dutch Republic (1581-1795) but 
also the Batavian Republic (1795-1806) as an example. Therefore, the 
downgrading of the diplomatic service which was being systematically and 
critically propagated by the liberals naturally caused his a great deal of mental 
anguish.20 
Another basic work on Dutch foreign policy which covers three centuries 
is J.A. van Hamel, Nederland tusschen de mogendheden De Hoofdtrekken van het 
buitenlandsch beleid en van de diplomatieke geschiedenis van ons vaderland sinds 
deszelfs onafhankelijk volksbestaan, Amsterdam, 1918 (‘The Netherlands between the 
Great Powers: The Main Features of Dutch Diplomacy and of the Diplomatic History of 
our Fatherland since National Independence’’). This book became very popular in 
the inter bellum years and may serve as an important indicator of the way of 
thinking about Dutch diplomatic tradition and diplomatic tendencies. Van 
Hamel’s argument is that the basic features of Dutch diplomacy applied equally 
well to the Republican era, the nineteenth century, as to his own time. He 
                                                                                                                                
mogendheid: de overzeese expansie van Nederland 1870-1914’ in: N.C.F. van Sas (red.), De 
kracht van Nederland Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid, Haarlem, 1991. 
20 Wels, ‘De historicus’, p.12.  
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propagated the idea that the Netherlands should set a model for international 
co-existence through neutrality, and that it should promote the principle of 
international peace and stability. Nevertheless, Van Hamel argued that the 
Netherlands had to rely on Britain in order to maintain its colonial possessions, 
which were indispensable to the Dutch position as a middle-size power in its 
relationship to such countries as France and Prussia with hegemonic tendencies 
on the European continent. Van Hamel’s view was that the Netherlands was a 
middle-size power at the end of a century in which Dutch neutralism had been 
affected by major international tensions. This view defined Dutch influence in 
relation to other European powers. 
Professor B.M. Telders, a jurist in Leiden with close ties with the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is another relevant author. Possibly with the 
knowledge and consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or prompted by it, he 
protested about the way in which the Dutch policy of neutrality was criticized. 
Such criticism appeared in English and French newspapers in the inter-war 
period (1918-1939), and Telders argued that the large powers were helping 
small countries only in their own interests. Hence, he insisted that the 
Netherlands should not espouse opportunism and that the neutrality of the 
Netherlands was not only a right, but also a duty in the interests of Europe. 
Furthermore, he referred to the traditional features of Dutch foreign policy over 
the centuries in order to support his argument.21  
Telders’ statements prompted historian P. Geyl of Utrecht to take up his 
pen.22 Geyl thought that Britain and France did not question the right of the 
Dutch to be neutral at all, but that they merely questioned whether Dutch 
neutralism was meaningful, especially in the current situation. Geyl did not 
agree that the Netherlands had a duty of neutrality in Europe. He criticized the 
views of Telders, especially the idea that the Netherlands had already chosen a 
policy of neutrality in 1814. According to Geyl, the Dutch Kingdom of Willem I 
(Willem Frederik van Oranje-Nassau, 1772-1843, as King Willem I, 1814-40), 
being unified with Belgium, was intended to serve as a bulwark against France.  
This survey of pre-Second World War classic works on Dutch diplomatic 
                                            
21 Wels, ‘De historicus’, p.15. B.M. Telders, Nederlands onzijdigheid Grondslagen en gevolgen 
( ‘Dutch Aloofness Basics and Results’) ’s Gravenhage, 1939 
22 P. Geyl, Nederland en de oorlog: Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van prof. Telders, Nederlands 
onzijdigheid, Utrecht, 1939  
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history shows that the views on Dutch diplomacy depended on the current 
circumstances in Europe. These discussions make clear that the Netherlands 
was not seen as a small power at that time, and hence was expected to play a 
role in the maintaining of the balance of power in Europe. Below, a survey of 
more recent studies which deal with Dutch diplomacy will be given in order to 
see how the idea that the Netherlands was a small power came into existence.  
 
 
The concept of small power politics  
 
The Netherlands temporarily disappeared as an independent state during the 
Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815). After these wars ended, at the Congress of 
Vienna (1815), the former Republic of the Netherlands regained its 
independence and was enlarged by the annexation of the present-day Belgium. 
Furthermore, the former Dutch colonies in South-East Asia, the vast area which 
makes up present-day Indonesia, were returned to the Netherlands by the 
London treaties (1814, 1824) concluded between Britain and the Netherlands. 
The main motive prompting the British to do this was that they considered 
Dutch independence   pointless to its own policy towards European continent, 
unless the Netherlands was strong enough to confront France and Prussia and 
act as a sentry for Britain.  
In short, the Netherlands was a full part of the balance of power system 
in Europe at that period. The neutral Dutch position in this system was not a 
product of small power politics, but rather of great power politics. The term 
‘small power politics’ is commonly applied to the foreign policy of small 
countries which avoid international political tensions as much as possible, as 
they concentrate their efforts on such profitable economic activities as shipping 
and trading.23 The traditional Dutch policy of neutrality, dating from the days 
of the Dutch Republic, may be more accurately called a ‘matter of choice’ and 
‘material gain’ neutralism. Traditional Dutch international policy was based on 
a dislike of the power politics of great powers; this policy transformed political 
affairs into moral ones. This dislike resulted in an anti-continental attitude, 
which was characterized by - in the words of a Dutch historian24 - ‘abstinence 
                                            
23 See works by Momose, Yokoyama and Vandenbosch.  
24 Boogman, ‘Achtergronden’, p.227.  
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and neutrality’ (‘onthouding en neutraliteit’) after 1848, that is, abstention from 
territorial ambitions in Europe. The Netherlands was even prepared to accept a 
reduction in its territory, if it were to be involved in a struggle with European 
great powers. The Netherlands nurtured a centuries’ old strong desire to be a 
maritime, mercantile nation, and was less interested in becoming an industrial 
nation. As a result of the Belgian revolt in 1830, the Kingdom of Netherlands 
and Belgium were separated. Belgium was the main industrial region and had 
the far more developed economic infrastructure in the Kingdom at that time. 
This event virtually halved the territory of the Kingdom and created the notion 
of Dutch small power politics. 
In 1839, the Netherlands was formally reduced to the territory of ‘the 
former Republic of the Seven United Netherlands’.25 It became common to 
regard the Netherlands not as a second-class country but as a so-called ‘small 
power’.26 Formerly, its existence had been indispensable to maintaining the 
balance of power system in Europe. After the secession of Belgium, however, 
the Netherlands lost its power to act autonomously in Europe and hence its 
independence was compromised. Therefore, it was said that Dutch neutralism 
could no longer be called a matter of choice. Although the Netherlands still had 
a vast colonial empire, by which it distinguished itself from other small 
European countries such as Denmark, the common perception was that it had 
been demoted to a third-rank power.27 Up to the present, this perception has 
dominated main stream Dutch historiography. Thus, the concept of Dutch 
small power politics was born. The moot point whether the Netherlands really 
became a small power, as it lost its function of bulwark against France, arises 
here. In this perception, not national power but military strength played the 
central role. Indeed military strength cannot be ignored, as it was an important 
issue in international relations at that time. Nevertheless it is important to note 
that the concept of Dutch small power politics is limited only to the aspect of 
military strength.  
  The Netherlands was not interested in intervening in European conflicts 
or in territorial expansion. However, it seems obvious that the secession of 
Belgium fundamentally affected Dutch foreign policy, but the new direction 
                                            
25 J.C.H. Blom, E. Lamberls (red.), Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden, Rijswijk, 1993, p.309.  
26 Smit, Diplomatieke Geschiedenis, p.198.  
27 Wels, ‘De historicus’, p.21.  
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was wholly compatible with the traditional Dutch ambitions in international 
relations. A closer look at the attitude of the Dutch towards the secession 
reveals that ‘The stout-hearted fighting they produced against the Belgians was 
not meant to undo the de facto separation, but to obtain a more favorable 
separation settlement, and of course to put the vain and overbearing Belgians in 
their place’.28 Originally French influence was predominant in the southern 
Netherlands. In a pamphlet a Belgian writer even wrote that ‘We are French 
owing to the way of our thinking and the sacrifice made. ... We are French 
owing to the blood which was shed in the wars of revolution.’ In other words 
some Belgians rather desired to merge with France than with the northern 
Netherlands.29 
Moreover, ‘in the Dutch politician Thorbecke’s writings the 
condemnation of the ungrateful Belgians and the joy that henceforth it was no 
longer necessary to share the same state system with them prevailed. The 
majority of pamphleteers had a clear answer to the question how the 
Netherlands should see its future in Europe: they were together as Hollanders 
again and could do without Europe from now on.’30  In other words, ‘the 
break-up of the Kingdom generally was greeted in the North with relief and 
delight: the Dutch were pleased to be rid of the restless and rebellious 
Belgians.’31 There is also another side to the Belgian secession which should not 
be overlooked. It displayed something of the politics of hegemony which were 
practiced by such great powers as Britain and France in Europe. The 
Netherlands had no overwhelming desire to recover Belgium. The 
Dutch-Belgian union was created by Britain, the ‘most natural ally’ of the Dutch, 
in order to make the Netherlands a British sentry on the European continent. 
The minister of Foreign Affairs (Secretaris van Staat vcoor Buitenlandse Zaken) 
Gijsbert Karel van Hoogendorp (1762-1824) used these words ‘onzen 
natuurlijksten bondgenoot’ in his letter to the sovereign on February 25, 1814. This 
                                            
28  Boogman, ‘The Netherlands in the European Scene 1813-1913’ in: C.B. Wels, 
(eindredactie), Vaderlands Verleden in Veelvoud, II: 19e-20e eeuw, Den Haag, 1980, p.62. 
29 Hans van der Hoeven, De Belgische Beroerte – De Tiendaagse Veldtocht en de scheuring der 
Nederlanden 1830-1839, Amsterdam, 1973, p.18. 
30 Wels, ‘De historicus’, pp.11-12.  
31  G.J. Hooykaas, ‘De politieke ontwikkeling in Nederland 1830-1840’ in: Algemene 
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, vol 11, Weesp, 1983, p.306.  
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tellingly expresses the position of Britain towards the Netherlands and shows 
that Dutch-British relations were considered to be special.32 
The Netherlands had now become involved in the balance of power 
system in Europe, which it traditionally detested. Then through the territorial 
reduction caused by the Belgian secession, the Netherlands found that it was 
able to launch a strong appeal for a new way of asserting its international 
position. The appeal was both practical and theoretical. Because of its aversion 
to great power politics and a national character based on Calvinist principles, 
the Dutch proclaimed that in the new situation it was their moral mission to 
stay aloof from political conflict in Europe. The Belgian secession enabled the 
Netherlands to interpret political issues morally. The Netherlands also had 
good practical reasons to maintain neutrality. The traditional policy of 
abstaining from territorial ambitions in Europe and the ideal of being engaged 
in sea-trade could be revitalized unimpeded after the function of acting as a 
bulwark against France had disappeared.  
After 1830, the Netherlands was destined to be a marine mercantile 
nation which could adapt quickly to new circumstances. This, however, is only 
one side of the story. As will be shown, the Netherlands was not content with 
merely being a small country which followed the policy of great powers. This is 
precisely the reason the Netherlands cannot be considered a small power in 
Europe. How did the Dutch overcome the disadvantage of being territorially 
small in order to maintain an independent position in European politics? This 
will be addressed below. 
 
 
‘National prestige and economic interest’ in Dutch diplomacy, particularly in 
relation to colonial policy.  
 
After its separation from Belgium, the Netherlands was reduced to being a 
small country in the sense that it occupied only a modest territory in Europe. It 
was, however, still a country with vast colonial possessions, the size of which 
ranked second only to the British colonial empire. What was the purpose of 
maintaining such a vast colonial empire, if the country was content with being 
small in Europe? Having large overseas possessions enabled the Netherlands to 
                                            
32 Sas, Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot, p.I.   
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retain influence on the international stage, instead of being confined to the 
limited role accorded other small countries. It was not only Dutch national 
prestige among the European powers that would be undermined if the 
Netherlands ceased to be a major colonial power, the economic interests of the 
Netherlands would also be affected, because as a consequence it would 
apparently be impossible for it to participate in the formulation of international 
economic policy. There could be no denying that diplomats of middle powers 
were not treated like those of great powers.33 In this context, the opinion that 
the maintenance of Netherlands supremacy in South-East Asia had always been 
closely linked to national prestige is understandable.34 
  For instance, Willem I established the royal cabinet of curiosities (‘Het 
koninklijk kabinet van Zeldzaamheden’ 1816) which included rare artifacts obtained 
in Asia. He used to show them to important persons from foreign countries. S. 
Legêne has pointed out that this cabinet was helpful as a means for national 
integration and, also, as a symbol of a strong mercantile nation that maintained 
relations with the whole world. Thanks to the cabinet, the Dutch international 
profile was strengthened.35 In order to protect its national prestige in Europe as 
much as possible, the Netherlands needed to maintain its colonial possessions 
outside Europe. ‘Surely, with its possession of the Netherlands East Indies, the 
Netherlands is a considerable country’ states the explanatory note to the 
Netherlands East Indies’ budget for 1870. The Ministries of the Colonies and of 
Foreign Affairs fostered an intimate relationship with each other. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the Ministry of the Colonies was larger than the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs reveals how Dutch foreign policy was perceived by the Dutch 
Government.36 
Although the Asian policy of European and American powers in the 
nineteenth century was important to all these countries, for the Netherlands it 
was even more so than for the other Western powers in Asia. In the 
Netherlands, overseas affairs were a means of obviating its position as a small 
                                            
33 C.A. Tamse, Nederland en België in Europa (1859-1871) – De zelfstandigheidspolitiek van twee 
kleine staten, Den Haag, 1973, p.4. 
34 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, p.285. 
35 Susan Legêne, De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel- Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de 
negentiende-eeuwse. Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme, Amsterdam, 1998, pp.330-367.  
36 Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, p.32.  
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country in Europe without directly confronting the other European powers. 
Therefore, its primary concern in Asian affairs was the colonial management of 
the Netherlands East Indies which contributed greatly to the economy of the 
mother country. Through effective management, the Netherlands could not 
only earn big profits and hence develop its economic interests, it also possessed 
the means to enhance its national prestige as the possessor of a vast colonial 
empire.  
A less attractive consequence of colonial management was that it 
required major investment. Should, however, the Netherlands have abandoned 
its colonial possessions, it would have been considered a low-ranking country 
on a par with Denmark. The Netherlands without the Netherlands East Indies 
would have been no more than ‘a farmer on the North Sea’.37 Outside Europe, 
the Netherlands pursued a policy that was completely different from its 
continental policy. It aimed to be ‘the first among the second-class powers’, 
while maintaining its aloofness (afzijdigheid) from power politics in Europe. 
From this viewpoint, this attitude may be labeled pragmatic rather than 
ethical.38 Notwithstanding, Wels argues that after the Belgian secession the 
Netherlands was reduced to the position of a country of the third rank and that 
its aloofness did not result from choice but from powerlessness.39 Although it 
has often been regarded as ethical, the Dutch attitude was not identical to what 
has been called ‘Dutch traditional neutralism’, which entailed avoiding 
problems concerning international politics as much as possible and keeping a 
distance from international affairs, focusing instead on such profitable activities 
as shipping and trade. ‘The policy of aloofness applied only to Europe. Outside 
Europe Holland acted with less reserve; in Asia her policy even showed 
aggressive features.’40  
The Netherlands displayed an aversion to being involved in the balance 
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Haag, 1998, p.151. 
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of power and the struggle for supremacy in Europe; but it is not true that the 
Netherlands was always indifferent in this regard. If its international interests 
dictated it should do so, it would join in. 41  To name an example, the 
Netherlands participated with Britain, France and the United States in the 
bombardment of Shimonoseki (1864) in Japan. In this incident the Netherlands 
played an important role. Moreover, according to Wels, ‘neutralism and 
neutrality are entirely different concepts; neutralism has a political content and 
neutrality has juridical content.’ 42  In this respect, the notion of ‘Dutch 
traditional neutralism’ is open to criticism. The ‘traditional neutralism’ theory 
does not apply to Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth century as smoothly as 
has often been thought. Tamse argues that the voluntary neutral policy of the 
Netherlands in 1860 accorded with its interest.43 
From the perspective outlined above, the problem with the theories of 
‘small power politics’ and ‘traditional neutralism’ argues that people who 
believed in small power politics and traditional neutralism considered Dutch 
foreign policy to be monolithic. Namely, Dutch foreign policy in Europe was 
different from that pursued in Asia. These theories largely ignore this fact. The 
Netherlands cannot be treated as a small country and its foreign policy cannot 
be defined as ‘one of traditional neutralism’. Only in Europe did the 
Netherlands behave as a small power. Because of the existence of the 
Netherlands East Indies, Dutch diplomacy in Asia did not display the 
characteristics typical of a small power. Kuitenbrouwer is referring to Fasseur’s 
work, when he states that: ‘around the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
[Dutch colonial] Government [in Batavia] indeed played a decisive role in 
Dutch expansion. Generally, local administrative officers took the initiative in 
intervening in the outer territories. These initiatives were often accepted by the 
Government in Batavia, as a result of which, the Government in The Hague was 
faced with a fait accompli.’44 
  This viewpoint is inextricably linked to the hypothesis that the 
Netherlands was a small power, but a large one in Asia.45 The superpower 
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Great Britain feared Dutch influence in the nineteenth century. For instance, 
Governor-General Johannes Count van den Bosch (1780-1844) tried to adjust 
tariffs in favor of Dutch commerce as allowed by Article Two of the London 
Treaty, which the British had intended would apply only to Java as far north as 
the southern limit of Atjeh. Such Dutch activities caused Henry John Temple, 
3rd Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865), the British Foreign Secretary, great 
vexation: ‘He had already battled with the Dutch for five years over the Java 
duties and was anxious to avoid a similar situation in Sumatra …Palmerston 
also raised Article Six of the London Treaty, which required the approval of The 
Hague for all Dutch advances in the East. Since none of these appeals to treaty 
right was conclusive, he was obliged also to bluster in general terms about ‘the 
hostile spirit and tendency of the proceedings of the Dutch authorities in the 
Indian Seas.’46 Moreover the Dutch strength is also shown by the fact that in 
the Netherlands ‘A British proposal to compromise over the interpretation of 
the London Treaty was not taken up, so that the matter was left at issue.’47 
Not only were there two sides to Dutch foreign policy: towards Europe 
and towards Asia, but Dutch diplomacy in Asia had also two sides: one 
towards colonial matters and one towards commercial matters. Since the 
Netherlands East Indies were a colonial possession, colonial matters were not 
regarded as truly foreign issues. On the other hand, commercial matters 
elsewhere in Asia really were international issues in the eyes of the Netherlands. 
It would be not an exaggeration to state that Dutch affairs in Asia amounted 
primarily to the Netherlands’ relationship with Japan. 48  Maintaining and 
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developing economic interests in Asia in ways that did not require direct rule 
over foreign countries was of major importance to the Netherlands, because, in 
that way, it could compensate for its small size. Furthermore, looking back 
upon Dutch history, this policy seemed appropriate to the Netherlands, as it 
concurred with the moral international ideal of maintaining good relations with 
other countries on the basis of commercial profits. Thus, the Netherlands was 
thought of very highly by other nations because its economy was strong. In 
general it was thought that the Netherlands could attain a respectable position 
among other powers because of the economic importance. The colonies were 
often/almost invariably regarded as the foundation of the Dutch economic 
importance.49 
National prestige was an important matter for the Netherlands in 
overcoming the status of being a small country. Therefore, the Dutch were not 
satisfied with the profits from their economic activities pure and simple. It 
makes sense to say that having national prestige strengthens international trust 
and contributes indirectly to commerce. Japanese affairs with the Netherlands 
at that period should be seen from this perspective. The prestige brought by the 
Dutch influence in the Far East and the confidence accompanying it gave the 
Netherlands the justification to manifest itself as more than a mere second-class 
country. Through this national prestige, the Netherlands was able to maintain 
an independent position in Europe among the great powers.  
  Apart from this aspect, there is one opinion that ‘In short, the United 
Netherlands served a number of functions as an intermediary body; most of 
these survived when its role as a barrier against France disappeared with the 
Belgian revolt of 1830. Belgium itself became an intermediary body with 
various important functions aside from that of being a neutral barrier against 
France.’50 Certainly the Netherlands is smaller than other Western Powers such 
                                                                                                                                
political economical viewpoint, it was ‘prudent’ rather than accidental. He interprets Dutch 
foreign policy towards China at that period as a product of Dutch imperialism.  
49 Van Raalte, Troonredes, 125; Geyl, ‘1813 herdacht in 1863’, 32 vlg.; Handelingen, 1860-1861, 
Tweede Kamer, 310 and 1865-1866, Tweede Kamer, 148 (Graaf van Zuylen); Handelingen, 
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50 Paul W. Shroeder, ‘The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure’ in: 
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as the United States, Britain, France and Germany. The Netherlands, however, 
was placed in a geographically important region in Europe and was the most 
important country among middle powers. 51  There is, however, another 
opinion: measures available to a small power are much fewer than those at the 
disposal of a great power, but if a small power can use them efficiently, it can 
attain much better results than these of a great power, because the politics of a 
small power is generally ‘onverdacht’ (above suspicion).52 Consequently, even if 
the Netherlands was a small power, it is important not to neglect the fact that 
the Netherlands could play an important role in Japanese affairs. 
 
 
‘Dutch Imperialism’ – a re-evaluation of Dutch foreign policy  
 
It has long been recognized that colonial and overseas affairs were very 
important to the Netherlands. In historical research on Dutch foreign policy in 
the second half of nineteenth century, especially in the 1870s, Dutch policy 
towards Indonesia is referred to as ‘Imperialism’. However, it is important not 
to overlook Dutch expansionist policy before the 1870s.53  The concept of 
imperialism should be applied generally, not only to Dutch policy in Indonesia 
but also to the policy with regard to what were known as the Dutch commercial 
interests in Japan and China. First, the concept of Dutch imperialism will be 
considered in some detail. After this, its relevance to this dissertation will be 
examined.  
The concept of Dutch Imperialism has emerged from a re-evaluation of 
modern Dutch diplomatic history. This re-evaluation has been promoted by 
historians of Utrecht University in particular who represent a long tradition in 
Dutch modern diplomatic history. Dutch diplomacy was long regarded as 
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virtually ineffectual when it came to the protection of the political interests of 
the Netherlands. Consequently, until recently modern Dutch diplomatic history 
was not the subject of any historiographical debate. In truth, the limited extent 
of Dutch territory in Europe failed to stimulate the expectation that Dutch 
diplomacy was a relevant factor. This was the appearance that the Netherlands 
incorporated into its very realistic approach to international relations. If the 
Netherlands were to have been considered a ‘great power’, it would inevitably 
have become involved in various conflicts between the other great powers of 
Europe. This was entirely contrary to the Dutch national interest. Rothstein has 
put forward the argument that small powers will not be interfered with by 
great powers owing to their unimportance, conversely they will not provoke 
the great powers. He thought that this policy was acceptable to the middle 
powers.54 Until recently, many historians refrained from referring to Dutch 
foreign policy as modern imperialism, the term commonly being used to 
indicate the expansionist policies of European and American great powers in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries based on a huge reservoir of capital 
coupled with oppressive military force. 
This view has long been widely accepted. It has been especially popular 
among researchers at Leiden University. This is the oldest university in the 
Netherlands and has produced a large number of civil servants and prominent 
intellectuals. Research emphasizing the realistic interests of the Netherlands is 
predominant among Leiden scholars. Colonial studies, that is topics crucial to 
the Netherlands, have assumed a prominent place in Leiden, and the symbol of 
this was the former Institute for the History of European Expansion and Global 
Interaction (Instituut voor de Geschiedenis van de Europese Expansie en Reactie, 
IGEER）, which is now incorporated into the Institute for History at Leiden 
University. In ethnological and cultural research related to the former colonies, 
the Royal Institute for Language, Geography and Ethnology (Het Koninklijk 
Instituut voor Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde, KITLV) is also closely linked to this 
university.55 The National Museum for Ethnology (Museum voor Volkenkunde), 
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famous for Siebold‘s (Philipp Franz von Siebold, 1796-1866) collection, is also 
located in Leiden. Ethnological research has not only studied the specific 
aspects of geography, race, language, and customs in Asia and Africa, its results 
were also applied in order to smooth the path of the colonial administration. 
Furthermore, during the colonial era, it was highly relevant that the Dutch 
should know whether it was possible to cultivate products required in Europe, 
known as colonial products, and to sell European industrial products in the 
colonies. Studies on such topics served an important economic and political 
purpose.  
Against this background, in recent years H.L. Wesseling, the founder of 
IGEER, published a series of articles questioning the existence of Dutch 
imperialism. He opposed connecting the ‘modern imperialism’ practiced by the 
great powers with Dutch foreign policy, since the Netherlands held on to its 
already existing possessions in Southeast Asia after 1870 without engaging into 
the scramble for new colonial possessions, and even traded off its possessions 
in West Africa for recognition of its sovereign rights to all of Sumatra. One 
other aspect of the Leiden School is that, although imperialism had both good 
and bad consequences for the colonized peoples, the Dutch were mainly driven 
by the idea of being weldoeners (benefactors) to the Asian people. 56 
It is also possible to detect this Dutch behavior in Japan. A good example 
is a letter from Johan Willem de Sturler (1777-1855) to the Japanese Governor of 
Nagasaki which reveals that the Dutch wanted to act as a benefactor to the 
Japanese. This would also seem to apply to the activities of Siebold.57 B.W. 
Schaper, Wesseling’s predecessor in Leiden, asserted that if the term 
imperialism also applied to the Netherlands, it should be typified as a ‘reluctant 
imperialism’. Therefore he, just as Wesseling, avoided linking the modern 
imperialism of the great powers with Dutch foreign policy.  
However, the recent concept of ‘imperialism as a Dutch phenomenon’ 
makes it possible to research Dutch foreign policy as an autonomous process. 
Furthermore, C. Fasseur has reinterpreted Dutch colonial policy by asserting 
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that around 1830 all Dutch overseas possessions and overseas territories were a 
burden on the Netherlands and were operating at a loss.58 Because of the costs 
involved, it was entirely out of the question to maintain an oppressive colonial 
rule based on powerful military force. As a consequence, the Netherlands had 
no alternative but to govern its colonies by means of building trust and 
tolerance. 59  This was what became known as the ‘policy of abstinence’ 
(onthoudingspolitiek) which enabled the Netherlands to manage its colonies 
applying as little military force as possible and cutting down expenses as much 
as possible.60 The Dutch managed to maintain a large colonial empire for a long 
time by skillfully devising ways to co-exist with the indigenous population. 
Dutch colonial policy does not seem high-handed and it gives the 
impression of being reactive rather than following a deliberate scheme. 
Moreover, it seemed that the Netherlands was obliged to resort to neutralism or 
small power politics not just in Europe but in Asia as well. Fasseur, however, 
has pointed out that Dutch colonial policy was completely different from a 
policy of neutralism. In its colonial empire, the Netherlands always had the 
option of resorting to military force, when it transpired that peaceful means had 
been ineffectual. 61  In presenting this explanation, Fasseur corrected the 
pre-existing interpretation of Dutch colonial policy. 
The Netherlands avoided the use of military force as much as possible, 
not for moral but for practical reasons: to cut down the expenses of colonial 
management as much as possible. Nevertheless, should this policy turn out to 
be ineffective, in the end the Dutch could always resort to the use of military 
force. This was a characteristic feature of the modern imperialism of all of the 
Western powers. Dutch foreign policy, especially its colonial policy, cannot be 
explained simply in terms of ‘neutralism or small power politics’. Since the 
Netherlands was not content with being a small power, it did not keep silent 
about attempts by other powers to acquire influence in certain Indonesian 
islands. Disputes over the northern half of Borneo can be cited as an example of 
this.62 It is more appropriate to research Dutch imperialism in the general 
                                            
58 Fasseur, De weg naar het paradijs, p.48.  
59 Fasseur, De weg naar het paradijs, p.49.  
60 Fasseur, De weg naar het paradijs, p.50.  
61 Fasseur, De weg naar het paradijs, p.52.  
62 Fasseur, De weg naar het paradijs, p.55. 
 30 
context of modern imperialism. 
 
 
The relevance to the Netherlands of relations with Japan 
 
The preceding analysis of Dutch foreign policy has concentrated on the 
two-fold aim of Dutch diplomacy: national prestige and economic interest. 
These two elements can be clearly identified in the Dutch policy towards Asia. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to research Dutch diplomacy towards Japan on the 
basis of these aspects, because Japanese affairs were very special to the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands was the only Western country to maintain trade 
relations with Japan in the period when the latter was subjected to its policy of 
seclusion.63 The Netherlands used its commercial relations with Japan to raise 
its national prestige in Europe. For example, European countries expected 
Dutch support in Japanese affairs, because the process of the opening of the 
country was not yet certain. The British Plenipotentiary in The Hague, Ralph 
Abercromby (2nd Baron Dunfermline, 1803-1868) made the following statement: 
‘At the same Ball, I have reason to believe, that His Majesty made similar 
communications [about the Japanese Affairs] to the Secretary of the French 
Legation in the unavoidable absence of the French Minister, and to the Chargé 
d’affaires of the United States of North America, - but I [am] not certain 
whether His Majesty [Dutch King] was able to do so also to the Russian Chargé 
d’affaires.’64 The Dutch king himself explained these affairs to plenipotentiaries 
of other countries. This is an example illustrating the Dutch pride concerning its 
role in Japanese Affairs. 
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Namely the relationship with Japan was a reminder of the Dutch time of 
glory in the VOC period.65 Fabius, who went on an expedition to Japan three 
times, expressed this importance as follows: ‘results in the last year have 
brought the Netherlands few profits at this moment. This fact, however, is 
important, that the Netherlands should receive the same benefits that other 
countries will be granted in Japan. In consideration of the honor accorded the 
Dutch, the Netherlands shall obtain the most favorable conditions in the future 
too.’66 It is well known that Japanese studies in the Netherlands were the most 
advanced in the world at that time. Moreover, Dutch was the first Western 
language in Japan. This was the most important privilege for the Netherlands. 
In this situation, a remark made by a Japanese person should not surprise us; 
“However you also know how childish they are, the British as well as the 
French cannot understand Dutch.”67 
The Dutch were highly knowledgeable about the Japanese mentality and 
about customs, and of how to get along with the Japanese. Therefore, in order 
to maintain their position in the Netherlands East Indies and to expand their 
influence in other parts of Asia as much as possible, the Dutch considered their 
diplomatic relations with Japan to be very important. As experts in Japanese 
affairs, they felt confident that they would be able to exploit their relations with 
Japan to a wider extent. Seen against this background, it is not surprising that 
after the opening of Japan, the Netherlands attempted to pursue its economic 
interests by expanding its position on the Japanese market, with which it was 
already familiar. For example, after the opening of Japan, the Netherlands tried 
to satisfy the Japanese demands for the building of ships and sent Dutch naval 
officers for training purposes to Japan. At that time, the British plenipotentiary 
observed that ‘Since then however, it appears, that their excellencies the 
minister for the Colonies, and Foreign Affairs have become impressed with the 
necessity of pursuing a more decided course of policy towards Japan,- and they 
have now come up to the more advanced position which His Highness Majesty 
had himself adopted at the beginning of this year.’68 
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  It was most important that the Netherlands regained control of the 
economic and political administration of the Netherlands East Indies in the 
1820s. It has often been said that the Japanese trade was of little interest to the 
Netherlands and had not been so for a long time, as the profit it yielded was 
small. 69  Since 1834, the system of forced cultivation of cash crops, the 
cultuurstelsel, in the Netherlands East Indies began to produce large profits. As a 
result, Dutch shipbuilding and the shipping needed for transporting the export 
crops developed rapidly. The number of modern industrial companies in the 
Netherlands was still very low about 1850.70 In this situation, it was logical that 
new markets for the colonial products of the Netherlands East Indies would be 
looked for and that the industrialization of the Netherlands was planned and 
promoted. Against this background, it is easily understandable that at that time 
the Netherlands hoped to expand its trade with Japan, because Japan was 
geographically proximate to the Netherlands East Indies and the Dutch had had 
a long relationship with the Japanese and had held exclusive trading rights.71 
Actually, although it happened only later, after World War I, the Netherlands 
East Indies did indeed develop an important commercial relationship with 
Japan. As an example, the Netherlands East Indies had imported cotton 
exclusively from the Netherlands and Britain before 1914. After World War One, 
the Netherlands East Indies imported substantial quantities of cotton from 
Japan too. This development was made possible because Japan was situated at 
no great distance from the Netherlands East Indies, the cost of Japanese labor 
was less than that in Europe, and because by this time the quality of Japanese 
products had improved sufficiently to meet European standards.72 
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To Dutch national prestige and economic interests, Japan was clearly 
very important. However, it is important not to overlook the fact that in the 
nineteenth century the Netherlands had participated in the dividing up of Asia 
into spheres of influence of the major powers. The Netherlands, in collaboration 
with its most natural ally, Britain, with whom it shared a common interest in 
this respect, opposed the emergence of the United States as a great power in 
Asia. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States pursued 
an active policy of defending its interests in Asia. For this reason, it is necessary 
to take into consideration the Dutch-British relationship in Asia. This matter 
will be taken up in Chapters 1, 2 and 8. 
Before examining the main subject, the following should be paid 
attention to. In this introduction some questions are noted that are relevant to 
the main subject in this study, the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late 
Tokugawa era. The answers to these questions will be formulated by using 
primary sources that will be thoroughly and fully analyzed and examined. The 
focus of this study will be on Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the late 
Tokugawa era. On the basis of historical facts it appears that the unique 
Dutch-Japanese centuries-old special relationship changed and came to an end 
after the American expedition to Japan. The reason for incorporating long 
quotations from many source materials in the text is to enable the reader to 
become better acquainted with the spirit and contents of these documents. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Dutch-British relationship as ‘Lords of the East’  
－ from the examination of the Treaty of London 
 
 
In the introduction, the history of Dutch foreign policy in the nineteenth 
century was examined, and the importance and the scope of Dutch foreign 
policy, especially toward Asia, were outlined. Furthermore, relations with 
Japan were identified as crucial to the aim of the Netherlands which was to 
preserve its national prestige and economic interests. The Dutch government 
commenced the pursuit of active diplomacy toward Japan in the 1850s, that is, 
about the time of the opening of Japan and this matter is the main topic of this 
book. However, it is also possible to identify the importance to the Netherlands 
of its relations with Japan before this period. Against this background, Chapters 
1, 2, 3 and 4 will examine the history of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before 
the 1850s. When discussing the scope of activity for Dutch diplomacy towards 
Asia, British-Dutch relations are also a highly relevant factor. So far, the 
relationship between England and the Netherlands had usually been seen as 
one of confrontation, especially with regard to Asia. It is commonly understood 
that the Netherlands was under the protection of England both in Europe and 
in Asia, and that in the formulation of their foreign policy the Dutch were 
dominated by the British. Chapters 1, 2 and 8 will examine the relationship 
between the Netherlands and England in Asia. The Treaty of London, which 
was concluded at the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815), will be the focus 
of Chapters 1 and 2. This will indicate in which sense England was ‘the most 
natural ally’ of the Netherlands, and how the British and Dutch co-operated to 
maintain their position as ‘Lords of the East’ in Asia.  
In Japan, S. Shinobu and A. Saitô examined the return of the Netherlands 
East Indies by England. The history of modern Japanese foreign relations is 
provided in K. Tabohashi’s works.73 In the Netherlands, I.H.J. Hoek examined 
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this subject in the history of the restoration of the Dutch authority in its colonies 
in Asia.74 C.M. Smulders made a special analysis of the Second Treaty of 
London.75 P.H. Van der Kemp has scrutinized the London Treaties in a series of 
articles.76 N. Van Sas has investigated the history of Dutch-British relations 
from the Napoleonic Wars to the Belgian Secession on the basis of primary 
sources.77 W.A. Veenhoven’s work is also relevant in this context.78 Up to the 
present, no attempts have been made to examine how the colonial aspects in the 
Treaty of London related to Japan’s foreign relations in the late Tokugawa era. 
The elements in this treaty that are relevant to colonial affairs in East Asia 
provide a broad framework for the interpretation of the colonial and foreign 
policy of European and American powers in Asia. Although Japan, of course, 
was not a Dutch colony, it is likely that Dutch-Japanese relations were also 
influenced by the Treaty of London. 
Here the Treaty of London will be considered from the viewpoint of 
Dutch diplomatic history towards Japan. The way in which Dutch relations 
with Japan were dealt with in this treaty will be outlined, and an endeavour 
will be made to pinpoint what influence the treaty had on European and 
American foreign policy towards Japan in the late Tokugawa era. Chapter 2 will 
focus briefly on some noteworthy incidents in Dutch-Japanese relations in the 
years just prior to the arrival of Commodore Perry.  
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The Treaty of London79  
 
In 1795, the shock waves of the France Revolution resulted in the collapse of the 
Dutch Republic that had functioned for over 200 years. Stadtholder Willem V 
(Willem Batavus, 1748-1806) fled to England with his family when the Batavian 
Republic（1795-1806）was established by the Dutch Patriots and the French, who 
occupied the Netherlands at that time. Shortly after his arrival Willem V issued 
a circular letter, dated at Kew, February 7, 1795, addressed to all governors and 
administrators of the Dutch colonies in the East and West Indies, ordering them 
to surrender their territories to the British government, which had promised to 
return the colonies as soon as the French occupation of the Netherlands would 
had come to an end. After the Kingdom of the Netherlands under Louis 
Napoleon (1806-1810), the annexation of this territory by France and the 
abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was 
established after the return of the House of Orange, now under Willem VI (as 
King Willem I), in 1813. The kingdom was given formal recognition by the other 
European powers at the Congress of Vienna of Vienna in 1815. 
The Treaty of London was drawn up in two steps. An initial agreement 
was signed by Britain and the Netherlands in 1814, while the second and final 
agreement was signed in 1824. The treaty returned the former colonies in Asia, 
which had been taken over by Great Britain, to the Netherlands. Not all former 
Dutch colonies, however, were returned by the British. The Cape colony and 
the island of Ceylon stayed in English hands. ‘Legitimism’, the principle of the 
Congress of Vienna, was modified in various ways to comply with the interests 
of the European great powers. The treaty demarcated the boundaries of the 
Dutch and British colonies in Asia anew on the basis of the new power balance 
in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. In the treaty, the more important colonies 
in East Asia were an especial issue. Simultaneously, the treaty also specified the 
rights of the two countries within their colonies.  
 
  
The First Treaty of London  
                                            
79 Many facts in this chapter were quoted from the following work. Alfred Zimmermann, 
‘Die Kolonialpolitik der Niederländer’ in: Die Europäischen Kolonien, Berlin, 1903.    
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There is a famous story that, as a consequence of the French annexation of the 
Netherlands and the British occupation of the Dutch colonies, Japan was the 
only place where the Dutch national flag continued to flutter during the 
Napoleonic Wars.80 In 1813, Napoleon was sent to exile on Elba and peace 
briefly returned to Europe. As the Netherlands was re-established as an 
independent country, it was decided that following the Kew agreement its 
former colonies should be returned.81 This was regulated in 1814 by the first 
version of the Treaty of London. The British Government was prompted by 
various considerations in returning the colonies to the Netherlands. Van der 
Kemp gives the following summary: ‘The general sense of joy in England about 
the events of 1813 (the defeat of Napoleon at the battle of Leipzig); a special 
sympathy for the Prince of Orange, who was living outside his country, and his 
House, and for the hostile attitude of the Netherlands to French rule; political 
considerations of making our fatherland strong enough to act as a bulwark 
against the expansionistic tendencies of France through a union with Belgium 
and through colonial possessions; and finally the idea that showing a dignified 
self-restraint instead of territorial greed would provide an example for the other 
powers who wanted to divide Europe according to their own interests. All these 
factors filled England－in the words of Viscount Castlereagh (Robert Stewart, 
2nd Marquess of Londonderry, 1769-1822) －with an almost romantic desire to 
help our fatherland by returning the colonies.’82 
In order to acquire such a territorial expansion and to recover its colonies, 
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it was obvious that the new Kingdom of the Netherlands should maintain close 
relations with England. British support was indispensable; in other words, 
England was ‘the most natural ally’ for the Dutch king, Willem I. He recognized 
that the Anglo-Dutch alliance was central to the balance of power on the 
European continent after the Napoleonic Wars, as it defined the role of his 
country in 1814 as a bulwark against France and at the same time as ‘sentinelle 
de la Grande Bretagne sur le continent, (the sentry of Great Britain on the 
continent)’.83 Willem also wanted ‘if possible to bind the Dutch nation more 
closely forever to Great Britain’.84 
Moreover, ‘His Royal Highness [the Dutch king] admitted that the views 
which on that question [about Dutch colonies] were not only liberal, as was 
contingent upon Holland being adequately secured against France, but that 
they were just and reasonable, with a view to our own security, if they should 
fail in accomplishing this object.’85Consequently, Willem I admitted that the 
British Government had taken the initiative regarding the restoration of the 
colonies.86 England expected that effective Dutch management of the colonies 
would strengthen the economy of the Netherlands and would enable this 
nation state to participate in the balance of power in Europe. The idea of 
strengthening the Netherlands against France came from William Pitt (Pitt the 
Younger, 1759-1806) in England and this idea was confirmed in the Convention 
of 11 April 1805 in St Petersburg. The then British Foreign Secretary, 
Castlereagh, agreed with it completely and continued this policy. The 
restoration of the Netherlands as a medium great power was seen to be 
advantageous to England.87 Therefore, Castlereagh regarded the unification of 
the Netherlands and Belgium as indispensable to the Netherlands itself and to 
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Europe as a whole, but in particular to England.88  
Castlereagh therefore argued that, ‘An effectively independent and 
friendly Dutch state was important to the British in Europe, both as part of the 
balance of power, and part of the defensive outwork of Britain itself: The Dutch 
empire overseas was the price to be paid.’ He wrote in 1819 that ‘a good 
understanding is to both states more important to their general interests than 
any question of local policy…the Basis of which, on the part of the British 
Government, will be to endeavour to provide adequately for the commercial 
Rights and Interests of British Subjects, without being incidentally drawn into a 
practical struggle for Military and Political dominion in the eastern seas, with 
the Government of the Netherlands…’.89 
  Acting as the British plenipotentiary at the Anglo-Dutch negotiations 
regarding the return of the colonies was Castlereagh. The Dutch side was 
represented by the Dutch ambassador in London, Hendrik baron Fagel 
(1765-1838), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anne Willem Carel baron van 
Nagell van Ampsen (1756-1851), and the Secretary of State, Anton Reinhard 
Falck (1777-1843). Fagel was referred to as a ‘learned statesman’ and Van Nagell, 
who was stubbornly loyal to the house of Orange, was called ‘a great lord from 
Gelderland’, while Falck was called ‘a moderate calm Excellency’.90 Moreover, 
Gijsbert Karel Count van Hogendorp (1762-1824), the former Foreign Secretary 
and then Vice-President of the Council of State (Vice-president van Raad van 
Staat), took part in these negotiations. In spite of their importance to the 
Netherlands, the deliberations with Britain did not run smoothly. Although 
England held the political considerations mentioned above, it was not prepared 
to return the Dutch colonies that had a political and economic importance 
unconditionally.91 The Dutch were determined to get rid of British economic 
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dominance in their returned colonies in order to restore their power. Therefore, 
the Dutch Government wanted to enforce a protectionist commercial system. 
The British Government, however, demanded from the Dutch the same rights it 
gave to foreign traders in its own colonies.92 Castlereagh agreed that ‘with the 
exception of the Cape93, there was no indisposition to restore the whole, 
provided Holland could be rendered so effectually independent of France as to 
make it clear that we were strengthening an ally, and not an enemy.’94 It was, 
however, very undesirable for England to hand over the colonies without 
provisions that assured access for British commerce.95 Castlereagh noted that ‘I 
deemed it also advisable not to appear to limit the restitutions to be made by 
Great Britain to French possessions, least it might furnish the enemy with 
pretence, however untrue, for insinuating that we meant to keep all the Dutch 
colonies ourselves. It occurred to me after the words ‘l’intéret général de l’Europe’ 
to insert ‘et particulièrement de la Hollande’;… I thought it was expedient to have 
maintained the interests of Holland in the negotiation on the broader grounds 
of general policy, than to put them forward as a British object’.96 
It was also clear that, even if these were very important to it, England 
could not afford to control all the former Dutch colonies, as these were very 
extensive. The upshot was that the Netherlands became more important to 
England as an ally, for as long as France was seen as a threat.97 Therefore, the 
British Government had to avoid becoming seen by the Netherlands as its 
enemy. Van Nagell, considered that the negotiations ‘naturellement’ should be 
based on the Dutch colonial possessions of 1792.98 He instructed Fagel in 
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England to recover all former colonies except for the Cape colony in southern 
Africa. England did not consent. In fact, the Dutch attitude aggravated 
Castlereagh, who saw the Dutch as ungrateful, and the negotiations stalled.99 
When the negotiations were resumed a little later, they took place in an 
unfriendly atmosphere.100 Van Nagell, however, was discontented with the 
way matters were developing too, because he thought that Dutch interests were 
being harmed by the British. He then put Falck in charge of the negotiations.101 
The first version of the Treaty of London was ratified on August 13, 1814. 
It stipulated that all Dutch colonies that had existed on January 1, 1803 would 
be returned. Therefore, Ceylon, which England had occupied in 1795, remained 
British.102 In addition, although the Cape colony had been occupied by England 
only in 1806, it was also not returned ‘for our own peace’, because the British 
Government considered it to be of crucial strategic importance.103 Castlereagh 
noted that ‘the Cape is of no real commercial value to Holland, not perhaps of 
much to us. It is, however, a point in favour of which there is a prejudice which 
inclines the British Nation to attach an importance to it,’, moreover ‘that the 
Prince of Orange and his subjects would sacrifice nothing by leaving Great 
Britain to defend these colonies for the joint commercial advantage of the two 
nations,’. 104 
Dirk Count van Hogendorp (1761-1822), the elder brother of Gijsbert 
Karel van Hogendorp had served in the Government under the Napoleonic 
regime. He was appointed an adjutant of Napoleon and was created a count in 
1810. After the collapse of the Napoleonic regime, he left public life in the 
Netherlands. However, he discussed the following questions in a note: ‘What 
should be the year of the colonial restitution, 1789 or 1802?’ and ‘What can the 
Dutch lose in this matter? If the year was to be 1802, the year of the 
peace-agreement of Amiens, then Ceylon should belong to England. Then he 
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argued that Ceylon was important as an anchorage area, but that the country 
had already been a nuisance to the Netherlands in the VOC period. 
Consequently, it cost more to control it than it generated in profit. Concerning 
the Cape, he considered this settlement to be very important to England that 
regarded it as a security bulwark for its considerable Asian establishments. 
Therefore, it was also best for the security and defence of the Dutch Asian 
establishments if the British maintained this place. Hence, the Dutch should 
regard British possession of the Cape as beneficial and necessary to the security 
of Dutch establishments, as if the Dutch themselves were in charge there.105  
The treaty was concluded by a Dutch compromise, because the 
Netherlands considered it of paramount importance to establish harmonious 
relations with Britain. Van Nagell was not completely satisfied. He refused to 
sign the treaty and submitted his resignation to the king, officially declaring 
that ‘the result of the honourable negotiations by Ambassador Fagel cannot be 
soiled by my signature’. In the end, the treaty was signed not by a minister, but 
by Fagel.106 In this matter the Dutch Government compromised with England, 
because the main consideration for the Netherlands was to maintain a good 
relationship with England. Consequently the Netherlands had to accept the 
severe loss of two of its former VOC settlements.107 
 
 
Return of the Dutch colonies and its problems 
 
Cornelis Theodorus Elout (1767-1841), Godert Alexander Gerard Philip baron 
van der Capellen (1778-1848) and Herman Warner Muntinghe (1773-1827) were 
appointed Commissaries General in charge of the return of the colonies. 
Somewhat later, admiral Arnold Adriaan Buyskes (1771-1838) was appointed in 
Muntinghe’s stead. Van der Capellen was appointed to assume the office of 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. Unfortunately, before the 
Commissaries had the opportunity to depart for Asia, Napoleon returned to 
France from Elba and their departure had to be postponed, because the troops 
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and fleets assigned to accompany them had duties to perform in Europe. 
Finally, at the end of October 1815, the squadron under the command of 
admiral Buyskes carrying his fellow Commissaries General sailed for the East 
Indies. 
Upon their arrival in Java on 17 April 1816, the delegation immediately 
faced a difficult problem. The British official, John Fendall (1762-1825), who was 
in charge of the former Dutch  colonies, insisted that he had received no orders 
about  any restitution of the colonies, and he rejected the Dutch demand for 
any such handing over.108 Fendall did not receive instructions about this matter 
from the British Government until 18 June 1816. These he regarded as still 
insufficient proof, and consequently he thought that he should await 
instructions from the British East India Company as his direct supreme 
authority. After receiving instructions from Bengal on 6 July 1816, he fulfilled 
his duty to restore the colonies and decided that all British activities in the 
former Dutch colonies would be regarded as officially ended on 1 July 1816. 
The Dutch commissaries were eventually able to take over power in Batavia on 
19 Augustus 1816. 
The Dutch committee members were now confronted with a serious 
problem which had arisen through the actions of the former 
Lieutenant-Governor of British-occupied Java, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles 
(1781-1826), who was opposed to the Treaty of London.109 He nurtured an 
abiding hatred of the Dutch.110 His experience had taught him that the Dutch 
were formidable rivals in Asia. He had handed over his charge to Fendall in 
March 1816 and went back to his mother country. Raffles accentuated the 
importance of the former Dutch colonies and criticized Dutch colonial policy in 
the English newspapers. It was not the trade in products from Java that Raffles 
was primarily interested in, but its geographical position. He particularly 
pointed out the politico-commercial importance of the island and noted that 
‘France looked to Java as the point from whence her operations might be most 
successfully directed, not only against the political ascendancy of England in 
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the East, but likewise against her commercial interests both abroad and at 
home’.111 Moreover, he also insisted on the importance of Java in terms of 
Chinese trade.112 The Malacca- and Sunda Straits provided the sea-lanes for all 
shipping between China and India, and hence were very important to British 
trade with China. For these reasons, he considered it very problematical to 
return Java to the Dutch who were jealous of the English in commerce and were 
exclusivist in their thinking.113  
This exclusive Dutch attitude is often pointed out in British literature. 
‘Before its wars with France Britain had challenged the claims of the Dutch to 
monopoly, as in the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1784’ and ‘On their (Dutch) return, 
they sought to renew their treaties and contracts, and this alarmed local British 
merchants and, more significantly, made British authorities apprehensive about 
complete Dutch control of the Straits of Malacca.’114 These remarks show the 
British awareness of the strong Dutch influence in Asia. He considered it 
indispensable to England to keep hold of the territories that were now being 
returned to the Netherlands. After he returned to Benkulen on West Sumatra as 
Lieutenant-Governor in March 1818, he desperately looked for a base against 
the Dutch Asian policy. The Netherlands possessed control of both routes －the 
Sunda and Malacca Straits－ through which any vessel had to pass en route 
from South Asia to the Far East and vice versa. In a report entitled ‘Our 
Interests in the Eastern Archipelago’ addressed to the President of the Board of 
Control for India, George Canning (1770-1827), Raffles emphasized that 
England had no territory whatsoever which could be used as a base between 
                                            
111 Sophia Raffles, Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stanford Raffles, F.R.S. 
& particularly in the Government of Java, 1811-1816, and Bencoolen and its dependencies, 
1817-1824; with details of the commerce and resources of the Eastern Archipelago, and selections 
from his correspondence, London, 1830, p.22. 
112 Ibidem, p.84. The Dutch also recognized that Java was a very useful place in terms of the 
products and the Chinese trade. D.F. van Alphen aan Hogendorp, Sept. 1814, p.679. Dirk 
van Hogendorp to Falck, 18 Sept. 1814, p.684. Hogendorp to the Sovereign Prince, 13 Oct. 
1814, in: Gedenkenstukken, Vol.I, p.701. 
113 Raffles, Memoir, pp.303-304. In the Netherlands it was noticed that the possession of 
colonies was not worthwhile under the obvious British superiority. J.A. van Braal to 
the Commissarissen-Generaal, 28 Sept. 1817 in: Gedenkstukken, Vol.I, p.18 
114 Tarling, The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia, pp.26-27. 
 45 
the Cape of Good Hope and China. In addition, there was no port where water 
and food supplies were guaranteed.115 Therefore, he strongly insisted that 
securing free passage through the Malacca Straits was of fundamental 
importance to Britain's political and commercial interests. He set out to create a 
British base at the island of Singapore, even though this was contrary to the 
directions laid down by the British Government.116  
Of course, the Netherlands strongly protested to England about Raffles’ 
actions. At the beginning, the British Government was critical of Raffles because 
it considered the maintenance of a good relationship with the Netherlands in 
Europe to be of paramount importance. At one point Canning considered 
calling him home. As a result, the British Government officially distanced itself 
from his actions in the former Dutch colonies.117 Raffles’ title kept the title of  
‘Lieutenant-Governor’ in consideration of his earlier position during the 
Napoleonic Wars, but it was an honorary title and actually meant no more than 
that he was a commercial resident with no political rights.118  
Raffles, however, did not give up his attempts, but, on the contrary, ‘had 
pointed out the legal weakness of the Dutch position in the Archipelago and 
believed that the British should assure their trade and influence there by 
themselves establishing settlements and concluding treaties with the native 
princes.’ ‘Certainly by 1814 the East India Company had no real interest in the 
spice trade; nor was it now very much concerned with the Archipelago and 
with profiting from the operations of the country traders there, since Indian 
opium now substantially provided for the tea investment at Canton.’ However, 
‘The Indian Government was especially impressed with his emphasis on the 
importance of protecting the China route. Therefore he gained the authority 
under which in 1819 he concluded a treaty of friendship with the still 
independent Sultan of Aceh at one end of the Straits of Malacca and acquired 
rights to a factory on the island of Singapore at the other.’119 However, this was 
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‘originally not requested by any English Government.’120 
The Netherlands lodged a vehement protest with England decrying 
Raffles’ action.121 However even though the British East India Company made 
an attempt to do so, it was not able to put an end to his activities in Singapore. 
The Company then left it to the British Government to deal with Raffles. The 
Government subsequently declared his act a violation of his instructions and 
denied all of his actions. In spite of this decision of the British Government, the 
new settlement in Singapore proved to be as successful as Raffles had hoped. It 
quickly became clear that Singapore was both a convenient place for shipping 
and a pleasant place to live. Maintaining this base for one year would, 
according to him, cost no more than running the establishment at Benkulen for 
one month. Commerce and shipping traffic grew each day. The number of 
migrants settling in Singapore had swollen to no less than 10,000－12,000 
persons by the summer of 1820.122 These circumstances brought a change of 
heart in the British Government. In England, it was noticed that ‘the settlement 
of Singapore, lately established by Sir Stamford Raffles, being in my opinion, of 
the utmost importance both in a political and commercial point of view to the 
British empire, particularly in the event of a war with France, Holland, or 
America.’ Also, ‘If we retain the settlement of Singapore, great security will be 
afforded to our China trade in the event of war; for by possessing a naval 
station at the entrance of the China Sea, no enemy’s cruizers will ever dare to 
wait off Puloaor to intercept our ships from China.’123 At last Castlereagh 
decided to demand Singapore from the Netherlands. The Foreign Secretary 
suspected that the Netherlands intended to monopolize the Straits of Malacca 
and Sunda, and he regarded this as undesirable for British interests. Therefore, 
‘I (Castlereagh) am confident that no wise statesman would advise the King of 
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the Netherlands to embark in so hazardous and so impracticable a course of 
policy [as to take military action against the new British settlement at 
Singapore].’124 
  Namely, ‘At the outset of negotiations in 1819, Britain was clear on its 
two fundamental aims: first, to safeguard British commerce in all South-East 
Asia save the modest area (Java and the Moluccas) acknowledged as Dutch 
possessions; secondly, to retain control of the Malacca Straits route to China. 
For both reasons, Raffles’ new settlement in Singapore was valuable. Beyond 
this, however, Castlereagh sought no territorial gain, and was content for 
Holland to assert a vague political hegemony over the archipelago in order to 
exclude more dangerous powers.’125 Hence, ‘So far as the latter (local British 
interest) were concerned, the Government could not, it was decided, either 
‘acquiesce in a practical exclusion’ of British commerce from the Archipelago, or 
in complete Dutch control of the ‘keys of the Straits of Malacca’.’126 Meanwhile, 
‘It is apparent, for instance, that the normal British anxiety not to disturb the 
Dutch (plus occasional British pressure on the Dutch), the British wish to keep 
the archipelagic region free of other major powers.’127 Against this background, 
it seemed of prime importance that ‘In London, the Government had seen that 
new decisions must be taken on the Archipelago. Raffles’ schemes must be used, 
not to overthrow the Dutch empire, but to press upon the Dutch a compromise 
by which its continuance could be reconciled with local British interests.’128 
Why did the Netherlands not persist in its attempts to regain all of its 
former colonies? One of the reasons was that a problem had arisen concerning 
compensation to England for administrative expenses. According to the first 
Treaty of London, the colonies would be returned in 1814. The Netherlands, 
however, had delayed taking back control over them. Consequently, the British 
demanded compensation for managing what was now once again a Dutch 
colony. The sum demanded was high and the Dutch Government did not agree 
with certain details in the method of calculating the expenses. In order to solve 
this disagreement, the Netherlands and England convened in London in 1820 
                                            
124 Lord Castelreagh to Lord Clancarty, 13 Aug. 1819 (secret) in: Gedenkstukken, Vol.I, p.132. 
125 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, p.11. 
126 Tarling, Imperial Britain in South-East Asia, pp.16-17. 
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for a new round of negotiations.  
 
 
The Second Treaty of London  
 
The Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, and the President of the Board of Control 
for India, Canning, on the British side and the Commissioner-General, C.Th. 
Elout, and the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Anton Reinhard Falck, on the Dutch 
side participated in these talks. ‘In general terms, M. Elout disclaims any desire 
on the part of the Netherlands to set up a system of exclusion or one of 
permission as emanating from them in the Seas with in the Straits of Malacca 
and Sunda,’ and, therefore, Clancarty remarked that ‘He appears to me to be a 
fair man’.129 Fagel was ‘an intelligent person with a lively and very amiable 
character’ and exerted a great influence in England, as he had lived there for a 
long time.130 Their appointments show that the Dutch monarch hoped the 
negotiations with England would develop favorably. However, any immediate 
agreement was out of the question. The negotiations ended when Britain asked 
for the meetings to be adjourned because the Dutch refused to consider the 
British proposal that by way of compensation the Dutch would hand over 
sovereignty over Singapore instead of Billiton. Furthermore, the Netherlands 
also refused to discuss giving up the other territories demanded by the British, 
such as the island of Banka near Billiton and Fultha in Bengal. The only 
consensus reached was that the two countries would allow each other to 
conduct trade in all of their colonies and they would refrain from acquiring 
exclusive commercial rights from local sultans. The negotiations did not 
formally resume until 1823. By then, the Dutch government had recognized that 
giving up Singapore was unavoidable, and had decided that the Dutch 
establishments on the Indian Sub-Continent were also expendable. In the 
Netherlands, some advisors to the King were of the opinion that it would be 
better to exchange the British establishments in Sumatra for the former VOC 
establishments in India that were no longer of interest.131 The motive for these 
                                            
129Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh, 3 Dec. 1819 (private) in: Gedenkstukken, Vol.I, 
pp.142-143.   
130 Hoek, Het herstel, p.57. 
131 Elout to Hendrik Fagel, 29 Maart 1818 in: Gedenkstukken, Vol II, p.183. Smulders, 
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concessions was that the Dutch believed that it would not be beneficial to them, 
if their relations with England deteriorated. After Castlereagh, who had openly 
said that there was no necessity for negotiations with the Netherlands, had 
committed suicide,132 the Dutch Government achieved the resumption of the 
negotiations in London by persuading Canning, the new Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs this should be done.  
The Minister of Colonial Affairs, Falck, with his nephew, Jhr. Otto Willem 
Hora Siccama (1805-1879) as his assistant, the Dutch Ambassador in England, 
Fagel, and a captain of the Netherlands East Indies army, Cornelis Pieter Jacobs 
Elout (1795-1843), attended the conference in London in late 1823. Elout had 
been appointed a member of the delegation because Fagel and Falck had no 
detailed knowledge of colonial matters and completely lacked local 
experience.133 Initially, the idea was to bring along Elout’s father, the former 
Commissioner-General and current Minister of Finance, C.Th. Elout as 
plenipotentiary. King Willem I, however, could not manage without him at that 
time. As a compromise his son, who had served as the former adjutant to 
Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen on Java, was appointed in his 
stead.134  
The main stumbling block continued to be that Britain still demanded 
compensation for the delay in the resumption of the colonial administration by 
the Dutch. Moreover England had to make compromise too, because England 
had to consider the United States. At that time American trade in the East was 
developing. Therefore support from the Dutch was desirable. ‘In any case it was 
impossible to define the position too elaborately without arousing the jealousy 
of other powers. The situation in which we and the Dutch stand to each other is 
part only of our difficulties’, wrote George Canning, one of the 
plenipotentiaries; ‘that in which we both stand to the rest of the world as 
exclusive Lords of East, is one more reason for terminating our relative 
                                                                                                                                
Geschiedenis en Verklaring, p.19. 
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severing the carotid artery in his neck.’ Montgomery H. Hyde, The Strange Death of Lord 
Castlereagh, London, 1959, p.4. 
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difficulties as soon as we can’.135 ‘A challenge to the Dutch must be avoided, for 
it was felt that this might invite the intervention of other major powers in areas 
flanking the route to China. But too obvious and too close an agreement with 
the Dutch might provoke other powers to intervene against the two allies.’136 
This consideration led the British Government to the compromise that ‘Without 
doubt, however, it weighted the decisions in British policy once more in favour 
of the Dutch.’ Also ‘the British accepted the spice monopolies in enumerated 
Moluccan islands.’137  
Although England had initially demanded 350,000 pounds sterling, by 
way of compensation, it reduced the bill to 100,000 pounds sterling. When the 
Dutch delegation refused to accept this amount, the British once again wanted 
to suspend the negotiations.138 The Netherlands tried to solve the situation by 
proposing to sell a fixed quantity of spices to England and to open the harbours 
of Tapanuli to British shipping. Nevertheless, Minister C.Th. Elout in the 
Netherlands was apprehensive about new problems that might result from 
these proposals. Therefore, he considered that it would be better to pay what 
the British asked. After a last Dutch proposal to reduce the amount to 50,000 
pounds sterling was rejected, the Dutch Government decided to pay the 100,000 
pounds sterling.139 In this way, the second and final version of the Treaty of 
London was concluded on March 24, 1824.  
 
 
Some noteworthy aspects of the final version of the Treaty of 
London140 
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Art.1: The Dutch and British nations in their respective colonies in East Asia 
shall provide each other’s trade activities with the most-favoured-nation 
treatment.  
Art.2: The amount of export and import duty to the other party shall not exceed 
twice as much.  
Art.3: Each party shall not have a contract with a country in the East Indies 
from now on that shall inflict a loss on the other party.  
Art.5: Piracy shall be controlled on both sides.  
Art.6: The local Governmental officials etc. in East India shall not build a new 
trading post without the consent of both Governments.  
Art.7: Exceptionally the Netherlands shall be allowed to have a monopoly of the 
spice trade in the Moluccan Islands, Ambon, Banda and Ternate. 
Art.8: The Netherlands shall transfer all establishments on the continent of East 
India to England.  
Art.9: The trading post at Fort Marlborough and all British properties in 
Sumatra shall be transferred to the Netherlands. England shall not build a 
trading post or make any contracts with a local state there in the future.  
Art.12: England possesses Singapore. On the other hand, England shall not 
build trading posts or make any contracts with the local states in the Carimon 
Islands, Battam, Bintag, Lingin or any other island in the south of the Singapore 
Strait.  
Art.15: The countries concerned shall not transfer territories or possessions 
stated in the above-mentioned articles to any other third countries. If one of the 
countries concerned abandons its land or possessions, these shall be transferred 
to the other country concerned.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The Treaty of London was aimed at demarcating the sphere of influence 
between the Netherlands and England and at strengthening their positions, 
                                                                                                                                
onderhandelingen met Engeland, betreffende de overzeesche bezittingen, 1820-24, ’s Gravenhage, 
1863, pp.222-228. Also in the British records, see British and Foreign State papers 1823-1824 
Vol.XI, London.  
 52 
especially in Southeast Asia. The main premise for the negotiations that led to 
the treaty was that England should return the Dutch colonies. This was not 
approached in any ‘romantic’ way, but as a pragmatic issue that served the 
interests of both sides.141 The Netherlands regained its colonies not through 
British courtesy but out of necessity, because England needed a strong Dutch 
state as a bulwark against enemies on the European continent. The Dutch were 
regarded as a power not just in Europe but also in Asia. Raffles’ persistent 
resistance to the Dutch policy in East Asia illustrates this. 
Namely ‘It involved the recognition that the two powers’ [The 
Netherlands and Great Britain] were, in the words of George Canning, one of 
the negotiators of the treaty of 1824, ‘exclusive Lords of the East,’ but that one 
lord was greater than the other.’ Also, in the words of Indonesian nationalist 
Soetan Sjahrir: ‘For more than a hundred years no Dutch power over our 
country and our people has been a by-product of the calculations and decisions 
of British foreign policy.’142 As the Netherlands, however, strongly needed 
England as its protector on the European continent, the Dutch side had 
undeniably made greater concessions than the British. England acquired full 
control of the former VOC settlements in India and gained major access rights 
to the islands of the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, Britain benefited more 
from the Treaty of London than the Netherlands. In Britain, however, there 
were also very critical opinions about the Treaty. The Times commented that the 
British Minister was regarded as having been deceived by the Dutch. 143 
Moreover, the British repeatedly complained; England had made an irreparable 
mistake in returning Java, which it had occupied with difficulty, to the 
Netherlands.144 
Consequently ’the conflict in commercial interests between Britain and the 
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Netherlands was by no means solved by the Treaty of London of 1824. Holland, 
in desperate need of revenue, could not be expected to tolerate continued 
British commercial predominance in its own empire. Yet this could only be 
curtailed by protectionist measures which certainly infringed the spirit of the 
Treaty of London, if not always its letter.’145 Against this background, the 
matter of colonies was later called into question again. Lord Palmerston 
protested vigorously about the Dutch advance in Sumatra in 1841. ‘But the 
world had changed in twenty years. British commerce was no longer unrivalled 
in the East. France and America, soon to be followed by Germany and Italy, 
were ready to dispute the Anglo-Dutch colonial monopoly in Southeast Asia. 
The unmistakable liberal trend in Dutch commercial policy after 1848 
confirmed the view of the Foreign Office that strategic corners of the world 
were better in Dutch hands than in those of some stronger Power. Thus the 
Foreign Office gradually shifted its ground, and by 1871 it had abandoned to 
the Dutch not only the East Coast of Sumatra but Atjeh as well.’146 This was the 
Sumatra Treaty of 1871. 
  This matter shows that ‘The relationship of the ‘Lords of the East’ to 
other powers was, as Canning had seen, a factor in keeping them – at times 
disputatiously or reluctantly – together.’147  Then ‘the Netherlands was an 
independent state within the ambit of international relations: its sovereignty 
could not be easily openly abused, any more than it could be exercised with 
complete freedom. In the period up to the 1870s, these issues were not 
prominent. What that period saw was the working-out of the relationship 
dissociate by the treaty of 1824 and of its implications for the Indonesian 
peoples. The two powers were indeed ‘exclusive Lords of the East’ in another 
sense besides their relationship with other Europeans.’148 Moreover, according 
to Tamse, the Dutch thought that British support was indispensable at times of 
war in Europe; however, the Netherlands could employ autonomous 
diplomacy by agreement with the British. 149  Moreover the Netherlands 
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expected British support for the protection of Indonesia.150 The Netherlands 
now had the opportunity to pursue a more autonomous policy than it had 
originally had with British support. 
                                            
150 Tamse, Ibidem, pp.28-29. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Dutch-British relationship as ‘Lords of the East’ 
－ from an examination of Japanese affairs in the Treaty of London 
 
 
Japanese Affairs in the Treaties of London 
 
This chapter examines the alliance between the Netherlands and England in 
East Asia and pays special attention to the issues of Japan as a Dutch sphere of 
influence and the relations between the Netherlands and England at the time of 
the opening of Japan to foreign trade. Of course, the treaty could settle these 
issues only to a limited extent, and left many questions open as to how it would 
be applied in regard to other powers. However, during the late Tokugawa era, 
European countries respected the Netherlands as the mediator in dealing with 
Japan. England seemed to prefer that the Netherlands should continue to play 
this role, for the British Government recognized the difficult nature of relations 
with Japan arising from the complex nature of Japanese society.  
This was demonstrated by the Morrison incident (1837)151 and by the 
presence of the anti-British feelings in Japan which had resulted from the 
Phaeton incident (1808). This had flared up when the British ship the Phaeton 
suddenly entered Nagasaki harbour, causing an outrage and throwing the 
whole city into pandemonium. In the aftermath of this incident, the magistrate 
of Nagasaki had been forced to commit seppuku (suicide) and the domain of 
Saga, which was responsible for Nagasaki’s defence, was also punished. Ishii 
also points out the British thinking ‘which would make the Netherlands the 
mediator of negotiations for Japanese matters’.152 
 
 
                                            
151 The American ship Morrison tried to establish contact with Japan through returning 
shipwrecked Japanese sailors, but it could not even approach the Japanese coast, because it 
was immediately fired at by the Japanese.  
152 Ishii, Nihon kaikokushi, p.175. 
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The Dutch sphere of influence in Asia from the British point of 
view 
 
The main purpose of the Treaty of London was to return the Dutch colonies. 
Therefore, this section will examine various problems that occurred during the 
negotiations to resolve the relationship between the two colonial powers in Asia. 
Since England, especially the British Government of India, had noticed the 
strategic position of the Dutch colonies, it was reluctant to return them.153 
Nevertheless, political considerations induced the British Government to 
withdraw from the Dutch colonies.154 Despite this strategic move, the British 
Government was loath to give up the economic profits and political benefits 
that could be reaped from the Netherlands East Indies. Through agreements 
about the demarcation of Dutch and British colonies in the Indian archipelago, 
the two Governments attempted to maximize their countries’ ability to make 
commercial profits and to preserve their political power in the region.  
From this point of view, did the Treaty of London take into consideration 
the full extent of the former Dutch sphere of influence in Asia? By focusing on 
this question, it is possible to understand what were regarded by the British 
Government as the proper rights of the Netherlands in Asia. The expression 
used to designate East Asia in the negotiations was ‘in the Eastern seas’. 
Moreover within the two treaty texts, the expression ‘in the East Indies (in 
Oost-Indië)’ and ‘in the East Indies Archipelago (in den Oostersche Archipel)’ were 
used. These words do not define the boundary of the accepted Dutch sphere of 
influence. When Raffles criticized Dutch colonial policy in a British newspaper, 
he asserted that the Dutch had harmed the British people ‘from the Cape to 
Japan’.155 
This description of the Dutch sphere of influence in Asia included not 
only the Netherlands East Indies but also Japan. England had no option but to 
recognize that the Netherlands had a commercial relationship with Japan. On 
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this basis, it seemed possible that England might have same rights as the 
Netherlands in Japan after it opened its door to trade with other countries, 
because the Treaty of London gave England the same rights that the 
Netherlands had in Asia. 
 
 
Relevance of the Treaty of London to Dutch-Japanese relations  
 
Was Japan on the agenda of the negotiations in London? Dutch ships had been 
unable to reach Japan during the Napoleonic Wars. In that period, neutral ships 
chartered by the Dutch in Batavia, and from 1808 British ships financed trade 
with British money went to Japan. During the negotiations preceding the 1814 
version of the Treaty of London, England claimed this money back from the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands, however, counter-argued that the English had 
paid this amount of money on the condition that they receive copper from the 
Nagasaki authorities. The Dutch Government had no intention of returning the 
money. On the contrary, the factory chief of Dejima, Hendrik Doeff (1777-1835), 
who had negotiated with the British during their visit to Nagasaki, suggested 
instead to claim the money from the British Government, because the British 
side had not fulfilled its contracts with Japan to the letter.156 
This incident resulted from Raffles’ plan for a mission to Japan. Raffles 
regarded relations with Japan as important. The reason he adduced for his view 
was that ‘with regard to the present Japanese trade, it certainly is by no means 
equal to that of many neglected countries in Asia, but the principal inducement 
to make efforts for its continuance is the prospect of it being opened on a more 
extensive scale’,157 and that ‘The Peculiarity of the China trade - the monopoly 
of the tea - and the uncertainty, with which it was attended, made him (Raffles) 
desirous of opening the trade with Japan to British merchants.’ Therefore, ‘To 
establish a British Factory in Japan, and furnish a population of not less than 
twenty-five millions with the staple commodities, and with the manufactures of 
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Great Britain, was in itself a great national object’.158  He displayed great 
interest in Japanese mining, in particular with regard to the production of gold 
and silver.159 Furthermore he argued: ‘But admitting that a connection between 
Great Britain and Japan might not be attended with all the commercial profits 
which might be expected from a consideration of the productions of the two 
countries, would it not, in a political point of view, be the most essential 
importance to her interest in China, which are acknowledged by all to be so 
important?’160 Therefore, with high expectations, he had organized a mission to 
Japan for the purpose of putting Dejima under the present British authority. 
Moreover, the mission aimed at obtaining ‘every possible information of the 
nature and resources of the country (Japan) with the means of obtaining a more 
extensive and advantageous intercourse’.161 For this reason, the ships carried 
cargo for trade, but ‘if it should be found impracticable to open Commerce with 
the Japanese, to proceed to China, where, as the cargo consists in a great 
measure of articles with would be saleable in China, it should be more 
advantageous to the Public Interests to dispose of it than to return with it to 
Java.’162 Raffles employed an experienced Dutchman, Willem Wardenaar (dates 
unknown), the former trade chief/chief merchant on Dejima (1800-1803), 
because of various possible difficulties concerning the Japanese affairs. 
Wardenaar would receive his commission of 20 per cent of the profits of 
the voyage. The Bengal Government allowed this high commission for the 
reason that ‘with reference to his situation at Java and to the peculiar nature of 
his appointment, we are satisfied that the reasons which actuated you to accede 
to these terms were cogent and adequate.’163 This fact also makes clear that 
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Raffles entertained high expectations of this mission. Since he, however, 
recognized the difficulty which would confront it, he noted that ‘its importance 
and profits are so great as fully to justify the attempt’.164 He also received 
advice relevant to this mission which was carefully prepared about the 
Japanese character from a Dutchman, Van Braam (probably Jacob Andries van 
Braam, 1771-1820). For example, he advised ‘to send thither a ship that would 
hoist Dutch colours on her arrival and during her continuance at Japan’, and 
‘To command the ship there should be a captain nominally Dutch’. Therefore he 
recommended Voorman (dates unknown), ‘an able seaman and who has 
frequently been there’. Moreover, he advised that: ‘The crew should be 
composed of as large a proportion of Dutchmen as it may be found practicable 
to engage, because all the Japanese that have dealings with the Dutch speak 
their language. The English seamen going there for the first time should in 
general be mild and peaceable men, in order to obviate disputes between them 
and the Japanese which may give rise to unpleasant circumstances.’165 
The history of this mission in Japan has been recorded.166 Wardenaar, the 
former chief merchant on Dejima and a Councillor of the Indies, and Anthonie 
Abraham Cassa (dates unknown), who was to be the new trading chief in 
Dejima (1813-1814), arrived there on July 2 1813. Until that time, Doeff had been 
ignorant of the reason why no Dutch ship had appeared for four years, or what 
the purpose of this mission was. He then found out that Wardenaar had come 
from Java to claim Dejima for England, having with him a letter from Raffles to 
prove his authority. Doeff claimed that the Dutch trading post in Japan did not 
fall under the jurisdiction of the colonial administration in Java. Furthermore, 
since he had not received a report that proved that his mother country had been 
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annexed by France, he refused to carry out Raffles’ instructions. Wardenaar was 
the former trading chief in Dejima and had also been responsible for Doeff’s 
promotion to chief merchant and considered himself to be his friend. He looked 
after Doeff’s property in Batavia. At first, Wardenaar tried to persuade Doeff by 
taking advantage of their old friendship. When he realized that his attempts 
were unsuccessful, he tried to bribe Doeff with a large amount of money and 
also the storekeeper Jan Cock Blomhoff (1779-1853, who would be the next 
trading chief after Cassa) with the promise that he would be promoted to 
trading chief. In spite of his various ruses, he failed to remove Doeff from his 
post.  
Finally, Wardenaar threatened to report the political changes in Europe 
and Southeast Asia to the Japanese authorities. To this, Doeff replied that the 
Japanese fostered anti-British feelings because of the Phaeton incident. Raffles 
noted that ‘These had been very much excited by an unfortunate occurrence 
with the Phaeton frigate in 1808, in consequence of which the Governor of 
Nangasaky and five principal officers to the Prince of Tisung, who commanded 
the Imperial Guards, were ordered to rip themselves up and die, an order that 
was usually obeyed, and the Prince himself was spiked up for one hundred 
days in his house, without leave to have his beard shaved; from this cause not 
only the Prince, but many of the principal Japanese, had sworn to kill every 
Englishman that fell in their way.’167 He explained therefore that the Japanese 
were awaiting an opportunity to retaliate against the British. Doeff also 
threatened Wardenaar that he would inform the magistrate of Nagasaki that he 
had deceived the Japanese authorities by pretending to be entering the harbour 
in a Dutch ship, while his vessel had actually been dispatched by the British 
authorities in Java. No British ships were allowed to enter Japanese ports. As a 
consequence, Wardenaar was forced to beg Doeff to guarantee his party's 
safety.  
Five Ôtsûji (chief interpreters, oppertolk) who were asked by the Dutch for 
their advice judged that it was dangerous to report this fact to the magistrate of 
Nagasaki. They advised pretending the ship was a chartered American vessel. 
At that time the Dutch trading post on Dejima was 80,269 kobans (Japanese 
gold plate) in debt, because no Dutch ship had arrived there between 1810 and 
1812. The shrewd trading chief Doeff decided to make a deal with Wardenaar in 
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order to pay off this debt. The points of this arrangement are briefly mentioned 
in Doeff’s book Herinneringen uit Japan (‘Memories from Japan’) as follows: that 
these two British ships were to be regarded as regular merchant ships, therefore 
Doeff was to receive all the cargo on these ships and to sell it. The British were 
to pay all debt of the trading post in Japan from 1809 to this year (1813) using 
the proceeds of these sales, while Doeff was to deliver as much silver as 
possible to the British; and that 700 pikols of silver were to be paid to Doeff or 
his representative in Batavia as his reward for arranging this matter. 
  However, since Doeff had frustrated Raffles’ attempts to obtain Dejima, 
the latter refused to pay.168 C.Th. Elout wrote about this incident: ‘In as far as 
the problem concerns only the above-mentioned sum of money (that is, the debt 
Wardenaar had agreed to settle as part of his arrangement with Doeff), it would 
be better not to let this unpleasant problem result in potentially unpleasant 
discussions, and to leave the whole matter untouched and to abandon the 
demand’.169 He made sure that the incident did not play any further role in 
relations with Britain. Although the affair is mentioned only briefly in Elout’s 
writings, it is clear that the Netherlands did its best to avoid any reference to 
matters relating to Japan in the Treaty of London negotiations. The Dutch 
feared that Britain would demand some conditions concerning Japanese affairs, 
if the incident - which was only a minor problem - came up in the discussion. 
The Dutch trade with Japan at that time was not very flourishing, but still the 
Dutch Government did not want British influence to affect the Dutch trade 
monopoly in Japan. 
 
 
Anglo-Dutch versus American interests in Japan  
 
According to Article 1 of the second version of the Treaty of London, the Dutch 
                                            
168 Doeff thwarted Raffles’ plan for this mission to Japan in the same way of Raffles, whose 
action was against his Government policy, firstly, to take over Desima, and secondly to 
proceed to China for trade, in case the trade with Japanese was impossible. This made 
Raffles furious. After Doeff’s return home, he was decorated by his action in this event. It 
makes clear that his action was highly laudable for the Dutch, because he was the only 
person able to beat the arrogant Raffles.  
169 Elout, Bijdragen, p.25, 29. 
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and the British granted each other the right of the most favoured nation 
treatment in each other’s Asian colonies. The article confirmed the close 
relationship between the two colonial powers. Furthermore, Article 15 clearly 
shows that the two countries were allies rather than just friendly nations, 
because it stipulated that should either one abandon its territory in Asia, the 
other would inherit it.170 The British and the Dutch Governments joined forces 
in their efforts to stop the increase of potential rival countries in Asia.  
American trade with China was carried out by American private 
merchants but the American Government initially took no action to support this 
trade by official means. In 1789－1790, fourteen American ships entered the 
harbor of Canton. This is fewer than the number of British ships that visited 
Canton at the same period: twenty-one owned by the British East India 
Company plus another forty commissioned from India. The number of 
American ships is, however, high in comparison with the five Dutch and three 
Portuguese ships, and the single ship that the French and Danish each sent. 
Moreover, exports to the United States of tea, China's main export article, 
amounted to 3,093,200 pounds sterling. In this regard, the United States 
occupied second place behind Britain, which imported 17,991,032 pounds 
sterling worth of tea. In the fur trade, the Americans had already overtaken the 
British in 1795.171 In the Netherlands East Indies, American ‘trade with the 
pepper coast of Sumatra began shortly after 1790 and developed rapidly until 
by 1820 it probably equalled that of Canton in importance’. ‘The Dutch 
Government was not sympathetic to American trading activities in Java, 
however, and it attempted to restrict them by means of high import and export 
duties’.172 
Although American ships did not enter into the China trade until 1784, 
they steadily expanded their share in the trade with China.173  The most 
common explanation for the rapid trade expansion of the United States is as 
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172 Battistini, The United States and Asia, p.9.  
173 Several American ships that were chartered by the Dutch in Batavia came to Japan in 
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follows. In comparison with the European chartered companies, the American 
companies were small and flexible, and put enormous effort into keeping their 
costs down as much as possible. They had no major rivals other than the British 
East India Company. From the time when they first arrived on the scene in East 
Asia, the American traders met a positive response from their European 
counterparts. 174  Furthermore, the American merchants observed the 
regulations set by the Chinese authorities and did not call on the political 
backing from their own Government. Their actions were amicable and they 
were greeted in a friendly way by Chinese officials and merchants, who 
likewise were not interested in creating tensions in international relations.  
When British-Chinese relations deteriorated during the 1830s, the United 
States benefited from this.175 However, ‘the early American traders were at a 
disadvantage in competing with the rival traders of imperialist nations like 
Great Britain, France, Portugal and Holland, which had nearby possessions that 
could be utilized as bases of support.’176 Naturally, the United States was also 
interested in obtaining a good staging point in Asia for its Chinese trade. The 
Netherlands and England were well aware of this and tried to prevent the 
United States from establishing its influence in Aceh, which was strategically 
located for the Chinese trade.177  
In this it is possible to see the balance of power among the major Western 
nations at the time of the opening of Japan. The Chinese trade of European and 
American powers received a strong impulse after the Opium War. As a 
consequence of now being free to participate in trade with China, many foreign 
powers also focused their attention on Japan, which was near to China and a 
potentially good basis for the trade. Since the Netherlands and England had 
guaranteed each other’s interests in Asia under the Treaty of London, they, and 
probably other European counties that also respected these regulations, could 
                                            
174 American merchants were granted the privilege of participating in the Indian trade by 
England according to the British-American treaty (Jay treaty) in 1794. Battistini, The United 
States and Asia, p.8.  
175 Tabohashi, Zôtei kindai, p.269.  
176 Battistini, The United States and Asia, p.14.  
177 In the first decades American ships sailed from the American East coast to Asia. After 
the occupation of California (1848), a direct trans-pacific route was planned and the 
opening of Japan was discussed in the United States. 
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be considered a community with common interests. Van Sas also pointed out 
the Dutch-British consensus to prevent the political-economic influence of other 
foreign countries as much as possible and to protect their mutual interests to 
the east of the Cape of Good Hope through Dutch-British cooperation.178  
There existed a balance of power between the European countries and the 
United States. Concern with Japan was not very strong in British foreign policy 
at that time. The main British interests in Asia were related to India and China. 
England expected to acquire trading rights with Japan from its agreement with 
the Netherlands, if the Dutch succeeded in opening Japan up for foreign trade. 
The United States, however, was seen as a rival and did not expect to 
acquire similar rights from the Netherlands. While England recognized a Dutch 
sphere of influence that included Japan, the United States regarded Japan as an 
independent country. Although it was actually not under Dutch control, the 
United States wanted to avoid any potential Dutch interference in its attempt to 
open up Japan. Consequently, the United States chose to use force to make 
Japan accessible to foreign trade judging that Japan was still untouched by 
Western powers and suitable as a base for the Chinese trade. An additional 
reason the American Government had an interest in Japan was whaling. Many 
Americans whaling ships fished in Japanese waters and some of these ships 
were wrecked on the coast of Japan. This had come to the attention of the 
American Government.  
 The situation of the Dutch and British trade in Asia should be 
considered from this perspective. England obtained the right to remain in 
Singapore in the second draft of the Treaty of London and use it as a base for its 
Chinese trade (Art. 12). The British Government refused to tolerate the 
Netherlands monopolizing the sea lanes needed for the British China trade.179 
The final version of the Treaty of London gave England unrestricted access to 
the Straits of Malacca. Furthermore, the Treaty also eliminated the possibility of 
either country monopolizing access to its colonies (Art.3). The Netherlands had 
a stronger tendency to pursue this course and was repeatedly reminded by 
England of the treaty stipulations. The Dutch monopoly of the spice trade was 
the only exception to this rule. Apart from this, trade monopolies were banned 
by the treaty. In spite of this, the colonies were not completely open to the other 
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country. Both countries could still impose trade duties and thus maintain 
commercial predominance in their respective colonies.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
These treaty articles reveal the resolve underlying Dutch and British colonial 
policy in Asia to work together as ‘Lords of the East’.180 While protective 
measures such as tariff rates within a certain range were allowed, a policy that 
fully eliminated influence of the other side was banned. In this way, when 
Japan opened its doors to foreign countries, the Netherlands expected to gain 
privileges granted to its alliance or friendly powers. It was the expectation of 
the Dutch and British Governments that they would have no problem at all in 
coming to a mutually beneficial arrangement about the opening of Japan, since 
they already had this treaty about their joint influence in Asia. ‘In the first place, 
the British Government considered the relation with the Netherlands in the East 
to be a political issue. A political community of interest was to be a basis upon 
which a sound commercial competition could be developed. Subjects of the two 
countries would be allowed in each other’s colonies on the grounds of the most 
favoured nation treatment, and the protection of the own trade was limited to 
some degree. England thus seemed to have succeeded in creating maximum 
commercial opportunities with minimum political presence.’181  
This scenario, however, collapsed when the United States - as a newly 
emerging power that was the equal of the main European powers - wanted to 
re-structure the balance of power in Asia and shattered this arrangement. The 
United States was in a difficult situation in Asia, because it was a late-comer 
among the Western powers, and because initially it was prevented from 
establishing a base in Asia through the skilful and concerted diplomacy of the 
Netherlands and England. Then, when its trade with China and whaling 
became more important, the United States felt the necessity to protect its 
interests by looking for a base somewhere outside the Dutch or British colonies. 
Against this background, the Americans chose Japan.182 
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Chapter 3 
 
The history that preceded the opening of Japan 
 –Dutch endeavours in it 
 
 
Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before the 1850s  
 
The co-operative relationship between the Netherlands and England in Asia has 
been outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. The development of this relationship in the 
context of Japanese affairs will be explored more thoroughly in Chapter 8. In 
this chapter, the history of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before the 1850s is 
surveyed. The main source used will be the book by Jacobus Anne van der Chijs 
(1831-1905), Neêrlands streven tot openstelling van Japan voor den wereldhandel (‘The 
Dutch endeavours to open Japan to international trade’, 1867), which records 
Dutch diplomatic history in Japan in the late Tokugawa era. This is the only 
such record to have been published in the Netherlands at that time. Moreover, 
Van der Chijs’ work has also been used for another purpose.  
After the opening of Japan, the idea in Europe that the Netherlands 
intended to preserve Japan’s system of isolation for its own benefit became 
widespread. A Dutch civil servant in the Netherlands East Indies, Van der Chijs 
wrote his book on the basis of official documents in order to refute this rumour 
and to show the Dutch contribution to the modernization Japanese foreign 
policy.   With this purpose in mind, Van der Chijs set about collecting mainly 
documents that showed the Dutch contribution and sometimes did not hesitate 
to change words in documents in order to hide the real intentions of the 
Dutch. 183  Consequently, this work exclusively reproduces evidence of the 
                                                                                                                                
onwards. 
183 The following articles discuss the various problems in connection with Van der Chijs’ 
monograph: Kogure Minori, ‘A study of Dutch Diplomacy towards Japan in the late 
Tokugawa period with reference to Van der Chijs’ Neêrlands Streven (1867) in: Bulletin of The 
Japan-Netherlands Institute, Nr. 42, Tokyo, 1997, pp.79-93 and ‘How Van der Chijs wrote 
Neêrlands Streven’, with Reference to its Table of Content’s list unpublished’ in: The Yôgaku 
 67 
benevolence of the Netherlands in its policy towards Japan. Re-examining this 
book in the context of autonomous Dutch diplomacy towards Japan, however, 
will lay bare the Dutch Government’s real policy towards Japan. The two main 
topics focused on in this chapter are:   
 
1. The sending of an official Dutch letter to announce the accession of Willem 
II to the throne and the accompanying presents, and  
2. The sending of a second Dutch letter, written by King Willem II of the 
Netherlands.  
 
An examination of these topics will reveal that the Netherlands dealt skilfully 
with its relations with Japan and considered these to be very important. The 
scope of the initiatives which the Netherlands would and could take in 
Japanese affairs after the opening of Japan will be demonstrated.  
 
 
The repudiation of the letter to announce the accession to the 
throne of King Willem II and the accompanying presents  
 
In 1840 Willem II became king of the Netherlands. The Dutch trading chief in 
Deshima, Pieter Albert Bik (1798-1855), was instructed to deliver personally a 
letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, Pieter Merkus 
(1787-1844), to announce this and hand over some presents when he went to 
Edo.184 He transmitted this matter to the magistrate of Nagasaki. Initially, the 
magistrate assumed that the offer would be accepted. However, he then 
received a letter from the Councillor of the Tokugawa shogunate, Mizuno 
Tadakuni (水野忠邦 Prince of Echizen, daimyô of Hamamatsu domain, 
1794-1851), stating that the letter and the gifts could not be accepted because 
                                                                                                                                
Annals of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan, Nr.8, Tokyo, 1999, pp.95-113 
and ‘An aspect of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in late Tokugawa era, with Reference to 
the handwriting of Neêrlands Streven in: Bulletin of Tsuyama Yôgaku Museum (Itteki - Annals 
of the Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan), Nr. 8, Okayama, 2000, 
pp.65-84. 
184 This is a so-called Hofreis (Sanpu). The Dutch in Japan had to pay their respects to 
shogun in Edo with gifts, because of their trade.  
 68 
Japan could not communicate with any foreign countries except Korea and the 
Ryûkyû. The magistrate communicated this to the Dutch.185 
The Dutch reaction to this was noteworthy. The Dutch Government 
considered military sanctions against Japan and the withdrawal of the trading 
post from Deshima in retaliation for the ill-mannered refusal. Yet, despite these 
Dutch intentions, ‘various serious reasons prevented the Government from 
immediately and forcefully demanding an apology for the impolite treatment 
suffered by the Japanese. The financial crisis in the mother country made an 
expensive war with Japan, which would undoubtedly have been the 
consequence of such an approach, very undesirable.’ Therefore, no military 
sanctions were taken. Moreover, ‘the abandonment of Deshima also raised 
specific objections, because by this action we would have lost all in Japan and 
obtained nothing. The blemished honour of the nation would not have been 
restored by this, and if the Japanese Government really desired to maintain 
relations with any European nation, we would before long be replaced by 
another country.’186 Consequently, the idea of withdrawing the trading post 
also had to be given up. Furthermore, Van der Chijs gave another reason the 
Netherlands should maintain its relations with Japan. ‘Because of a lack of 
means to use force to make the Japanese Government acknowledge and 
compensate for its faults, we had to use peaceful methods to draw attention to 
the offence to us.’187  
At the time of the opening of Japan, other powers forced the Japanese 
Government to open the country to foreign trade by using or displaying 
military force in order to obtain a treaty. The Dutch emphasized that they had 
negotiated without using military force and that they contributed to the 
opening of Japan at that time. The above, however, exposes the fact that the 
Dutch also considered using force. It also shows that Japan was important to 
them, both politically and economically. This was the reason that the 
Netherlands had maintained the difficult relationship with the - in their eyes - 
stubborn Japanese for such a long time. In spite of the unpleasant incident of 
the refusal to accept to the Dutch letter and gifts, the Dutch Government did not 
sever its relations with Japan.  
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The Dutch King’s letter188  
 
The Japanese authorities realized that they had to reconsider the position of 
their country in international relations in the aftermath of the First Opium War 
(1839-42). Hence, in 1842 Japan amended its laws in order to limit the risks that 
might result from the system of national isolation, the so-called Sakoku. 
Concretely, this 1842 amendment restored the former law of 1806, known as the 
Shinsui Kyûyo Rei, ‘the law on supplying firewood and water’. This law allowed 
that firewood, water, and such necessaries should be supplied to foreign ships 
in trouble that managed to reach the Japanese coast. At that same time, the strict 
law of 1825, the Muninen Uchiharai Rei, ‘the law of repelling without two minds’ 
(‘without two minds’ meaning ‘unhesitatingly) was rescinded. This law made it 
compulsory to fire without hesitation at foreign ships wanting to enter Japan, 
with the exception of Chinese and Dutch vessels. This is irrefutable evidence 
that after the First Opium War Japan still wanted to maintain its policy of 
isolation. The amendment still did not allow foreign ships to be admitted to 
Japan. The Japanese Government asked the trading chief on Deshima to 
transmit this amendment to other countries. The trading chief requested that 
the Government of the Netherlands East Indies instruct him how to deal with 
this matter.  
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This letter from the trading chief was handed to the director of Products 
and Civil Supplies (Direkteur van Produkten en Civiele Magazijn), J.D. Kruseman 
(1794-1861). Kruseman decided to exploit this difficult situation in Japan for the 
purpose of acquiring commercial privileges. Therefore, he advised the 
Governor-General, Merkus, to send a special mission to Japan and make 
demands from them under pressure of the threat that the Netherlands would 
break off its relationship with Japan, if Japan could not grant them. Merkus 
could not agree to this proposal from Kruseman. He worried about the possible 
danger to this mission that wanted acquire Dutch commercial advantages. It 
was possible that Japan might grant privileges to the Netherlands in exchange 
for its support in the case of a British attack on Japan. In this case, the 
Netherlands could not turn it down, and this would mean that it could not 
maintain its neutrality. Also, Merkus thought that England would care nothing 
for Dutch interests in Japan or for the relationship between the Netherlands and 
Japan. Consequently, it seemed possible that England would establish an 
advantageous position in Japan, if the Netherlands maintained its neutrality in 
a collision between England and Japan. On the other hand, Merkus also foresaw 
that Japan could not maintain this policy over a long period. In his opinion, 
Dutch trade with Japan was not yet sufficiently profitable, but it would be 
possible to expand the Japanese market for Dutch products after Japan had 
been opened, even if England also entered this market as a competitor. He 
decided to draw the attention of the Japanese Government to this matter by 
political means. Merkus advised the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Jean Chrétien 
baron Baud (1789-1859), to dispatch an envoy to Japan.189 Kruseman again 
proposed the dismantling of the trading post from Deshima, a ploy which the 
former trading chiefs had used repeatedly. The Governor-General, however, 
did not agree to it, because of the profit reaped from the Japanese trade, an 
average of fl. 120,000 in 1823-1832, and of fl. 250,000 in 1833-1837.190 This is a 
clear-cut clue that the Netherlands maintained Deshima for economic reasons. 
However, Van der Chijs stressed that Japanese affairs were more politically 
than economically important to the Netherlands, and it continued to strive to 
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make its unselfish contribution to the opening of Japan. This is a good 
indication of the nature of his book. 
Baud believed that the Japanese Government’s request to extend the 
amendment of 1842 to other countries should not be granted for the time being. 
However, another reason for sending an envoy was that Minister Baud had 
decided not to inform other countries of the Japanese legal amendment of 1842, 
even though Japan had requested this. According to Baud, ’this decree might be 
considered by other nations to be a strong message to announce the abolition of 
the isolation system in the near future, and encourage them to send trade 
missions to Japan immediately. Nevertheless, the admission of the other 
countries was probably not what was intended by the Japanese Government. 
The appearance of such missions would provoke conflicts and troubles, from 
which the Dutch Government wished to shield Japan. Before the Japanese 
Government was formally warned by the Dutch mission and before a guarantee 
that the Japanese were willing to listen to such a warning was obtained, we 
should refrain from taking steps that might provoke premature trade missions 
to the Japanese coast.’191 Therefore, he proposed this mission to the king.  
Willem II, who had a reputation for enjoying luxury and fine objects, was 
not the person to refuse this kind of mission and he agreed to send the envoy. 
Major-General Charles baron Nepveu (1791-1871) was instructed to convey a 
letter written by the king accompanied by some presents to the shogun. This 
plan shows how the Netherlands procured its ‘national prestige and economic 
interests’ in this mission. The Netherlands recognized that the Japanese 
Government had a very high opinion of the information passed on to it in the 
‘separate news’, therefore it could inform the Japanese of this matter in the 
conventional way, which they would highly appreciate. The real significance of 
the mission, however, was that the Dutch would convey the king’s letter and 
gifts to the shogun, and in doing so warn him of the danger. Therefore this 
mission to Japan ‘not only meant exacting sweet revenge on the British, it also 
polished up Dutch pride and prestige in Europe.’192 Moreover, this mission 
was also to deal with the long-pending problems of investigating defences in 
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 72 
Java and making a plan for their improvement.193 According to Van der Chijs, 
‘the purpose of this letter was to act completely without self-interest – without 
having such hidden aims as using the occasion to obtain new benefits for the 
Netherlands, or to prolong in any way the existing privileges, or to pay 
attention to any possible consequences for the Netherlands – and to open the 
eyes of the Japanese Government, out of gratitude for the exclusive hospitality 
given to the Netherlands, to the political restructuring which was about to take 
place in regions around Japan, as well as to the dangers to which Japan exposed 
itself by persisting in maintaining a system of seclusion and denying access to 
any foreign ships (apart from Dutch or Chinese) that reach the Japanese coast – 
a practice that runs counter to the European ideas of international law.’194 To 
make sure that the mission would succeed, Philipp Franz von Siebold, who was 
the leading authority on Japanese matters, was ordered to make preparations to 
ensure that the letter would be well received in Japan.195 Von Siebold accepted 
this mission and put forward some suggestions about suitable presents to be 
taken to Japan.196 After that, the instruction regarding this mission was sent to 
the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.197 The Ministry also 
consulted the former trading chief, Johannes Edewin Nieman (1796-1850) and 
the former Dutch ambassador in Constantinople, Baron Van Zuijlen van Nievelt 
(dates unknown) about this matter. The latter offered particular advice about 
the protocol that European ambassadors observed in Eastern countries.198 
The sending of this letter was kept strictly secret, because ‘if the Japanese 
in some way or another were to have gained more or less complete knowledge 
of the aims and intentions of the mission, then it would not have been out of the 
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question that the Japanese Government –which would be greatly interested in 
the aim and intentions of this mission– would have refrained from receiving the 
mission for reasons that admittedly would be reasonable – for instance, by 
pointing out the dangerous precedent that accepting the mission would create 
for Japan, if representatives from other nations were later to follow in its 
footsteps. Therefore, all that was related to the plan of Minister Baud had to be 
dealt with in such a manner that no hint of its real purpose would be known, in 
order to create a reasonable chance that the curiosity of the Japanese would 
overcome their characteristic behaviour exhibiting caution and inhibition.’199 
As a result, even the trading chief in Deshima did not know about the purpose 
of the mission until he received the letter. Nepveu indicated he wished to be 
excused from his task and was subsequently dismissed.  
The reason for Nepveu’s dismissal was that he regarded the military 
investigation in Java as a secondary issue and the special mission to Japan as 
the main purpose; moreover he demanded excessive expenses for carrying out 
this mission. As a result, the German officer, Friedrich Balduin Ludwig Freiherr 
von Gagern (1794-1848) was appointed. However this mission was also called 
off. This was because it could not be delayed and to send a mission only to 
Japan from the Netherlands would be a burdensome expense.200 The mission 
was also hindered in other ways. After Nepveu’s dismissal, it was decided that 
the trading chief in Deshima should present the king’s letter to shogun. Because 
the letter of the Governor-General about Willem II’s accession and the 
accompanying presents had previously been refused, the Dutch Government 
now considered the possibility that the king’s letter would likewise be 
repudiated. Directions to the trading chief to prevent this were drafted in the 
Netherlands East Indies. Then Governor-General Merkus gave the trading chief, 
Bik, in Deshima instructions, based on the draft of the instruction written by the 
                                            
199 Van der Chijs, Neêrlands streven, pp.21-22. NA Koloniën no.4297, 7 Januari 1844 N.23/A, 
Geheim. 
200 Jacobs, ‘Met alleen woorden als wapen’, p.67. NA Kabinet des Koning no. 4164, 15 
January 1844 on 22 January 1844 M2 (exh.). After that, the Minister of Colonial Affairs 
reported this matter to the Governor-General. NA Koloniën no. 4297, 20 January 1844 
N.50/C. Documents that mention this high expenditure, are NA Koloniën no.4295, 1 
December 1843 N.512, Geheim. NA Koloniën no.4296, 27 December 1843 N.567/W1, Zeer 
Geheim.  
 74 
Dutch Government. Merkus emphasized that ‘if the Japanese were to ask him 
about the reason for and the purpose of the king’s letter, he should reply as 
concisely and plainly as possible that all that he knew about this letter had 
already been reported to the Japanese in the separate news, and that only this 
letter itself could give them the complete information they wanted; [moreover] 
that he had been informed that the king’s letter had no relation whatsoever to 
the Dutch trade in Japan; [and] that the letter related exclusively to Japan’s 
interests and that it was of the utmost importance to these.’201By adopting this 
tactic, the Dutch hoped to stimulate the curiosity of the Japanese.  
At last, the HM Steamship Bromo arrived in Batavia carrying seventeen 
boxes containing the king’s letter and the presents for the shogun. These were 
then trans-shipped to the warship Palembang, which left Batavia on 21 July 1844. 
Since the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Baud, expected that the time needed for 
the trans-shipment would be short, he had already prepared directions for the 
commander, H.H.F. Coops (dates unknown), and the trading chief, Bik, in the 
Netherlands. In the Netherlands East Indies, these directions were slightly 
altered. The main amendment was that not the trading chief but the naval 
commander should hand over the letter to the Japanese, because the Japanese 
respected military men, but not merchants. In his directions, the Minister 
instructed the commander to make sure that the difference between his warship 
and the usual merchant vessel would be obvious to the Japanese so that they 
would recognize that this mission arrived for a special matter. Should the 
Japanese Government object to the mission, then the commander and his crew 
were to wait on board until the objection had been resolved. In this manner, the 
Dutch would show that they were no ordinary merchants. Firm decisions and 
skilful diplomacy were needed to fulfill this mission. 
The merchant vessel Stad Thiel arrived in Deshima before the warship on 
29 July 1844. Bik, received his first instructions regarding the mission with the 
king’s letter from its crew. In this way, Bik was informed about the character 
and purpose of the mission, and he initiated negotiations with the magistrate of 
Nagasaki about this matter.202 After he had expended considerable time and 
effort, the magistrate agreed to receive the letter from Willem II. The letter was 
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delivered under a strong guard. After the warship had arrived, the Dutch 
delegation went to the magistrate’s office in Nagasaki, helping to create an 
impression with a brass band. After having accepted the letter, the magistrate 
declared that it would be sent to Edo and that the next step in the procedure 
was to wait for a response. After the ceremony, Bik stated his gratitude for the 
magistrate’s efforts. In reply to Bik’s words, the magistrate expressed his 
satisfaction. Unlike what usually happened, communications between the 
Dutch and the magistrate were carried out not through secretaries of the 
magistrate’s office and translators, but through translators only. The Dutch 
believed that ‘this distinction was as a result of the respect which the Japanese 
had for the important object [the letter] that was addressed to the emperor. The 
magistrate acknowledged the great importance of the king’s letter by the way in 
which he received it. Any Japanese customs that could have caused difficulties 
[for the hand-over procedure] were removed by him.’203  
Having handed over the king’s letter, Commander Coops, according to 
his instructions, gave Bik an envelope with a copy of the king’s letter and 
additional secret instructions. In this letter the king warned Japan that its 
system of national isolation might bring it into conflict with England. The king 
stated that he had been motivated to give this warning by the old friendship 
existing between the Netherlands and Japan.204 He also informed the shogun 
that the Netherlands was ready to send a reliable person, if he wanted to know 
about these important matters in greater detail. The letter of the king was 
significant with regard to the Dutch policy towards Japan, as were the 
additional secret instructions given the trading chief. These contained four 
directions.  
1. The trading chief should refrain from taking the initiative in matters relating 
to the political future of Japan. 
2. He should indicate to the Japanese that a capable person of high status - as 
referred to in the king’s letter - would be sent from the Netherlands, should 
Japan ask for this. 
3. He was to advise the Japanese Government that it would not to be able to 
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maintain its system of national isolation and that it would be wise to adopt a 
peaceful and friendly policy, if it wanted to avoid a collision with foreign 
powers. 
4. He was to refrain from using the present situation to obtain commercial 
privileges for the Dutch because, unlike privileges granted voluntarily, those 
obtained under pressure would not last very long.205 
The king’s letter and the additional secret instructions for Bik are 
undoubted proof that the Dutch had learned much from their relations with 
Japan in the previous 200 years. They also reveal how important the Dutch 
Government considered the matter to be. Although the trading chief, Bik, 
succeeded in obtaining permission for Coops to deliver the king’s letter, 
considerable time passed and difficulties had to be met before he received the 
formal reply.206 In its reply, the Japanese Government showed no intention of 
changing the Japanese system of isolation or improving trade relations with 
foreign nations. 
This reply was very cold, because the Japanese Government expected that 
this reply would be transmitted to the other Western powers. Therefore it had 
to reply to the Netherlands politely yet coldly.207 None the less, the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs expressed his satisfaction with the situation to King Willem II: 
‘The Netherlands has done its duty of warning Japan, out of gratitude for the 
monopoly enjoyed by the Dutch flag during [the past] two centuries. That the 
Japanese Government was utterly sensitive to the importance and generosity of 
Your Majesty’s actions can be witnessed from these words [in the reply on 
behalf of the Shogun of Japan]: He (the king of the Netherlands) has shown a 
unique and noble benevolence. Our Lord, who is benefiting fully from it, is 
deeply moved by his recognition of these motives.’208 Van der Chijs also noted 
that the Japanese response was friendlier than that received by the Russians 
                                            
205 Van der Chijs, Neêrlands streven, p.53. NA Koloniën no.4299, 4 Maart 1844 N.133, 
Geheim. 
206 This is explained in detail in Tabohashi, Zôtei kindai, p.353 and also see Conrad Totman, 
Early Modern Japan, London, 1993, pp.532-533. 
207 Mitani Hiroshi, Meijiishin to nationalism, Yamakawa shuppansya, 1997, pp.86-89. 
208 Van der Chijs, Neêrlands streven, p.65. NA Koloniën no.4324, 21 Mei 1846 L.A N.142, 
Geheim. 
 77 
who had sent a mission in 1804.209  
Concerning this incident, Von Siebold replied to Baud that it was a great 
success, because it reconfirmed with an unprecedented honour that only the 
Netherlands could trade with Japan, although this was never achieved.210 Baud, 
however, seemed disappointed with this Japanese reply. Therefore, Jacobs 
concluded that ‘the mission had failed. The Netherlands failed to obtain 
commercial privileges and boost its prestige. None the less, although it could 
not ‘take the wind out’ of the British sails, the Government fulfilled its duty and 
this mission made an impression on Japan.211 In this affair the Netherlands had 
aspired to seize the chance to establish its firm position and to improve its trade 
in Japan through exploiting the British menace. Namely it wanted to ‘take the 
wind out of the British sails’ in its Asian affairs. 
  Beasley pointed out that this British menace used by the Netherlands 
was ill founded. He states, ‘Thus in the years immediately following the Opium 
War, the Japanese became convinced that Britain was preparing aggressive 
action against Japan. The same opinion was current in some parts of Europe. 
British records of the period, however, provide no evidence of any sudden 
development of interest in that country.’212 Moreover ‘The Opium War had not 
produced as marked an effect in England as it had in Japan, but it had at least 
made large sections of the British public aware of the affairs of China for the 
first time.’213 
According to Beasley, ’It was, indeed, far more the age of Manchester 
than of morals in politics. And there were some who objected to political action 
in China, still more to the use of force, on the grounds that such action could 
only cause a disruption and diminution of trade.’214 He added: ‘A Foreign 
Secretary contemplating negotiations in Japan might well anticipate the same 
kind of criticism at home, if his actions seemed to depend on the use or threat of 
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force. Moreover the problem of China and that of Japan differed markedly in 
one particular. The influence of the ‘old China hands’ on the China coast itself – 
the point at which action had to be taken – and the willingness of the 
Government to endorse, or at least accept, the actions of its representatives 
there, ensured that the threat to China remained in being for a time. There was 
no equivalent pressure behind proposals for opening trade with Japan.’215 
Finally , ‘In so far as action depended on merchant opinion, indeed, the Opium 
War, by concentrating attention more than ever on the China trade, had 
reduced rather than increased the possibility that Britain would use force to 
secure the opening of Japan.... Admittedly, a clash between British merchants 
and Japanese officials would probably have led to Government intervention if 
the merchants were not obviously in the wrong. Even so, the danger was 
relatively slight.’216 
Various opinions exist about this incident. Jacobs concluded that in view 
of the disappointment of Baud the Netherlands did not succeed in this 
incident.217 Nagazumi Yoko emphasized the success the Dutch did achieve in 
it.218 Matsukata Fuyuko has explored this disagreement. 219 Her conclusion is 
that it was partly successful and partly not, but she argues this from a different 
point of view, saying: ‘I do not think that the king or the Minister of Colonies 
expected that the letter could expand the Dutch trade with Japan and allow 
Holland to acquire benefits from expanded commerce with Japan. Therefore, 
they probably were not disappointed that the letter did not lead directly to a 
greater opening of Japanese contacts with the outside world. For this reason, I 
do not think that Willem II’s letter was simply intended to offer advice to 
Bakufu leaders about the opening the country.’  
The Netherlands could not easily send a warship to Japan, because of the 
Netherlands East Indies' eternal lack of sufficient warships. Moreover, this kind 
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of activity involved enormous costs. Therefore, the Netherlands would not have 
been able to undertake this kind of activity without expectations that it could 
gain some political or economic benefits. Moreover, this Dutch diplomacy was 
of little use for what happened subsequently in Japan’s foreign relations, 
especially the event of Perry’s arrival in Japan in 1853. The Netherlands wanted 
to use its diplomacy in 1844 in order to refute America’s insistence at the time 
that the Netherlands intended to preserve Japan’s system of isolation for its 
own benefit. But this goal was not reached. From these considerations, this 
incident was a diplomatic failure. 
Although Beasley pointed out that there was little possibility that England 
would have used military force, he admitted that relations with Japan gained 
prominence: ‘Although the Opium War did not immediately raise the question 
of Japanese seclusion for British statesmen, it was out of the aftermath of that 
war that there arose the first official plans for opening trade relations with 
Japan, the first plans, that is, in which the Foreign Office accepted the idea of 
active intervention.’ 220 Moreover ‘Directly and indirectly, references to Japan 
were becoming quite common, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it should 
have occurred to Davis [Sir John Davis 1787-1854] that an attempt might be 
made to open communication with that country.’221  
On this point Beasley and scholars who believe in the Manchester 
Principle are at odds. According to the Manchester Principle, military force 
should be used only if commerce was interrupted. This is the theory of 
Robinson and Gallagher, ‘By informal means if possible, or by formal 
annexations when necessary’.222 England would use military force if Japan 
stubbornly rejected the conclusion of a commercial treaty. If the Netherlands 
had recognized this British policy and it had advised Japan to open its country, 
the criticism of the Netherlands by Beasley is unfounded. 
  
 
Conclusion 
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This chapter has made clear that the Dutch government dealt skilfully with the 
difficult Japanese relations and that, while assessing the international situation, 
it attempted to maintain or even expand its interests in Japan by using the 
knowledge about Japan that had been gathered in the past centuries. In spite of 
various difficulties, the Netherlands insisted on continuing its relationship with 
Japan. Still, so far Dutch diplomacy towards Japan has mostly been regarded as 
a passive policy.223 The facts show that in fact Japan was very important. 
Relations with Japan were essential to the Netherlands because of the 
Netherlands East Indies and its ‘national prestige and economic interests’. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Dutch and American Diplomacy towards Japan 
 Before the Opening 
  
 
American diplomacy toward Asia until its Japanese expedition  
 
The American advance into Asia occurred relatively late. Since steam shipping 
was expensive, by the middle of the nineteenth century sailing ships were still 
mainly used in maritime commerce. Most American sailing ships headed for 
the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope and proceeded from there either 
to India or via the Indonesian archipelago to China. The Pacific Ocean remained 
for a long time the realm of American whalers who spent years on end catching 
whales and distilling whale oil. These ships sailed as far north as Alaska and 
the Aleutian islands and occasionally sought provisions and fresh waters in 
Japan’s northernmost islands.  
In his novel Moby Dick Herman Melville described the whaling, business 
in detail. The first American is said to have killed a whale in the Pacific in 1788. 
By the 1820s, when the whale population in the Atlantic was already showing 
signs of depletion, there were five established whaling grounds in the Pacific, 
and one of them, soon to be the most productive, was ‘on Japan’, as the whalers 
said. Whaling became a multi-million-dollar business, a major component of the 
American economy. Melville, in his exhaustive description of the industry, 
estimated that the United States, with the largest whaling industry in the world, 
employed 18,000 men aboard 700 ships that reaped a harvest of $7 million 
annually.224Gradually, American shipping was making its mark in the world.225  
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In 1848 the United States acquired California. Soon after, San Francisco 
grew very prosperous thanks to the discovery of gold. This development put 
the United States in a good position to open up new business opportunities in 
the Pacific Ocean and in the Far East. Because railways still had to be built and 
overland traffic was cumbersome and slow, the communications between the 
east and west coast still depended on the sea link. Originally  between 143 and 
267 days were required to sail the distance between New York and San 
Francisco (via Cape Horn), but the genial engineer Donald McKay (1810-1880) 
designed a clippership, the Stag Hound, that sailed the distance in 110 days on 
its maiden voyage. Later on his master work, the ship Flying Cloud, needed only 
89 days.   
A plan for trans-Pacific steam shipping between Shanghai and San 
Francisco was devised in order to improve American trade with China. In this 
project Japan was to play an important role with regard to the coal supplies 
needed by the steamships, even though at this time Japan was not open to 
foreign countries. Also with regard to trade and, moreover, to protecting 
American whaling ships, Japan was assuming greater importance for the 
United States.226 Soon after taking possession of California, on 4 May 1848, 
Thomas Butler King (1800-1864), member of the House of Representatives and 
chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted a report that 
advised the establishment of a steamship route from the Pacific coast of the 
United States to Shanghai and Guangdong.227 
Steamships at this time worked on a one-cylinder system, which 
produced limited power. Therefore, ships consumed a large quantity of coal. If 
a ship had no port of call on a long voyage, it could not carry much cargo, 
because a lot of room had to be reserved for coal. The Japanese archipelago was 
perfectly situated to supply coal to American steamships en route to and from 
China.228 In a report to the governor of Hongkong, the well known German 
missionary Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803-1851), portrayed Cochin China, 
Siam, Korea and Japan as independent countries. He pointed out that since 
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Japan and Siam maintained only minimal political relations with China, there 
was a very good possibility to begin trade and conclude a treaty with these two 
countries.229 Hence, it seemed obvious that Japan would provide the best ports 
of call for the supply of necessities such as water and coal. 
  In January 1849 an American whaling ship, the Lagoda, drifted ashore at 
Matsumae (a place in Hokkaido). As a result of the Japanese treatment of the 
sailors, the so-called ‘Lagoda Incident’ triggered a discussion on humanitarian 
grounds in the United States, where it was regarded as a serious problem and 
received a lot of attention. Japan’s policy of seclusion was heavily criticized in 
American public opinion. 230  The Lagoda Incident prompted an American 
expedition to Japan.231 According to Wiley, ‘Fifteen sailors from the whaler 
‘Lagoda’ out of New Bedford had decided that they could no longer take the 
harsh treatment of their captain. The mutineers, who ranged in age from 
nineteen to forty, included the first and second mates and thirteen seamen, nine 
of whom were Hawaiians.’232  
  Moreover, Wiley points out the importance of whaling in the Japanese 
seas at that time. The Lagoda turned a ninety-eight percent profit on six voyages 
between 1841 and 1860, including the one during which its men mutinied. In 
1846, out of the 945 American vessels that sailed the Pacific, 736 were whalers. 
Whaling, Melville argued with remarkable prescience, would inevitably bring 
the United States to Japan: ‘If that double-bolted land, Japan, is ever to become 
hospitable, it is the whale-ship alone to whom the credit will be due; for already 
she is on the threshold.’ 233 
  Furthermore, Wiley explains the reason the Americans needed Japan at 
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that time. ‘Though the new clipper ships dashed around Cape Horn, other 
American merchant and naval vessels still preferred to reach the Orient by way 
of the Cape of Good Hope, which was a less hazardous route. But this route 
took one along the southern reaches of the British Empire. British-controlled 
ports such as Cape Town, Aden, Trincomalee, and Singapore only reminded 
brashly nationalistic Americans of their decidedly junior status in the world of 
global power politics. Now the Americans were looking for new routes, via 
Panama and Nicaragua and across the continent, to their recently-acquired 
territory on the West Coast and on to the tantalizing markets of China and the 
whaling grounds of the Pacific Basin. Japan would eventually figure in their 
ambitions.’234  
This circumstance was related to the plan for ‘the route to be taken across 
the Pacific. The United States would have to build fuel depots at ports along the 
route across the Pacific to provide coal for the steamers, since they gobbled up 
fuel at the rate of more than a ton an hour. Hawaii was the first logical place for 
a fuel depot…To go by a more northern route would take the steamers into 
fog-bound areas that would be dangerous to navigate and uncomfortable for 
passengers – like ‘the disagreeable atmosphere’ for which San Francisco was so 
notorious. This left only one logical stopover place: ‘the island of Nipshon [sic] 
(in Japan) lies directly on the line from San Francisco to Shanghai.’235 Against 
this background, ‘Glynn’s reports of the ill treatment of the ‘Lagoda’ crew had 
reached Washington some time during 1850. In response, both houses of 
Congress introduced resolutions calling on the executive branch to provide 
information about what was happening in Japan.’236 
  In the wake of the Lagoda Incident, mounting an expedition to Japan 
was seriously discussed in the United States. ‘In late January 1851, Perry wrote 
privately to Graham laying out his preliminary ideas about a strategy for 
dealing with the Japanese.  ‘The real object of the expedition,’ he explained, 
‘should be concealed from public view, under a general understanding, that its 
main purpose will be to examine the usual resorts of our whaling ships, with 
special reference to their protection, and the opening to them of new ports of 
refuge and refreshment.’ Perry described Nagasaki as the only port at which 
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foreign vessels were admitted, but noted that the Dutch “though their 
intrigues” had enough influence to frustrate any other nation’s attempts to 
enter into negotiations there. For this reason he proposed selecting as a 
destination for an expedition one or two ports at the other end of the country, 
but within communicating distance from Edo, such as Matsumae, Hakodate or 
both.’237 After all, ‘By virtue of its history and its seaboard, the United States 
was destined, however, to become an ocean-going commercial power in a 
world of European empires that boasted great navies.’238 
Against this background, given the commercial circumstances of the 
United States in that period, it was thought that the United States would 
dispatch an ambassador to the countries of north-eastern Asia, especially to 
Japan, in the near future. Moreover, the Dutch Minister-Plenipotentiary in 
Washington, F.M.W. baron Testa (1806-1882) reported that the name of Aaron 
Haight Palmer (1779-1863)239 was mentioned as a suitable person to lead this 
expedition, when major trading companies in Baltimore submitted a petition 
which appealed to the President to start immediate diplomatic and commercial 
ties with the independent countries in East Asia.240 John Middleton Clayton 
(1796-1856) described Palmer as ‘entitled to more credit for getting up the Japan 
Expedition than any other man I know of.’241 
These reports on the opinions of the American commercial world show 
that the American intentions behind a Japanese expedition were not primarily 
the spread of Christianity. In March 1851, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
sent a copy of a report that had been written by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy 
to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. It had been attached to the message of 
President Millard Fillmore (1800-1874) and outlined the policy of the U.S. navy 
in the Far East. This policy aimed at the protection and expansion of American 
commercial interests in East Asia and at the security of the American Pacific 
Coast. Although the American expedition to Japan was not yet sure, the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew the attention of the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs to the fact that this plan for an expedition to Japan was not lost sight of 
in the United States.242 
The United States' plans for its new sea routes took into account the 
‘British domination of the international mail service, and the weakness of the 
American navy in comparison to the navy of England.’ Consequently, ‘in an 
emergency, the ships [on the route of the international mail service] could be 
converted to warships.’243 Therefore, ‘Construction of the steamers for these 
lines was to be varied out under naval supervision so that they could be 
converted for war use in the event of an emergency.’244 Moreover, ‘With the 
hothouse growth of the California economy and the United States’ bid for 
domination of the China carrying trade, the question of a subsidized steamship 
line from San Francisco to Shanghai naturally enough surfaced once again 
while Perry was in Washington in February 1851 planning the Japan 
expedition.’ 245  After all, however, it became clear that ‘The mail 
steamships…were turning out to be neither cheap nor efficient.’246 
 
 
Dutch diplomacy towards Japan before its opening 
 
Before it was widely known in the Netherlands that the American Perry was 
designated to make a voyage to Japan, many proposals concerning the Dutch 
trade with Japan can already be discovered in the minutes of the Dutch 
Parliament and Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië. As mentioned above, after the 
Belgian secession, managing colonial and Asian affairs was of primary 
importance to the economic base of the Netherlands, especially in the matter of 
preserving Dutch status and prestige in Europe.247 Furthermore, there is no 
perceivable reason why the Netherlands would not be interested in a form of 
overseas trade that required only minimal administrative expenses and did not 
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entail other problems related to colonial rule.  
  In the Kingdom of the Netherlands after the Napoleonic wars, legal 
jurisdiction on colonial matters was the exclusive prerogative of the king. 
Consequently, no debates in Parliament were necessary to make decisions 
about the colonial territories. Only from 1840 onwards did the Dutch 
Government have to provide detailed information about colonial matters to 
Parliament. The Minister of Colonial Affairs, J.C. Baud, pursued a rather 
minimalist colonial policy, which was aimed at getting the figures in colonial 
trade out of the red. Although before 1850, economic motives had hardly been 
an incentive for Dutch colonial expansion,248 in Parliament the Liberals were in 
favour of an expansionist overseas policy which would promote free trade. This 
pressure resulted in the Government having to amend its overseas policy. After 
the enactment of the new Constitution of 1848,249 the cabinet was responsible to 
Parliament for Dutch colonial policy and the Minister of Colonial Affairs took 
charge of colonial matters. In exchanges of ideas about the colonies, the debate 
between the Government and the members of Parliament intensified and Dutch 
colonial policy was gradually ever more greatly influenced by the Parliament.250 
In this respect, it is interesting to read the work of Wolter Robert baron 
van Hoëvell (1812-1879), a liberal in the Dutch Lower House at that time, who 
favoured an expansionist policy in overseas matters.251 He was the editor of 
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was a member of the Council of State (Raad van State) from 1862 to 1879. His statements on 
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Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsch Indië (‘Journal for the Netherlands East Indies) 
published by the Indisch Genootschap (The Netherlands East Indies Association), 
and also an active contributor to the journal. Both in Parliament and in his 
journal, he energetically argued against maintaining a minimalist overseas 
policy, on the grounds that this harmed Dutch national interests. His very frank 
utterances on Japanese affairs appear in several places in the parliamentary 
archives and in his magazine.  
  The fact that Van Hoëvell had lived in Batavia and had hands-on 
colonial, experience no doubt encouraged him to form this opinion. Although 
he had no deep insight into Japanese affairs, it is very interesting to note that he 
discussed Japan in relation to colonial problems and in the context of the policy 
of restraint. Opinions like his reveal that multiple options existed for Dutch 
diplomacy towards Japan at that time. Moreover, it shows that Japanese affairs 
were actively debated in the Netherlands. The next section will contain an 
outline of the relevance of Japan to the Netherlands, mainly on the basis of Van 
Hoëvell’s utterances recorded in the Dutch parliamentary archives and in his 
journal.    
Referring to the replacement of the Dutch trade chief in Deshima in 1850, 
Van Hoëvell argued that ‘an efficient merchant’ should be appointed as 
successor. He argued that, since Dutch civil servants engaged in Japanese trade 
with their own money and enjoying the protection afforded by their rank, they 
neglected their main duty. Instead of concentrating on Government trade, they 
paid more attention to their private trade interests. This disgraceful behaviour 
had eroded the status of the Dutch commercial chiefs. From 1836, the Dutch 
Government had taken steps to place Japanese trade in the hands of a person 
who paid commission for this right. Van Hoëvell questioned whether this was 
sufficiently effective, even though he did acknowledge that at least it raised 
Japanese respect for Dutch officials somewhat. Although acknowledging the 
increasing profits, Van Hoëvell still indicated that the changed approach had so 
far not been at all effective. While he admitted the significance of the Dutch 
Government’s measure of asking King Willem II to give his advice to Japan in 
his letter in 1844, urging it to open its borders, he considered this measure to be 
                                                                                                                                
Dutch colonial affairs in parliament have been collected in: W.R. van Hoëvell, Parlementaire 
Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen 1849-1854, Zalt-Bommel, 1862 and Parlementaire 
Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen 1856-1859, Zalt-Bommel, 1864.  
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purely political and pointed out that it would not stop the economic 
deterioration of Dutch trade with Japan. On the contrary, the decline in 
profitability was actually increasing. Therefore, he argued that the Dutch 
Government was not displaying adequate awareness or giving sufficient 
instructions about raising commercial profits. He said, however, that it was not 
necessary to separate the pursuit of commercial profits completely from 
continuing to uphold a sincere and noble policy, and claimed that with a little 
skill these aims could be combined. Furthermore, he warned that the Dutch 
monopoly on trade was threatened, because, through the mediation of Chinese 
traders, Britain had begun indirect trade with Japan: ‘probably the Japanese will 
gradually learn to do without the Dutch goods by using the British.’252  
Moreover, it should be noted that at this time it was being said in the 
Netherlands that future negotiations with Japan should be facilitated by 
sending a mission to Edo which should be accompanied by an adequate display 
of naval power in order to raise respect and imbue reverence.253 It was well 
understood in the Netherlands that its position in Japan would hardly be 
improved if a mission was sent only to Nagasaki which was far from Edo, the 
political center. Some voices warned that the Netherlands would be supplanted 
by other countries in Japan, if it did not take a more active stance. 
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253 Ibidem, p.385. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Dutch foreign policy in relation to America’s Asian policy 
 
 
The oldest document in the archives of the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
that relates directly to the expedition of the American Commodore Perry to 
Japan is a secret letter dated 22 November 1850, written by the Minister to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, Jan Jacob Rochussen 
(r.1845-1851). This document opened a new stage in Dutch diplomacy in Asia. 
The document indicates that the Dutch expected that the United States 
would send a representative to Japan in the near future, because in 1849 the 
Secretary of State, John Middleton Clayton, had been making plans for such an 
expedition. It was intended to end Japan's international isolation and to spread 
Christianity.254 The Dutch Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, Baron Testa, 
reported that so far the United States had not yet made a definite decision about 
engaging in commercial relations with any independent country in Asia.255 The 
plans were shelved when Clayton resigned after the death of President Zachary 
Taylor (1784-1850). Meanwhile, Testa believed that Aaron Haight Palmer would 
assume charge of this plan. He was a businessman in New York and had 
worked as a director of the American and Foreign Agency from 1830 to 1847. 
He remained interested in Asian trade: he worked as a broker in foreign trade 
and drew up a number of reports on this matter for the Department of State 
during 1846-1849.256 
At this time Japan was still showing no signs of relinquishing its policy 
of Sakoku. Therefore, the Bakufu was very anxious about the increase in foreign 
visits during recent years. These concerns continued to grow, because from 
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what was referred to as the Dutch ‘separate news’257, the Japanese Government 
knew of the agitation being stirred up by British and American merchants to 
open Japan to international trade. In response, Japan repealed the strict 
isolationist law of 1825 and re-adopted the somewhat milder law of 1806 in 
1842. The magistrate of Nagasaki asked the Dutch Government, via the trading 
chief in Deshima, whether it was willing to transmit the notification to other 
foreign countries that this legal modification was not intended to ease the 
Japanese policy of seclusion and that Japan still prohibited contacts with 
foreigners. The magistrate of Nagasaki at the same time handed the translation 
of the explanation about the amended law to the trading chief, who in his turn 
suggested to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies that the 
following year the separate news should report on the British and American 
attempts to open Japan to trade. He also asked that the news be drawn up with 
special care, because the Japanese Government greatly valued such 
information.258 
The Governor-General was of the opinion that this request from the 
magistrate of Nagasaki should be complied with. However, he also considered 
it to be unwise and unnecessary to issue a definite declaration immediately, for 
fear that the Netherlands would come into conflict with the other powers.259 
However, the Dutch Minister of Colonial Affairs, who agreed that this Japanese 
demand should be complied with, requested the king’s approval for this 
message to be conveyed to Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain, as the matter 
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had already been communicated to England, the United States and France. It 
was decided not to pass on the Japanese message to England because of the 
following reason: when the Netherlands transmitted this message to European 
countries, the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Palmerston - since the report 
was not received from Japan directly - replied as follows: ‘In reply, the 
Undersigned has to state to Count Gerrit Schimmelpenninck (1794-1863), that 
Her Majesty’s Government request, that the Government of the Netherlands 
would have the goodness to explain to that of Japan, that, according to the 
practice of Europe, it is the custom for every independent state to be the organ 
of its own communications to other states…Her Majesty’s Government can not 
attach any official character or value to communications coming to it from Japan 
through any other channel’.260  
 
 
Difficulties in Dutch Far Eastern policy - discord between the 
home Government in Netherlands and the colonial administration 
in the Netherlands East Indies.  
 
Although Dutch-Japanese relations were entering a new phase and the 
Netherlands were believed to be close to achieving a breakthrough, the 
Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies had different interests in their 
dealings with Japan. Whereas the Netherlands strongly desired to deal with 
Japan for the sake of commercial and political interests in the Netherlands itself, 
the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, especially Rochussen’s 
successor, Governor-General A.J. Duymaer van Twist (r.1851-1856), had little 
interest in matters relating to Japan.  
Duymaer van Twist had not been Prime Minister Thorbecke's first choice 
as Governor-General. Originally in the formation of his new cabinet Thorbecke 
had selected George Isaäc Bruce (1803-1850) from his own province, Gelderland, 
to be Governor-General. Bruce, however, died before he could take up his new 
office. It was difficult for Thorbecke to find a new candidate. Baud was the most 
suitable person because of his knowledge of colonial affairs and his ability. 
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However, since he was a Conservative, it was expected that his appointment 
would cause difficulties with the king and the ministers. Therefore, because of 
the similarity of his and Bruce’s political ideas Van Twist was chosen as ‘Bruce’s 
Political Twin’. A popular and well known speaker in parliament, where he was 
appointed president in 1850, this quite sensitive man later on became the victim 
of the hard-hitting discussions in the press and Parliament in connection with 
the accusations uttered by the Dutch writer Multatuli against the Cultivation 
System on Java and the Governor-General in person. He was a moderate 
conservative; although a reformer in Java itself, he was not the kind of person to 
be inclined to pursue a strong foreign policy.261 
He informed the Minister of Colonial Affairs about his opinions in these 
words: ‘The trading chief on Deshima, Frederick Cornelis Rose (1808-1880), had 
requested that he be allowed to resign after only one year and this had been 
accepted. Since England and the United States were trying to make contact with 
Japan, it was very important, and at the same time very difficult, to choose a 
suitable successor.’ It was difficult to explain the reasons for Rose’s resignation 
given the lack of reliable material, however the well known parlementarian, 
W.R. van Hoëvell, had insisted that ‘an efficient merchant’ would be the most 
suitable successor to the trading chief in Deshima and, at that time, the liberals 
in Parliament were appealing for an active policy to be pursued in Japan. Since 
Rose’s assumption of office in 1851, his skill in dealing with Japanese affairs had 
already been called into doubt and his functioning was summed up in the 
words of Van Hoëvell ‘An efficient diplomat is not always a good merchant’.262 
On the other hand, it was also said that Rose submitted his resignation because 
he disliked living in the confined space on Deshima.263 
Furthermore, according to Duymaer van Twist, it would be impossible for 
the Netherlands to maintain its neutrality should a dispute erupt between Japan 
and a foreign country. Therefore, he asked: ‘Should we take sides with an 
aggressor and in a sense betray our old friend, or should we take sides with 
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 94 
Japan and be obliged to become the enemy of England or the United States?’ He 
believed that the Netherlands should persuade the Japanese Government to 
acquiesce in the Western demands. Should this prove unsuccessful, ‘It would be 
better to give Japan up completely,’ rather than to expose the Netherlands to 
danger. Duymaer van Twist went on to argue that the commercial profits from 
the trade with Japan were not large and this trade was maintained mainly out 
of ‘a certain national honour or prestige.’ Moreover, he noted that he did not 
understand what reason people had to boast about this relationship with Japan, 
because it was common knowledge in every country that, in order to maintain 
this trade, the Dutch had to suffer very humiliating treatment at the hands of 
the Japanese. Furthermore, he continued, every country had its doubts about 
the Netherlands’ policy towards Japan and it was generally believed that the 
Dutch intended to made big profits, while excluding all other countries from 
Japanese trade. He argued that although this doubt was completely unjustified, 
it existed.  
A fine example of the Americans’ misunderstandings over the 
Netherlands, is the diary of an American sailor, William Cleveland (1777-1842), 
who visited Nagasaki on a chartered ship in 1800. He mentions that ‘The Dutch 
being the only foreigners, except the Chinese, that are permitted to trade here, 
have it in their power to prejudice the Japanders, against any foreign nation, of 
whom they may be jealous, but as the Americans hold no place in India, I 
cannot conceive of any motives of policy that can be offered for diminishing the 
importance of America unless it is to make the Japanese, think they possess the 
most extensive Country in the Western World.’264 This example shows that the 
Americans not only held a prejudice against the Netherlands for a long time, 
but also believed that the Netherlands had a certain level of influence in Asia. 
The British historian W.G. Beasley also supports this view; ‘The Dutch 
and Chinese merchants at Nagasaki were Japan’s only regular source of 
information on world events, and neither were likely to view with sympathy or 
approval Britain’s growing power and influence east of Singapore. The Dutch, 
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in particular, had long used their special position in Japan to prejudice the 
officials against possible competitors.’ 265  Hence, Van Twist’s anxiety was 
justified in a way. Against this background the Governor-General thought that 
it would be a good idea to make public the letter from the late King Willem II, 
advising Japan to open in 1844; it would serve to remove this odour of 
suspicion hanging over the Dutch. If it resulted in failure, ‘We cannot be 
blamed for this. The Japanese Government should be forced to adopt another 
system by military force: we can leave it without a concern about other powers 
that might be called in and be capable of handling this matter’.266  
  In response to the Governor-General’s message, the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs in the Netherlands, Charles Ferdinand Pahud de Montanges (1803-1873), 
who has been described as ‘an administrator more than a legislator, especially 
an administrator more than a reformer; a diligent, active administrator, but the 
administrator more than all other administrators stubbornly attached to the 
tradition,’267 proposed to the king that the new trading chief in Deshima should 
be instructed to advise Japan to change its foreign policy. This should be done 
through a letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, 
while a copy of King Willem II's letter should be transmitted to the United 
States. At the same time, however, he decided to inform the Governor-General 
that relations with Japan were not to be broken off, and that the trading factory 
on Deshima was not to be closed down. In spite of the negative policy towards 
Japan proposed by Duymaer van Twist, Pahud made a clear case for 
autonomous diplomacy by the Netherlands.268 
 
 
Japanese expedition by the United States – Commodore Perry 
 
In the meantime, in the United States a new plan had been made for the 
proposed Japanese expedition, which was much larger in scale than the first 
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plan. The Dutch document said that, as a result of this change, the commander 
of the previous plan, John H. Aulick (1789-1873) could not take charge of it and 
was no longer the preferred choice as its leader, and Commodore Matthew 
Calbraith Perry, who was a capable person and was highly experienced, was 
appointed.269 The real reason for the dismissal of Aulick, however, was his 
character.270  
  Perry grew up in a family with a father and an elder brother in the navy. 
He did important work in modifying the steam engine for use in warships. He 
became famous as ‘the father of the steam navy’.271 ‘Matthew Calbraith Perry 
had already proven his mettle as a sailor, diplomat, naval reformer, and 
advocate of the new steam navy. Perry, too, was personally acquainted with 
many if not all of the most powerful men in the New York merchant 
community. His daughter Caroline was married to August Belmont, one of the 
wealthiest businessmen in the city, and, as a representative of the Navy 
Department, he had supervised the construction of the mail steamers 
subsidized by the Federal Government. This job brought him into regular 
contact with such merchants as Howland and Aspinwall. Perry, moreover, was 
an avid expansionist who had commanded the Home Squadron, the largest 
ever assembled, that blockaded and shelled Vera Cruz and ranged up and 
down the Gulf Coast of Mexico under Fillmore’s Whig administration. 
Meanwhile, this was doing its best to promote more legal and less abrasive 
forms of expansion, while heading off the aggressive schemes of Manifest 
Destiny Democrats, filibusters, and slave owners, all of whom were casting 
covetous eyes at Cuba, Mexico and parts of Central America.’272 
  In a description of Perry’s character Silas Bent, who served under him 
in Mexico and Japan, says that: ‘He was bluff, positive and stern on duty, and a 
terror to the ignorant and lazy, but the faithful ones who performed their duties 
with intelligence and zeal held him in the highest estimation, for they knew his 
kindness and consideration.’ Perry hesitated when he spoke, often searching for 
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the right word. However though his penmanship, for which he apologized, 
often verged on the undecipherable, he was a fluent writer and his letters and 
journals were thoughtful, even on occasion poetic. A religious man who 
enjoyed a good sermon, he was known for his sulphurous tongue and enjoying 
a good drink. Perry had always shown a strong intellectual drive and interest in 
science. On his first cruise to the Mediterranean, he spent his spare time 
translating a Spanish book and later became fluent in Spanish. He was also a 
careful student of the weather, winds and currents, as well as botany and of 
conchology. At sea he made sure that the midshipmen under him were given as 
full an education as shipboard life permitted. While on shore duty he turned his 
mental energies toward the improvement of the navy, organizing a naval 
lyceum, museum, library, and a naval journal at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.273  
Perry had formed an unfavourable impression of the Dutch. ‘Perry 
thought that accounts of [Japanese] prejudice against foreigners were highly 
exaggerated. He assigned blame for the lack of trade with the outside world to 
the intrigues of the Dutch, ‘who have stopped at nothing, however 
dishonourable, or degrading to their national character, to effect their object’’ 
274  Therefore, he carefully avoided having any contact with the Dutch. 
However, he did acquire useful information about Japan from Dutch material 
sources. ‘Perry acquired a set of charts from Holland for thirty thousand dollars, 
including some brought from Japan by Philipp Franz von Siebold.’275 
Perry's expedition was supported by a strong naval squadron. It now 
became clear to the Dutch Government that the United States was getting more 
serious about the expedition, that it strongly desired to conclude a treaty with 
Japan and that it was prepared to use military force if Japan rejected the 
American request for a treaty without sufficient reason.276 Since the United 
States strongly desired to initiate commercial relations with Japan, the Dutch 
expected that the United States would justify its attempts to pursue its 
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economic interests as ‘a duty to civilize Japan’.277  
  Perry’s instructions were formulated in a document by C.M. Conrad 
(1804-1878), the acting Secretary of State. They stated the objects of the 
expedition as: 
1. To effect some permanent arrangement for the protection of American 
seamen and property wrecked on these Islands, or driven into their ports by 
stress of weather. 
2. Permission for American vessels to enter one or more of their ports in order 
to obtain supplies of provisions, water, fuel, &, or, in case of disasters, to refit so 
as to enable them to prosecute their voyage. 
It is very desirable to have permission to establish a depot for coal, if not on 
one of the principal islands, at least on some small uninhabited one, of which, it 
is said, there are several in their vicinity. 
3. The permission to our vessels to enter one or more of their ports for the 
purpose of disposing of their cargoes by sale or barter.278 
Perry should recognize that the Japanese ‘are very excited against the 
English, of whose conquests in the east, and recent invasion of China, they have 
probably heard.’ For this reason, he was to explain that the Americans, though 
they speak the same language as the English, are ‘connected with no 
Government in Europe’ Instead he was to emphasize that the United States was 
located directly across the ocean where large cities lay within twenty days by 
steamer from Japan. American commerce in the Pacific was increasing daily. 
‘That part of the ocean will soon be covered with our vessels,’ and Japan and 
the United States were ‘becoming every day nearer and nearer.’ ’279 
  Perry’s personal thoughts about the expedition were expressed in his 
letter to the Secretary of State for the first time: He placed the expedition in a 
global strategic context, particularly in relation to the United States’ chief rival, 
Great Britain. Great Britain, Perry explained, was now in possession of the most 
important fortified points in the East India and China seas, especially in the 
latter. Singapore covered the southwestern entrance to the China Sea, Hong 
Kong the northeastern. Borneo, to which the British had set an expedition in 
1846, represented an intermediate point. From these fortified positions England 
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was on the verge of ‘shutting up at will and controlling the enormous trade of 
those seas, amounting, it is said, in value to 300,000 tons of shipping, varying 
cargoes certainly not under £15,000,000 sterling.’ To prevent the British from 
monopolizing the China trade, the Americans had to act quickly. Fortunately 
there were many islands in the western Pacific, including Japan, left untouched 
by this ‘annexing Government,’ and these islands lay along the steamer route 
from California, ‘which is destined to become of great importance to the United 
States.’ ‘Now that Perry was free of Washington and the controversy 
surrounding steamship lines, he could state his objectives clearly: ports of 
refuge for whalers might be the ostensible reason for the Japan expedition, but 
the United States’ global rivalry with England and the need to secure ports on a 
Pacific steamship line were its real raisons d’être.’280 
Against this background, the Dutch Government decided to adopt an 
autonomous diplomatic course towards Japan. The Netherlands did not want to 
give up its relations with Japan under any circumstance. Therefore, the 
Government sent directions to the new trading chief on Deshima telling him not 
to put pressure on the Japanese Government by threatening to break off 
relations with Japan or to withdraw from Deshima. During the transitional 
phase of the opening of Japan, no Dutch intervention should occur, unless the 
integrity and dignity of the Dutch government required such action. Also the 
Netherlands should not support Japan, if it entered into hostilities with a 
foreign country. But if mediation [between the warring parties] was asked for, 
an attempt should be made to reach a desired and satisfying solution.’281 
 
 
Von Siebold’s proposal for the American diplomacy towards 
Japan 
 
While the Netherlands was unable to take definite measures in response to the 
Japanese expedition of the United States, a new initiative was unexpectedly 
taken by Ph.F. von Siebold. He explained his proposal to the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs by saying that the Japanese expedition set out in the American 
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plan had forced him to take consideration what had occurred between the 
Netherlands and Japan and he had made the decision to explain his opinion in a 
memorandum. His proposal was that more direct efforts should be made 
towards the Japanese Government than the directions already issued to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, thereby trying to gain what 
the United States wanted to obtain, if necessary, by arms.282 He also explained 
that, as it looked for opportunities in the new trade the United States would 
assert its influence in Asia: ‘Very important events have taken place in the 
Chinese and Japanese waters and the northern part of Pacific Ocean in the last 
ten years. For this reason, the Netherlands has many opportunities to assert its 
influence with a view to expanding Dutch commerce and maintaining our 
ancient navigation in this area. The Anglo-Chinese war, the opening of northern 
harbours in China, the rise of California, the increase in American whaling in 
the Pacific Ocean are important events, and these happenings form a 
considerable period in the history of maritime trade and the colonization of the 
old and new world’. In consideration of these events, he summarized the 
present problems as follows: 
1. Which obligations does the Netherlands have? 
2. Is it possible that the Netherlands would be regarded as only a maritime 
mercantile [and neutral] country in events relating to Japan? 
3. What should the Netherlands do? 
Examining these issues he stressed that the Netherlands could, and 
should, give advice to Japan and that it could preserve its national honour, 
while looking after its commercial and political interests carefully. Furthermore, 
he suggested that the Netherlands should advise Japan to adopt the principle of 
general private and free trade in view of the interests of other countries; and 
that, if necessary, England should obtain the same free trade rights as the Dutch. 
In addition, the Netherlands should propose a treaty to Japan by which other 
foreign countries including England and the United States should be granted a 
commercial relationship with Japan. This was because the British and the 
Americans would not be able to establish a commercial relationship with it 
peacefully on account of the ignorance of the Japanese institution and their 
ways of thinking.283 
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  Von Siebold wrote in his ‘Report of East and South Asia’（Le Moniteur 
des Indes orientales et occidentales）that ‘our (Dutch) Government should continue 
to strive hard to open Japan and for this purpose be kind under these 
circumstances. Therefore, if Japan was finally opened, our Netherlands would 
also naturally benefit from this with other powers.’ This view implies that the 
opening of Japan would be in the Dutch interest. To achieve this goal the Dutch 
government decided to employ Von Siebold as its special advisor on Japan.284 
 
 
American request for Dutch support for its expedition to Japan 
 
The Minister of Colonial Affairs subsequently put Von Siebold’s proposal on 
the agenda of a cabinet meeting.285 Moreover, he also confirmed the intention 
not to withdraw from Japan. After the king had given his assent, he instructed 
the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies as follows: that he was to 
promote the American efforts to change the Japanese Sakoku system and he was 
to instruct the trading chief on Deshima about this matter. The Japanese reply to 
William II’s letter giving Dutch recommendations to Japan was also reported at 
the same time.286 The Governor-General, however, was to support the United 
States only if its peaceful intention was clear. He was also to act within the 
diplomatic initiative outlined by William II and was not to exceed it. He was 
not to participate in an American demonstration. The trading chief on Deshima 
was instructed to follow this instruction very carefully.287 
In the meeting many objections to the plan to send a special mission from 
the Netherlands were raised. As a result, the Instruction to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies was amended: he was to 
appoint either the new trading chief on Deshima or send a special envoy from 
Batavia to Japan to carry the Governor-General’s letter to the magistrate of 
Nagasaki. This official advised the Japanese Government on such matters, and 
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the Dutch representative to be appointed was to negotiate the commercial 
treaty drafted by Von Siebold with him. To demonstrate the disinterestedness 
of Dutch foreign policy, all sentences that might hint at attempts, however 
slight, to pursue any new privileges had to be carefully avoided. The 
representative was also to inform the Japanese Government that the 
Netherlands would refrain from further contacts with Japan if its advice was to 
prove useless, as the Netherlands was unselfishly advising Japan at its own 
risk.288 Later, the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies confirmed 
to the Minister of Colonial Affairs that, in the message to be conveyed, all 
sentences regarding Dutch benefits had been deleted; and that topics relating to 
religion had not been mentioned; moreover it was stressed that the Netherlands 
had always been the recipient of a most-favoured-nation treatment in Japan.289  
The American Government had requested the Dutch Government 
through the American chargé d'affaires in The Hague, George Folsom (1802-1869), 
to see that the trading chief on Deshima would promote the policy of the 
American Government and co-operate in the achieving the abolition of the 
isolation system in Japan. In addition, he also asked for a map of Japan. When 
he received the reply that the Netherlands had no such map, he emphasized 
that ‘Should the proposed objects, which are of a strictly pacific character, prove 
successful, it is universally admitted that great advantages would result to all 
nations interested in the commerce of the East’.290 The Minister of Colonial 
Affairs saw no objection to honouring the American request regarding the role 
of the trading chief, as long as the Dutch intervention (tussenkomst) should not 
be seen as arbitration (arbitrage)’,291 and as long as the Dutch role could be 
restricted to a liberal support of the United States in view of Willem II’s letter. 
In short, the Netherlands seriously intended to convey to the Japanese 
Government the unfortunate consequences if it refused to dismantle the 
national system of isolation. On the other hand, the Netherlands were also 
concerned about possible American misunderstandings regarding the Dutch.292 
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Referring to this possibility, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herman van 
Sonsbeeck (1796-1865), remarked, for example, that the  reports of the 
humiliating treatment of the Dutch merchants in their customary audience in 
Edo was written ‘in an extremely unpleasant way’ in an American newspaper. 
Furthermore, he pointed out the incorrectness of the reference of United States 
President Taylor, which intimated that there was an American consul in 
Batavia.293 
The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies consented to most 
aspects of the Dutch Government’s plan, but he raised objections to the 
directive requiring the dispatch of two naval ships to Japan in order to enhance 
Dutch prestige in the region. The Governor-General explained that the 
Netherlands East Indies’ navy was insufficiently equipped to protect the 
Archipelago and deal with piracy, and, therefore, sending two ships to Japan 
was impossible. Regarding the dispatch of a new trade chief, he was worried 
that the United States might easily consider the appointment of a military 
officer a hostile act, and it might harbour suspicions that the Dutch were 
informing Japan about European military tactics and teaching it how best to 
defend itself against foreign aggression. He added that it was difficult to find a 
high-ranking civil officer, because nobody would be available to take over his 
duties during his absence. Consequently, it was decided that Jan Hendrik 
Donker Curtius (1813-1879) would be appointed the new trading chief on 
Deshima and would be given the necessary mandate to execute this task. 
Another reason for this decision was that the mediation of the trading chief 
would be considered acceptable, as the Japanese neither knew about or nor 
allowed any diplomatic way other than the conventional contacts at 
Nagasaki.294 This Japanese attitude had been glaringly obvious in the events 
surrounding the Dutch King’s letter in 1844.295 
Secret instructions given by the Netherlands East Indies’ Government to 
the trading chief in Deshima were attached to a document dated 6 January 1853, 
and contained directions for the negotiations with Japan. The most important 
points were that the chief was never to approve an agreement that could cause 
difficulties for the Netherlands or degrade the trading post in Deshima (Art. 6); 
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that he was not to leave Japan, even temporarily, unless there was an 
unavoidable necessity and Dutch honour absolutely demanded this (Art. 9)296. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned above, it was decided to inform the 
Japanese Government that the Netherlands would refrain from further contact 
with Japan, if this altruistic Dutch action was rejected.297 
The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies sent the magistrate 
of Nagasaki a letter stressing the altruistic and noble motives of King Willem 
II's friendly advice in view of the Dutch-Japanese long-time relations. This letter 
stated that there was a rumour in Europe that the United States intended to 
send a mission to Japan with the aim of establishing trade relations; and that 
Japan could not reject any reasonable demands made by the United States 
outright, because strength wise it was comparable to ‘the strongest power in 
Europe!’ It also said that Japan, even if it were a great power, could not resist 
the trend of world history; and that if the matter were to be decided by military 
force, this decision would entail long and bloody fighting; should this be so, the 
Dutch king was afraid that the Dutch might forsake Japan temporarily.298 
 
 
The Japanese expedition of the United States with a powerful 
force and the Dutch reaction to it 
 
The Netherlands collected and analysed information about Perry’s expedition 
through the Dutch Minister to the United States, Testa. This information 
contributed to the formulation of a new Dutch policy for the Far East. Testa 
informed his Government of a report by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy that was 
attached to the President’s State of the Union message to Congress. 299 It said 
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that Perry’s squadron was fully armed for a possible confrontation. Although 
the mission had a peaceful character its stated intention was not to go home 
until it had succeeded in its purpose; and that the expedition had been 
strengthened in order to prevent failure.  
  The military strength of the American squadron was also indicated in 
the letter from Tailor to Von Siebold. According this letter, ‘the squadron was 
strong enough to make an impression, in case finally military force should be 
necessary. The squadron consists of eight steam ships and frigates, which are 
equipped with 230 cannons. You are more able than I to imagine the influence 
that this kind of extraordinary military power can exert on the Japanese.’300 
The map made by the United States named the tip of Kannon Point, 
Rubicon Point,301 a designation which shows how serious the purpose of the 
American squadron was. Meanwhile, Marshall wrote to Perry, ‘and it appears 
to me no effort should be spared to preserve the beneficial and prosperous 
commerce already open with this great, extensive, and productive country 
(China)’ The Japan expedition, Marshall concluded, was only of secondary 
importance. China was the most pressing issue.’302 Actually ‘Nothing that 
Marshall could have said could have been more offensive to the commodore 
(Perry).’303 Before Perry arrived in the vicinity of Edo, he visited Ryûkyû. 
Through this visit, ‘Perry left the Bonins with the sense of having accomplished 
one of the major objectives of the expedition, undoubtedly a source of 
satisfaction this early in his voyages. He had been instructed to locate ports of 
refuge and sources of supplies for ships sailing the surrounding seas. This he 
had done at Naha and Port Lloyd. More important, he had found ‘suitable 
stopping places, for a line of mail steamers, which I trust may soon be 
established between some one of our Pacific ports and China.’304 
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Testa’s report, furthermore, noted that the United States intended to 
enlarge the reach of its navy on the political consideration that other maritime 
powers had also reinforced their naval power. It is worth noticing that the 
Secretary of the U.S. Navy took special pains to point out that the south of the 
Pacific Ocean would be the stage of many important expeditions ten years on. 
Testa also mentioned the Russian advance in the Pacific and he directed the 
attention of the Dutch Government to four expeditions that were being 
prepared in the United States, as follows:    
 
1. An expedition to explore and open Chinese waters of the North Pacific Ocean 
and the Bering Strait. 
2. An expedition to explore part of the African continent. 
3. An expedition to cruise and investigate the Plata and Parana Rivers in South 
America, which had recently opened to foreign trade.305 
4. An expedition to explore the northern shore of Greenland. 
 
It was thought that these expeditions might contribute to international 
trade, which was being stimulated by the development of new technology and 
by the advance of other maritime countries into undeveloped areas, especially 
Asia and Africa, which were expected to act as new reservoirs of commercial 
activity in the near future. The Russian expeditions are an example of the rapid 
development of international trade at that time. The attention of the Dutch 
Government was also drawn by an American expedition under the command 
of Cadwalader Ringgold (1802-1867) to conduct a hydro-graphic survey in the 
Indian Ocean, in Chinese and Japanese waters along the sea route between 
China and California, as well as in the northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering 
Sea area, which American merchant ships frequently visited. 306  Acts of 
American diplomacy in Asia, especially the Perry expedition, were often 
reported in the Dutch newspapers. This indicates that the Dutch showed a great 
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interest in them.307 
The Dutch Government expended considerable energy in trying to figure 
out a response to the intended expedition to Japan by the United States. The 
Government of the Netherlands East Indies, however, disagreed with the plans 
for Japan that were being made in The Hague. The Governor-General expressed 
various objections.308 To begin with, he asked the Minister of Colonial Affairs 
how could he carry out the instruction that he was preparing to fulfil, because 
the Dutch Government had promised its assistance to the American expedition. 
Next, the Governor-General, on the advice of the Council of the Netherlands 
East Indies, asked the Minister about his plan to dispatch a king’s ship to Japan 
with a definite mission. He wanted to know whether he should consider this 
instruction a definitive order or did it simply authorize him to carry it out, and 
in the latter case he would assume this authority. He pointed out that the 
dispatch of a warship under present conditions might arouse suspicions in 
Japan. Also he gave the Minister a warning that it could harm the negotiations, 
if these were initiated.309  
Van Twist worried that Japan would think that the Netherlands was 
conspiring with the United States against it. In fact, when Perry negotiated with 
the Japanese, ‘A number of officials from the san bugyo (三奉行) offered their 
own analysis of the situation. It was clear to them that the American and the 
Dutch were ‘in collusion in a cunning plot to betray us.’’310 This may be 
construed as a clue that the Japanese had doubts about the Dutch, thinking that 
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their only purpose was to protect their own trade interest.311 This shows that 
Van Twist's concern was right. Against this background, the Governor-General 
wrote in his letter to Commodore Perry that he could not give the trading chief 
on Deshima definite orders urging him to assist the American plan because he 
had not yet been officially informed. Moreover, he stated that even if the 
trading chief had succeeded in the negotiations with the Japanese Government, 
the understanding between the United States and the Netherlands would 
clearly exert a disadvantageous influence on these negotiations, because the 
intentions of the United States were not necessarily always peaceful.312  
  The Minister of Colonial Affairs supplied the Governor-General with a 
letter to be passed on to Commander Perry in case he should visit Batavia. This 
letter contained regulations and pointed out what the Netherlands wanted to 
secure in a possible future treaty with Japan. This was a precaution against the 
Americans getting the idea that the Dutch Government was intentionally 
refraining from informing them. Furthermore, the Minister instructed the 
Governor-General that he was authorized to deal with this matter,313 and that 
any further steps taken towards the Japanese Government should be in line 
with the action taken by Willem II in 1844. In this way, the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs was clearly pursuing an active course of diplomacy towards Japan in his 
communications with the Governor-General, in spite of the latter's opposition 
to his views. 
The Dutch Government also provided the Governor-General with specific 
directions regarding the trading chief to be appointed to Nagasaki. The 
directions stated that he was not to lose sight of the objective of concluding a 
treaty; and that he should be careful to prevent Japan from granting any 
privilege or concession to foreign powers which excluded the Netherlands. 
Furthermore he should do his best to convince Japan that it was in its own 
interest to abolish the isolation system, and that the Netherlands would 
continue to give it altruistic advice in this matter. The document continued by 
instructing the chief that he was to remove any misunderstandings that the 
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Netherlands sought or enjoyed any exclusive privileges that might exist among 
other foreigners. Furthermore, concerning the Japanese request to obtain a 
warship from the Netherlands in order to build the Japanese navy, the Dutch 
Government would do nothing for the time being, however it planned to 
dispatch a small, unarmed steamship to Japan so as not to damage the 
relationship.314 This measure should be seen in the context of the Crimean War 
(1853-1856). As the Netherlands took a neutral position in this conflict, it had to 
avoid becoming involved in a possible collision between England, France and 
also Russia in Japan. 
  It was of great importance for the Governor-General of the Netherlands 
East Indies to avoid coming into conflict with any of the great powers. 
Moreover, as he had already received a report from the trading chief relevant to 
the American and Russian intentions to enter Japan, this issue was very real for 
him. He was not actually in favour of the active diplomacy of the Dutch 
Government towards Japan, and he requested the Dutch Government to take 
measures to deal with this matter in consideration of the advice of the Council 
of the Netherlands East Indies: ‘As the Council rightly advises, the supreme 
Government in the Netherlands has discretion in this matter’. Moreover, he said 
that ‘he restricted himself to waiting for such orders as the home Government 
might deem necessary.’ In other words he left this matter completely to the 
Dutch Government.315 His position in this matter is understandable, because he 
occupied a subordinate office, but none the less one with far-reaching powers as 
an executive body in the overseas territories, and the Dutch Government had to 
rely on this body because of the great distance between Europe and Asia. The 
lack of enthusiasm, or rather passive resistance, of the Netherlands East Indies 
Government regarding the policy of the home Government would lead to great 
difficulties for the realization of an effective Dutch foreign policy towards 
Japan. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Perry’s arrival in Japan and the desired outcome 
 of the expedition. 
 
 
The effect of Perry’s arrival in Japan 
 
Japan was forced to open itself to foreign trade and diplomacy after the 
American-Japanese treaty of 1854. The opening, however, was described as an 
act of ‘gunboat-policy’ by President Fillmore. 316  Perry’s action involved 
steamships, which were at the cutting edge of Western science and technology 
at that time. The warships deeply impressed a great number of Japanese who 
witnessed their arrival in Edo Bay. A Japanese guard who was present 
described how ‘four three-masted ships of about 3,000 Koku each, which did 
not have their sails raised, were moving with perfect freedom, like a bird flying. 
Suddenly I lost track of them.’ This Japanese guardsman, however, was a little 
off track, because 1000 Koku is about 100 tons. Actually Perry’s frigate, 
Susquehanna, was not three times but about twenty times as large as a ship of 
1000 Koku.317 It was plain for the Japanese to see that they were technologically 
and militarily backward and that this situation demanded urgent action. The 
Tokugawa Bakufu decided to ask for assistance, not from the United States, 
which had effectuated the opening, but the Netherlands, which had a 
long-standing relationship with Japan. From the Japanese point of view, the 
intrusion of Perry into Edo Bay was in ‘the rudest possible way’. The behaviour 
of these American foreigners in Japan infuriated the Japanese, although they 
had not originally been anti-foreign.318 
  Before his arrival in Edo Bay, Perry did a survey of Uraga. Thereby, 
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‘The Governor, on observing these boats, inquired what they were doing, and 
when he was told that they were surveying the harbour, he said that it was 
against the Japanese law to allow of such examinations; to which he received 
for reply, that the American laws command them, and that Americans were as 
much bound to obey the American as he was the Japanese laws.’319  Uraga, 
however, was within the territorial waters of Japan. Therefore discussing this 
incident Ishii observes that: ‘Perry was brave to exclude the unequal 
international relationship under the policy of seclusion in Japan. However, I 
think that it is not wrong to say that his reply had a logic, because he did not 
intend to apply an equal relationship between civilized countries to Japan, but 
to force it to accept an unequal international relationship.’320 In the opinion of 
Perry, Western capitalist powers should bring uncivilized countries within the 
system of world trade. To achieve this aim, the use of military force was 
justifiable.321 
Perry's arrival in Japan had not only broken Japan's system of national 
isolation, but it also showed the Japanese how advanced Western civilization 
and technology were. Perry brought to Japan a model of a steam locomotive, a 
telescope, a telegraph and other symbols of technical progress. Actually, the 
steamships on which he arrived were also a product of the latest technology. 
Perry thought that criticism of the opening of Japan by military force expressed 
by other countries would be mitigated by this, i.e., by the introduction of 
Western civilization to the uncivilized country, which Japan, in his view, was. 
Wiley explains that ‘Perry was determined to present the Japanese with 
‘practical evidence of the wonderful development of this country, which will go 
far to convince them of the fact that sooner or later they must give away to the 
tide of circumstances and influences which had already begun to serve against 
the permanency of their absurd and exclusive institutions.’’…Perry considered 
the presentation of gifts as part of a larger commercial strategy. ‘Experience and 
the history of commerce has shown,’ he wrote, ‘that the introduction among 
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uncivilized and half-civilized people of commodities (in quantities however 
small) whether of usefulness or ornament, has invariably begotten a desire to 
obtain larger supplies, and thus the consumption of American products in the 
East had increased in a very extraordinary degree.’322 
Essentially the United States justified the opening of Japan with the 
argument that ‘the Anglo-Saxons were a master-race and had a duty to bring 
‘besotted Oriental Nations ….. into the ranks of civilization.’323 According to 
the Note composed by Perry, he thought that it was better not to conclude a 
treaty, if he had to make a concession similar to that of the Netherlands. 
Consequently, his minimum requirement for the treaty was that it would be 
different from the arrangements with the Dutch.324   
 
 
The Bakufu’s policy 
 
Meanwhile, the Japanese Government (the Tokugawa regime) had no definite 
policy by which to respond to the American demands. For example, ‘Kawaji 
[Toshiakira] (川路聖謨 , 1801-1868) and Tsutsui [Masanori] (筒井政憲 , 
1778-1859)325 were ready with a second  possibility: they could prolong the 
negotiations, perhaps for five or ten years, without giving a definitive answer. 
This strategy of ‘keep them hanging on’ (burakashi seisaku) would give the 
Bakufu time to restore its military power.’326 
Ishii Takashi regarded this inconsistent policy as downright ridiculous, 
and claimed that the Tokugawa Government followed ‘Burakashisaku’ (an ‘idle 
policy’, that is, neither refusing nor acquiescing in the American demands). Ishii 
also criticized the strategy of the Tokugawa Government known as ‘Abu mo 
torazu Hati mo torazu Saku’ (the strategy of falling between two stools) as ‘the 
absurd measure’ which was the most extreme element in this idle policy of the 
high official, Tokugawa Nariaki (徳川斉昭, 1800-1860), who was put in charge 
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of the efforts to defend the island nation against the encroaching foreigners. 
Nariaki’s plan consisted of two alternatives:  
1. Supposedly as firewood, coal, would be supplied in Nagasaki for a period of 
three years at the beginning of the present year (1854), while it would no longer 
lease out one of the Ogasawara islands as a coaling station. 
Or  
Trade would tentatively be carried out by steamship for three years from 1857. 
This, however, implies that no coal was to be supplied, even if the Americans 
insisted that steamships needed coal, because the trade would entail the 
enormous costs in supplying coal.  
 
The Tokugawa Government was to offer these two alternatives and to 
ask the United States to choose one. If the United States did not agree to do so, 
there would be no alternative but to suspend the negotiations. The United 
States would then ‘fall between two stools’. This plan was aimed at gaining 
time and at building up armaments for the purpose of being able in future to 
negotiate more effectively with foreign countries. Ishii’s apt criticism was that 
such a childish trick would not fool the Americans.327  
Moreover, as another example of the ‘idle policy’ of the Bakufu, there is 
Sakuma Shôzan’s (佐久間象山, 1811-1864, a military strategist) story. ‘Sakuma 
Shôzan had visited the batteries (which in Edo Bay or at Nagaskai) before 
Perry’s arrival and reported that ‘their arrangement made no sense and none of 
them could be depended on as a defence mechanism. Upon discovering this, I 
unconsciously looked up to Heaven and sighed deeply; I struck my chest and 
wept for a long time.’328 At this crucial moment in Japanese history, ‘Abe 
Masahiro (阿部正弘 , 1819-1857, 老中 rôjû, senior councillor) was also 
despondent about the inept performance of the Bakufu. He had shown great 
skill in consulting and placating the various factions, from the hard-line 
supporters of Tokugawa Nariaki to the foot-dragging bureaucrats in the 
kaibogakari. He had ventured beyond the confines of the fudai-dominated 
enclaves of Edo Castle to build a consensus. But in the end, he had failed in his 
attempts to fashion and implement an effective policy for dealing with the 
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feared foreigners.’329  
The Tokugawa regime even asked the Mikado (Emperor) in Kyoto about 
his views in this important matter. This action was performed not out of respect 
for the Mikado, but to contain the Nariaki faction. In the course of negotiations 
with Townsend Harris (1804-1878), according to Sakumu-kizi(昨夢紀事)330, 
Nariaki roared that ‘Bittyû (堀田正睦 Hotta Masayoshi, Prince of Bittyû, 
1810-1864) and Iga (松平忠固 Matsudaira Tadakata, Prince of Iga, senior 
councillor, 1802-1890) should commit hara-kiri (suicide), and Harris should be 
beheaded.’331 Nariaki also made sure that Nakahama John Manjirô (中浜万次郎, 
1827/28-98) was removed from his position of translator. He sent a letter to Abe, 
which said that Manjirô was not appropriate, because he had spent too long in 
the United States.332  Moreover, ‘In fact, Nariaki had already written secretly to 
Abe Masahiro suggesting that Hayashi and Ido Iwami be ordered to commit 
seppuku to demonstrate to the Americans that the Bakufu would not tolerate 
‘careless’ negotiating.’333 
However, when Nariaki took a closer look at the Perry squadron in Edo 
Bay, even he lost faith in the usefulness of maintaining a reckless anti-foreign 
stance. It was said that Fujita Tôko (藤田東湖, 1806-55, 側用人 sobayônin, 
Tokugawa Nariaki’s grand chamberlain) had himself rowed out into Edo Bay 
secretly at night to investigate the strength of Perry’s steamships. Nariaki, as a 
member of one of the major Tokugawa cadet houses, was well informed about 
foreign affairs. Later he asked the Bakufu if he might participate in the Japanese 
mission to the United States with Fujita. It seems that he wanted to gain some 
real knowledge of the detailed situation there. His request was disavowed by 
Bakufu at that time, and ultimately the mission never went, because Fujita was 
crushed to death in an earthquake. Until his death in 1860, Nariaki did not 
change his anti-foreign sentiments because of his pride and vanity. 
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However, in later years he wrote in a letter to Echizen Shungaku 
(Matsudaira Yoshinaga, 越前松平慶永[春岳] daimyô of Echizen domain, 
1828-1890) that ‘I as an old man retain my stance, but since you are young, you 
should work hard, while adapting to the new circumstances.’ By this time he 
had admitted the necessity of opening the country.334 Hence, the Bakufu clearly 
recognized that the present system in Japan should be changed; however it 
could not set the necessary measures in motion. Therefore,‘those in charge of 
the Tokugawa regime should be accused of formulating no substantial policy, 
because they had already acquired information about Perry’s mission one year 
in advance from the Netherlands.’335  
Moreover, the Japanese already had some knowledge about the 
formidable strength of American warships. ‘In July 1846, the American 
Commodore James Biddle (1783-1848) suddenly appeared off Uraga with two 
warships. One of them, the Columbus, was a mighty ship of the line sporting 
ninety-two guns. Biddle, despite being knocked down by a Japanese soldier, 
pressed his proposal for an opening of trade only half-heartedly and then went 
away. However Abe took careful note of the size and strength of these two 
formidable warships, which had all but violated the shogun’s inner sanctum.’336  
In this situation, the Japanese had to rely on the Dutch. Anxious about 
Perry’s return, the Governors of Nagasaki, Ôsawa [Jôtetsu] (大沢秉哲 , 
1808-1883) and Mizuno [Tadanori] (水野忠徳 ) with the translators Nishi 
[Kichibei] (西吉兵衛, 大通詞, 1812-1855) and Moriyama [Einosuke] went to 
Deshima to ask Donker Curtius his advice. They stayed there from 1 November 
to 4 November 1853.337 Katô concludes that this shows that the position of the 
Netherlands in Japan, the relationship with Japan and the significance of the 
Dutch trading chief being stationed in Nagasaki were still very important at 
that time.338 
 Moreover, it is noticeable that it was said in the Netherlands at this time 
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that future negotiations with Japan should be facilitated by sending a mission to 
Edo, accompanied by sufficient naval power to raise respect and esteem.339 It 
was well understood in the Netherlands that its position in Japan would hardly 
improve if a mission was sent only to Nagasaki because this was situated far 
away from Edo, the political centre. Some voices warned that the Netherlands 
would be replaced by other countries in Japan if it did not take a more active 
stance. The fact that Commodore Perry and his powerful battleships had 
arrived not in Nagasaki but in Edo is generally considered an original and 
successful feature of American policy.  
However, the idea of doing exactly the same had previously already 
been mooted in the Netherlands by Van Hoëvell who had made an appeal to 
consider Japan-related matters highly important. After Perry and his powerful 
fleet had departed for Japan, Van Hoëvell stated that a nation which was 
ignorant of the tenets of international law should not be forced into signing a 
treaty merely on behalf of the interest of the United States. He also did not 
believe that Perry would be successful in opening Japan by means of military 
force, which he considered to be unsuited to diplomatic purposes. In 1853 in 
Parliament Van Hoëvell had actually urged the Dutch Government to resort to 
military force in its dealings with Japan. Now it seemed that he had changed his 
mind and he did expect results from the American use of military force. This is 
an indication that he had little insight into Japanese affairs. Another example of 
his lack of insight into Japanese affairs was when Van Hoëvell criticized the 
Government because it had not threatened Japan with the withdrawal of the 
Dutch factory from Japan and supported this by actually setting such a 
withdrawal in motion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs ridiculed him by 
replying that ‘It seems to me that this utterance is very strange, .... the 
Government had not begun to do so there, even partially.’340 
 
 
Dutch ‘national prestige and economic interest’ diplomacy 
towards Japan under the changed circumstances 
 
The straightforward and aggressive attitude adopted by the Americans was 
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offensive to the Japanese. Therefore the latter came to rely more and more on 
the kindly Dutch in a solution to their problems.341 The progressive group in 
the Japanese Government was well aware of the country’s weakness and 
technological backwardness. In order to address such serious problems, the first 
thing that Japan needed was to build up a modern navy. The Japanese informed 
the Netherlands of their desire to possess steamships. They ordered Dutch 
steamships and also requested the Netherlands to set up a dry dock for 
steamships and, after that, to set up a shipyard in Nagasaki so that Japan would 
be able to build steamships itself. The Dutch Government was delighted with 
these requests, which would be highly beneficial to Dutch industry. 
At that time in the Netherlands, a plan was taking shape to take the 
initiative in exporting the Western civilization to Japan, as a result of which 
Japan would come to depend on it. The Dutch also had a plan to teach Japanese 
about Western civilization in the Dutch language, because, by so doing, Japan 
would be brought under a strong Dutch influence. In this way, the Netherlands 
planned to establish a renewed long-term and intimate relationship with 
Japan.342 
  The hoped for Japanese approaches to the Netherlands indeed 
materialized: ‘For a time during the fall [of 1853], Nariaki and the advocates of a 
strong defence appeared to be gaining ground. In September Abe turned to the 
Dutch, ordering a steam corvette, fifty-six sailing corvettes, two steamships, a 
bronze carronade, and three thousand percussion-cap rifles. On October 
seventeenth, the law forbidding the construction of warships was repealed.’343  
In reaction to these initiatives, The Minister of Colonial Affairs requested 
King Willem III (Willem Alexander Paul Frederik Lodewijk, 1817-1890; 
r.1849-1890) to send a steamship, if possible a warship, in addition to the 
commercial regular ship, to Japan from the Netherlands East Indies. This 
measure was aimed at increasing the speed with which information regarding 
important developments in Japan could be acquired, and at promoting the 
stature of the trading chief's activity in Nagasaki. In general, dispatching a 
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warship to an overseas country was often a way to protect one’s own nationals 
residing there. In this case, however, the sending of a naval vessel was aimed at 
improving the trading chief’s standing with the Japanese. Unlike the other civil 
servants at the trading post in Nagasaki, the trading chief was treated with 
respect, but his standing was not very high, because he was seen as a merchant 
– and merchants were, after all, the lowest class in Japan. Therefore, the Dutch 
Government believed that future negotiations with the Japanese authorities 
would stimulate a more favourable course, if the trading chief were to be seen 
to be directing a warship, thereby showing that he was a person of consequence 
in his home country.344  
In June 1854, three months before the conclusion of the 
American-Japanese treaty, the Minister of Colonial Affairs instructed the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to send a suitable navy 
steamship in convoy with the regular annual merchant vessel to Japan.345 In 
reply to this instruction, the Governor-General wrote that he was unable to 
spare such a warship away from the Netherlands East Indies, but one could 
order such a ship and deliver it somewhat later. The Minister of Colonial 
Affairs considered it important to honour Japanese requests without delay, 
because it was very anxious that any postponement would give Japan a bad 
impression that might induce them to make its requests to another country. 
Therefore, the Minister did not agree with the Governor’s opinion. Moreover he 
said, ‘In case a small merchant ship which would be suitable for making the 
voyage [between Europe and Asia] still is asked for, it is hardly thinkable that 
the General-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies would feel himself 
authorised to order such a ship because the term tiny steamer (‘klein 
stoomscheepje’) has been used’ 346 In this way, the Minister strongly criticized 
the Governor-General’s attitude because he thought that the government of the 
Netherlands East Indies should try to harmonize its policy with that of the 
mother county. 
The Dutch were greatly pleased by the fact that the Japanese acceptance 
of Western civilization had resulted in a significant improvement in 
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Dutch-Japanese relations and in new privileges in Nagasaki, without having 
been required to give a demonstration of military force themselves. They 
welcomed the fact that the Japanese had acknowledged their relative 
technological backwardness and were now eager to learn all aspects of 
European civilization, and, in particular, that the Japanese expected the Dutch 
to render them the most assistance in this matter. The Dutch Government was 
of the opinion that it was very important to support Japan’s development 
actively, without showing any hint of hesitation and to seize this opportunity as 
a way to tighten relations with Japan. Since Japan demanded naval technology 
in particular, the Dutch Government decided to meet this demand without 
delay. By helping Japan, the Dutch hoped to raise their political status in Japan 
as well as the status of the personnel of the Dutch trading post on Deshima. 
They aspired to achieve the abolition of the close surveillance and isolation of 
the Deshima post, and that Dutch trade with Japan would expand. 
For many years prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Dutch medical 
doctors on Deshima had taught the Japanese about Western science and 
technology, especially medical science. This had been highly appreciated by the 
Japanese,347 a fact well known in the Netherlands. By using a similar approach 
after the opening of Japan, the Netherlands hoped to achieve a similar level of 
appreciation in the 1850s. In 1855 the Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that it 
would also be appropriate to send a portrait of his king to Japan for the purpose 
of promoting a closer relationship. This was because he had received a report 
from the trading chief in Nagasaki which said that the chief had had a long talk 
with high-ranking Japanese officials about the Dutch royal house and had 
shown them Willem I's portrait.348  
The idea of presenting a portrait, not a product of the latest Western 
technology, while England was going to present a steamboat and the United 
States a steam locomotive to the shogun, encountered again criticism from the 
liberal statesman Van Hoëvell: ‘That is beautiful proof of the king’s personal 
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interest in this important matter, but it is no Government action.’349  The 
Minister of Colonial Affairs reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the 
trading chief would enter into negotiations about a treaty with the Japanese 
Government, and in anticipation of this development, he requested the chief's 
formal title be changed to a more suitable one, because the Japanese had little 
respect for persons engaged in commerce.350 He pointed out that the authority 
to conclude an international treaty lay with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but 
in this instance the authority of the Netherlands East Indies colonial 
administration to conclude treaties with native sovereigns in the Asian region 
was also considered to apply to Japan. The Government of the Netherlands 
instructed the trading chief in Deshima that in principle he should not explicitly 
pursue Dutch profits in his endeavours to expand the Japanese trade. However, 
it was added that he did not have to refuse an advantageous commercial 
contract if the Japanese Government itself offered one. 
In 1854, Senator Abram van Rijckevorsel (1790-1864) stated in the Dutch 
Lower House that relations with Japan were a highly important issue in respect 
to the Dutch moral influence (onzen zedelijken invloed) in the Netherlands East 
Indies. The Minister of Colonial Affairs replied on behalf of the Government 
that he was not neglecting Japan. He added that the Japanese Government often 
indicated how highly it thought of Dutch accomplishments, and that it would 
accept without hesitation that ‘all that it gave to others should also be awarded 
to the Netherlands’. This is interesting, because this exchange of words showed 
that Japanese affairs were considered in relation to the Dutch colonial interests 
in Southeast Asia. 
The Dutch Government outlined its policy towards Japan in the Cabinet 
reply to the address of the king at the state opening of parliament, (‘Adres van 
antwoord op de troonrede’), in 1855. The Government pointed out its assistance to 
other countries in their relations with Japan and the treaties concluded between 
them and Japan, and continued by stating that ‘thereby, we have once more 
re-established the friendship which has existed between us and this country for 
several centuries. Thereby, we not only showed other maritime nations a proof 
of our altruism, but also proof of our good relations and friendship with the 
Japanese shogun. This policy has been rewarded with a good result at present. 
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This has maintained the peace on this continent and probably －we hope more 
and more－ we shall reap the fruits in industry, trade and shipping.’ While 
Van Rijckevorsel admitted that the policy was a sound one, in his view this 
Government answer sounded somewhat selfish and one-sided. He pointed out 
that the general improvement in relations among nations in the Far East, as 
accomplished by the Netherlands, was not mentioned.  He believed the Dutch 
Government was pursuing an active policy towards Japan and naturally was 
making efforts to benefit from this. The Government's statement was, he said, 
understandable in this light. Van Rijckevorsel, however, was afraid that it 
would elicit criticism from other countries. Furthermore, he wanted to 
emphasize that the Dutch policy was different from the high-handed policy of 
safeguarding the self-interest of the other powers.351 
 
 
Active diplomacy towards Japan by the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs 
 
The Government considered it very important that the Netherlands take 
advantage of Japan’s strong desire to found its own navy. Therefore, it repeated 
its instruction to dispatch a steam-powered warship there in order to acquire an 
advantageous position for the Netherlands in future trade with Japanese.  The 
Netherlands wanted to play a positive role in Japan's modernization with the 
aim of increasing its influence. It expected that a commercial treaty between 
Japan and the United States would be concluded in the near future. The 
outcome of Perry’s mission was made public in the American President’s 
annual State of the Union address to Congress. According to a Dutch 
newspaper it said that ‘Through the officers in charge, the expedition to the 
Japanese Empire was achieved successfully, which was dispatched two years 
ago for the purpose of establishing the relationship with it. Through this 
concluded Treaty, ports of the densely populated areas [of Japan] were opened. 
In order to exert this treaty completely, furthermore the ratification shall be 
exchanged and the commercial articles shall be stipulated.’ 352  When this 
summary of the President’s message was immediately reported to Holland by 
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telegraph, soon thereafter, the complete text was received.  
The Dutch displayed a strong interest in the developments following 
Perry’s mission. The afore-mentioned presidential address stated that the 
United States had succeeded in opening Japan and concluding a treaty of 
friendship; and that the United States intended to conclude a commercial treaty. 
When the United States dispatched the mission to Japan, it did not formally 
announce its intention to establish a commercial relationship with Japan. 
However, it was widely suspected by the European powers that this was really 
the Americans' intention. The State of the Union message appeared to confirm 
this. Among the Western powers, only the Netherlands had the exclusive right 
to trade with Japan. Therefore, the Dutch merchants involved in this trade in 
Nagasaki firmly insisted that the government protect and promote their 
interests against any American advance. The Dutch Government did indeed 
endeavour to do so by concluding a treaty with Japan that included commercial 
regulations. 
When the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies still voiced his 
disapproval of the order to dispatch  a warship to Japan, the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs insisted that his instructions be carried out, motivated by 
reports from Japan stating that it was determined to obtain a steam engine and 
steamship technology. He did not expect that the amicable situation resulting in 
the Dutch being asked by the Japanese to provide them with lessons in naval 
techniques and technology would ever occur again in the future, but that this 
situation was still open at this moment.353 Furthermore, the Department of the 
Navy promised the Minister to deal with the objections of the Government of 
the Netherlands East Indies that it had too few warships at its disposal, to the 
best of its ability. In his letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Lieutenant 
Gerhardus Fabius also emphasized that a steamship should immediately be 
dispatched, not for trade but to boost the status of the personnel on Deshima, 
because he was aware that Japan was being very friendly towards the 
Netherlands at this moment.354 The confidence of the Minister of the Colonial 
Affairs, C.F. Pahud, and the support and opinions of his colleagues of the 
Department of the Navy ensured that his plan to dispatch a steamship to Japan 
was realized. The aim of the Minister of Colonial Affairs seems to have been to 
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make Japan regard the Netherlands in terms of ‘Our most natural ally (Onze 
natuurlijkste bondgenoot)’. Actually, at that time the Japanese referred to the 
Netherlands as their ‘best friend’.355 
For this reason, it was essential that the Netherlands fulfilled Japanese 
demands and improved the status of the Dutch by displaying its might. As 
concrete measures, Minister Pahud considered raising the Dutch flag in the 
open port of Shimoda, presenting the shogun with special gifts, and 
re-dispatching the naval Lieutenant Fabius, who was highly respected by the 
Japanese. Pahud further noted that ‘Our future in this country is at stake. If the 
Japanese Government turns to another country, we shall have lost the present 
opportunity to improve our commercial and political relationship with Japan. It 
will never occur again.’ These words express how crucial this moment was 
thought to be.356 In addition, this report is also quoted in the work by Van der 
Chijs, Neêrlands streven, which however omitted the part in quotation marks. 
The reason may be that these sentences would have damaged the image of the 
Dutch altruism which the book was trying to project.357 
The Dutch trading chief on Deshima played a significant role as a 
mediator between Japan and the foreign powers, because the Japanese had little 
knowledge of how to negotiate with Western powers and, moreover, they had a 
problem with Western languages. Therefore, the function of the trading chief 
assumed a political rather than a commercial character. This raised the question 
of how far the authority of the trading chief to act extended in political affairs. 
The Minister of Colonial Affairs was of the opinion that his activity was 
restricted to ‘mediation’, not ‘arbitration’. Moreover, he noted that the title of 
trading chief was too low for a person charged with dealing with the more 
important matters that were arising in Japan. 358  Minister Pahud had no 
objection to changing the title of the trading chief on Deshima to ‘Consul’ or 
‘Consul-General’, given that matters concerning commerce were considered 
subordinate in Japan. He, however, devised the title of ‘Dutch Commissioner’ 
(Nederlandsche Kommissaris), because the draft Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1852 
explained to the Japanese that the consul did have an interest in commerce and 
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he was the head of the foreign merchants. As the change from the trading chief 
to consul had no meaning to the Japanese who did not have respect for 
commercial matters, the title was changed to ‘Dutch Commissioner’. He was to 
wear a uniform to show that he was clearly a more important person than a 
field officer (hoofdofficier). Pahud considered that such a uniform would be 
suitable, because a military person was placed among the higher classes in 
Japan. After all, the rank of ‘Dutch Commissioner’ was equivalent to that of a 
Naval Captain (Kapitein ter Zee) and accorded, therefore, the right to wear a 
proper uniform.  However, this privilege was available to him only in Japan.359 
Later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially gave Donker Curtius the title of 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in order to deal with political 
matters in Japan.360 Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs noted that it 
would be necessary to re-organize or expand the trading post on Deshima with 
the aim of developing Japanese trade. The administration of the Netherlands 
East Indies was in charge of affairs of Deshima.361 
In 1855, the view of the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pahud, regarding 
Dutch-Japanese relations was as follows: ‘The draft treaty of 1852 drawn up by 
Von Siebold aimed to open Japan in the common interest of free trade. The 
Netherlands behaved unselfishly in order to benefit other foreign powers as 
well. As a matter of fact, however, affairs pertaining to Japan were of little 
concern to us at that time. That is, it was not desirable to maintain the existing 
state of affairs for the Netherlands, because our place, Deshima, was subjected 
to many restrictions on trade and produced few profits. A different situation, 
however, exists at present. The United States and England have acquired open 
ports through their treaties with Japan. With the exception of the 
Anglo-Japanese agreement, the United States also gained the privilege enjoyed 
by the Netherlands, that of a most favoured nation treatment.’362 In other 
words, Japan had changed its way of thinking and considered Western-style 
development useful. Moreover, it had chosen the Netherlands to introduce 
Western civilization. It was therefore important to establish its commercial and 
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political predominance in Japan in response to its preference for the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, the report of the trading chief indicated room for a 
remarkable commercial expansion. Pahud therefore continued: ‘We have very 
essential interests in Japan at present. These should not be sacrificed by an 
idealistic manifestation of unselfishness.’  Referring to the prospect that the 
United States would open Japan for trade, ‘under the present circumstances, it 
would be contrary to our interest to hasten this moment when the United States  
would be competing with us [in the Japan market]. We must zealously make 
use of our opportunity [to expand the relationship with Japan] and the time 
[which we have at present before the commercial competition with the United 
States makes inroads] for this preparation. For the time being, however, we 
should take no action to make others share in our commercial relationship with 
Japan.’363 
The Minister of Colonial Affairs summarized the issues he thought 
relevant to relations with Japan in the near future.  
1. The securing of the location of the centuries-old Dutch trade in Nagasaki.  
2. The freedom for foreign nationals to visit Nagasaki, as well as Shimoda 
and Hakodate. 
3. All privileges that England and the United States gained were to be 
guaranteed to the Netherlands as well. 
4. If a country wanted to conclude a treaty with Japan for the same purpose 
[as the above-mentioned powers had], the Japanese Government was to declare 
in advance that it would permit the country to acquire the privilege applicable 
in above-mentioned Art. 3. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs drew up a Note entitled 
‘Issues  regarding Japan which need to be decided before they can serve as a 
basis for new proposals to be submitted to the King’ (Punten betreffende de 
Japansche Zaak, waarop voorafgaande beslissing wordt vereischt, om te dienen als 
grondslag voor de aan den Koning te doene voorstellen). This note also contained an 
overview of the relationship with Japan. The matters brought forward in the 
note were:   
1. Should a steam-powered warship be dispatched to Japan in 1855 again?   
2. The delivery of a steam-powered warship to Japan.  
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3. To grant the negotiator the authority and status needed to conclude a treaty 
and to approve the subsequent ratification.  
These three issues were itemized and later twenty-six further items were 
examined. The following statements in this note are noteworthy: ‘Penal 
regulations against smuggling are to be carried out strictly, for if we don’t do so, 
this will spoil the credit which at present we should try to acquire even more 
than before in view of the circumstance that the Japanese are relying on us for 
support. 
 Concerning abolishing the Kambang trade,364 Donker Curtius was of the 
opinion that it would be preferable to open it up as freely as possible. However, 
if this were to prove impossible, the Dutch Government officials were to take 
over the Kambang trade. He suggested that if the Nagasaki trade was to be 
expanded, the Japanese Government should be allowed to pay a part of the 
purchase of the ordered warship in kind, because it could not pay the whole 
amount in gold. The Dutch had obtained from the Japanese the concession that 
their ships could come to Japan without limitation in order to receive articles 
delivered in compensation for a warship. Therefore, the Dutch should pay the 
greatest attention to this moment, since, for the time being at least, active 
intercourse with Japan was open for several years.’ 365  Also the Dutch 
Government believed that the conclusion of a treaty such as the 
Japanese-American treaty and the Anglo-Japanese treaty could not bring better 
opportunities to foreign powers than the delivery of a warship ordered by the 
Japanese Government. Therefore, it noted that the Dutch in the Netherlands 
East Indies as well as the Netherlands should try to take every possible measure 
to promote Dutch interests in Japan. For this purpose, at least, the sum of 
1,500,000 gulden was allocated, and this was subsequently increased twice. 
Furthermore, the Dutch Government decided to honor the request of the 
trading chief that various instruments for industrial use and these models were 
to be collected and handed to the Japanese Government in return for a small 
sum. Lieutenant Fabius was to be re-dispatched and an engineer well-versed in 
machine technology was to accompany him, reflecting the insight that 
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knowledge regarding mechanics (like chemistry) was very desirable in Japan. 
The Japanese would pay for the ship with copper; however the price of the 
copper had to be raised, because the price in the Honkata trade was so low that 
the trading chief called it a ‘giveaway price’. The technology lessons to be given 
by Dutch experts in Japan would be given in Dutch in order to promote the 
Dutch language there.’ 
In March 1855 the Dutch Government received an order from the 
Japanese Government for two steamships. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
contacted the Department of the Navy and proposed that two propeller-driven 
corvettes were to be built at the expense of the Japanese Government at a 
private shipyard in the Netherlands, and that a model of these ships would be 
presented to the shogun. The Dutch Government had to consider the possibility 
that Japan might become involved in a war during the construction of these 
corvettes. Under such circumstances these warships could not be handed over 
to the Japanese. However, it was decided that the Dutch navy would use them 
should this situation occur. The first ship was to be delivered in 1857, and the 
Minister decided to promise the second for delivery, if necessary, before 1858. 
Since he was well aware of the strong Japanese desire to possess a steamship, he 
wanted to avoid disappointing the Japanese because of a later delivery date, 
which could mean that they might place their orders with other countries. 
The Japanese Government also needed naval specialists. The Minister 
considered it very important that ‘We’ should provide Japan with such 
specialists, lest it should ask another country for a navy specialist. Japan 
especially wanted to master steam-power technology - the symbol of advanced 
Western technology at that time. The Dutch were well aware of this. They 
thought that it would be useful to make a bigger model of the corvette than the 
scale usual for such models, because this would make the ship’s principle more 
instantly comprehensible to the Japanese. Moreover the Minister decided that a 
Dutch handbook should be sent with the ships for the purpose of spreading 
knowledge of the language in Japan. To keep the Japanese patient until they 
received their much-desired steamship, the Minister thought it important that 
the Dutch would promise the Japanese to send the model from Batavia to Japan 
before the end of 1856. He would begin consultations with the Department of 
the Navy in this matter without delay, while preparing the required formal 
proposal to the king for the final plan as soon as possible. This is convincing 
evidence that the Minister of Colonial Affairs considered it most important that 
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the Netherlands kept its promise and did not disappoint Japan. 
The Japanese Government had asked the Dutch for a price list of all types 
of ships and ship’s tackle/equipage (rigging etc.) and for an explanation of 
these goods too. In the end of March in 1855, Lieutenant Fabius was to leave the 
Netherlands East Indies to return to Japan. Since the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs, Pahud, was extremely anxious to exploit this opportunity, he requested 
the Minister of Navy to respond quickly with his views on the matter.366 The 
Dutch Government knew that the Japanese Government had politely refused 
proposals from Britain and the United States that they might have the honour of 
presenting a steamship to Japan, because it was prepared to talk only with the 
Netherlands about this matter. As the Dutch Government prized this situation 
highly, it proposed to present the Soembing to Japan. The Dutch Government 
considered it of great importance to be the first in this matter. It was also afraid 
that Japan would ask another country, if the Dutch Government did not 
generously and strenuously support Japanese expectations. The context within 
which this plan was conceived was the belief that the Dutch economic and 
political future in Japan was in danger because of this burgeoning situation.367 
Moreover, from a report by the Governor-General of the Netherlands East 
Indies, the Minister of Colonial Affairs had learned that the Dutch trading chief 
was looking forward to receiving further requests for military supplies from 
Japan as a part of the coming trade in the new open ports, Shimoda and 
Hakodate. While this prospect was welcomed in the Netherlands, it would be 
difficult to satisfy the expected large number of Japanese orders. The Minister 
recognized that the Netherlands East Indies could not fill all Japanese orders, 
but he answered the Governor-General explaining that ‘I am very pleased that, 
for the time being, this matter is brought up only as a prospect and there is no 
problem about waiting for further information about this subject’. He called 
upon the General-Governor to be vigilant and ready to deal with this matter in 
the future.368 
In consideration of a report from the Government of the Netherlands 
East Indies, the Minister of Colonial Affairs thought it important that the 
collection of scientific instruments, models, and the Dutch scientific works be 
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delivered to Deshima to serve to demonstrate Western supremacy 
unequivocally to the Japanese.369  This measure was expected not only to 
increase the number of Japanese orders, but also to raise Japanese respect for 
the Dutch personnel on Deshima and for the Netherlands itself. This measure, 
however, was not without its problems. The right of the Kambang trade 
leaseholder, Adrianus Johannes Jacobus de Wolff (dates unknown), would 
expire only after the trading season of 1856. It would infringe on his rights, if 
the Government sent scientific instruments. Under the terms of his contract, the 
Government would not order or receive any article from Japan with the 
exception of copper, camphor, kimono, objects relevant to natural history and 
return presents for the Japanese princes.  
The Government of the Netherlands East Indies proposed to the Minister 
of Colonial Affairs that the rights of the leaseholder be purchased and that the 
Government should take charge of the Kambang trade, because the Japanese 
market had become much more important to the Netherlands and the matter 
could not be postponed until the end of the contract in 1856.370 Up to then the 
right to the Kambang trade had been auctioned off in Batavia. A private 
merchant could purchase this right and only he could carry out this trade. 
Although this document said that this leaseholder was Wolff, his contract had 
been already transferred to Johannes Robertus Lange (1813-1863) by the 
apostillic disposition (Apostillaire dispositie) of the Governor-General of the 
Netherlands East Indies on 28 February 1854 N.8. Later the right was purchased 
from Lange.371 
The Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that it was essential to take 
advantage of the Japanese demands for trade and its recent expansion in 
Nagasaki for the purpose of promoting Dutch political and economic relations 
with Japan.  Taking due note of the proposal of the trading chief on Deshima, 
the Governor-General and the Council of the Netherlands East Indies had 
agreed to the abolition of Kambang trade. The Minister also shared the opinion 
that the Dutch Government should take direct charge of all Japanese trade. 
Consequently it was not possible to lease a part of the trade and to grant the 
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right to a third person; the Dutch Government should not be hindered in its 
purpose or activities by the existence of private concessions. In spite of this 
decision, the Dutch Government had little knowledge of Japanese trade and 
could not formulate a coherent plan to organize. Therefore, the Minister noted 
that under the present circumstances the Dutch Government should carefully 
choose a person and try to free commercial transactions, which was thought 
would automatically lead to commercial expansion.372 
The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies agreed to the 
abolition of the Kambang trade, although his reasons were different from that of 
the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The Governor-General was of the opinion that 
future Japanese trade should be liberalized as much as possible, even if this 
meant that the Dutch Government would have to sacrifice its interests. 
However, he considered this to make sense only after the commercial treaty 
with Japan had been concluded. Therefore, he thought that until such time a 
Government official should direct all trade (Honkata and Kambang trades).373  
Concerning Japanese affairs, the advice of Council of the Netherlands 
East Indies as stated in a document dated 6 April 1855 was that: ‘The old 
position of our post on Deshima was tantamount to a place of exile for Dutch 
Government officials. They were only slightly compensated for being isolated 
by material rewards. This situation has changed in the last several years. 
Japan’s former attitude of doubts about and distrust of the Dutch has been 
transformed into one of frankness and trust. This outstanding result is to be 
attributed to the trading chief, Donker Curtius, while the doctor at the trading 
post, Jan Karel van den Broek (1814-1865) and the naval Lieutenant Fabius, 
have also greatly contributed to it. We would like to ask the Governor-General 
to express his deep appreciation to Donker Curtius who made an effort to the 
Japanese Government grant favors to the Netherlands and the Government of 
the Netherlands East Indies, and also show this same appreciation to Fabius 
and Van den Broek who performed outstanding service [on Deshima]. One part 
of Donker Curtius’ endeavors has already succeeded. Consequently, although 
the Netherlands might be faced with difficulties and sacrifices, it has the 
prospect of achieving success by strictly obeying the rules of the Japanese 
isolation system’; furthermore that ‘the Netherlands should obtain higher 
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profits in Japanese trade than before. Now the abolition of the Kambang trade is 
inevitable, and we are completely in agreement with the opinion of such a wise 
senior bureaucrat [Donker Curtius].’374  
Nonetheless the Governor-General still refused to dispatch the Soembing 
and Gedeh to Japan, because ‘It would be disastrous for the interests of the 
Netherlands East Indies, however important Japanese affairs may be’ to remove 
steamships from the fleet of the Netherlands East Indies.375  
 
 
The true story about the presentation of the Soembing to Japan 
 
By April 1855, both England and the United States had already offered to 
present a steamship to Japan as a gift. Since the Netherlands knew this, it seized 
the initiative in this matter. A wave of criticism about giving the Soembing was 
voiced in Parliament. The argument was that the Netherlands East Indies fleet 
would be seriously weakened and it would become very difficult to patrol 
against pirates in that region: it was already very difficult to deal with this 
problem as it was. The Government replied to such criticism as following: 
‘Although usually there are ten Dutch navy ships in the Netherlands East Indies, 
there are now twelve, apart from the Soembing…of these twelve ships…some 
are in need of repairs or supplies, and consequently it can happen that these 
ships are temporarily unable to perform their duties. It is for this reason that at 
the moment their performance is less than optimal.’ In other words, this 
problem was not directly related to the presentation of the Soembing to Japan. 
The presence of the navy in the Netherlands East Indies had declined and 
under these circumstances it was believed that new ships should be constructed, 
and that it would be better to offer an old ship to Japan.  
Since the Soembing had been used in the Dutch maritime instruction 
manoeuvres in Nagasaki and thus was a well-known ship, and because the 
Japanese eagerly wanted to have a steamship, it, would be a case of ‘killing two 
birds with one stone’. Furthermore, the Government explained that, although 
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the Netherlands East Indies would lose the Soembing, at that moment the ship 
the Amsterdam was ready to leave right away from the Netherlands in order to 
take up duties there. The costs of the Soembing were to be refunded from the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Department of Naval Affairs, which needed 
a better or newer steamship to replace the Soembing, which was verging on the 
obsolete. The Government also mentioned that it was the custom to exchange 
presents between the Netherlands and Japan. It hinted that, surely, Japan 
would reciprocate with a gift of similar worth. Presenting the Soembing was 
done not only out of generosity, but also because other Governments were 
preparing similar gifts. Furthermore, the need of the Netherlands East Indies’ 
navy for new ships and the experience from Dutch-Japanese diplomatic 
relations touching upon the exchange of gifts played a role.376 According to 
another document, the Minister of Colonial Affairs tried to please the 
Governor-General by stating that the Netherlands East Indies should be better 
able to deal with its affairs in the future than at present, because it would 
acquire three more steamships besides the Amsterdam, because the mother 
country was striving to expand the Dutch Navy.377  
On 5 October 1855, the presentation of the Soembing was carried out with 
a magnificent ceremony. The Dutch historian Jan Kikkert comments in his 
biography of King Willem III: ‘Fabius taught the custom of flag-raising on a 
ship to the Japanese on that occasion. Fabius chose the rising-sun flag on a 
white background, which meant that the local commander was on board. As 
the result of this event, the national flag of Japan came into existence.’378 
Actually, however, when Fabius came to Japan in 1854 for the first time, he 
received damyô of Satsuma domain, the nephew of the shogun, on board the 
Soembing. At that time, Fabius hoisted the white flag with a red ball, the 
standard of the Satsuma clan. He received damyô of Hizen domain, one of the 
family members of Shogun Tokugawa Iesada (徳川家定, 1824-58) in the same 
way and, moreover, advised the Japanese to hoist the same flag during the 
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ceremony for the presentation of Soembing.379 As a co-incidental result of these 
circumstances, in September 1854, three months after Perry’s return, a roju 
(senior councillor) ordered that the rising-sun flag with a white background 
should be used on large ships in the future.380 An anecdote exists about the 
presentation of the Soembing. The ship’s colored signal lamp was made in 
England and the name of the manufacturer was inscribed on it in capital letters. 
The Dutch changed the lamp for that from the Gedeh.381 This detail shows again 
that the Netherlands wanted to show its supremacy by obscuring that of 
England. The Netherlands presented a product of Western technology that 
Japan anxiously desired to have at that time, and with it introduced one aspect 
of Western civilization. There was a clear intention behind this. Although the 
Soembing was a gift, Japan would have to depend on the Netherlands in order to 
maintain it. 
   Lieutenant Fabius wrote, ‘It is no longer necessary to ask an exorbitant 
price for our goods. Now we can gain fl. 120,000 in profits on rifles. Moreover, 
we can get fl. 20,450 for 6 million detonators.’382A Dutch navy detachment had 
already started to train the Japanese in Nagasaki. Since Japan had clearly 
recognized the importance of foreign naval assistance, it was expected that it 
would insist on the continuation of such training. The more Japan depended on 
the Netherlands, the more the Dutch could obtain in political concessions from 
Japan. Moreover, the Dutch Government could also expect economic profits by 
fulfilling Japanese demands. This was the Dutch diplomatic strategy. 
 Since the signs intimated that this strategy was being successful, the 
Dutch Government displayed a high degree of confidence with regard to Japan. 
This confidence and the policy followed in respect of Japan, however, were also 
being questioned by some. For instance, Thorbecke demanded from the 
Government a detailed explanation about its statement that ‘We trust that the 
Japanese Government will not lose sight of its old relationship with the 
Netherlands when it confers privileges on other nations’. He severely criticized 
this optimistic way of thinking and the Dutch Government’s policy, which he 
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considered inappropriate and vague. 383  After Perry had executed a fleet 
demonstration and created the first breakthrough in ‘the Japanese wall’, the 
Dutch Government declared in Parliament that its warning and advice had 
contributed to this improvement in the West's relations with Japan. Thorbecke, 
however, had already mentioned that it was ‘a fact that was [enormously] 
influenced by another power rather than by us.’, and he expressed his serious 
concern concerning the present Governmental diplomacy towards Japan.384 
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Chapter 7 
 
The endeavour for and success 
 in concluding the Dutch-Japanese treaty 
 
 
The unique Dutch diplomacy towards Japan 
 
The Netherlands thought it a matter of the utmost importance to conclude a 
treaty with Japan, although it already enjoyed privileges that other countries 
did not have. The Dutch needed a treaty, because the current situation 
depended on the goodwill of the Japanese Government and was uncertain 
because of recent developments. The Dutch Government considered it 
particularly important to specify the improvement of the treatment of the Dutch 
in Nagasaki in a treaty, in order to enlarge the Dutch commercial interests there. 
Lieutenant Fabius was therefore assigned the task of concluding the treaty with 
Japan. He reported that he had been successful in concluding a provisional 
Dutch-Japanese agreement on 9 November 1855. This news greatly pleased the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs, who hastened to report it to the king.385 The 
reports Fabius sent back from his mission to Japan were very extensive.386  
At this point it is useful to explore briefly the question of why the 
Netherlands continued its Japanese trade in spite of the deficit which it brought 
the Dutch Government year after year. The document ‘11 March 1856 N.141, 
Geheim’ includes the table of prices for goods imported to Japan in the Honkata 
trade and also the table of prices for the Japanese traders. This table reveals that 
the price of the Japanese traders’ goods was already 3 to 4 times higher than the 
goods price of the Honkata trade. For example, the price of spices was about 20 
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times higher at this point. This fact suggests something about another Dutch 
trade, the Kambang trade. It makes clear that the Dutch made higher profits in 
the Kambang trade, which meant in fact that the Netherlands could expect to 
gain large profits, if the Japanese market were expanded and opened up 
  On the basis of Fabius' detailed reports, the future of Dutch-Japanese 
trade was carefully considered at the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. As a 
guideline for future trade relations, a set of documents was submitted to the 
king by the Ministries of Colonial and Foreign Affairs. This included two notes 
entitled, ‘Note on the summary of the Japanese documents which arrived in 
February 1856’ and ‘Further note on the summary of the Japanese documents 
received in March 1856’, written by H.T. Krabbe. He was in charge of Japanese 
affairs in Section G, the historical department and library of the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs (Historisch bureau en bibliotheek, the so-called Japan desk 
‘Japansche afdeeling’). These documents allowed an overview of the development 
of Dutch-Japanese relations.387 In their joint report to the king, the Ministers of 
Colonial and Foreign Affairs presented relations with Japan as an important 
political issue relevant not only to the colonial empire but also to the Dutch 
position in Europe. In order to improve Dutch political and commercial status 
in Japan, the Dutch needed to satisfy the Japanese desires for reform and 
progress. However, the two Ministers considered it completely reasonable that, 
for the time being, the Dutch should refrain from any direct measures aimed at 
opening Japan to free trade. In other words, the Dutch Government decided to 
expand existing Japanese trade for its own agenda, in order to prepare for the 
future commercial competition with other powers. 
The results obtained and the activities pursued in Japan by the Dutch 
commissioner, Donker Curtius, and Lieutenant Fabius, and the development of 
the treaty negotiations are summarized in this report as follows: ‘The Dutch 
commissioner proposed the provisional agreement and concluded it, in 
consideration of the various difficulties in connection with the treaty 
negotiations; thus the aims of ensuring the former Dutch privileges in Nagasaki, 
and of abolishing the isolation of the Dutch on Deshima, and of acquiring 
individual freedom [for those working there], and of enjoying all rights given to 
other powers by Japan in the future, was accomplished. Furthermore, since the 
troublesome commercial procedure for the Dutch in Nagasaki was removed 
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and the Dutch commissioner was allowed to keep the key to Deshima’s water 
gate, Deshima became, so to speak, a Dutch bonded warehouse (entrepôt).’388  
  Furthermore, to obtain a powerful tool for Dutch influence on Japan's 
development, this report stressed that the Dutch were not only to contribute to 
Japan materially (steamships etc.) and intellectually (specialists etc.), but also to 
assert Dutch moral influence (Zedelijken invloed) in Japan. The Netherlands 
thought that it was very important to maintain and increase Dutch influence in 
Asia by means of placing Japan under Dutch cultural influence, at a time at 
which it was also strongly supporting the Japanese policy of Europeanization. 
Moreover, asserting a cultural influence seemed to be a highly effective means 
of competing with the assistance offered to Japan by such great powers as the 
British and Americans who would base their support on their material 
superiority.389  Fabius also stressed the importance of widening the Dutch 
cultural influence there. He reported that it was important to export Dutch 
books and spread the Dutch language. He thought that this would promote 
Dutch industry, because the Japanese would learn about and develop an 
interest in Western civilization through the medium of Dutch; therefore they 
would order Western goods from the Netherlands.390 
For this reason, the maritime lessons in Nagasaki were given in Dutch. 
Fabius reported that ‘I was pleased to see that a Japanese officer not only 
commanded the manoeuvres excellently, but also explained them in clear 
Dutch.’391 Fabius, however, was surprised to receive the harbour regulation in 
English, when he anchored in Hakodate. He reacted as follows: ‘I pointed out 
the fact that a system of Dutch interpreters existed in Japan and the Japanese 
authorities demanded to receive an unofficial paper written in English. And I 
refused to accept it and required a paper written in Dutch.’ He explained his 
actions by saying: ‘I thought that it would be difficult to maintain the Dutch 
influence there, and that the Dutch influence established for two centuries 
might rapidly vanish.’ Oblique lines were drawn in this sentence.392 With 
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respect to cultural influence, the Governor-General of the Netherlands East 
Indies was in charge of choosing which personnel to dispatch to Japan. Fabius 
did not wish to discuss illegal affairs: ‘I shall not expatiate on disloyal trade or 
smuggling, which one may find anywhere. If one wishes to risk it without 
fearing the problems, headaches, and losses that may result from it, it 
[smuggling] can be done. But that is no [proper] trade and would very much 
hurt our position in Japan.’393  
The Dutch commissioner requested a warship be dispatched to Nagasaki 
to maintain public order as the number of merchant ships coming there would 
increase. This request for the sending warships from the Netherlands Indies to 
Japan had always encountered the opposition of the Governor-General in 
Batavia, but the Minister of Colonial Affairs, however, dismissed these 
objections. The Dutch commissioner was in the position to obtain permission 
from the Japanese Government for the Dutch trading post to import an 
unlimited supply of linen products for auction in the Kambang trade, because the 
Dutch were entitled to receiving goods in exchange for the steamship ordered 
by Japan. The Minister of Colonial Affairs pointed out that it was highly 
important that in this way the existing monopoly of the Japanese Government 
monopoly on the trade in European linen products was abolished. The Dutch 
expected large profits from this trade, because the Dutch commissioner had 
reported that many such commodities had been sold in 1856, at least 20,000 
invoices having been made. It was thought that this trade would create an 
important market for Dutch textiles in Japan.394  
In spite of these expectations, the means for payment for the ship was not 
decided on immediately. The Dutch commissioner noted that ‘Our relations 
with Japan regarding trade also are perfect, but, especially at present, we 
should strive to get ahead of other powers in this matter’. Thus the 
commissioner stressed that the Dutch Government should take active measures 
to increase trade, and he warned that passive diplomacy would result in losing 
the present favorable opportunity.395 
   In order to strengthen the Dutch commercial position, the commissioner 
discussed the possibility of establishing regular shipping between Nagasaki 
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and China with the Japanese authorities. Along this route coal, which was 
abundant in Japan, was to be carried to the open ports in China. Moreover, 
Donker Curtius was of the opinion that this plan had an even greater 
importance, because it would lead to establishing a new trade in Asia, as the 
Dutch would be able to transport Chinese goods regularly to Japan, and of 
enabling the rapid dispatch of documents regarding Japanese affairs to Europe. 
At this time relations with Japan were regarded as very important by the 
Netherlands, and the Dutch Government wanted to obtain these documents as 
soon as possible for the purpose of formulating its new policy. Donker Curtius 
requested the Dutch Government to purchase a small steamship and send it to 
Nagasaki, should Japan not be able to procure a ship for this plan.396 The 
Minister of Colonial Affairs thought that the plan was attractive, but he could 
not proceed with it immediately. He pointed out that Donker Curtius had 
explained this plan completely hypothetically, because the trade in Japanese 
imports was still uncertain.  
  The relevance of coal to trade is shown by the fact that a mining 
engineer was to be dispatched to Japan from the Netherlands East Indies. The 
era of the steamship had begun, and the demand for coal was increasing 
rapidly. It was of crucial importance to secure a supply of the coal needed for 
shipping to and from Japan. This matter was also related to the principal 
problem in Japan’s emerging international trade: there were only a few 
Japanese export products available. In order to solve this problem and to create 
a new industry in Japan, coal-mining was seen by the Dutch officials as the key 
to building up a foreign trade without the expediency of large quantities of 
silver or gold leaving the country. When the Governor-General of the 
Netherlands East Indies reported that no mining engineer was available, the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs stressed that this matter would be important not 
only to Japan but also indirectly to Dutch interests. He stressed that ‘As the 
interest seems paramount, the first signatory [the Minister of Colonial Affairs] 
does not falter in his conviction that some less necessary mining matters in the 
Netherlands East Indies temporarily have to be made subordinate to this 
reason.’397 
Fabius reported that Japan requested 100,000 guns, and that Koban of 
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2,000 ryo (a currency unit of Japanese gold plate) had been sent to Batavia on 
the Gedeh in order to pay for the two ships ordered by the Japanese Government. 
Therefore, he pointed out that this was of the greatest importance to 
Dutch-Japanese political relations. He explained that the speedy solution of this 
matter was not only important to Japan, but also to Dutch commerce and 
industry. He stressed especially that these events were of great significance not 
only to the Netherlands East Indies but also to the Netherlands. As an example 
to back up his expectations that Dutch commerce and industry would obtain 
very favourable results in Japan, he mentioned that damyô of Hizen domain 
(Nabeshima Naomasa 鍋島直正, 1814-1871) had requested the construction of a 
shipyard. Furthermore, taking into account the Dutch Government’s concern 
about the uncertain situation in Japan’s foreign trade, he proposed that 
merchants in Batavia should send various goods recommended by him to Japan 
by way of a small-scale trial, adding to his comments that he did not think that 
this trial would in any way be disadvantageous and that it would immediately 
result in the expansion of the Nagasaki trade.398 Furthermore, he noted that the 
profits would rise immediately, even if this trade began rather tentatively at 
first. He also reported that colonial products, especially coffee, could be sold in 
Japan. His ideas about the organization of the Japanese trade, however, were 
different to those of the Dutch Government. He thought that this trade should 
not be monopolized but be free. 
 
 
From the Dutch-Japanese Provisional Agreement of 1855 and the 
Dutch-Japanese Treaty of 1856 to the Dutch-Japanese Amended 
Treaty of 1857  
 
‘The Dutch Minister at Deshima, Donker Curtius, kept Edo fully informed of 
international developments and did his best to exploit Japanese fears to his own 
advantage. In August 1856 he warned the Bakufu (shogunal government) that 
Britain planned a mission to Japan and advised conclusion of a commercial 
treaty with Holland to forestall unpleasant surprises, remarking as an added 
inducement that customs duties would be a useful means of increasing 
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Government revenue.’399 The Bakufu understood that allowing foreign trade 
could no longer be avoided. Nevertheless, the influence exuded by the 
anti-foreign group stood in the way. Under these circumstances, it seemed best 
for Japan to negotiate with the Netherlands which measures would be 
appropriate to the process of opening its metaphorical doors. After the 
Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1856, the Netherlands endeavoured to effectuate a 
commercial treaty that would grant free trade access to other countries, but the 
Bakufu was reluctant to make any such concession. Therefore, Opperhoofd (‘the 
trading chief’) Donker Curtius proposed a transit trade, in which, on the basis 
of the system similar to Dutch trade carried out in Nagasaki, the Netherlands 
would mediate in the trade of other foreign countries with Japan. The 
magistrate of Nagasaki agreed to this proposal. As a result, an Amended 
Dutch-Japanese Treaty, supplementing that of 1856 was concluded. ‘It still 
promised many restrictions on the Dutch freedom of action, but it was much 
more generous than anything previously considered, permitting trade to an 
unlimited amount at Nagasaki and Hakodate, to be carried on by private 
merchants under official supervision and on payment of a considerable duty. 
Curtius found it very satisfactory.’ 400  The Netherlands regarded the 
supplementary agreement as the fruit of having given the Soembing to shogun, 
but the Dutch liberals, especially in the lower house, expressed great 
disappointment at such a meagre result. In their eyes, the outcome was entirely 
different from the Dutch expectations aroused by the presenting of the Soembing. 
The treaty did not allow the desired Dutch access to Japan on the basis of free 
trade. It was natural that they were highly critical of the Dutch commissioner in 
Japan, Donker Curtius. 401  The Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pieter Mijer 
(1812-1881), who had been a member of the Council of the Netherlands East 
Indies in 1852-1854, pleaded in his favour: ‘I know him personally as an 
efficient, careful, and adroit person.’ 402  Van Hoëvell also questioned this 
outcome.403 After the treaty of 1858 was concluded, Van Hoëvell expressed his 
regret that ‘we cannot assume that Mr. Donker Curtius, until recently a judge of 
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the Supreme Court in Java, has any special aptitude for business.’404 Although 
the Netherlands had intended to procure special privileges based on vested 
rights unique to the Dutch, nothing of this kind was specified. This drew an 
enormous amount of criticism in Parliament.405  
None the less, the Dutch Government had succeeded in concluding the 
first substantial treaty, which included commercial regulations, with Japan. 
Moreover, the treaty did give certain privileges to the Netherlands. The Dutch 
Government chose to emphasize only these successful aspects and stated that it 
would continue to improve relations with Japan, and asserted once again that 
the treaty was the direct outcome of giving the Soembing as a present. Van 
Hoëvell criticized such Governmental comments by quoting the words of 
Gijsbertus Martinus van der Linden (1812-1888), Member of Parliament: ‘This 
agreement is the outcome of our Soembing, said Mr. Van der Linden on that 
occasion. A result that seems to entail no more than that we are allowed to 
navigate freely through the Bay of Nagasaki without communicating with 
anyone, that we may fish there at our leisure, and that we may go from Decima 
to Nagasaki without being accompanied by a Japanese officer!’406 Moreover the 
treaty did make an ambiguous remark that the Dutch could expect further 
privileges in the future, but Japan only granted these little by little.407 Such 
statements by the Government were hardly convincing. Not much later, in 1858, 
an incident occurred which made clear how little the Dutch had achieved with 
their treaty. 
Official documents in the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs, however, 
indicate that the Dutch Government really did feel highly satisfied with the 
continuation of the restricted trade system, because it meant that the Dutch 
monopoly in the Japanese market would be protected.  Deshima was allowed 
by the Japanese Government to be used as a kind of Dutch bonded warehouse 
(entrepôt) for the Nagasaki trade. The Dutch could import goods for the 
Japanese market or for Dutch consumption on Deshima free of duties. 
Consequently, the Netherlands would completely control all Japanese foreign 
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trade and this greatly, but secretly, pleased the Dutch Government. The Asian 
head office of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM)408 in Batavia was 
pleased with the many privileges accorded to the Netherlands in the 
provisional agreement, which was intended to result in a Dutch-Japanese treaty. 
The basis of this agreement was the idea that the restricted trading system, and 
the Dutch privileged position in it, would be maintained. It fitted admirably 
with the purpose of ‘hunting up new sources for Dutch trade and shipping’, 
precisely the aim of the NHM establishment. Therefore the NHM office in 
Batavia asked the Governor-General for permission to send colonial products 
from the Netherlands East Indies and industrial products from Europe to 
Nagasaki and to charge a person instructed by the NHM with the sale under 
the control of the Japanese trading post. The NHM was very enthusiastic: ‘The 
NHM did not intend to make huge profits from this expedition and it will, if 
anything, suffer an initial loss, however if we are prepared not to flinch from a 
loss, we shall be able to become acquainted with the goods most desirable for 
export and import in Japan.’409 
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The endeavour to maintain Dutch profits in Japan 
 
The director of Products and Civil Storehouse (‘Directeur van producten en 
Civiele Magazijn) at Batavia reacted negatively to the expansion of the Japanese 
trade.: ‘As far as it seems wise in consideration of the interest of this country 
[The Netherlands] and as long as the Japanese persist in their restrictions on 
trade, we [the Dutch] can continue the trade at the expense of their Government 
in the present situation, only if we can obtain suitable Japanese imports in 
exchange for articles demanded by the Japanese. It is very uncertain whether 
filling the demands of Japanese lords and consequently booking considerable 
sums in the Kambang fund (Kambang-fonds)410  will lead to making profits, 
because the Japanese lords try to buy their necessities or the articles which catch 
their fancy at a bargain rate. There would be no objection to this if the Japanese 
were to pay for the articles in copper, gold or in the articles highly amenable to 
us in this trade. These articles, however, can be purchased only from the 
Japanese by way of the Kambang trade at present, and the right is sold off to the 
Kambang lease-holder….The Kambang lease-holder is not hurt because he is 
making profits of 300-400 per cent by dispatching invoices of a comparatively 
small sum. Therefore, he does not make a loss…On the other hand, the 
Government will suffer great losses by sending much larger quantities of goods 
at moderate prices, without the kambang privileges.’ 
  For this reason, he advised the Governor-General as follows: ‘If Japan 
recognizes Western superiority and asks the Netherlands for various articles 
and the Dutch can fulfil all demands, the Kambang fund will immediately swell 
to millions of guilders. It seems unadvisable to expand the trade with Japan to 
this extent at the expense of the Government. It would be no longer advisable 
that an enlightened and substantial trade group like the NHM devote its 
knowledge, experience and funds to the trade in consideration of the interest of 
the Netherlands. Then, it would be no problem for the Government of the 
Netherlands East Indies that the NHM carry out this trade independently. 
However, it is not desirable for the Government of the Netherlands East Indies 
that the Kambang trade be conducted at its expense. This opinion should be 
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transmitted to the Dutch commissioner in Japan, and it is left to your judgment 
whether he should assure the Japanese authorities that they can acquire their 
demands most cheaply by private trade.’411  
The ideas of the Director of Products and Civil Storehouse found 
acceptance: the Council of the Netherlands East Indies decided to support the 
trial of the NHM and to hand over the required information about Japanese 
trade secretly, because the NHM might not be properly informed about the 
present condition of the trade. 412  Against this background, the 
Governor-General decided that, although the Government of the Netherlands 
East Indies could not admit what the Japanese Government would not admit, 
this matter should be transmitted to the trading chief on Deshima. It had no 
objection to co-operation and mediation to this case; furthermore the NHM 
could send goods to Japan freely at its own risk through the agency of the 
trading post on Deshima or use no agency at all.413 The Governor-General 
stated that the monopolistic state in the Kambang trade was still necessary under 
the present circumstances as an instrument for forcing the opening up of more 
harbours in Japan for the private trade and also the trade with other countries. 
414 On the other hand, he did hold the view that the monopolistic practices 
should be eliminated in favour of free trade based on free competition in the 
near future.  
Such inconsistency occurred frequently in Dutch official statements at 
that time: the Dutch Government did not stop fulfilling Japanese demands, 
while paradoxically the Government did not intend to comply with Japanese 
demands as long as the system of isolation was maintained. The hypothetical 
ideal fostered by the Dutch was based upon the opinion that Japan would come 
to appreciate foreign trade from its experience with the Dutch, and that this 
experience would then indirectly contribute to the economic and political 
reformation of Japan. In practice, however, the Dutch aimed at maximizing 
                                            
411 NA Koloniën A letter of 21 January from the Director of Product and Civil Stock to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies 1856 on 2 May 1856 N.232.  
412 NA Koloniën A letter of 24 January from the Director of Product and Civil Stock to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies 1856 on 2 May 1856 N.232. 
413 NA Koloniën, Extract out of the register in resolutions of the Governor-General of the 
Netherlands East Indies on 22 February 1856 in 2 May 1856 N.232 on 2 May 1856 N.232.   
414 NA Koloniën, ‘A letter of 10 January 1856 on 2 May 1856 N.232’.  
 146 
trade profits. The Governor-General and Council of the Netherlands East Indies, 
Donker Curtius, and Fabius all advocated free trade in Japan based on free 
competition by private merchants as soon as possible. On the other hand, in 
consideration of large profits made for the Netherlands on this trade, the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs believed that free trade would not serve the Dutch 
political and commercial interests in Japan, or Japan’s own interests.   
Therefore, he considered it unsuitable to set Japan immediately on a course of 
unreserved commercial competition in which only civilian merchants chased 
profits, because Japanese trade was in a period of transition. He instructed the 
Governor-General that the Dutch were to refrain from direct diplomacy with 
Japan, lest a collision should occur with the other foreign countries incited by 
their jealousy of Dutch privileges in Japan. However, he believed that a 
contribution should be made to such fields as industry, mining and the like, 
without neglecting Dutch interests and to work effectively on the expansion of 
the Dutch commercial policy. The Dutch Government preferred to allow 
Japanese affairs to develop gradually, and justified this policy by the 
consideration that ‘a gradual transition is completely in the character of the 
Japanese.’415 In the latest Instruction from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the 
Governor-General, the Minister confirmed the idea that ‘we will enable Japan to 
persevere in its exclusion of foreigners, if we continue to freely accommodate it 
[in that policy]’… ‘We have refrained from engaging in several big transactions, 
because that would be unwise in the present experimental stage of affairs that 
our trade with Japan is facing. Yet the necessity has also been shown, that we 
should make our trade serve the wishes and the needs of Japan, in order to 
bring about, that the Japanese learn to appreciate [the use of] foreign trade.’416 
This statement is very important. The Netherlands protested strongly 
against the idea widespread in Europe at the time that the Netherlands 
intended to preserve the Japanese system of isolation for its own benefit. The 
contrary was true. The idea was to carefully make the Japanese aware of the 
profits of foreign trade, without forcing the situation. J.A. van der Chijs, the 
author of Neêrlands Streven, actually wrote that book for the specific purpose of 
refuting this rumour on the basis of official documents. He meant to emphasize 
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the Dutch contribution to the modernization of Japan’s foreign policy. The Royal 
Institute for the Linguistics, Geography and Ethnology of the Netherlands Indies at 
The Hague supported this book that was published with the consent of the 
Government and dedicated to the Dutch king. However, although Van der 
Chijs attempted to deny this, the official documents in the archives show that 
some of these rumours were actually based on the truth. What was happening 
was that the Dutch were too slow and that too little to convince the others of 
their basically good intentions. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
 as allies in Japan 
 
 
British policy in Asia  
 
According to N. Tarling, during the nineteenth century Britain had only limited 
needs in South-East Asia and these needs were basically related to needs 
elsewhere. They applied to such issues as the security for the dominion in India 
and the trade to China, the command of the Straits of Malacca, a fair share of 
the trade of the [Indonesian] islands, and, at a later date, the protection of 
communications with Australia and New Zealand.’ 417  Diplomatically, 
England’s main concern in Asia was the southern expansion of the Russian 
empire. 
 Before the opening of Japan, England had forged a plan to take 
possession of the tiny Ogasawara Archipelago, which was under Japanese 
rule. 418  Perry also called at this archipelago in 1853. 419  In 1834, England 
abolished the exclusive right of the British East India Company to the trade 
with China, in order to make the trade more efficient. This opened the China 
trade to competing companies. William John Napier (9th Lord Napier, 
1789-1834) was sent by the British to act as trade inspector in China, where 
informally he also acted as Britain’s diplomatic representative. On his arrival, 
Napier attempted to hand a notice of his arrival to the Governor of Canton, but 
the Chinese refused to deal with him. This upset England which considered it 
correct in international relations that a British high official should conduct 
negotiations on an equal footing with a Chinese high official. The Chinese 
authorities allowed only written petitions from foreigners to be submitted 
through Chinese merchants. In response to the British attempt to circumvent 
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this rule, China stopped all trade with England and stopped providing food 
and water for the British trading firms in Canton. Moreover, Chinese soldiers 
were sent in to surround the British premises. Two British warships sailed up 
the Pearl River towards Canton to protect British nationals while exchanging 
fire with Chinese forces. Despite such gunboat diplomacy, China continued its 
pressure on the British in Canton, and Napier had to cease his attempts to 
establish direct contact with Chinese officials.420 
  This incident clearly demonstrated to the British government how 
important it was to possess a base in the region to which its nationals could 
safely be evacuated and where a fleet could be concentrated to display military 
strength. It was at that time that the Ogasawara archipelago attracted the 
attention of the British, because of its location near to China, Japan and Taiwan. 
After the Opium Wars, however, the annexation of Hong Kong vitiated this 
plan. The catalyst of the Opium Wars changed the trading system in China 
from closed to an open one. In the aftermath, England vigorously increased its 
trading activities in East Asia. After China, Japan would be a logical next target 
for British commercial penetration. However, in the years after the Opium Wars 
China still required plenty of attention from the British, who did not have 
sufficient resources to send a part of its navy to Japan. Moreover, Britain did not 
rank the importance of trade with Japan very highly.421 As Tarling has pointed 
out, Britain indeed had taken the initiative in opening up China ten years 
earlier, but it was now displaying much less interest in opening up Japan. 422 
John Davis, the Superintendent of Trade and Governor of Hong Kong, 
had already recommended sending a mission to Japan in 1845,423 but a British 
mission to Japan actually materialized only much later. Moreover, the British 
were not very optimistic about the possible gains from an active Japanese policy. 
According to Beasley who has described these plans in detail, Davis was quite 
willing to leave the China coast to conduct negotiations elsewhere, but instead 
of Japan, he turned his attention to the plans for opening trade with Cochin 
China, which had been drawn up at Gützlaff’s suggestion in the previous year. 
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In November 1846 he wrote to the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, to 
announce his intention of going to Cochin China in the spring, a project which 
he considered ‘much more likely to be attended by success than the mission to 
Japan in which the Americans (James Biddle) have lately so entirely failed.’. 
Moreover, says Beasley, ‘When, in the summer of 1846, Davis reported his 
decisions to postpone the Japan expedition because he could not raise enough 
force to match the French and American missions, he was appealing – though 
the dispatch was addressed to Lord Aberdeen (4th Earl of Aberdeen, George 
Hamilton Gordon, 1784-1860) – to all Palmerston’s national prejudice.’…[Yet] 
‘This would continue to be impossible until the Foreign Office or the Admiralty 
decided that the Japan mission was important enough to be given priority over 
some of the other duties required of the China squadron. There seemed no 
immediate prospect of any such decision.’ 424  In other words, the British 
authorities drew a lesson from Biddle’s failure and decided that nothing should 
be undertaken in Japan without sufficient naval support.’425 Therefore, Tarling 
remarks, ‘Bowring (Sir John Bowring, 1792-1872) in fact was anxious to attempt 
the mission to Japan first. He felt it unwise, however, to go without ‘a 
respectable armament’, and this could not be provided owing to the outbreak of 
the Crimean War. He decided instead to attempt the easier mission to Siam.’426 
This kind of comment is reconfirmed in another document Bowring wrote; ‘I 
hope if I go to Jeddo I shall obtain other and better conditions; but I must go 
with a considerable fleet.’427 
  The British policy towards Japan is further explained by the British 
Consul in Japan, Alcock, who wrote: ‘The extension and free development of 
commerce, without costly armaments of war, being the avowed and sole object 
of our treaties, it would be very important if we could determine, with some 
degree of certainty, under what conditions and to what extent it my be possible 
to attain this end in the far East.’ He added ‘To secure new markets without 
danger of collision or risk of interruption, is the dream of Manchester and the 
hope of our manufacturing interest generally’428, and continued: ‘There must, 
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we have seen, be means of coercion in the background, and to this must be 
added the known will and power to resort to them – if all other means fail to 
secure the honest fulfilment of the stipulations of Treaties. This implies a 
possible contingency of collision and war, but there be firmness and discretion 
in the employment of such means of diplomacy, there is the best chance, which 
circumstances admit, of avoiding the actual resort to force, or any overt acts of 
compulsion.’429 His words are a textbook example of the representation of the 
policy of ‘Free trade Imperialism’: expanding imperialist control ‘By informal 
means if possible, or by formal annexations when necessary’ in order to achieve 
free trade.430 
  Diplomacy towards Japan was not important in England at that time. 
Certainly, diplomacy towards China was considered more important. Alcock 
said that the population of India was 130 million, that of China was 300 million 
and that of Japan was only 30 million. ‘Japanese trade we could very well 
dispense with,’ he said, adding that: ‘The tea and silk supply can be procured 
elsewhere.…while the profits on any of our manufactures they may take, will 
probably never pay the cost of a small squadron to protect it.’431  
In the opinion of Alcock, however, Japan formed part of the ‘chain’ of the 
British Empire. Because his thoughts on the matter very eloquently voice the 
British views at the time, a series of quotes from his famous work The Capital of 
the Tycoon will do here: ‘In this chain, not a link can be broken or damaged, 
even in such an outlying and distant region of the East as Japan, without some 
danger and prejudice to the whole,’432 … ‘Western Powers, and we more 
especially, have great interests in the East, of which Japan is an outpost.’ 
Therefore, the loss of ‘our prestige in the East’, and ‘any act or course of policy 
which may serve to indicate either fear or weakness, is calculated to affect the 
power and the integrity of the whole empire.’ Acquiring knowledge of what is 
important and what is not about Japan, ‘unfortunately, [...] cannot be decided 
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with exclusive reference to that country.’433   
Alcock had noticed that Russia wanted to acquire new territories in East 
Asia, even though it did not seem much interested in carrying on trade. He 
insisted that England would maintain a relationship aimed at maintaining 
Japan as a buffer to oppose the southwards advance of this ‘aggressive 
Maritime Power’. He believed that Russia, if it wished to undertake something 
against British trade in the China seas and in the Pacific, would try to conquer 
or annex islands in the Japanese seas: ‘the only link wanted to complete her 
chain of empire round the world…there can be little doubt Japan would 
become a portion of the Russian empire at no distant date, if other European 
Powers retired.’434 As a consequence, England preferred to maintain smooth 
relations with Japan, through the good offices of its ally, the Netherlands, which 
happened to be the only Western power that entertained relations with Japan 
and which was possibly in the position to open up this country to foreign access. 
Moreover, in case England ever took action to open Japan, it would take the 
support of its ally, the Netherlands, for granted.435 
When England received information about the conclusion of the 
Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1856, the British Foreign Secretary, George William 
Frederick Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon (1800-70) asked Abercromby to transmit 
this sentiment to the Dutch Government, ‘You will express to the Netherland 
Minister for Foreign Affairs the best thanks of Her Majesty’s Government for 
the communication of these important documents, which have been read with 
great interest and satisfaction by Her Majesty’s Government, who trust that the 
sound advice, supported by able arguments, of the Netherland Government 
may lead the Japanese Government to adopt a course of policy more consonant 
with the interests of Japan and of those Foreign countries with which, sooner or 
later, Japan must come into relation.’436   
Beasley points out that ‘British action, it believed, had already eased 
American difficulties in China. It would in some sense redress the balance, 
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therefore, if American initiative in Japan broke down the policy of seclusion 
and thereby made it easier for to establish trade relations. Such a result seemed 
both probable and desirable.’437 Referring to Bowring’s dispatch to Japan he 
says, ‘He was ordered to report on the progress and results of the American 
expedition, but was given no power to negotiate because Sir Samuel George 
Bonham, 1st Baronet, (1803-1863) already had it and would probably return to 
duty before any action was needed. James Howard Harris, 3rd Earl of 
Malmesbury (1807-1889) certainly had no intention of competing with Perry.’ 
Therefore, as far as the British were concerned, ‘Her Majesty’s Government 
would be glad to see the trade with Japan open; but they think it better to leave 
it to the Government of the United States to make the experiment; and if that 
experiment is successful, Her Majesty’s Government can take advantage of its 
success.’438  
There is yet another example of British non-active diplomacy towards 
Japan in the Aberdeen papers. A memorandum of 1852 noted that ‘The 
American Expedition to Japan is naturally a matter of great interest. Its precise 
object does not seem to be avowed; but it is scarcely to be supposed that the 
Government of the United States would incur the expense of setting on foot a 
larger force than has ever quitted its shores without some commensurate 
advantage in view.’439 
When the first news of Perry’s success reached London, this raised some 
consternation: ‘1st Baron Edmund Hammond (1802-1890), Addington’s [Henry 
U. Addington] successor as Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, at 
once drafted a letter to the Admiralty to inform them that Bowring had already 
received instructions to go to Japan when the opportunity arose; that Perry’s 
success afforded that opportunity; and Stirling (James Stirling naval 
commander-in-chief of China and the East Indies, 1791-1865), if he had not 
already done so, should be ordered to provide as large a force as he could spare, 
since the size of the American and Russian squadrons in Japanese waters made 
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desirable ‘a certain degree of pomp.’440 ‘The Foreign Office saw American 
action in Japan not as a model of what should be done but as a guide to how 
easily results might be achieved. Thus if Biddle’s failure contributed to the 
postponement of Davis’ plan, Perry’s success on the contrary led to the 
adoption of Bowring’s.’441  
It was agreed that ‘Gunboat diplomacy’ was necessary to negotiate with 
Japan. Beasley remarks in this respect: ‘The Foreign Office under Clarendon 
was equally convinced that nothing less than a guard of honor of warships 
would enable a British diplomat to succeed in negotiations with Japan. The 
Taiping Rebellion and the Crimean War, both harbingers of new threats to 
British lives and shipping in China, first made it difficult and then impossible to 
detach a squadron for the purpose. The mission was again postponed. In theory 
this postponement was until the spring of 1855.’442 
  England became involved in Japanese affairs after Japan’s opening. It 
was not active, but assumed a rather reluctant attitude. For instance, ‘The first 
British official representative to reside in Japan was Rutherford Alcock who 
was appointed as Consul General. He reached Japan in June 1859 and finding 
that this title did not give him sufficient rank among his diplomatic colleagues 
assumed the title of ‘Plenipotentiary’. The Foreign Office agreed and formally 
appointed him as ‘Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary’. 
Moreover, ‘The British Mission was a very small one and the head of mission 
had to carry a heavy burden of work.’ Furthermore, ‘Language was a major 
problem especially in the 1860s. At first as there were no competent interpreters 
between Japanese and English interpretation had to be through the medium of 
Dutch. This fact and the absence of equivalents in Japanese for terms and 
concepts in common use in English not only meant that conversations took a 
long time but there were frequent misunderstandings and nuances were 
missed.’443 
  Beasley also points out these language problems; ‘The Japanese at 
Nagasaki were no better equipped for communicating in English. Their official 
interpreters had begun the study of that language early in the nineteenth 
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century and attained some proficiency in it, but thereafter they had worked 
largely at Edo and interest at Nagasaki had waned. By the time of Stirling’s 
arrival the officials there were forced to admit that they had no means of 
writing in English and could therefore give only verbal replies to his letters. 
However, Donker Curtius, the Dutch Superintendent at Deshima, knew English 
well enough to translate the admiral’s letters into Dutch, and this made it 
possible for the Dutch-speaking interpreters attached to the bugyô’s Office to 
translate them into Japanese. This method was normally used during the 
negotiations.’444 
Cortazzi states that, ‘Certainly, it is clear from Alcock’s despatches that 
he was never in doubt about the fact that the development of British trade was a, 
if not the, major objective of his mission.’445 Hence, England regarded it as 
unimportant to establish British political influence in Japan. Meanwhile Alcock 
encountered many difficulties, not in the least because Japan was a dangerous 
place for foreigners. As early as 9 August 1859 he sent a note to the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs in which he complained that his officers could not walk outside 
their missions ‘without risk of rudeness, offence and … violence of the most 
determined and wanton character…These outrages can only be considered as 
reproach and scandal’. Alcock’s protests had no effect.’ 446  ‘In November 
Alcock’s servant was attacked before his eyes.’ Finally, ‘Alcock became so 
frustrated that on 14 December he addressed a note to the authorities which 
contained a threat of armed retaliation.’ However, ‘This earned a rebuke for 
Alcock from Lord John Russell (1st Earl Russell, 1792-1878), the Foreign 
Secretary: ‘Time and patience may remove many of the difficulties of which you 
complain…’447 Furthermore, in 1861 his legation was attacked in the middle of 
the night by rônin (masterless samurai). ‘Alcock was provoked by the 
appearance after the incident of a Japanese official who called to congratulate 
him on his escape and prayed him ‘to accept a basket of ducks and a jar of sugar 
in token of amity.’ Alcock rejected this peace offering and demanded ‘justice 
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and redress, not ducks or sugar’.’448   
  Confronted with these developments, England needed the support of 
its ally, the Netherlands. Therefore it was necessary for England to maintain a 
good relationship with the Dutch in Asia. This approach was very different to 
the relationship that the British had with the French. ‘Their rivalry overseas 
never disappeared entirely after 1815, and flared up on occasion over various 
issues, such as the slave trade,’ ‘In a similar way, Britain and the Netherlands 
remained friends in Europe despite their commercial and colonial rivalries and 
disputes in the Far East.’449 
  England intended to pursue its interests in Japan, in return providing 
the Netherlands with advantages in the other Asian regions. A second reason 
for this attitude was that England was aware of the fact that the Japanese 
harbored ill feelings toward the British that dated back to the Phaeton Incident 
of 1808. The delegation that Sir Thomas Raffles sent to Japan in 1813 had 
already made clear that this incident had done great damage to Anglo-Japanese 
relations.450 England, though the great power in Europe, depended on good 
relations with the Netherlands in order for the two countries to act jointly as 
‘Lords of the East’. This British attitude toward Japan suited the interests of the 
Netherlands. In this policy of a strategic, long-term friendship it was pragmatic 
to divide responsibilities regarding their common interests in Asia between 
each other. 
  It was not always easy to maintain a close relationship. ‘Canning had 
thought that too demonstrative an Anglo-Dutch association might provoke a 
challenge from others. But it came later than he thought and from other 
directions. Britain’s disposition was to adjust its relationships in so far as that 
was in keeping with the principles of its foreign policy and the framework 
which they constituted. In all such cases, the adjustment had to take account of 
both Britain’s interests and Britain’s power. But it had also to take account of 
the connection with the collaborators, through which Britain’s power was 
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amplified and its interests served, and that was an intractable task.’ 451  
In the case of the Anglo-Dutch relationship, yet other difficulties were 
involved. As Tarling remarks: ‘Two powers in an established pattern of 
collaboration might wish to react differently to a challenge from outside.’ 452 ‘In 
departing (from Singapore) Perry noted that with sufficient naval force England 
could command this entrance to the South China Sea.’453  ‘Social relations 
between the British and the Americans were amiable enough. But there was 
mutual suspicion when it came to diplomatic initiatives.’454 The American 
rivalry with England in Asia resulted in strengthening the good relationship 
between England and the Netherlands. Certainly for the Netherlands, a good 
relationship with England was indispensable to ward of the American advance. 
The Netherlands wanted to maintain its position as the most favored 
nation in Japan, and was unwilling to acquiesce in other countries being 
granted more privileges than it already had. At the beginning of the British 
relationship with Japan after its opening, the British Government asked the 
Dutch for mediation in the conclusion of its treaty with Japan and it 
acknowledged Dutch superiority in the first Anglo-Japanese treaty. 455 
Although the British Rear-Admiral Sir James Stirling, who was in charge of the 
negotiations at that time, at first demanded the same conditions as the Dutch, 
by virtue of that treaty, the pre-existing privileges of the Dutch and Chinese in 
Nagasaki were the only privileges which could not be claimed,456 because the 
treaty affirmed the existence of Dutch vested rights in Japan. Consequently, 
‘Stirling’s diplomacy was not greeted with enthusiasm [by the British] on the 
China coast.’ The China Mail said, ‘in his preoccupation with this ‘precious 
treaty’ with Japan, Stirling had neglected the more important duty of protecting 
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British ships and subjects in China.’457 
On the one hand England expected Dutch support in Japanese affairs, 
but on the other hand it kept an eagle eye on Dutch diplomacy. In Bowring’s 
report on the Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1855 dated 6 December 1855, we find the 
following critical comments: ‘The steamer “Gedeh” Lieutenant Fabius with the 
Dutch Royal Commissioner arrived from Japan on Monday last, and it was 
immediately reported that a treaty of the most satisfactory nature had been 
closed with the Japanese Government whereby the trade was to be opened to 
the whole world.’ ‘I was favored by a private friend with a reading of it, and 
never in my life have I read a more silly and contemptible production. Matters 
remain exactly almost as they have been for the last 200 years with this 
exception that the Dutch inhabitants of Desima are to be allowed to enter and 
circulate freely in the town of Nagasaki without a Japanese guard as - 
heretofore – and the Factory – buildings on Desima, with the ground on which 
they stand, become the property of the Dutch at a fixed taxation. The privileges 
of every kind hitherto enjoyed by the Dutch are confirmed to them and no 
favors are to be conceded to any other European nation by the Japanese in 
which the Dutch are not to participate.’ ‘and only one article seems at all to hint 
at the possibility of a change, the Opperhoofd, or head of the Factory being 
empowered to treat with the Japanese Government on the part of the Dutch in 
the event of the Emperor of Japan at any future period making new 
propositions by which further concessions are to be made to the Dutch!!... ‘This 
is the substance of his famous treaty of which the Dutch have much reason to be 
heartily ashamed and I am much mistaken if the feeling in Holland is not one of 
universal disappointment.’… ‘A public sale was held at Desima of the cargoes 
of the two ships loaded by the two Vessels of - which I enclose particulars, - 
Everything sold at an enormous price, the Japanese Commissioner having 
evidently had carte blanche to buy at exorbitant rates.’458  
Moreover, ‘that report is correct, and that – the Netherland Government 
in making this repurchase, have had in view the removal of difficulties and 
impediments in the way of their future negotiation with the Government of 
Japan, upon questions of Commercial interest.’…‘I am informed that Lieutenant 
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Fabius has received a considerable sum of money from the Japanese 
Government to be expended by him in the purchase of scientific instruments 
and Books for the use of the Japanese Government.’459 Furthermore was also 
reported that ‘Lieutenant Fabius was proceeding to Japan, for the purpose of 
delivering to the Japanese Government certain articles such as books, scientific 
instruments and etcetera, which he had been commissioned by them to 
purchase in Europe, and further, to assist in giving instruction to the Japanese 
in the practice and principles of steam of Navigation.’460 
Receiving these kinds of reports, England had to be wary of the Dutch 
attempt to pursue its own privileges in Japan. These kinds of comments are 
seen in documents, for example as follows: ‘It is true, as is expressed in Art. 6 of 
the explanations attached to the Dutch Draft, that His Royal Majesty has not 
expressly stipulated for any particular or exclusion advantages in favour of his 
own subjects, beyond what is comprised in the engagement that Netherland 
Subjects, are by Art 6 of the Treaty itself at once to be equalized to the most 
favoured nations, in the case of Treaties being concluded with Foreign Powers 
on the Basis of the Dutch Project; - but Your Lordship will not fail to observe 
that the whole Draft of the Netherland Government is drawn up with a view to 
the maintenance of a predominating influence on the part of the Netherlands 
over the Commerce with Japan, and with an intent to exercise a species of 
tutelary authority over the conduct of the Japanese Government, with respect to 
the nature of its future relations with other Powers’461 
Moreover the British Government tried to obtain word from the 
Netherlands that it did not acquire its own privileges in the Japanese affair. The 
document about a conversation with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
the Hague says ‘I [Abercromby] recently took an opportunity of referring in the 
course of conversation with His Excellency Monsieur Gevers d’Endegeest (D.Th. 
Gevers van Endegeest, 1793-1877), to the intention which Royal Majesty’s 
Government have of extending at a fitting moment our commercial relations 
with the Empire of Japan, by an additional Treaty with that country.- I at the 
same time said that Her Majesty’s Government confidently expected, whenever 
they entered upon negotiations with the Empire of Japan. In such a purpose, 
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that the Netherland Authorities on the spot would be ready to assist Her 
Majesty’s Plenipotentiary in carrying out the objects of his mission.’ ‘he had 
distinctly stated, that the Government of His Royal Majesty when negotiating 
such a treaty, disclaimed every intention of wishing to obtain exclusive 
privileges or advantages for Dutch Commerce, - and that they would see with 
pleasure the Commerce of Japan thrown open to the world. I terminated this 
part of our conversation, by stating to His Excellency the satisfaction with 
which I had learnt the news and intentions of the Netherland Government; and 
by informing him that I should remind him of his declaration, whenever His 
Majesty’s Government entered upon their negotiations for a treaty of commerce, 
with the Government of the Emperor of Japan.’462 
Another document recording a conversation between the British 
Plenipotentiary and the Dutch king also says: ‘I have now reported to Your 
Lordship the substance of all that has helped between His Royal Majesty’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and myself, - and I think it results from what has 
transpired, that both His Royal Majesty and His Minister have unequivocally 
recorded their intention to repudiate all desire to obtain exclusive advantages in 
the commerce of this country, and to declare their determination to exert their 
influence with the Government of Japan, to obtain their acceptance and 
execution of the principle of free trade.’463 
Sometimes England would complain about the Dutch diplomacy 
towards Japan. After receiving a report from Bowring which stated that ‘Your 
Lordship will observe that it is the object of the Dutch in their proposed treaty 
to confine the trade to Nagasaki, and to make the nobles the sole instruments of 
barter. I conceive that such terms ought not to satisfy us, and have no reason to 
believe they would be acceptable to the Americans. Their practical effect, in my 
judgment, would be to exclude other nations from a fair participation in the 
commerce of Japan, and to confine it principally to the Dutch and the Dutch 
Goverment’. The British Foreign Secretary sent to the Plenipotentiary the letter 
containing the word that ‘I have to instruct you to intimate to the Netherlands 
Government that Her Majesty’s Government have no reason to be satisfied with 
the conduct of the Dutch agents in this matter.’464 
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England, however, did not strongly protest against the intervention of 
the Netherlands in Japanese Affairs, because it did not wish to lose the Dutch 
support. Even if England complained to the Netherlands of its action in these 
affairs, it should do it mildly and transmit its desires to the Netherlands, as 
quoted in the following: ‘and I [Clarendon] have to state to you that under the 
circumstances I am of opinion that it is unnecessary for you to give effect to that 
instruction; but that you may take an opportunity of saying unofficially to the 
Netherland minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty’s Government intend 
to extend their commercial relations with Japan, and that they trust that the 
same friendly feelings which exist between the two Governments will be 
manifested by their agents towards each other.’465 ‘The attitude of the British 
made it possible to adopt onthouding (refrain from active intervention) without 
of course abandoning Dutch claims. Itself not challenging the Dutch, Britain 
cherished a relationship with them that helped to keep out others, and did not 
wish to challenge the Dutch.’466 
In 1864 England negotiated the position of Sumatra with the Netherlands 
and concluded a second treaty of London. In this context the magazine ‘The 
Friend of India had expressed the British feelings: ‘If the Dutch would only 
guarantee free trade we could see them take all Sumatra with indifference. But 
this they will not do, nor if they promised to do so, could they be trusted.’467 
This utterance seems to show that this region was not important to England. 
This is not correct. ‘To Britain, North Sumatra was important because it was the 
mainstay of the commercial prosperity of Penang, and because in the hands of a 
strong Power it could have commanded the strategic Malacca Straits…England 
opposed Dutch expansion of its influence there…But the faith of the Foreign 
Office in this doctrine was weakening, especially in view of the steady 
liberalization of Dutch commercial policy. In the 1860’s London’s protests were 
neither firm nor immediate enough to prevent Holland’s advance in the East 
Coast of Sumatra. The increasing interest of more dangerous Powers in the area 
made it seem desirable that Holland should be allowed effectively to occupy 
the island which the 1824 Treaty had seen as its ‘sphere of influence’.’468 
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Therefore, ‘The Colonial Office agreed that a voluntary submission of the Sultan 
to Holland would be in Britain’s interest, since ‘Acheen had much better be in 
the hands of Holland than of France or the United States’.’469 Here we see again 
confirmed that England strived to maintain its good relationship with the 
Netherlands in Asia. 
  This relationship between the Netherlands and England had existed 
since the Napoleonic Wars. Tarling explains: ‘In the 1840s, the Foreign Office is 
found taking their par. In the case of the State of Siak on the east coast of 
Sumatra, the British were faced with a threat of Dutch conquest and, in the 
absence of any precise stipulation in the treaty of 1824, they attempted to 
counter this by reviving a treaty with the Sultan made on behalf of the Penang 
Government in 1818.’470 ‘Alarmed for the security of their empire, the Dutch 
sought to strengthen their position in Bali, Lombok, Celebes, Borneo and 
beyond. The arrangements of 1824 had been further disrupted.’ 471 England, 
however, was prepared to tolerate the Dutch expansion to a large degree. 
Consequently, ‘While the Dutch extended their empire as a means of excluding 
all major powers from the Archipelago, the British themselves preferred the 
Dutch to the other major powers.’472 
 
 
Political co-operation and economic competition  
 
The Dutch treasured their special relationship with their mighty neighbour, 
Great Britain, the major imperial power in South-East Asia and even in the 
world.473 Generally speaking, only the points of confrontation between the 
Netherlands and England in Asia are singled out for emphasis. These were the 
outcomes of their economic activities in that region. Disputes between the 
Dutch and the British did occur. Tarling, however, explained their special 
relationship as follows: ‘But the Anglo-Dutch relationship was not destroyed. 
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Essentially the British permitted the Dutch to prevail politically in the Indies, 
while securing economic opportunity and protection for their own strategic 
interests. In some sense the Dutch were collaborators in a system suited to the 
objectives of the British: they were ‘exclusive Lords of the East,’ but though 
exclusive, they were not equal. Subordination was not always easy to bear, nor 
superordination easy to restrain.’474  
A report by the Dutch Lieutenant Fabius provides a good example of this 
situation. On his way to Japan in 1855, he called at Hong Kong for refuelling. 
His report shows that the British he met there were highly concerned about 
everything related to the Dutch enterprise in the East. He reported that, to his 
great surprise, the British Governor Sir John Bowring began talking to him 
about his duty to present the Soembing to Japan; he had thought that no one 
knew of this except the Dutch authorities concerned.475 ‘When John Bowring 
was appointed to succeed Bonham as Superintendent, he was given appropriate 
powers and instructions to negotiate, when feasible, with Siam, Vietnam and 
Japan.’476 Furthermore, Bowring told him that he had read articles about the 
report by the Dutch Minister of Colonial Affairs to the king presented in the 
Staats Courant of 12 February 1855 (no.23) with the greatest satisfaction and 
with great interest, while completely approving of this Dutch policy. Bowring 
also told Fabius that he intended to leave for Nagasaki within several weeks. 
The reason was that, in view of British interests in trade, he would amend and 
expand the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty concluded by Rear-Admiral Stirling in 
the previous year, and, in principle, make it into a treaty like the one that he 
concluded with Siam.  
Fabius confessed that he had no idea where the British fleet was, that was 
carefully kept secret. Some said it was in the waters of Japan, while others said 
that it was on its way to Kamchatka. This secrecy shows that the British 
remained cautious in their attitude towards the Netherlands.477 This by itself 
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was also a sign that the Dutch had a certain level of influence in Asia. For 
instance, when Alcock looked at the residence of the Dutch trading chief in 
Nagasaki, he noted that ‘the view from the Dutch Commissioner's residence, 
with its quaint Japanese garden, and fine sweep down the bay towards the 
entrance, is very charming. As I stood for a few minutes alone on the balcony, 
there flitted before me a vision of the sort of life these indomitable 
representatives of the Great Batavian Republic must have led.’478 Moreover, the 
remark by a visiting Italian envoy that the Netherlands East Indies formed a 
very important center of European civilization, also illustrated Dutch influence 
in Asia.479 
The Netherlands had striven to maintain its predominance in Japanese 
affairs even against its ally, England, especially before the conclusion of the 
Harris Treaty in 1858. In spite of this fact, it would be a more than hasty 
conclusion to regard their relations as confrontational. Dutch activities were 
based on the Anglo-Dutch alliance, and their confrontations had mostly 
remained restricted to commercial, not political matters. This commercial 
confrontation has been identified too easily by historians as Anglo-Dutch 
clashes. This view is in need of a revision. Confrontations in the field of 
commerce are a matter of competition between countries that have international 
companies. Such competition can occur anywhere. Besides their commercial 
competition, the mutual relation of ‘most natural ally’ that existed between the 
Netherlands and England in Europe naturally also existed in Asia.  
As an example of the close Anglo-Dutch relations in Asia may be 
mentioned the fact that the trading chief in Japan, Donker Curtius, had several 
meetings on various Japanese affairs with the British Rear Admiral Sir Michael 
Seymour (1802-1887) who arrived at Deshima in 1857. Bearing in mind Donker 
Curtius’s report, this ‘good relationship’ can be witnessed as follows: ‘on this 
occasion, I did not make any secret at all about Dutch policy towards Japan. 
Especially, I took pains to express to him at length my feeling that the opening 
of Japan need not cost one single drop of blood, if none of the powers would 
demand that it take place completely at once, but if they were to expand their 
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relationship with Japan, in stages, just as Japan also shows that it wants to do, 
which in all probability is the only option that Japan has. This admiral also 
immediately agreed with the view I expressed that many simultaneous and 
large commercial operations by various countries would result in 
disappointment and loss.’ 
Later, their talk turned to delivering warships and weapons to Japan. 
Donker Curtius reported as follows about Seymour’s utterance: ‘in case it 
should be difficult for the Netherlands to fulfil this kind of Japanese demand 
from its own industry, orders for warships and steam engines etc. on the 
account of our trading post here, would undoubtedly be most welcome to the 
British industry.’ Furthermore, Seymour talked about having already actually 
supplied three steam engines to China, and about going to sell six steam 
gunboats and sending specialists accompanying them. This plain talking is also 
a clear indication of Dutch-British relations as allies. 
 On the other hand, it seemed that Seymour’s utterances caused Donker 
Curtius some anxiety about the advance of British industry into Japan. After the 
description of this topic in his letter, in which he pointed out that the Dutch 
inhabitants in Nagasaki disapproved of the results that the Dutch Government 
had already gained, he noted that ‘my position becomes more difficult as the 
situation advances, and I foresee that, after the departure of these ships, I shall 
have to request the powerful assistance of Your Excellency in the future.’480 
It is understandable that both Donker Curtius, who was in charge of the 
active policy towards Japan at that time, and Fabius were afraid of British 
economic pressure. These utterances, however, had nothing to do with the 
Dutch-British political confrontation. It even seemed possible that the 
Netherlands would leave its special position in Japan to England, if it were to 
lose its special relationship as ‘Japan’s special (onderscheide) friend’. 
Nevertheless, if it appeared that if the Netherlands could not meet the Japanese 
demands after all, it would be desirable that England should step in and not 
other countries. Concretely, if the newly emerging power in Asia, the United 
States, which had wedged itself into a position in Japan and did not respect the 
ancient Dutch-Japanese relationship, came to play this role, it would become 
much more difficult for the Netherlands to protect its interests in Japan.  
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  Another example is provided by a talk about Japan between the Dutch 
ambassador in London, Baron A.A. Bentinck van Nijenhuis (1798-1868), and the 
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon. In this talk, the British Secretary 
spoke to the Dutch ambassador ‘of the selflessness of the Dutch diplomacy 
towards Japan by using the most heart-warming expressions. He, however, 
added if it was not supported by a demonstration of military power, eminent 
advice the Dutch gave to Japan would be of no use to the Netherlands or 
anybody else. He said that it would make more of an impression if we actually 
paraded several warships before Japanese eyes than if we gave the Japanese 
Government friendly advice.’481 In this talk, it was obvious that the Dutch 
Government recognized that England had a plan to take decisive measures 
against Japan in due time. England was irritated because the Japanese 
Government was progressing so slowly in the reform of its foreign policy. 
Referring to recent incidents in China,482  the Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
instructed the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies that before 
exchanging opinions with the Government at home, his superior, for the time 
being he was not to fulfil the Japanese request to add more officers to the Dutch 
navy detachment in Nagasaki who were instructing the Japanese in knowledge 
pertaining to the navy.483 This measure resulted from the Dutch concern about 
relations with England as the ‘most natural ally’, should the British ever have a 
‘collision’ with Japan.  
Moreover, when Lieutenant Fabius reported on his trip to China, he 
mentioned that ‘the British Consul-General in Canton, Lord Elgin (James Bruce 
8th Earl of Elgin, 1811-1863), was well informed of the sincerity with which the 
Dutch Government had promoted the interests of their community in Japan and 
that England regards it as a duty to promote Dutch interests in China as much 
as possible’. Furthermore, Fabius reported that the British admiral, Seymour, 
unexpectedly presented him with a nautical chart, and that Fabius was treated 
with the highest respect at a party hosted by the upper echelons of the 
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Government in Hong Kong, and he reported the British statement that ‘the 
British authorities were willing to be of service to the Dutch in this portion of 
the world’. This is further proof of the close relationship between the 
Netherlands and England.484 
A conversation between Abercromby and the Dutch king about the 
Japanese affairs deserves special attention as Abercromby said the following: 
‘At this Ball, His Royal Majesty made to me a very earnest and somewhat 
detailed communication on the subject of Japanese affairs, accompanied by the 
express request that I should report it to My Government, as having been made 
by His Royal Majesty in person.’ ‘His Royal Majesty then entered into various 
details connected with the state of the relations of this country with the Empire 
of Japan’. ‘The Netherland Government urges that if the Government of Japan 
are sincerely desirous of adopting into more intimate commercial relations with 
European states, the principle of free trade (Libre-échange) must not only be 
accepted in theory, but he practically put into action;- for the Netherland 
Government seek no exclusive advantages on privilege for themselves; but 
desire to see the commerce of Japan opened freely to all Nations.’ ‘To these 
observations I replied that I was certain that Her Majesty’s Government would 
fully appreciate, the frankness of His Majesty’s communication; - that Her 
Majesty’s Government. I knew were anxious to increase the commercial 
relations between Great Britain and Japan; - and that they looked with 
confidence to His Majesty’s Government for their friendly assistance in 
furthering this object.’485 From this conversation it can be assumed that the 
Dutch king had a great interest in Japanese affairs. 
Great Britain tried to hand over its diplomacy concerning the Japanese 
affairs to the Netherlands and to co-operate on this affair. It also seems that the 
Netherlands was willing to undertake that task. Another document of the 
British envoy says: ‘I called a few days ago on His Excellency Monsieur Gevers 
d’Endegeest for the purpose of communicating to him the instructions I had 
received from Your Lordship in your Dispatch No.17. F:O: 17 inst. in reply to 
the report which I had had the honour in a former dispatch to make to you, of 
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the communication which His Royal Majesty had personally addressed to me 
on the subject of His Majesty’s intended policy in His relations with the Empire 
of Japan; - and I need not assure Your Lordship of the extreme satisfaction with 
which the Netherland Minister for F:O: learnt the entire approval which Her 
Majesty’s Government have expressed of the intended views and objects of the 
Government the Netherlands, with respect to their commercial relations with 
Japan.’486 In these words the co-operative relations pertaining between the 
Netherlands and England speaks for itself.  
The Netherlands had to take the balance of power in Europe carefully 
into consideration. Needless to say, its Asian policy was closely linked to the 
political situation in Europe. The extent of Dutch influence in Europe, however, 
was different from its large sphere of influence in Asia. While the Netherlands 
maintained a position of neutrality in Europe, its Government, and especially 
the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, followed an active and autonomous policy in 
Asia. On the other hand, the Netherlands had to pay due heed to its Western 
powers in Asia, too, lest a collision might occur. Hence, the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs instructed the Governor-General of Netherlands East Indies not to 
deviate from the policy of the home Government, stressing that the Dutch 
Government maintained a policy of strict neutrality in Europe. 487  The 
Governor-General answered that the strengthening of the fleet in the 
Netherlands East Indies was inevitable in the event the political situation in 
Europe should become more serious.488  
This remark made by the Governor-General was a good indication of the 
real Dutch policy in Asia. When examining the Japanese policy of the 
Netherlands it is necessary to take into consideration the co-operative 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. To the Dutch, 
the British were not only the ‘most natural ally’ in Europe but also collegial 
‘Lords of the East’ in Asia. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Clashes within the Dutch bureaucracy 
 about Japanese policy 
 
 
Confrontation between the Minister of Colonial Affairs Pahud 
and the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies 
Duymaer van Twist  
 
A Dutch-Japanese treaty was expected to be concluded in 1855 by the Dutch 
Government. This treaty was to specify the Dutch privileges in Nagasaki. The 
Japanese authorities had declared that Japan regarded the Netherlands and 
China as its ‘relatives’ on account of their long relationship, and that they 
would accord the Dutch more favourable treatment than other nations.489 
Therefore, the Dutch Government considered this treaty to be the outcome of 
the fact that the magistrate of Nagasaki had fulfilled the promise of the 
Japanese authorities, and assumed that the Japanese policy of allowing the 
Dutch and Chinese to retain their old privileges in Nagasaki had been approved 
by the magistrate. Prior to this, the vested rights supposedly held by the Dutch 
were described and specified only in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty  thanks to the  
efforts of Donker Curtius, but such a kind of Dutch privilege had been 
mentioned in neither the Russo-Japanese nor the Japanese-American treaties. It 
seems likely that other powers did not mention the Dutch privileges in their 
treaties, because they did not want to allow anyone privileges in which they 
could not share. The upshot was that the status of the traditional Dutch rights 
had become very uncertain. The Japanese Government thought that allowing 
foreign countries to trade with Japan had become unavoidable by that time. As 
some within Government regarded the Netherlands as a country that had 
proved its loyalty, the Japanese Government considered asking the Dutch to 
investigate which foreign trade policy would be most suitable, charging them 
with the task of dealing with the other foreign countries on behalf of Japan. In 
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this manner, the Government counted on winning Dutch support. A Rôjû, 
Hotta Masayoshi, was appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs.490 The 
decision to appointment Hotta, whom Nariaki Tokugawa disliked deeming him 
a ‘Ranpeki, (Dutch maniac)’, as did Shimazu Nariakira(島津斉彬, 1809-1858, 
daimyô of Satsuma domain) and other lords of large domains, is in some ways 
strange as intense dislike of him was widespread. This conundrum is 
considered an important issue in Japanese historiography.491 
Whatever the ins and outs, in 1855, the Dutch Government in The Hague 
was clearly pleased with this report on the Dutch-Japanese treaty. However the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, Duymaer van Twist, was at 
odds with the opinion of the Dutch home Government. He protested strongly 
claiming: ‘England, the United States and France will use military force against 
Japan because of the delay in opening the country; each power is jealous of the 
Netherlands and misunderstands the Dutch relationship with Japan; therefore 
this provisional agreement and final treaty will only  inflate this jealousy and 
misunderstanding further. The Dutch position in Japan will become very 
dangerous.’ Moreover, the Governor-General requested the Dutch Government 
to revise its direction for acquiring rights by means of a treaty or an agreement. 
He was of the opinion that the Netherlands could exert a certain level of 
influence in Japan, however this advantage was thought to be much larger than 
it was in reality by the other powers and therefore was a problem. It had no 
need to conclude any treaty that would guarantee specific rights, because the 
Netherlands could acquire the same rights given to other powers simply on the 
basis of the Japanese reliance on the Netherlands.492 
The Governor-General was very worried that a conflict might erupt 
between Japan and other powers. As the lesser of two evils, he proposed that 
the Dutch should choose to abandon Japan temporarily rather than to expose 
the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies to danger, if a war should 
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break out between one of the foreign powers and Japan.493 Thereby, he pointed 
out that the Netherlands was in danger of straying considerably from its chief 
aim, even though he admitted that the Dutch Commissioner was striving his 
utmost to obtain the highest profits for the Netherlands. He explained that the 
chief aim was to open Japanese harbors to other powers and for private 
enterprise. He emphasized again that it was impossible to acquire an exclusive 
treaty and a commercial system to which only the Netherlands had access. 
Furthermore, he criticized the proclaimed intention of the Dutch Government to 
pursue its own profits, because he believed that, at present, the Netherlands 
could not embark on a long-term policy concerning Japan’s future or even 
concerning Dutch commercial relation with Japan. Therefore, he proposed that 
all countries should be permitted equal rights in Japan, that is, that the 
Netherlands should not acquire more advantageous rights beyond securing its 
vested rights. Finally, he finished his letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs by 
saying: ‘I take the liberty of submitting these considerations to the wiser 
judgment of Your Excellency.’494 
The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies was reluctant to 
pursue an active policy towards Japan, because it entailed great risks. Contrary 
to the passive posture of the Governor-General on Japanese affairs, the Minister 
of Colonial Affairs decided to take direct action and send Commander Fabius to 
Japan for a third time in order to promote Dutch interests there. The Minister 
thought that the Netherlands should continue to obtain further concessions 
from Japan for other countries, but it should take care to acquire many more 
privileges than other countries. He also hoped that an intimate relationship 
would develop between the Netherlands and Japan.495 In spite of his hope, 
after remarking that ‘it would be redundant to state these points in this letter’, 
he had to admit to sharing the previous opinion of the Governor-General, i.e. 
that the Netherlands should abandon Japan temporarily, in the case there might 
be a conflict between Japan and one of the other powers, and that it should not 
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lose sight of the chief Dutch aim, namely to abolish the Japanese isolation 
system and to open its harbors to the private enterprise of foreign countries. He 
also noted that straying from this aim would be in opposition to the directions 
of the Dutch Government.496  
Later, however, the Governor-General declared that ‘he was nothing more 
than an intermediary regarding the Japanese affairs between the Supreme 
Government and the Dutch agent in Japan.’ The Minister of Colonial Affairs, 
Pahud, replied to this as follows: ‘Such comments seem reasonable, as long as 
the Governor-General executes the commands issued by the Supreme 
Government’. However, he added to his warning that the Governor-General’s 
remark could be construed as reasonable only in this case, i.e. ‘as long as the 
political relationship between the Netherlands and Japan does not need to 
amend present principles, namely if these affairs are dealt with appropriately 
and rationally’; moreover he pointed out that ‘The Government of the 
Netherlands East Indies in all respects can and must possess knowledge of 
Japanese affairs, because the Dutch home Government could not do this to the 
same extent; and this knowledge would immediately be utilized to influence 
the direction of these affairs’. He stressed that ‘The Governor-General is far 
from a mere intermediary. The task of the Governor-General is to supply 
complete information to the Supreme Government for the purpose of serving 
the requirement in the instructions about Japanese affairs not only by a 
statement in writing, but also especially supplying sufficient and motivated 
considerations and recommendations too.’ In this way, he made clear that the 
Governor-General’s duty was to align the policy of the Netherlands East Indies 
to the policy of the Netherlands.497  
Furthermore, the Minister expressed his dissatisfaction about the slow 
handling of Japanese affairs. In his response, however, the Governor-General 
pointed at the limitations on communication with Japan, and he also explained 
that it could happen that a whole year might be required to report suitable 
considerations and advice to the Dutch Government. Hereby he denied having 
any responsibility for the Minister’s complaints.498  
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One month later, the Minister of Colonial Affairs informed the 
Governor-General that it would seem better to steer a moderate course through 
the various problems regarding Japanese trade. He expected that the 
Governor-General would also adopt a moderate attitude, in accordance with 
the policy of the Supreme Government.499 At the same time, in spite of the 
Minister’s intention, the Governor-General made clear to the Minister that: ‘The 
semi-official letter of 8 March has made clear to me that the views of Your 
Excellency regarding Japanese affairs differ considerably from mine. I regard it 
as meaningless to return to this matter’.  By doing so, he radicalized their 
confrontation, and he resigned immediately upon making this statement.500 
Duymaer van Twist had opposed the Minister of Colonial Affairs not just with 
regard to Japanese Affairs, but had also crossed swords about the management 
of the colony. The exact details relating to his resignation are not known and 
will not be speculated on here. At this time, the attitude of the Netherlands East 
Indies towards the home country was confirmed by Minister Pahud’s proposal, 
and consequently the political principle about the opinion and disposition of 
the Council of the Netherlands East Indies was decided, and afterwards the 
resolution to it was passed by royal decree.501 In this context, it would be fair to 
say that the serious differences of opinion regarding Japanese affairs between 
Duymaer van Twist and Pahud are likely to have contributed to the resignation 
of the Governor-General. Surprisingly, it was Pahud who succeeded him as the 
new Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.  
In response to a royal decree, in his capacity as the new Governor-General, 
Pahud declared to the new Minister of Colonial Affairs, P. Mijer, who had 
experience of dealing with Japanese affairs from 1852 to 1854 as a member of 
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the Council of the Netherlands East Indies (Raad van Indië): 502  ‘I am in 
agreement with Your Excellency in respect to Japanese affairs’. Consequently he 
declared himself ready to fulfil the Japanese demands without any limitation.503 
In another document Pahud again expressed that he completely agreed with 
Mijer’s opinion about a reciprocal present for the Japanese.504  This Dutch 
Government aim was to harmonize the opinion between the Netherlands and 
the Netherlands East Indies. This fact argues that Dutch Asian affairs, especially 
those pertaining to Japan, were given a much higher priority than has been 
recognized until now. 
At that time, plans were considered to gradually set up arms factories in 
the Netherlands East Indies, independent of management in the home country. 
The Minister of Colonial Affairs, however, firmly supported the Minister of 
War who believed that a small country such as the Netherlands should 
maintain its existence through the co-operation of various national factories. 
This could be interpreted to mean that a close relationship between the home 
country and its colony was deemed very important and that the Government 
was to take an initiative for trade. 505 
 
 
Confrontation between the Chief of ‘the Japan Desk’ Krabbe and 
his Minister at the Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
 
Following on Von Siebold’s recommendations about shipping and trade in 
Japan, the Minister of Colonial Affairs decided to draw up a joint report for the 
king in collaboration with his colleague in Foreign Affairs, and asked Krabbe of 
the ‘Japan Desk’ to prepare this report. Krabbe wrote the report, but he also 
submitted a memorandum in which he raised strong objections to Von 
Siebold’s proposal and the joint report.506 Von Siebold had advised putting 
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pressure on Japan, because from his own experience he believed that ‘the 
shrewd and slick Japanese politicians are perfectly well aware that the 
stipulations in treaties concluded with maritime countries since 1854 are not 
adequate to cover the development of shipping and trade in the northern 
Pacific Ocean and even the expectation of civilized maritime commercial 
nations in the old and new world.’ Convinced of his own words, Krabbe 
strongly opposed this proposal. He was adamant that the opinions of Fabius 
and Donker Curtius expressed in their latest reports should not be ignored, 
even if they were slightly over-heated and exaggerated. Moreover, he pointed 
out that Von Siebold lacked information regarding the latest developments on 
the ground in Japan and insisted that the current situation in Japan was very 
different from that in Von Siebold’s time: ‘His Excellency, as far as I know, has 
never even looked over our voluminous records of this period to inspect them.’ 
He pointed out that ‘the present Dutch position in Japan is regarded as too 
insignificant, while, on the other hand, its former position had been 
exaggerated. The present position of the Netherlands is owed to its unceasing 
advice to Japan and to the cautiously incremental advance in response to 
Japanese wishes and needs, and by carefully avoiding excessive pressure.’  
In other words, the favourable position was attributable to the Dutch 
policy to systematically adopt an appropriate course that was attuned to the 
Japanese character. Krabbe noted that the sort of pressure proposed by Von 
Siebold would be reasonable, only if Japan was willing to listen. He was 
worried that Japan would turn to other countries to seek satisfaction for its 
demands, because it now had relations with various great maritime powers. He 
believed that these maritime powers intended to usurp the Dutch position in 
Japan as soon as possible, because it seemed that other maritime powers would 
be perfectly satisfied even with the restricted trade that the Dutch now 
possessed in Japan, but that this could be expanded considerably. 
Furthermore, Krabbe did not agree with Von Siebold’s proposal to put 
private merchants in charge of the Japanese trade of the Dutch Government, 
even though he thought that the Japanese would be forced against their will to 
accept free trade in the near future. Krabbe thought that it would be preferable 
to keep Japan in its system of national isolation, as long as a more favourable 
situation for the Netherlands could not be achieved. He also proposed that 
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military supplies to Japan should be stopped in consideration of the general 
good, because they were damaging the Dutch reputation. He expected that this 
measure would ensure other powers of Dutch good will and enable the 
Netherlands to avoid breaking off its relations with Japan.  
 
 
The modified policy towards Japan  
 
Since progress in the opening of Japan was not developing as fast as expected, 
the Dutch Government was worried about the criticism of other powers against 
the sale of Dutch military technology. In spite of this anxiety, the Dutch did not 
want to abandon their economic interests in this trade. Therefore, the Dutch 
Government reconsidered the present policy in order to find ways to achieve 
the opening of Japan more rapidly. The Government decided that the Dutch 
naval detachment in Nagasaki should remain there, because this was the 
express wish of Japan, but that new Japanese requests for military supplies 
would not be granted. For the time being, no officers or equipment were to be 
added to the Dutch detachment there. The Hague instructed the Government of 
the Netherlands East Indies of this new policy and decreed that Batavia should 
act according to the same policy.507 This modified policy was aimed at carefully 
expanding commercial interests while bearing the sentiments of other powers 
in mind. This was to be done while preserving what had been achieved by 
previous efforts and also trying to avoid becoming caught up in conflicts 
between Japan and other countries.  
 
 
Trade reform and the Dutch situation in Japan  
 
The Dutch-Japanese Treaty of January 1856 was largely in line with the 
provisional treaty signed in the previous year. Although the Netherlands 
succeeded in concluding this treaty, during the negotiations the Dutch noticed a 
Japanese tendency to reduce the pre-existing concessions and rights. Moreover, 
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the Japanese Government objected to proposals made by the Dutch trading 
chief for an additional treaty on commercial regulations. This induced the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs to draw up a joint report for the king in 
collaboration with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This report was sent to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies so as to instruct him about the 
new Dutch policy towards Japan. The report contained four important points; 
 
1. To ratify the treaty of January 30 1856 with Japan. 
2. To decide that pressure be exerted on Japan. 
3. To comment upon the treaty negotiation conducted by Donker Curtius. 
4. To continue doing their best to obtain completely free trade in the open ports 
in Japan.508 
 
The second and fourth items relate to the inconsistencies in Dutch policy 
mentioned earlier. The Dutch Government had so far always attempted to 
monopolize trade with Japan, but now it decided to assign the task of trading 
with Japan to private merchants, because private trade (free trade) was about to 
commence in the other open ports in Japan, Hakodate and Shimoda. The 
Japanese Government now had the option of importing its goods through other 
foreign merchants there, if the Dutch Government refused to supply Japan with 
military technology. Yet, the Dutch trading post in Deshima still seemed to be 
in a position to bring considerable benefits to the Dutch, because the other open 
ports would not be able to play a major role in international trade immediately. 
Therefore, for the time being, the Dutch Government did not regard it as a 
problem that pressure - by refusing the Japanese requests for arms - would be 
applied at least temporarily.509 
The application of pressure depended on three factors: firstly, the Japanese 
tendency to reduce vested concessions and rights and the tenacity of the old 
Japanese customs and their way of thinking; secondly, the Japanese attitude to 
the proposed additional treaty on commercial matters, and, thirdly, the Chinese 
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situation in consideration of Japanese and Dutch interests among other great 
maritime powers. The pressure involved ignoring Japanese orders for military 
supplies, as long as Japan did not reform its foreign policy and adopt a free 
trade regime. Moreover, the Dutch Government should refuse to add an 
artillery and an engineering unit to the Dutch naval detachment in Nagasaki. 
On the other hand, the Dutch Government decided to send the ships ordered by 
Japan, to provide maintenance for the Soembing and ensure that it stayed in 
good condition, and to keep the Dutch naval detachment in Nagasaki. The 
reason for this decision was that the Dutch Government considered it important 
and necessary to support Japan’s intellectual and industrial development. The 
Dutch Government decided to apply the above-mentioned pressure to Japan, 
but it added that the Dutch could relieve the pressure at any time, because they 
did not want to sacrifice their commercial interest by persisting with this 
pressure. 
 The damyô of Hizen domain, the Japanese official in charge of 
Nagasaki’s defence, had decreed that the transition from the Kambang trade to 
private merchant trade would be allowed [by the Japanese Government]. 
Moreover, he had tried to persuade a Dutch captain to sell his ship. Such signals 
as these led the Dutch to believe that the transition towards a new system of 
commercial relations would not be a serious problem. At the same time, 
however, they expected that switching from the Honkata trade (the Dutch 
Government trade) to free trade would meet serious obstacles. The Dutch 
Government had a plan to liberalize Japan’s foreign trade, but it thought that it 
would only be possible to continue with this trade in certain objects, because 
the Government dealt only in specific goods. Military supplies, which the 
Japanese Government frequently asked for, were not to be sold to Japan at all. It 
seemed improper that any foreign state should supply Japan with such goods, 
therefore the Dutch Government decided that military supplies were never to 
be exported under the Honkata trade, and it proceeded to find two private 
companies in the Netherlands that could handle the goods ordered by Japan for 
the next year. The Government in The Hague accepted Donker Curtius’ 
decision that a mining engineer, Friedrich Ulrich Jacobus Huguenin (1827-1870), 
remain on Deshima. When Donker Curtius had decided this, he had not yet 
obtained permission to visit any mine, and moreover his fees had not yet been 
guaranteed by the Japanese Government. At first, the Dutch Government 
blamed Donker Curtius for this situation, because it thought that he could 
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exploit this pressure on Japan, if he did not succeed in obtaining a concession 
from it. The Netherlands, however, wanted to secure Japanese coal supplies for 
its planned shipping activities between Japan and China, and to play a 
prominent role in Japan’s overseas exports. Therefore, the Dutch Government 
acceded to Donker Curtius’ decision, albeit with a bad grace. These measures 
argue that the Netherlands tried to deal with Japan by executing a very 
carefully designed policy in order to maximize present and future commercial 
benefits.510 
Krabbe of the Japan Desk pointed out two disappointing developments 
that occurred in 1856. His observations were transmitted to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, and this event is also an 
obvious indication that Japanese affairs had become very important to the 
Netherlands at that time. Krabbe noted that, firstly, given the postal system at 
that time, it would be impossible for the Dutch Government to send complete 
directions to the Netherlands East Indies, because it would have great 
difficulties trying to assemble the necessary information for such orders and, 
secondly, The Hague was not always fully informed on Japanese affairs. That is 
why the Governor-General and Council of the Netherlands East Indies 
continually suffered from a lack of adequate information. Despite his 
powerlessness to supply proper information, the Minister of Colonial Affairs 
informed the Governor-General that it was urgent that the Government of the 
Netherlands East Indies take action with regard to Japan. Pointing out the 
hitches in gathering intelligence, he said that it was of no use to Japan receiving 
advice after the matter concerned had already been dealt with. He explained 
how difficult it was to deal with Japanese affairs in the Netherlands. Since 
relations with Japan had to be co-ordinated jointly between the Ministries of 
Colonial and Foreign Affairs, this process was both dilatory and circuitous,  
and in this way valuable time was lost. Therefore, the Minister stressed the 
importance of information being sent to Europe immediately after becoming 
available in Batavia.511 At that time, the Governor-General was Pahud, who 
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was the former Minister of Colonial Affairs and had followed an active policy 
towards Japan. These two points would seem to lead to the assumption that 
Pahud would endeavour to fulfill the demands of the Dutch Government. 
Hence, these exchanges also argue that Japanese affairs were very important for 
the Netherlands. 
 
 
Criticism of Dutch Government in the Dutch Press 
 
The Minister of Colonial Affairs was an advocate of taking an active approach 
in diplomacy towards Japan. However, because he faced considerable 
opposition, he was unable to carry out such a policy.  The opposition to the 
policy of the Dutch Government came mainly from the liberal section of the 
public opinion in the Netherlands. In general, the Dutch approach to relations 
with Japan was passive rather than active. This policy of neutrality created an 
impression among the informed public that the Dutch Government did not 
intend to conduct a positive foreign policy for the sake of national interests. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not venture beyond taking formal measures, by 
stationing a representative in Japan or raising his rank to promote trade.512 
Dutch merchants did not regard the activities of the Dutch representative as 
energetic enough. They criticized the Dutch Government for not protecting 
Dutch commercial interests.  
An interesting example of this is the following newspaper article from 
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant of 21 November 1858, which we shall paraphrase 
and quote from: 
The NRC commented on the reply by the Government to a report of the Dutch 
commission in the Lower House investigating the treaty with Japan. This reply, 
the newspaper said, contained many unsatisfactory statements and was even 
erroneous. The Government had ratified the treaty of 30 January in 1856, 
although it too was disappointed in the treaty. The newspaper now directed its 
attention to the additional treaty of 16 October in 1857. It had expected ‘that the 
Government would have answered the question of whether we can obtain 
exports for the imports, in order to consolidate a proper market situation. Since 
the export of neither gold, silver nor copper is permitted, the merchant has been 
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made completely dependent on the favor of the Japanese Government by the 
terms of this treaty and the additional treaty. If, despite the forced concession, 
the Japanese Government which has been coerced into opening its ports and 
admitting free trade, wants to maintain its system of seclusion, the Government, 
according to words of our treaty, can suggest Nagasaki as a clearing house for 
foreign trade accounts and thus the merchants should be able to maintain high 
prices for their commodities, because it would be impossible for all foreign 
merchants to participate in the exchange trade. Thereby, a foreign merchant 
cannot not purchase, but sell. Moreover, a foreign merchant cannot receive the 
money when he is paid, because he cannot export it. Consequently, such a sale 
will become an obstacle to the foreign merchant, because he can receive the 
exports only at an extraordinarily high price. In this situation, even if he could 
make large profits from his imports, he will still suffer a considerable loss.’  
It was clear to the NRC that under these conditions, only if the Japanese 
Government would be completely benevolent and fair minded, this treaty could 
realize any results. The opening of the ports occurred only after a protracted 
resistance by the Japanese while they were desperately needed. Therefore, the 
hoped fair treatment from the Japanese was quite uncertain. As a result the 
newspaper remarked that it was not unlikely that the Japanese authorities 
intended to make the situation appear better than it really was. It added: ‘The 
postscript in the reply of memorandum is the most important part. This says 
that the Dutch Commissioner in Japan has succeeded in preparing a new 
commercial treaty with the Bakufu in Edo. This treaty allows the opening of new 
ports and other liberties, among which are the articles for tariffs, the freedom to 
export of gold and silver coins and the abolition of the Nagasaki clearing house 
for foreign trade accounts’ mediation, etc.’…‘These articles solve many of the 
problems incurred by the treaty of 1856 and the additional treaty of 1857.’ 
…‘Treaties with other nations, especially North America and England, have 
been concluded. As we know, however, it will be a matter of wonder to hear 
that our Commissioner, in the same way, has succeeded in preparing this 
commercial treaty with Japan.’…‘Other nations have been able to negotiate 
with Japan through our good offices. It is not necessary for us to regret that this 
situation has changed and that the empire has been opened to all nations. On 
the contrary, we have wished for this outcome for a long time. Thereby, the 
result of the Dutch Government’s endeavor has added a brilliant page to our 
history.’ 
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But the author of this article could not refrain from ironically remarking 
that the influence of the Netherlands had suddenly suffered a serious decline. 
How was this possible?  The Netherlands should have been the first nation to 
learn that the Japanese Government was to give other nations new privileges 
and be able to conclude a treaty. ‘We should have been able to take this into 
consideration at our leisure. But, on the contrary, we are actually the last nation 
to hear of it.’…‘Where does the responsibility for this lie?’ … ‘Lord Elgin, who 
went to Japan from China, concluded a treaty with new privileges within three 
weeks. We have now only the prospect of perhaps gaining the same.’...Is not 
this a little surprising? Although we do not know the facts, did our Government 
pay the necessary attention to the change in our position in Japan and take it 
into consideration?’…   
The newspaper then asked whether perhaps a mistake was made in the 
way in which the Dutch government had presented its case in Japan: ‘Japan 
received us merely as merchants before. Our Commissioner was a chief among 
merchants in Japanese eyes. Our position changed suddenly. As a result of the 
Treaty of 1856, our Government abandoned the status of merchant and acts as if 
it is the supreme Government to the Japanese Government. Should our 
representative in Japan also have been changed at that time? The Japanese have 
a custom of dividing rooms up strictly. Can the people think that the same 
person who has worked as the chief of merchants until today, shall take over as 
the representative of the supreme Government tomorrow?…While other 
nations have already concluded a treaty, we are still preparing it. Can the 
reason be investigated in this respect?’ … 
‘We rightly abandoned our exclusive right to trade in Japan…but 
neglected to encourage the Japanese Government to maintain our influence as 
long as possible, and to make the Bakufu in Edo allow our consul or diplomat to 
be received  and asked to be an advisor for negotiations with other nations, 
when the Japanese Government was making a preliminary declaration for 
concluding a treaty with all nations…That would have promoted our interests 
and even our dignity among all nations and also in respect of the Japanese 
Government.’…‘We will not judge it and will certainly not level accusations at 
anyone. However, no one will gainsay that it is worthwhile explaining how 
other nations were able to go ahead of us in concluding a commercial 
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treaty…’513 
Japanese affairs were important to the Netherlands from the point of view of 
its ‘national prestige and economic interest’. Therefore, the NRC also strongly 
refuted articles in foreign newspapers which harmed Dutch prestige. It was 
particularly irritated by an article in the North China Herald which it said was 
indulging in horseplay, because Lord Elgin had concluded the treaty with 
Japan.  
‘It seems that the treaty allows the granting of more privileges to us. We 
shall be very pleased with this, if it is true. For instance, according to Article 4 of 
the treaty of 30 January 1856 and Article 39 in that of 16 October 1857, all 
privileges that are granted to other countries, shall immediately be granted to the 
Netherlands too. Therefore, we have no reason to envy them the fact that other 
foreign negotiators are happier than ours, because their endeavours also ensure 
us our privilege. The North China Herald must have missed these articles in our 
treaties. Otherwise, it would not have reported about more privileges being 
allowed England than to the Netherlands so light heartedly. This bad taste is 
not all. The newspaper seems to spew malice against the Dutch who excluded 
the British from Japan for such a long time and so carefully. It seems as if other 
nations are unaware of the fact that they can conclude their treaties with Japan 
at present only thanks to the efforts of the Dutch. The Netherlands gave them 
the opportunity for this and has continuously made strong efforts in this regard 
since 1844, and has finally succeeded in opening this large country for world 
trade. This ingratitude is so unfair since the Netherlands has paid no less than fl. 
220,000 to achieve this aim in this year. The Netherlands, exclusively for the 
benefit of the Government, gained fl. 150,000 profits before. The country bore 
the expense of this trade at that time. It paid about fl. 70,000 for the expense 
incurred by the factory on Desima. Therefore, the total expenses amount to fl. 
220,000.’ … ‘The Netherlands made sacrifices to open Japan to trade in the 
interest of England. The British newspapers, however, pour ridicule on and 
slander us, although now the country enjoys the fruits of the Dutch sacrifice.’ 
 The NRC noted that the North China Herald pointed out as the main 
element in Lord Elgin’s treaty the fixing of the export duty at 5 per cent and the 
import duty at 20 per cent. The treaty had a list of articles on which the import 
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duty of 5 per cent applied. Among these articles were cotton and woollen goods, 
which are very important to England, but the newspaper concluded that it 
could not possibly decide whether this article is more profitable than the 
articles relevant to the Netherlands before having read the whole treaty. It was 
clear however that many more exports were mentioned in Lord Elgin’s treaty 
than in the Dutch one. Yet how were the Japanese who cannot export gold or 
silver, to pay for all those import goods?  This point had also been indicated in 
the report of the Dutch Lower House concerning the treaty of Japan. Under the 
present conditions the foreign merchants had to sell all imported goods at any 
price: ‘In this case, the opening of Japan will actually lay a trap for merchants 
who trade in good faith.’ …‘This is a very important issue for merchants. The 
Government is expected to provide information on this matter, which shall be 
proper and can promote the trade.’…‘It is repeated that we should draw not too 
many conclusions about the truth of the insolent report in the North China 
Herald, before having read the whole treaty concluded by Lord Elgin. Any 
rights which have been granted the British, however, are also granted to us. 
Therefore, we do not need to worry that the other nations introduced in Japan 
by us will harm us.’514 
Thus the NRC concluded that although it was very unhappy about the 
inept policies of its own government, the English at last had achieved great 
gains and benefits in their negotiations which luckily also applied to the Dutch 
merchants in Japan.   
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Chapter 10 
 
The Harris Treaty of 1858 
 
 
Harris’ endeavour to establish American supremacy in Japan 
 
From his arrival in Japan (1856), the American envoy Townsend Harris actively 
pursued negotiations for a new commercial treaty between the United States 
and Japan, although the Dutch-Japanese treaty allowing trade in Japan had 
already been concluded. Harris was aware of the fact that both the Netherlands 
and Russia had concluded a commercial treaty with Japan.  Nevertheless, since 
he believed that these treaties were useless, he said that he would not have 
taken the trouble of coming to Edo, if he had been content with a restricted 
form of trade. He demanded free trade and the opening of several ports, 
including Edo and Osaka.515  
The Dutch Commissioner, Donker Curtius, also negotiated with Japan in 
attempts to draw up a new treaty.  Unsuccessfully, as it turned out. At the time 
of these negotiations, on 31 July 1858, Lord Elgin, the British High 
Commissioner to China, arrived in Nagasaki from Shanghai. Harris fully 
exploited this, presenting the British as a dangerous menace, trying to push for 
a rapid signing of a treaty. Since this ploy failed, both Donker Curtius and 
Harris returned to their respective settlements. An American ship, the 
Mississippi, then arrived in Japan bringing information about the recent 
Anglo-Chinese treaty. Harris exploited this opportunity to prove to the 
Japanese that Britain was a danger and came back from Shimoda to Edo. 
Thanks to this warning he finally achieved his aim.516 The behavior of Harris 
was regarded as ‘greatness of soul’ by the Japanese. Moreover, Inoue (Inoue 
Kiyonao井上清直, Prince of Shinano, 1809-1867) added that ‘the Americans 
were a very different people from the Dutch. His attitude and negotiations 
seem to have made a strong impression on the Japanese. Adroitly, Harris 
persuaded the Bakufu officials to accept the treaty by displaying a dignified 
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attitude and giving clear explanations. For example, referring to Japan's future 
he said: ‘Commerce is the blood, the great source of life of an Empire; look at 
England. Without trade the people who live in that small county would 
starve. ... What is it that has made her the mightiest country of the world? 
Trade!... It is the life, the great activity of nations, and if Japan in employing its 
resources is opened for commerce, there is no reason why it would not end in a 
most fortunate condition, the England of Asia.’517 Shortly after this, Iwase 
(Iwase Tadanari 岩瀬忠震, 1818-1861) used Harris’ words for the purpose of 
prevailing on daimyos to enable the Lords to approve the treaty. Quite obviously, 
his words made a strong impression on the officers in Bakufu.518  
In addition to Harris’ clear explanation, ‘His frequent references to the 
aggressive designs of Britain, to which exception might be taken were justified 
by all too recent events.’519 Referring to the British menace, Harris strongly 
insisted that, under the most favourable and honourable conditions, Japan 
should first conclude the proposed treaty with the United States, which had no 
escort of warships, because under this treaty with the United States, Japan 
would be much better able to reject new or excessive requests from other 
countries that accompanied their request by sending a large fleet. 520  He 
emphasized the British threat by stating that England was planning to go to war 
with Japan.  He also offered America's support by acting as a mediator, if 
Japan had a clash with European countries. When Harris recognized that the 
Japanese were unresponsive to all persuasion, he felt very dissatisfied and 
threatened the Japanese as follows, ‘that their treatment of me showed that no 
negotiations could be carried on with them unless the plenipotentiary was 
backed by a fleet, and offered them cannon balls for arguments. Poor Shinano 
listened in evident trepidation.’521  
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Soon after this, he succeeded in concluding the treaty. This treaty meant 
the end of Dutch monopoly trade in Japan, and was definite proof that the 
Dutch were no longer Japan's ‘special friend’. The news came as a blow to the 
Dutch Government. 
Dickins mentioned that Japan had concluded the treaty with the United 
States as it had been deceived by false threats made by Harris.522 Moreover, he 
criticizes Harris, stating that many troubles, which the opening of Japan 
brought after the long-term policy of seclusion ended, resulted from the 
indiscreet and selfish policy he pursued.523 Actually, it still seemed too early to 
admit to the existence of the treaty in Japan. After its conclusion, ‘In reality, at 
night on 24 June 1858, Nariaki and his son (水戸斉昭夫子, daimyô of Mito 
domain), Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu (一橋慶喜, 1837-1913), Yoshikumi (尾張藩主
慶恕, daimyô of Owari domain, 1824-1883) and Matsudaira Shungaku called at 
Edo Castle without any previous announcement. Thereby, Ii Naosuke (井伊直弼, 
1815-1860) only repeated “I am so ashamed.”524  
Did Donker Curtius negotiate less skilfully with Japan in comparison 
with Harris? This was not the case. W.J.C. ridder Huyssen van Kattendyke 
（1816-1866） mentioned that ‘Donker Curtius  is well acquainted with the 
Japanese nature. By means of respecting it, he continues to negotiate with Japan. 
Therefore, he has an influence in Nagasaki as well as in Edo.’525 Moreover, 
Donker Curtius went to Edo, because Harris’ negotiations were not running 
smoothly. Ishii explained this action as follows: ‘it seemed that, while 
competing with Harris, he would have concluded the commercial treaty with 
Japan in advance of Harris by exploiting the Dutch ‘loyalty’.526 In other words, 
Donker Curtius’ negotiations exerted severe pressure on Harris. Therefore it 
seems that Harris merely forestalled Donker Curtius by his above-mentioned 
action. 
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Disappointment in the Netherlands  
 
The Netherlands had exploited its special relationship with Japan and 
preserved its ‘national prestige and economic interest’. This special relationship, 
however, came to an end by the conclusion of the Harris Treaty in 1858. In the 
past, Japan had had closer relations with the Netherlands than with other 
powers and it had given the Dutch certain privileges. The Netherlands had 
been given a pledge by Japan that such privileges would also be granted in the 
future. The Japanese believed that people generally show more goodwill to 
blood relatives. Since the Netherlands, with China, had had a long relationship 
with Japan, the Netherlands was regarded more or less as a blood relative. Also, 
in respect to foreign relations, the Dutch predominance in Japan had been 
accepted by the British in the Japanese-British treaty.527 That the Netherlands 
was greatly valued was also revealed in the Japanese utterance that ‘the Dutch 
were distinguished from other nations and were trusted most by the Japanese 
Government’.528 Since the opening of Japan, the Dutch Government had been 
relying on this pledge and patiently persisted in the difficult negotiations with 
the Japanese Government which was experiencing serious domestic troubles 
after the country’s opening. However, it now became clear that the high Dutch 
expectations were based on an illusion.  
The Netherlands did acquire most-favoured-nation treatment, and was 
able to enjoy the same rights as granted to the United States in the Harris Treaty. 
The sticking point was, the status of Deshima as a bonded warehouse, 
considered a very important vested right by the Dutch, was still unsecured. The 
Minister of Colonial Affairs proposed postponing the ratification until this 
point had been clarified by Japan, but the Dutch Government decided to 
conclude a new treaty without delay. The Ministers of Colonial and Foreign 
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Affairs had, on behalf of the king, signed the previous agreement and treaty, 
but now the signature of the king was required to ratify the new treaty 
modelled on the American text.529 The Minister of Colonial Affairs requested 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs to give the necessary consent for the signing of 
the treaty. Although the form of the treaty was not the correct one, the Minister 
of Colonial Affairs thought that it would be desirable to prepare the related 
official documents immediately, because he believed that it would be difficult 
to require the proper form in negotiations with a country like Japan, which had 
had few relations with foreign countries until recently.530 Later, the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ask the king to 
ratify the signature of Donker Curtius in order to conclude the treaty. After his 
consent, the instrument of ratification would be submitted to the king.531 A 
distinctive feature of the Dutch-Japanese treaty was that it mentioned that 
books, medicine and steam engines were exempt from import duties; moreover 
merchant ships, coffee and sugar were subject to a duty of 5 per cent of their 
value, while other products would be taxed at a 20 per cent duty rate.532 
It was proposed to send Von Siebold to Japan in order to bring the 
ratification of the Dutch-Japanese additional treaty of 1856, and to promote 
Dutch commerce there by acting as a representative of the NHM.  The Minister 
of Colonial Affairs anticipated that this measure would strengthen Dutch 
diplomacy in Japan, but the Ministry of Colonial Affairs strongly opposed the 
idea. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs explained that it would be difficult for the 
Japanese to distinguish between Von Siebold’s role as a civil employee of the 
NHM and as an official representative of the Dutch Government. Hence, the 
Dutch Government tried to realize its plan for free trade in Japan by means of 
private merchants. Moreover it was worried that Donker Curtius’ management 
of Japanese affairs and his standing with the Japanese authorities might be 
called into doubt, if the Japanese regarded the sending of Von Siebold as a sign 
of the Dutch Government’s disapproval of his management of Japanese affairs. 
It might also create the impression that, in the eyes of the Dutch Government, 
Curtius had failed to supply his Government with full information on Japanese 
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trade.533 In spite of this opposition in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs did not abandon his plan. Requesting the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to inform Donker Curtius of 
his comment, he expressed his disappointment; the documents he had received 
shortly before had left him with the impression that Donker Curtius no longer 
showed the same active and lively concern about ensuring the centuries-old 
Dutch position in Japan, which had previously characterized his endeavours.534   
Until 1858 the Dutch Government had tried to give direction to their 
policies towards Japan to other countries, while simultaneously attempting to 
exploit its relations with Japan for its own sake, even if this meant that the 
opening of Japan to international trade was delayed. Against this background, 
the Minister of Colonial Affairs expressed his disappointment that ‘at present, 
so to speak, the Netherlands only follows other powers, especially the United 
States of North America and it is pleased with acquiring the same privilege 
admitted to other powers.…I shall not speak my wish here that the Netherlands 
should be admitted more privileges than others powers in Japan. These last 
words show that this would be contradictory to the altruistic Dutch policy 
pursued up to then. Yet the Minister expected that the Netherlands could 
acquire one exception, recognition of Deshima as a bonded warehouse. The 
Minister considered that this Dutch privilege was of importance, because the 
Netherlands would have a chance to establish a vast market for its colonial 
products in Asia. In spite of this expectation, he finally expressed his grief 
saying ‘I confess that I would have liked to have seen the Netherlands, as much 
as the circumstances and our position as a minor power would allow, would 
lead the way for other powers in Japan, and not merely only follow the flag of 
others, a situation which has now obviously materialized.’  
Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs continued, he did not intend 
to blame Donker Curtius that not he, but the American Consul-General, had 
negotiated the new treaty with Japan. He approved of the fact that Donker 
Curtius had thought it necessary to enter into the conclusion of a new treaty for 
the purpose of securing the Dutch position of the most-favoured-nation 
treatment, although he had not been explicitly authorized to do this. On the 
other hand, the Minister pointed out that a new treaty had been unnecessary, 
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because the previous treaty had already promised the Dutch the position as the 
most-favoured-nation in Japan. Therefore, the Minister criticized Donker 
Curtius saying that ‘it would be better to say that he thought he would enter 
into a new treaty, because the position regulated in the previous treaty could be 
rectified considerably, improved and should be changed to consolidate a firmer 
position over a long period of time.’  
The Minister of Colonial Affairs also criticized Donker Curtius for the 
fact that the currency unit used in the Dutch-Japanese treaty was the dollar. 
While admitting that the dollar was already generally known as the current 
money in the Japan and China Seas, he commented that Donker Curtius did not 
need to obey the American negotiator ‘like a slave’, and, ‘if a trifling thing is 
pointed out’, to accept the American currency even in the regulations of 
payment and reparations. Therefore, the Minister instructed that, at the very 
least, ‘these regulations are to be written in the Dutch currency against the price 
of the dollar’. Furthermore, he rejected as ‘groundless’ the comment by Donker 
Curtius that ‘the Netherlands had recently lagged behind others from the 
political and economic viewpoint in Japan’. 
Here, it is important to notice that the influence of the dollar in Asia was 
being more firmly established: the provisions for payment were expressed in 
dollars in the Japanese-American treaty. This point seems to have been 
significant, in spite of having no connection with the most-favored-nation 
treatment. That is, if the Netherlands had preceded other countries in the 
currency regulation of the treaty with Japan, the influence accompanying the 
advantage would have been significant. Actually it is difficult to presume this 
real influence, however it would have contributed greatly to Dutch ‘national 
prestige and economic interest’ in Asia. 
Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs did ‘not overlook’ the matter 
that Donker Curtius and the Japanese negotiators regarded it as ‘unnecessary 
and strange’ to include a similar article as in the Japanese-American treaty in 
the Dutch-Japanese treaty. The article in the American document said that the 
United States of America supported the Japanese interests in West European 
countries and that Japan placed orders in the United States. The Minister feared 
that the Netherlands would need to double its activities in order not to lag 
behind the United States in Japan in respect of political influence, trade, and 
industry, because the United States would exploit the differences between the 
two agreements in order to promote its own interests over those of the Dutch. 
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While alluding to this, the Minister could not conceal his opinion of 
Donker Curtius’ report of the latest negotiations and his letters. He pointed out 
that, although the report and letters did not clearly mention it, it was the plan of 
the American negotiator that ‘the United States conclude a substantial treaty 
with Japan first and, furthermore, he [Harris] tried to make other countries 
think as if the United States was the first country which succeeded in an 
essential treaty of commercial with Japan’. Moreover, he believed that this plan 
was contrived to conceal the important contribution to the Dutch additional 
treaty of October 16 1857, i.e., the honour of the Netherlands, which concluded 
the first commercial agreement with Japan.  
Furthermore, the Minister of Colonial Affairs deplored the fact that the 
Dutch-Japanese additional treaty had been replaced by the new treaty and that 
Dutch moral influence in Japan would disappear, and that it would be 
immediately forgotten that the Netherlands was by right the first country that 
had contracted a commercial agreement. Also the Minister reproached Donker 
Curtius for making the Japanese regard the treaty of 1858 as a supplement and 
correction to the agreements of 1856 and 1857, because it was contradictory to 
the attitude of the Dutch Government, to whom the agreements of 1856 and 
1857 were still in effect. The Minister even thought that Donker Curtius might 
subconsciously be under American influence, from which may have robbed 
him of his previously firmer attitude and clearer insight.  
Having made these remarks, the Minister of Colonial Affairs presented 
several points of attention for maintaining Dutch predominance in Japan. First, 
after he mentioned Donker Curtius’ view that the new treaty would bring the 
special situation for the Dutch on Deshima to an end, he pointed out that this 
view was completely different from what the home government thought, and 
that this special situation of the Dutch did not conflict with the provisions of the 
new treaty. Therefore, he was of the opinion that it was very important not only 
to secure Deshima as the sole privilege for the Dutch, i.e., as a Dutch bonded 
warehouse, but also to extend it further and to make it a free and unrestricted 
possession. Therefore the Minister instructed the Governor-General to maintain 
Deshima as a Dutch bonded warehouse as accepted in the treaty of 1856, for the 
purpose of securing Dutch profits in Nagasaki. 
  Furthermore, the Minister noted the abolition of ‘the use of a plate with 
a crucifix [to be trodden on in order to prove that somebody was not a Roman 
Catholic) in Japan, because it seemed that this matter would have great 
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significance for Christian countries. The Japanese authorities had always 
declared that this kind of article would not be specified in the treaty; they 
insisted that other countries should not intervene in the domestic policy that 
strictly forbade the introduction and propagation of Christianity. In spite of the 
Japanese attitude, the Netherlands repeatedly demanded the abolition of the 
use of this plate with a crucifix, and finally succeeded in acquiring this abolition. 
Thus in consideration of ‘Dutch honour’, he regarded it as important that the 
abolition of the use of the plate with a crucifix should be included in the treaty.  
Moreover, the Minister of Colonial Affairs pointed out that neither 
handicrafts nor wool or cotton were mentioned as goods falling under the 5 per 
cent tariff specified in Clause 2 of the regulation on tax that was added to the 
new treaty. The Minister stated that he could not ignore this fact, because the 
sales of the Dutch textiles in Japan would suffer serious damage if these 
products were classified in the list contained in Clause 4 (for goods requiring a 
20 per cent tariff). While mentioning that the British Lord Elgin had acquired an 
agreement that England would pay a tariff of 5 per cent for its textiles, he 
expressed his disappointment: ‘I should have informed the Governor-General 
of the Netherlands East Indies that the Dutch commissioner be instructed in this 
and that point in order to use specifically all the articles in our treaty that would 
be to our benefit’ 
Consequently, the Minister of Colonial Affairs complained that this new 
treaty and the actions of Donker Curtius were not desirable at all. Furthermore 
in his personal opinion, he deplored the fact that the Netherlands had lost its 
moral and commercial influence in Japan. Referring to moral influence, he 
noted that the Netherlands had set the course for other powers’ policies 
towards Japan, that it had been ahead of them, and that it had been the most 
respected country there (de in Japan meest geeerde mogendheid), even when this 
had got the Netherlands into trouble. The Netherlands had played the role of 
mediator for the other great powers in Japan, being special (onderscheiding 
genietende) to Japan from the political viewpoint. On the other hand, he 
expressed his disappointment that at present the Netherlands, as it were, ‘had 
been taken in tow by others’ and its former pioneering role had shifted to others. 
Regarding commercial influence, he noted that it seemed to be a obstacle that 
the new treaty had articles that explicitly forbade the export of rice and wheat; 
copper was to be sold by auction in Kanagawa first; and keeping Deshima’s 
former position as bonded warehouse might not be supported by the articles of 
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the new treaty, if the opinion of Donker Curtius were correct.  
Finally, the Minister of Colonial Affairs expected that the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies would take the initiative in 
developing future Dutch trade in Japan on the new commercial stage 
established by the treaty of 1858, because it was clear that the Dutch merchants 
in Japan would have to enter into difficult competition with other nations. The 
Minister hoped that the Dutch could compete with them in the Japanese market 
with a satisfactory result, only by means of their greater insight and knowledge 
about Japanese requirements than other nations’. While he completely agreed 
that the Government should stop all direct interference in Japanese trade as 
soon as possible, he was of the opinion that it was very important to establish a 
commercial relationship by connecting Japan closely with the burgeoning trade 
in the northeastern part of Atjeh in the Netherlands East Indies: a huge profit 
was expected from that region’s colonial products. He planned to build a new 
Japanese market for colonial products from the Netherlands East Indies.  This 
was the reason he wanted to maintain Deshima as a bonded warehouse. 
Donker Curtius had forfeited the trust of the Dutch Government. In a 
private letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, he stated that he was about to 
request the Governor-General to accept his resignation. It looked as if it would 
be difficult to find a suitable successor. The Minister had already instructed 
Commander Van Kattendijke of the Dutch naval detachment in Nagasaki to 
take over the duties of Donker Curtius temporarily, if the latter was absent or 
could not deal with his task there. He had, however, not ordered his permanent 
replacement, and the matter had remained pending since that time. The 
Minister expressed himself guardedly, but quite clearly, when he asked the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies that ‘Your Excellency might 
think about a suitable successor for Donker Curtius, even if you may not have 
received his request to be recalled from Japan.’535 Donker Curtius remained in 
office in Japan until 28 February 1860. His diplomacy towards Japan may not 
have risen to Dutch expectations but it suited the Japanese. When the treaty 
negotiations with Harris ran into difficulties, some members of the Tokugawa 
Government asked for Donker Curtius to act as mediator.536 
                                            
535 NA Koloniën no.6528, The semi-official letter of 24 February 1859 N.195 from the 
Minister of the Colonial Affairs to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. 
536 Ishii, Nihon kaikokushi, p.361. 
 195 
 
 
Disappointment in Dutch public opinion 
 
Donker Curtius’ diplomacy as well that of another Dutch representative was 
criticized in the Dutch press as well. In general, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
pursued an active diplomacy towards Japan, but this did not satisfy the Dutch 
nation. Dutch representatives did not take their own initiatives in negotiating 
relations with Japan, because they regarded co-operation and harmony with 
representatives of other Western powers, especially the British and French, as 
their priority. The Minister for Colonial affairs was not alone in his criticism of 
Donker Curtius, public opinion was also scathing. 537 
This was expressed publicly in Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant which 
stated that the Japanese had already fully mastered English and that they used 
English in speaking as well as in writing. Consequently, Dutch, the former 
foreign official language, was no longer used there. Hence, the article 
questioned whether it could be said that the Dutch Commissioner had paid 
careful attention to this development in the course of his duty. Moreover, 
judging from an argument of the Dutch merchants in Japan, the newspaper 
questioned whether the Dutch Commissioner’s reply was true, namely that he 
had already long been expecting this situation (i.e. non-fulfilment of treaty), 
when he protested about the non-fulfilment of the treaty of 4 July. Thus, the 
article was highly sceptical about why, if his reply were true, he allowed the 
return of the Dutch warship, the Bali, whose threatening presence could have 
promoted his position during the negotiations with Japan. 
Furthermore, the article levelled more accusations at the Dutch 
Commissioner by introducing a report dated 15 July 1859 sent by a Dutch 
merchant in Kanagawa. The report says as follows: ‘Donker Curtius in Desima 
did not think that Japan would honour the treaty on 4 July. He, however, 
allowed the departure of the warship, the Bali, because he wanted ‘to insist on 
the fulfilment of the treaty to Japan without using military force’. Since a Dutch 
merchant in Desima heard that the British Consul-General, Sir Rutherford 
Alcock, and the American Consul-General, Harris, would go to Kanagawa by 
warship, he also decided to go there. Since he did not know about the 
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appointment of the Dutch Consul in Kanagawa, he asked Donker Curtius about 
this matter. Donker Curtius answered that ‘Mister Alcock will take care of the 
Dutch interests under his supervision.’ The merchants thought that this answer 
was laconic and was very remarkable, because, before his departure, Donker 
Curtius had already known about the appointment of Van Polsbroek (Jhr. Dirk 
de Graeff van Polsbroek, 1833-1916) as the Vice-Consul. Why did Donker 
Curtius not tell him about the appointment in Deshima? The new Vice-Consul 
Van Polsbroek would guard the Dutch interests, while the nation would be 
under supervision of other nations. The merchant guessed that it was a plan 
hatched by Donker Curtius to stop the Dutch from going to Kanagawa. He 
asked the following questions: ‘Does the measure benefit Dutch industrial 
interests? Does Donker Curtius want British linen to drive Dutch linen out? 
Does he want the Japanese to forget the national flag that they have known for 
centuries and respect more than other nations?’ These were the critical words 
he chose to express his suspicions about the Dutch Commissioner’s behaviour.  
Furthermore, the merchant pointed out the fact that Yokohama had 
become the site of the foreign settlement instead of Kanagawa. Therefore, he 
stressed that Donker Curtius in Desima had already decided that Japan would 
not fulfil the treaty on the promised day. The Japanese Government had 
allowed the temporary establishment of a consulate in Kanagawa. The 
merchant mentioned the fact that the magistrate of Nagasaki, however, told 
Donker Curtius that the Government would not allow this before 1862, and 
passed the sarcastic remark that ‘Of course, this Japanese friend is delighted 
with this utterance and is content with it’.   
On the basis of these circumstances he reported that ‘the Dutch 
merchants greatly respect the actions of the British Consul-General, Alcock, in 
Edo, because it is clear that his firm conduct must indicate the right direction to 
the Japanese. Regrettably the Netherlands is not participating in the 
co-operative endeavour’. Therefore, he expressed his regretful feeling, ‘We 
should thank other nations that we are guaranteed to gain privileges after them. 
What a regrettable situation! The Dutch security is under their supervision.’  
‘Van Polsbroek in Kanagawa takes a firm line with the magistrate of 
Kanagawa. It is regrettable that he has won no confidence in Edo and he cannot 
make the Japanese there listen to his voice. However, he actively takes care of 
the interests of Dutch merchants more than Donker Curtius in Desima’ Then, 
the merchant mentioned his expectation of Van Polsbroek’s future activity. He 
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noticed an important fact; ‘The Vice-Consul is stationed in Kanagawa. 
Therefore, he has the privilege of being able to negotiate directly with the 
magistrate of Kanagawa where the new trade was expected. This privilege is 
granted the Dutch Commissioner on Desima only in special opportunities. 
‘Again it may be noted how important is for the representative to show firm 
behaviour.’ He pointed out the importance of the personal relationships and the 
character of the representative with regard to local circumstances.  
Moreover, he noted that the Vice-Consul always attended the audience 
in full dress; at least he always carried his sword, which the Japanese respect. 
He, however, deplored that ‘I saw that the Dutch Commissioner returned from 
an audience on a Russia ship, who wore less than ordinary clothes and a 
meunier hat.’ It was actually highly important for the Netherlands to increase its 
self-assurance and prestige amongst the Japanese, because the Dutch had 
always been seen as merely lowly merchants there. It had been an important 
Instruction from the Dutch Government that they behave so. These remarks 
reveal that Donker Curtius had neglected this part of his job. Moreover, the 
merchant continued; ‘The American and British Consuls-General went to 
Kanagawa by warship, on which their flags were flying with suitable splendour. 
To the Japanese surprise, the Dutch Consul arrived there like a tourist by a 
merchant ship chartered from a Batavia merchant. We should thank the 
coincidence that the Dutch ships, the Atlante, the Prinses Charlotte and the 
Schiller could fire the necessary salute for the flag-raising.  It seems that our 
Dutch influence has been lost. It is not surprising that the words one Thail were 
printed in a new bill on Deshima in place of the former een Thail.’ He lamented 
the fact that Donker Curtius did not have the stuff that representatives are 
made of. 
He remarked that the commercial situation in Kanagawa and Yokohama 
was uncertain, and doubts that merchants in Osaka could buy goods in 
Nagasaki, because their small merchant ships could not ply the dangerous 
southern Sea of Japan. As long as Osaka was not open for trade, Nagasaki was 
the best place for it to take place at present. This remark is important, because it 
expresses the opinion that the Dutch had lost their influence in Japan, as they 
preferred to cling on in Nagasaki. This opinion is right in a way, but it would be 
too facile to accept it as the only reason. It is necessary to take the contemporary 
situation into consideration. 
  Not only was Donker Curtius the object of aspersions, but his successor 
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as as Dutch Consul-General in Japan, Mr Jan Karel de Wit (1819-1884,) was also 
accused. An article dated 28 June 1860 in Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant 538 
states that the new Consul-General, De Wit, had succeeded Donker Curtius. 
The article goes on to express its surprise that De Wit is to remain in Nagasaki, 
while other foreign consuls have settled in Kanagawa near Edo. Pursuing this 
line, it says; ‘Nagasaki was the very place of banishment and imprisonment for 
foreigners (the Dutch and Chinese); at this  time, this situation has changed 
and it is no longer necessary to be restricted to remaining there; therefore, the 
best move would be to discard the hoary custom; in other words, from a 
political and economic point of view, the new Consul-General should settle 
himself in the new open port; this is why England and especially the United 
States have driven Dutch influence out of Japan in a short period. The reason 
for this has been the fact that with their acumen and proper diplomacy the 
British and American Consuls-General have chosen a good settlement; therefore, 
the Dutch Commissioner in Japan should settle in Kanagawa as soon as 
possible after its opening and he should be a leader in promoting its opening: 
This is emerging as the general opinion in Japan.’  
The article introduces a piece of a research report compiled by the Dutch 
head of an important company in Japan, who carried it out to acquire 
commercial expansion and interests there. He criticizes the Dutch Government 
diplomacy in his conclusion, asserting as evidence that it was obvious the 
Dutch had been very rapidly and seriously estranged from Japan. Donker 
Curtius objected that the research report was unfair. While the article says that 
both parties seem to have proper grounds for objections, it, however, mentions; 
‘that it is the most unpleasant for the Netherlands that the Japanese mission 
went first not to the Netherlands but the United States; moreover, in view of 
letters from Japan, it generally seems that the Commissioner, who is going to 
retire, could have dealt with this matter  more correctly and could have 
attained the honour that the first Japanese mission had been to the Netherlands; 
as yet the author was unaware of the principles of the new Consul-General, but 
he was happy for the Dutch in Japan that a change in representative had 
occurred.’  
When it is all said and done, the article only evaluated the change of 
representatives as a good aspect of the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan. The 
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criticism was not just aimed personally against Donker Curtius, it also railed 
against the measures of the Dutch Government. At that time, the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs had a plan to establish a big new market in Asia by connecting 
Nagasaki with Shanghai by ship, and also in the future by connecting this 
shipping line with the Netherlands East Indies. This was the reason the Dutch 
representative was based in Nagasaki, even though other representatives 
settled in Edo and Kanagawa in its vicinity. People who were unaware of the 
subtleties of this Dutch Government plan regarded this matter as the symbol of 
negative Dutch diplomacy towards Japan. This being so it is incorrect to say 
that this Dutch diplomatic measure was wrong. 
It was clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not always carry out 
autonomous diplomacy among major Western powers. This sort of diplomacy 
would have been unwelcome to the nation. For this reason, it seems that the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs also ploughed the same furrow. In general, the 
negative strategy pursued in Dutch diplomacy was strongly criticized by its 
contemporaries. One article about the Dutch diplomacy claimed as follows: ‘A 
small power, whose military can hardly be held by other European powers in 
awe, needs shrewder and more careful diplomacy than that of the stronger 
powers in order to protect its rights and interests. Such diplomacy ensures the 
smaller power does not often become embroiled in the European affairs. 
Moreover, as the need becomes less, the smaller power should direct its [desire 
for] peace more strictly. Such diplomacy is highly beneficial, especially to our 
merchant country, and can promote material peace. We, however, have so far 
found it unsatisfactory. We cannot discern a positive diplomacy. Diplomacy is 
always neglected, when it can be shown to be important to our interests and it 
should be promoted.’ 
After the above-mentioned introduction, the incident about the German 
customs union is mentioned. It says; 
 ‘When some confusion occurred in the German union, this offered an 
opportunity for us to acquire a member nation, Limburg from this union. We 
did not take advantage of it. If we had been able to exploit irreconcilable 
demands fully among the members of this union, we could have obtained the 
repeal of duty in the Rhineland. Although the Dutch Lower House did pay 
some attention to this affair, eventually it let this opportunity slip. When an 
agreement to build a permanent bridge in Cologne was presented in the Dutch 
Lower house, the chamber persuaded the Government to demand the repeal of 
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duty in Rhine. In reply to this affair, the Minister of Foreign Affair answered 
that it had been impossible to demand the repeal or reduction in duty at that 
time, because not Prussia but Hessen and Nassau had objected to it. There was 
the opportunity for us to gain the repeal from Hessen, this opportunity, 
however, was neglected.’ Moreover, this kind of negative character of the Dutch 
foreign policy is criticized not only in Europe, but also in Asia as below.  
‘As the second example, Japan will be mentioned. Through our 
endeavour, Japan has been opened for other European counties. We were a sole 
country that maintained a friendship with the Emperor. All countries had to 
contact Japan via us. This country was scarcely opened, when the diplomacies 
of other nations drove us away. The United States and England pushed us aside. 
They were able to arrange that the Japanese mission should go first to their 
country. We have not even been told in Japan, although we were there as if we 
were at home. Our influence has been completely lost there. In this way, our 
foreign policy budget achieves very few results.’539 
In the meantime, an article that defended the Dutch diplomacy was also 
published in this newspaper. The contributor was a Hague solicitor, Jhr. J.K.W. 
Quarles van Ufford（ 1818-1902） . He worked as an Assistant Secretary 
(adjunct-commies）in the Home Office（Binnenlandse Zaken）in the period from 
1850 to 1855. Therefore, although not officially, it can be assumed that he voiced 
the Government's views. As an introduction, he mentions that; ‘I would like to 
answer the question in het Bijblad van de Economist, who concluded the first 
treaty with Japan?; moreover, I cannot refrain from also answering an article 
concerning this matter written by Van Hoëvell in the August issue of Tijdschrift 
voor Neêrlandsch Indië.’ 
Quarles stated that the honour should accrue to the Netherlands in this 
matter. Van Hoëvell criticized the Government but without adducing any kind 
of reason. The Government made an endeavour to put the Japanese trade 
in ’hands of civilian merchants as soon as possible after the conclusion of the 
Dutch-Japanese supplementary treaty in 16 October 1857 which he considered a 
commercial treaty. Moreover, the Dutch Commissioner had planned that the 
commercial treaty should also apply to other nations.’  
Van Hoëvell believed that the fact that the Japanese mission went first 
not to the Netherlands but to the United States showed the inadequacy of 
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Dutch diplomacy, but this insinuation was clearly wrong. The Japanese mission 
to the United States did not mean to show ‘an honour to the President of the 
United States’ and an honour to this country more than to the Netherlands.’ 540 
  Van Hoëvell blamed the Government for this event, because he thought 
that the Netherlands had lost its special relationship with Japan. Quarles, 
however, argued as follows:  
‘This event happened only because the American representative insisted on 
exchanging the instruments of the ratification of the America-Japanese treaty of 
1858. Whereas when Donker Curtius as well as other representatives concluded 
the same treaties, they did not insist on exchanging instruments of ratification. 
This was the upshot of an American aim. He wanted to seize the leading place 
that the Netherlands had occupied in Japan. Therefore the United States wanted 
to afford the Japanese mission the opportunity to show American power and 
greatness. It can be said that this was an American endeavour. If I openly have 
to admit that Perry’s impolite words and cannons contributed to the conclusion 
of the first treaty with Japan more than our endeavour of persuasion in Japan, I 
advise that we should provide against the hard competition in Japan from the 
point of view of moral and material matters. It is easily possible to admit that 
the situation in Japan would have scarcely changed, if the Perry’s expedition 
had not occurred and we had continued to persuade the Japanese to open its 
country, while Perry’s expedition, however, did not deprive the Netherlands of 
the Dutch endeavour to open Japan from 1844 on and of the honour of having 
concluded the first essential commercial treaty with Japan.’ 
‘Why did Donker Curtius not make arrangements to exchange 
instruments of the ratification in the Netherlands? I can say that it would have 
been possible for him, because he, unlike the American Consul-General, could 
obtain the same conditions treaty without the support of military force. He 
could easily make arrangements to exchange instruments of the ratification in 
the Netherlands. He, however, taking the same way that only an intelligent 
negotiator in his position could take, did not do so. If the Japanese mission had 
arrived in the Netherlands, it would have visited different countries in Europe 
and compare the Netherlands with other European powers. It seems that this 
would not have improved our power and our image among the Japanese either. 
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The Japanese mission’s visit to Europe would attract demerit rather than merit. 
The United States that always occupies the strongest position in the China seas 
and can easily send ships from San Francisco, can easily fit out a steamship for a 
mission to Japan. Meanwhile, it is difficult for the Netherlands to detach a ship 
from the Netherlands East Indies’ fleet, even for a short period, in order to 
show its flag in Japan. Would the Dutch Government and the Parliament permit 
the use of one of its few warships in the Netherlands East Indies for the 
Japanese mission over a long period? It is not necessary for us to send a 
steamship all the way from the Netherlands, because this is nothing but a 
display. Whose responsibility is the large expense of this mission that would be 
incurred by the participants during their sojourn? Namely, according to the 
American example, we should assume all the expenses.’ 
‘In consideration of these matters, Donker Curtius, indirectly the 
Government, did not insist that a Japanese mission should come to the 
Netherlands, and for this he should not earn criticism but applause, because it 
was already well known that the Japanese Government had wanted to 
postpone for a long time the effectuation of that treaty. Therefore, it is clear that 
the Japanese mission to the United States has no meaning of ‘showing honour 
and respect’ to the United States. Therefore, said Quarles, Van Hoëvells’ 
argument is unsound.’541 
  It is understandable that Quarles, as a former government official, 
wanted to refute Van Hoëvell’s criticism of the Dutch Government diplomacy. 
His argument, however, does not represent official Dutch Government 
diplomacy. It is a big mistake that no merit would accrue to the Netherlands in 
bringing a Japanese mission on a visit, because then the mission would have 
noticed that the Netherlands is a small power. A Japanese mission was 
dispatched to Europe in 1862. The mission had no plans to visit the Netherlands. 
The Dutch Government, however, succeeded in persuading the mission to come 
to the country. Seizing this opportunity, the Japanese Government sent young 
people to the Netherlands in order to learn about European civilization.  
Neither Van Hoëvell nor Quarles had a good insight into Japanese affairs. 
These two persons actually had a short-sighted discussion with each other.542 
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These articles show the critical stance taken by the newspaper. Here follows 
another one which introduced a letter to the Minister of Colonial Affairs from 
Dutch merchants in Japan that describes the unpleasant situation in Kanagawa. 
The newspaper comments on this letter as follows: ‘These gentlemen mostly 
forget the difficulties that shall ensue at the beginning. As if they were living in 
Java or the Netherlands, they wish that things would soon be better in Japan, a 
nation wanted them to leave rather than to remain in this country. They have to 
endure difficulties and unpleasantness, if they, according to their – intelligent 
and laudable – will, want to make large profits. Otherwise, anybody can be 
their competitors.’543 
  The article is also interesting, because as it mentions here; ‘A separate 
report appeared on the 20th of this month which criticized that the Vice-Consul 
in Kanagawa for not having shown a determined attitude toward the Japanese 
authorities for the purpose of promoting Dutch commercial interests. There is 
no evidence to back up this criticism. However, it is fully refuted by different 
reports from this and other newspapers. Every newspaper praises this 
vice-consul highly for his eagerness, while he is being criticized about the 
present defects. Many people who have been unlucky in other regions of Japan 
go to Kanagawa. Since they expect to find the putative gold mountain in the 
place, they often are disappointed…Therefore, their jealousies are stirred up 
against fellow countrymen who are happier.’544 
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Chapter 11 
 
Dutch diplomacy in Japan after the Harris Treaty 
 
 
New developments in Asian diplomatic relations  
 
By now it was clear that the Netherlands had lost its special position in Japan. It, 
however, did not give up Japanese affairs, because these were an important 
factor in Dutch Asian policy. In reality, the Netherlands had completely lost all 
its influence there. Therefore, it planned to develop a new autonomous 
diplomacy towards Japan and the rest of Asia. 
Japanese affairs were very important to the Netherlands in connection 
with its national prestige and its economic interests. The Netherlands still 
fostered an expectation that it could make large profits in the Asian markets. 
This was based on the construction of the Suez Canal. This canal would make 
the distance from Europe to Asia much shorter.545 Although the Suez Canal 
was opened only in 1869, the plan was already being taken into consideration at 
this time, and it gave a strong inducement to increase commercial profits in 
Asia. Then, although the opening of Japan was not sufficiently developed at 
that time, in consideration of the trends in world trade, the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs instructed the General-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies to 
deliver goods to Japan and to search out potential export articles. 546 
Furthermore, the Netherlands had actual proof to support its expectation of 
commercial profits to be made in Japanese trade. It was already receiving many 
orders for various articles from Japan. It was also reported that a fourth 
                                            
545 NA Koloniën no.5889, A letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East 
Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs on 8 January 1857 no.149, Geheim. In this 
document, it was said that this construction would be divided in the Netherlands, England 
and France and through it the Dutch industry in Egypt was beginning to be increasingly 
valued.  
546  NA Koloniën no.5877, A letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 6 July 1856 no.166, Geheim.  
 205 
merchant ship would be required for the Japanese trade.547 If this expanded as 
much as the Dutch expected, i.e., if Japan itself, at that moment still hesitating to 
expand its market, should be willing to do so, it was thought that the 
Netherlands would be able to acquire huge profits from the trade. For this 
reason, Dutch ‘national interests and economic interests’ were actively followed 
in such a policy before the treaty of 1858.  
 After the treaty of 1858, it became customary in Dutch Government 
circles to point out that the Dutch policy toward Japan had never included the 
use of military force, that the method of persuasion had invariably been used, 
and that the Netherlands had peacefully contributed to the opening of Japan 
not only for itself but also for the benefit of other countries.548 In the Dutch 
Parliament, however, the liberals repeatedly stated their disappointment in the 
Government's policy. Since the Netherlands had lost its centuries-old special 
relationship with Japan, these critics argued that it was time to adopt a new 
policy for Japan.549 They pointed out that the great powers England, the United 
States, and France began to follow an active policy towards Japan. England had 
engaged in the Arrow (Second Opium) War in China, the Crimean War with 
Russia and had been catapulted into the Indian Mutiny in India, and France 
also had been engaged in the first two conflicts and had dispatched troops to 
Indo China in the 1850s but the Netherlands had maintained neutrality in the 
Crimean War. 550  Especially after the Belgian secession, the Netherlands 
avoided international conflicts in Europe as much as possible, preferring to 
develop as a maritime mercantile nation. 
Against this background, Dutch diplomacy in Japan should be 
considered in the context of its Asian policy in the nineteenth century. It has 
become clear that the Netherlands had high expectations of its relationship with 
Japan. The most important issue for the Netherlands in Asia was the 
Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands could maintain its national prestige 
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and economic interests only by successful colonial management. There was, 
however, no reason for the Netherlands as a maritime mercantile nation not to 
develop a major interest in trade.551 Japan was a very suitable target for Dutch 
foreign policy, because the Dutch had a long-standing relationship with it and 
was very well acquainted with its customs. Besides this, there were also great 
expectations of the trade with China, in particular as a new market for colonial 
products from the Netherlands East Indies. It was also the beginning of the era 
of the steamship. Japan could play an important role in international maritime 
trade as a supplier of coal, especially for the Chinese market. Besides coal, Japan 
was thought to have abundant supplies of gold, silver and copper. The 
exploitation of these resources was expected to yield big profits. The Member of 
Parliament Harm Stolte (1797-1859) reminded the Government of the 
importance of Japanese trade, saying that ‘Would it be too bold to assume that 
Japan will be still a second California and a second New Holland in respect of 
the production of gold?’552  
In 1859, the Dutch Government sent Ph. F. von Siebold to Japan. Up till 
then his advice had seldom been heeded in its diplomacy towards Japan, but 
now his role was to promote commerce and act as advisor to the NHM. It seems 
that the Dutch Government hoped for a final chance to improve its position in 
Japan.553 In short, the Netherlands did not give up its ambitions in Japanese 
affairs right away, as it has generally been thought, when the other European 
countries and the United States successfully entered the Japanese market.554 If 
the Dutch would give up this market easily in the face of other great powers 
entering into it, it would be difficult to explain the present Dutch economic 
activity all over the world. The British Consul-General Sir Rutherford Alcock 
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said that the Netherlands ‘often wanted to play a role as a large influence for 
the realization of the opening of Japan’.555 
 
 
Public opinion and Dutch diplomacy 
 
In Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant the freedom of trade in connection with the 
Japanese affairs, was discussed as follows:  
‘For a while foreign nations have regarded the Netherlands as an extremely 
greedy monopolist. Before 1848, foreign newspapers and magazines recounted 
only Dutch desires to make a fortune at the cost of other nations. Therefore 
public opinion was a headwind against us. The capital that the Dutch had 
gathered through diligent industry and hard work was regarded as plunder 
from other nations in foreign countries. It was clear that this situation greatly 
damaged our commercial interests. Countries that competed with us in transit 
or other trades wanted to exploit this opinion against us in every respect.’… 
‘The Governments prior to 1848 underestimated public opinion. They 
did not encourage public opinion to be positive towards us in Europe. 
Therefore, other nations thought ill of us. Because of the small issues concerning 
the sea（jusqu’ ά la mer）, measures on  immigration and so on, we have 
aroused the antipathy of other nations. However, it should be admitted that our 
trading regulations have introduced various liberal modifications before 1848. 
This fact can reverse the opinion against us. Unfortunately we have failed to 
make other nations aware of this fact. Therefore, Germany and other countries 
still regarded us as the leech of the trading countries.’… 
‘After 1848 this situation changed. Public opinion was looked upon as a 
strong doctrine that could not be neglected. Therefore we bravely took the road 
to liberalism and took heed of public opinion. As a result the former slander 
against us stopped.’… 
‘The treaty with Japan could have improved our position among 
European merchants. We strove for a long time to persuade Japan, as it was 
important to trade, to discard its policy of seclusion, not only for ourselves, but 
also for all nations in the world. We strongly supported the attempts of Russia, 
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England and the United States. Finally the world realized the opening of this 
large market. The Netherlands should earn the gratitude of the world for this. 
We had already insisted that the Japanese Government open its country during 
the reign of Willem II. Since then, we did not cease in these kinds of endeavours 
until this aim was achieved.’… 
‘The more these Dutch endeavours are admired in world trade, the more 
the fruits will be collected. Once European civilization has been introduced in 
Japan, the enlightened Dutch behaviour towards Japan will soon be valued 
more and more.’… 
‘We are singing a hymn in our own praises in a way.  Nevertheless, we 
have let our opponents in foreign countries speak ill of us for a long time. 
Although they have long taunted us, they do not allow us to bring explicit 
evidence to clarify their misunderstandings of us. We, however, ignore this 
fact.’… 
‘We are the first to have allowed the freedom of shipping on the Rhine. 
With reference to the Navigation Act, we are one of the first to have followed 
the British example. Only a few countries have introduced a tariff rate as low as 
ours. We opened Japan for the sake not only of our interests, but also of world 
trade.’… 
‘Will you please let us know whether this evidence which we might use 
to show our liberalism as against the protectionism in most European countries 
is correct or not.’556… 
Moreover, a British newspaper criticized Dutch protectionism against 
foreign trade in their colonies. Another article in Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant 
refuted this by comparing British colonial policies with those of the Dutch, and 
showing that the Dutch trading measures in their colonies are the same as the 
British. Therefore, the article concluded that the British criticism was unfair, and 
badly informed. The author concluded by saying: ‘It is always heard that the 
British newspapers boast that England opened China not only for herself, but 
also for all the world. We, however, opened Japan at in a gentler manner not 
only for ourselves, but also for the trade of all nations.’557 
                                            
556 ‘Japan’ on 19 March 1858 no. 78 in: Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant. This article was 
reported on the front page.  
557 ‘The Colonial Policy of England and the Netherlands’ on 14 October 1860 no. 284 in: 
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant. 
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The Dutch contribution to the opening of Japan is stressed in articles 
such as the review article of Van Kattendyke’s published diary. He had been the 
Dutch commander of the navy detachment in Nagasaki.558 This article stressed 
the importance of the diary, because all civilized countries were interested in 
the country at that time: ‘If this book provides evidence that the Dutch still have 
‘the oldest letter (priority)’ among the good Japanese at present too, although 
this fact hopefully should not exert a bad influence on us, this fact will apply 
salve to our national wound that was made by the American boast and the 
narrow-minded negligence of great powers. We thank Van Kattendyke for his 
service. He wanted to devote himself to this service and he actually did so. In 
conclusion we hope that he will make timely use of his abundant knowledge 
about Japan and its culture for the sake of the general good.’  
This article demonstrates the Dutch wish at that time. Namely the 
Netherlands should continue to compete with the large powers in Japanese 
affairs and, if possible, it would win back its former status in Japan. The author 
of this review shows the Dutch pride and interest in the Japanese affairs and 
refutes the slander on the Dutch diplomacy by citing several proofs to the 
contrary. 
 
 
Active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan 
 
Donker Curtius reported that the United States had concluded a treaty with 
Ryûkyû and that American ships were entering the port there. The Dutch 
colonial administration in Batavia considered it important that the Netherlands 
should respond to this new development by also showing its presence in the 
Ryûkyû area, for the purpose of protecting its diplomatic and commercial 
interests in Japan. Ryûkyû was under the authority of the damyô of Satsuma 
domain. Therefore, the Dutch immediately wanted to enter into a contract with 
this feudal lord. The Council of the Netherlands East Indies advised that this 
kind of interest in Japan should be expanded without delay, and a plan was 
made to send the warship the Ardjoeno from the Netherlands East Indies to the 
Japanese Sea. 559  In The Hague the Minister of Colonial Affairs strongly 
                                            
558 ‘Contribution’ on 10 November 1860 no. 312 in: Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant. 
559  NA Koloniën no.5904, 2 October 1858 N.501 and Extract out of the register of 
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supported this plan, and he instructed the Governor-General that, if possible, 
the Act of Ratification of the treaty of 18 August 1858 should be carried to 
Nagasaki on this ship.  
The treaty of 1858 made it necessary to send a diplomat to Japan. The 
Council of the Netherlands East Indies advised that Donker Curtius was to be 
appointed by order of the king. The motive was that it would not be necessary 
to modify the management of Japanese affairs between the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs and the Government of Batavia, if Donker Curtius was appointed in this 
way. According to this scheme, it was hoped that Donker Curtius would be the 
Consul-General and diplomat. Donker Curtius, however, had no intention of 
taking up this position, but stated that he wanted to go back to the Netherlands 
at the end of 1859. Consequently, the Government of the Netherlands East 
Indies proposed appointing Van Kattendijke, who was Donker Curtius’ 
deputy.560 Declining to this proposal by the Netherlands East Indies, Van 
Kattendijke stated that he also did not want to remain in Japan for more than 
two years from 1858.561 The Governor-General then advised the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs that, for the time being, it was not necessary to appoint a 
person in this matter, as long as England, Russia and the United State had also 
not yet taken the measure of sending a diplomat. However, he mentioned that 
the Netherlands should not lag behind other powers in its diplomatic relations 
with Japan. 562  The Minister basically agreed to this, but he noted that 
Kanagawa would be an exception, because trade was expected to expand there 
rapidly. He also added that he believed that subsequently Edo and Osaka 
would also become very important in international trade. Furthermore, he 
asked the Governor-General to reorganize the staff in Nagasaki.563 
 
 
New-style Dutch diplomacy towards Japan  
                                                                                                                                
resolutions of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies dated 24 October 1858 
on 25 February 1859 N.83/G. 
560 NA Koloniën no.5907, Advice and observation of the Council of the Netherlands East 
Indies dated 15 March 1859 on 24 June 1859 N.248/x. 
561 NA Koloniën no. 5907, A letter of 15 October 1858 on 24 June 1859 N.248/x.  
562 NA Koloniën no. 5907, A letter of 6 April 1859 on 24 June 1859 N.248/x.  
563 NA Koloniën no. 5907, 24 June 1859 N.248/x.  
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The Netherlands also tried to play a role in Japan’s foreign relations after the 
treaty of 1858, and, meeting this challenge, a new style of diplomacy was 
developed towards Japan in order to protect its interests there. The underlying 
reason was that the Netherlands was actually making huge profits in its 
Japanese trade. For example, the report of the trade balance in 1857-58 year 
issued by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies says that the gross 
earnings in commerce (‘Koophandel’) of the Netherlands East Indies of 
fl.5,699,109 contained fl.762,399 from Japan in 1857 and that gross earning of 
fl.5,186,407 contained fl.755,823 from Japan in 1858.564 The report also stated 
that Dutch influence in Asia, especially in Japan, was very important to the 
Netherlands East Indies. A symbolic event in this new-style Dutch diplomacy 
was to send the ‘Japanese expert’, Von Siebold, to Japan, in spite of the 
consternation this move aroused in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. Moreover, 
the Dutch Government took care to see that its contribution to the development 
of Japan’s foreign relations was widely propagated. Quietly confident, it had 
looked forward to the publication of the above-mentioned ‘Neérlands streven’ by 
Van der Chijs.565 At a later stage, Japan invited what were known as Oyatoi 
Gaikokujin (foreign experts, literally ‘foreign employees’) from various foreign 
countries for the purpose of transferring the knowledge of Western culture. 
Japan also requested such persons from the Netherlands. The Dutch 
Government fulfilled this request with pleasure. The Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs expected that the Dutch new-style diplomacy towards the future 
Dutch-Japanese relations would develop successfully.566 
 
 
                                            
564 NA Koloniën no.5899, 24 March 1858 N.197.  
565  NA Koloniën no.6531, The semi-official letter of 13 July 1861 N.277 from the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies also expressed his expectation that he 
would take great interest in it. NA Koloniën no.6531, The semi-official letter of 6 September 
1861 N.23 from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs. 
566 NA BuZa no.3142, 10 May 1862 N.30. This document says that the Netherlands had not 
completely lost ‘Prism’ yet.  
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The Anglo-Dutch -French ‘Entente’ against the United States 
 
Dutch diplomacy in Japan inevitably had to change course as a result of the 
Harris Treaty of 1858. Until then the Netherlands had taken advantage of its 
long-standing relationship with Japan and tried to maintain, or rather to 
expand, its influence. Moreover, through the channel of this diplomacy it also 
intended to expand its own privileges and interests in the other Asian regions. 
One example of this Dutch diplomacy can be mentioned, namely a provision 
about learning the Japanese language and Japanese studies was added to the 
Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1858. T. Ishii has described this provision as a ‘unique 
regulation’ and it is one that argues that the Netherlands intended to maintain 
and expand its influence in Japan in a different way to those chosen by other 
major Western powers.567 
The Harris Treaty was a clear signal that Japan no longer considered the 
Netherlands the first among the foreign countries. In spite of this situation, as a 
power having interests in Japan, the Netherlands had to acquiesce in this and 
find ways to deal with this matter. However, how could it deal with Japanese 
affairs in relation to such major Western powers as England, France, Prussia 
and the United States? How could it compete against the mighty United States 
in the Japanese market, which was a stranger in Asia and did not respect the 
long-standing Dutch-Japanese relationship? The Netherlands as a European 
power looked for co-operation with other European powers after 1858. It looked 
to its ‘most natural ally’ England first and also to France which was actively 
pursuing its interests in Asian affairs. It had to choose its moment though, 
finding a time when France was not in discord with either the Netherlands or 
England.  
After the treaty of 1858, the Netherlands continued to pursue its active 
diplomacy towards Japan in view of its commercial and political interests in 
Asia. It did so through the ‘Anglo-Dutch-French Entente’ in Japanese affairs, an 
European alliance, which the Netherlands suggested in order to oppose the 
challenge of the United States that had newly emerged in Asia and was equal to 
the strongest country in Europe. While Japanese affairs were important for the 
Netherlands in connection with its national prestige, commercial considerations, 
its economic interest, were highly important too. Moreover, at that time, the 
                                            
567 Ishii, Nihon Kaikokushi, p.366.  
 213 
Netherlands anticipated that it could make large profits in the Asian markets 
once the Suez canal would be ready. 
Japan was opened to foreign intercourse, nevertheless a campaign calling 
for the expulsion of foreigners (Jôi) grew stronger there day by day. Therefore, 
the Edo Bakufu requested Western countries to postpone the implementation of 
the treaty of 1858 until this campaign had calmed down. The Japanese 
Government tried to soothe the unrest by forcing foreign countries to accept 
this postponement. Consequently, the Government would be able to show a 
group, which was against the opening of Japan and which considered it 
disgraceful simply to follow the demands of foreign countries, its autonomous 
diplomatic attitude. Out of consideration for the Japanese Emperor, who 
resided in nearby Kyoto, the opening of the ports of Hyogo and Osaka was also 
postponed.568  
Concerning this matter, the Minister of Colonial Affairs forwarded a 
letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies (dated 29 
October 1861 no.974/1) with his own remarks to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
The documents state the opinion of the Governor-General of the Netherlands 
East Indies, as follows: the Governor-General had received a letter in which the 
Tycoon (shogun) requested the postponement of the opening of the harbours, 
but he considered it unwise to amend the Edo Treaty (the treaties of 1858) as the 
Japanese were demanding. The Council of the Netherlands East Indies was of 
the opinion that it could accept the Japanese request but insisted that Dutch 
warships be allowed to enter the harbours mentioned in this treaty after the 
short term allowed for the opening of cities. It called upon the Japanese 
Government to suppress any incident arising from the aversion to foreigners, 
and to carefully upkeep the good relationships with the signatory powers of a 
treaty. Hence, the Netherlands East Indies advised the Dutch Government to 
adopt a strong position opposing the Japanese request. The Minister of Colonial 
Affairs, James Loudon (1824-1900), however, did not entirely agree with this 
proposal.  
Minister Loudon’s opinion was that the Dutch reply should not put the 
Japanese Government into a difficult position, because it was actually moving 
in the right direction. Moreover, to some extent, the considerations of England 
and France in this issue would be reflected in this Dutch reply. That is, if the 
                                            
568 Fukuchi, Bakumatsu suibôron, pp.201-202.  
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Dutch decision met with the disapproval of other powers, it would put the 
Netherlands at a disadvantage. The Minister underlined the importance of the 
relations with England and France in this remark; ‘In view of the closer 
relationship between Mr De Wit and the representatives of England and France, 
it is natural that the Dutch Government should take into account the reactions 
of both above-mentioned countries.’ 
On the other hand, the Minister also showed some Dutch autonomy in 
his opinion. The British Government had acquiesced in the Japanese request 
and agreed to postpone the opening of harbours for seven years, but had 
demanded it be able to carry on trade in Tsushima and on the opposite shore of 
the Korean Peninsula. Tsushima was an important place as it was a 
stepping-stone to China. When Russia tried to occupy this island after the treaty 
of 1858, England opposed this Russian plan.569 Loudon considered it unwise 
that the Dutch Government follow the British decision in this issue at present. 
The reasons were that a postponement of seven years seemed over long and not 
conducive to helping the Japanese Government control the aversion towards 
foreigners from the West of its nationals. It did concede that the one-year term 
that had been proposed by the American and British representatives was too 
short and, if the plan were pushed, the same problem might repeat itself. 
Therefore, the Minister thought that it was advisable to avoid adopting this 
measure, and that the postponement of about two or three years might be the 
correct middle course. This may be considered proof that the Netherlands was 
not absolutely dependent on Franco-British decisions. 
  Minister of Colonial Affairs Loudon was of the opinion that the Dutch 
should get another concession than the British would receive. He believed it 
would be in Dutch interest if ‘the Netherlands should perform better in the 
agreement about Deshima as a free bonded warehouse’ and ‘if all interference 
by the Japanese authorities in commercial dealings with foreigners in the open 
ports’ would be terminated. He considered it to be useful that the signatory 
powers with Japan should understand each other’s policy regarding Japanese 
affairs. Then, he asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to relay the ideas of the 
French Government to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, because the Dutch 
Government wanted to take a final decision about this issue, whereas Japanese 
                                            
569 See Tokutomi, Kinsei Nihon kokuminshi, 1991.  
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affairs were still obfuscated.570 
This document proves that the Netherlands did not take its own 
decisions about Japanese affairs lightly. What was decided always reflected the 
decisions of other Western powers. In order to protect Dutch interests, however, 
the Netherlands strove to have its demands reflected in the policies of other 
powers towards Japan as much as possible through general consent. This was 
definitely the new Dutch policy after 1858, and shows that it is impossible to 
maintain that the Netherlands only followed the path set by other powers in the 
development of Japanese affairs. In truth it should be called a very realistic 
policy, which avoided criticism and averted a serious failure in its policy. It ran 
up against problems because the attitude of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
at variance with that of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs.  
The Minister of Foreign Affairs gave the following answer to the 
above-mentioned letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs: the sentiments of 
the Japanese Government for the Netherlands are obvious from its kind deeds, 
especially in view of the latest report… in the present atmosphere of open 
competition between the great powers for Japanese trade, the sole chance for 
the Netherlands to hold and establish its influence is to adopt a very friendly 
attitude and depend on the continual wise and careful behavior of its agents 
and subjects in that country [Japan]. If such a measure unexpectedly ends in 
failure, the Netherlands should follow the measures taken by other 
governments in respect of Japan, because Dutch power is insufficient to secure 
a lasting predominance in Japan by force.  
This reply makes it clear that the Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted at 
all costs to avoid putting the Netherlands into an awkward position in Europe 
through the failure of its diplomacy.571  
                                            
570 The number of documents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as follows: 
2.05.01, 
3141: from February 1852 to October 1859. 
3142: from October 1859 to June 1862. 
3143: from June 1862 to July 1863. 
 NA BuZa, 14 January N.11 on 16 January 1862 N.10.  
571 NA BuZa, 29 January 1862 N.30. This letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs could not be found in the index of the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs. The copy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used here.  
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Seeking a solution to this situation, the Minister of Colonial Affairs 
proposed the idea of a Dutch-British-French ‘Entente’. He had a plan to secure 
and to pursue Dutch interests in Japan in the safest and most effective way 
through supple co-operation with its closest great powers in Europe. The 
United States was excluded from this plan, because, ‘On the one hand in 
general its [American] behaviour militates against us, and in particular its 
representative’s behavior in Japan towards his British, French and Dutch 
colleagues gives little cause to involve him, especially in this matter. On the 
other hand, it may serve a useful purpose in preventing exacerbating 
susceptibilities and consequently more decisive opposition from the side of the 
American Consul, if we were to advise him of the steps we have taken either 
now or after our proposals have been accepted in London and in Paris.’572 
After deliberation in the Cabinet meeting, the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs corrected the draft report of Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs to 
the King dated on 5 March 1862. In general, the points of this report to the King 
were approved at the Cabinet meeting. Nevertheless, a guiding principle to be 
followed towards the Japanese Government in the enforcement of the 
Dutch-Japanese treaty was decided at this meeting. In the first place, the 
Netherlands would firmly hold on to its rights acquired under this treaty when 
measures were taken in London and Paris in the interest of the Entente. In the 
second place, the United States of America would not be informed of its 
participation in this plan, but only of what should occur as a result of the 
Entente. 573  Dutch rivalry against the United States shows clearly. The 
Netherlands intended to establish a kind of European alliance in Japanese 
Affairs. This Dutch plan demonstrates that the Government wanted to retrieve 
its honour and regain its interest in Japanese Affairs. After this revision, the 
Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs submitted this report to the king.574 
The majority of the contents coincided with the above-mentioned document 
dated 16 January 1862 (N.10).  
                                            
572 NA BuZa, 5 March 1862 N.27. A letter from the Minister of Colonials Affairs to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
573 NA BuZa, 24 March 1862 N.7. A letter dated 20 March 1862 N.24 from the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
574 NA BuZa, 4 April 1862 N.4. The report to the king dated 5 March 1862 N.27 by the 
Ministers of Colonial and Foreign Affairs dated 3 April 1862 N.89.  
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The Von Siebold incident – an obstacle to the Triple Entente  
 
At this point it is essential to mention a particular event, namely Von Siebold’s 
banishment from Edo which is mentioned in this same report. Von Siebold’s 
banishment can also be considered a result of the Anglo- Dutch- French Triple 
Entente. As a representative of the NHM, Von Siebold was stationed in Japan. 
He had been deported from Japan after what became known as the Von Siebold 
Incident of 1825. This banishment was rescinded by the treaty of 1858. The 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs wanted to recover the dominant position in Japan 
of the Dutch after it had been lost because of this treaty. Therefore, the Ministry 
had sent Von Siebold, the expert on Japan.575 In this letter from the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs to the king, Von Siebold was mentioned as follows: ‘One can 
accept that in Europe nobody can be found who has made such a particular 
study of Japanese laws, morals and usages as Von Siebold has done.’576  
As he was very proud of his knowledge of Japanese Affairs, Von Siebold 
thought that he would be sent there and be appointed as Consul-General.577 
Even after Von Siebold had been expelled because he had bought maps of Japan 
and Korea drawn by Inô Tadataka from the court astronomer, Takahashi 
Kageyasu, he was still respected by many Japanese as their former teacher in 
various branches of scientific knowledge. After Von Siebold’s return to Japan, 
he actively pursued his own Japanese policy. However, he was about to 
undergo a rude awakening. 
The murder of a Dutchman in American service, Harry C.T. Heusken 
(1832-61) in Edo in 1861 was symptomatic of the fact how dangerous Edo was 
for foreigners at that time. Von Siebold, however, seemingly took no notice of 
this and eagerly taught European technology and civilization to the Japanese 
researchers there.578 Nevertheless, inklings of the problems encountered by 
                                            
575 NA Koloniën no.3142, 3 April no. 152, Geheim. 
576 Mac Lean, ‘Philipp Franz von Siebold and the opening of Japan, 1843-1866’, p.59. 
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foreigners in Japan did filter down to him. To the extent that Von Siebold even 
wrote an essay about these incidents. It was published and could be found in 
the Dutch newspaper too. Here follow the contents of that piece in a nutshell:  
Concerning the series of assaults on foreigners, foreign representatives 
criticized the indifferent attitude of the Japanese government. Von Siebold also 
consulted with the Japanese Representative of Foreign Affairs about this issue. 
He pointed out that it was necessary not only to search the culprits, but also to 
pursue the reasons and motives of these kinds of crimes. Although this official 
promised to takes action, Von Siebold, did not believe that this would add up to 
anything. He commented that according to this Japanese official. ‘Japan is 
composed of many domains. Each daimyô rules his domain autonomously…In 
this country, some daimyô close their domain and do not admit any kind of 
outside investigation access. Moreover there are many temples and shrines in 
Japan. Every criminal who pretends to be a pilgrim, a mendicant monk or a 
priest can easily find a hiding place among them. In this situation, it is difficult 
or almost impossible for the Bakufu to find a culprit. On many occasions it has 
already happened that even a vicious criminal such as a parricide could not be 
found. At present, it has only proved possible to arrest a few criminals. 
Furthermore, the Bakufu is expected to pursue and investigate the reason and 
motive for the murder.’ 
Von Siebold argued that it was very difficult for the Bakufu to solve these 
kinds of problem because of the nature of the political system in Japan: ‘After 
the conclusion of the first treaty on 31 March 1854, the Bakufu had a serious 
problem. Some influential exclusionists had either left politics or changed their 
viewpoint. It has been confirmed to the Japanese people that it is impossible to 
struggle current trends in the world. The Bakufu is doing its best to fulfil the 
terms of the treaties and to protect foreigners to order to promote the interests 
of Japan and trade. In spite of these positive situations, however, the biggest 
obstacle is public opinion in Japan. It is undeniable that leaders of national 
parties and fanatical believers in the old system have strengthened various 
rumours and have deepened the former Japanese prejudice towards foreigners. 
Naturally, the present political situation and recent painful bloody affairs in 
Japan are the outcome of this situation.’… 
Von Siebold remarked that the Bakufu had been able to maintain peace in 
                                                                                                                                
pp.137-139. 
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the country for over 200 years, not by force but by the spirit of the law. The 
Japanese nation deeply respected the law and the legislator and it would not be 
easy to change the national way of thinking immediately by force. He therefore 
believed that the foreign representatives should modify their opinions, shed 
their doubts about the Japanese, and reduce their requests and suppress their 
dissatisfaction with the Bakufu in these conditions.  Because it should be clear 
to anyone that the Bakufu could not be held responsible for all these 
extraordinary incidents. He concluded: ‘Therefore the Bakufu is making real 
endeavours to establish new credit among foreigners in order to improve the 
present situation in Japan.’579 
  Von Siebold analyzed the reason for the series of assaults on foreigners 
and the reaction of the Bakufu by looking at the political system and the history 
in Japan. He remained favourably inclined towards Japan, but the other foreign 
nations were adamant that the Bakufu should prevent this kind of accident. In 
their opinion the failure of the Bakufu to take measures against these 
murderous attacks showed that the political system had already collapsed. 
Consequently, Von Siebold’s opinion of Japan did not agree with the views held 
by other foreign countries. 
  As a result of all this, the Japanese authorities did not pay much heed to 
the Dutch Consul-General in Japan, De Wit. Van Siebold had told the 
magistrate of Nagasaki that De Wit was a moderate person, but that he did not 
understand Japanese affairs, and that therefore the Governor-General in the 
Netherlands East Indies had asked him to advise De Wit on these matters.580 
De Wit clearly was not amused by Von Siebold’s behaviour and reported to his 
Government how much trouble he experienced on account of him.581 As a 
result of this Von Siebold was recalled. In Japan there was sympathy for Von 
Siebold, and it was said that De Wit had ordered Von Siebold to leave Japan 
because he was jealous of his fame.582  
                                            
579 ‘The attack on the British mission in Edo – considered from the historical and political 
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In other quarters it was remarked that Von Siebold, although he held the 
title of colonel in the Netherlands East Indies army and was an official adviser 
to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, he was in reality Pro-Russian. Moreover, if 
Von Siebold were to remain longer in Japan, the Japanese Government might 
think that the Netherlands supported this Japanese plan to admit that Nagasaki 
should be the only free port in Japan and this was contrary to Dutch interests. 
Furthermore, it was worried that its own diplomatic course was contradicted. 
Therefore the Dutch Government thought that the time had come to make a 
decision.583 Although all this may have been true, I believe, that this affair 
should be seen as the inevitable result of the principle of Dutch co-operation 
with England and France, the Entente, which did not leave space for such 
independent behaviour. Von Siebold disliked England and France, in spite of 
the Dutch plan for an Entente, and in addition he was pro-Russian.584 The 
banishment of the Japanese expert Von Siebold is a clear indication of how 
important this Entente was considered to be in the Netherlands. 
Russia itself, however, did not believe either the Dutch or Von Siebold’s 
opinions. After the opening of Japan, Russia sent Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin 
(1803-1883) to Japan. In his instruction he was told to pay courtesy to the Dutch, 
but he should not believe them too much; He should not ask the Dutch to 
mediate during the negotiations with the Japanese Government. Russia still 
doubted the Netherlands after the incident of Nikolai Petrovitch Rezanov 
(1764-1807) in 1804.585 Therefore, when Putyatin’s mission arrived in Nagasaki 
and negotiated with Japan, he politely declined the proposal of the magistrates 
of Nagasaki that he be supported by the Dutch.586 Von Siebold suggested that 
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Nagasaki should be the sole port for trade in Japan.  However, in his letter to 
the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senyavin, dated December 16, Putyatin 
reported that ‘Generally, I cannot follow Von Siebold’s advice. It would not be 
preferable for Russia to choose the port of Nagasaki as we would have to 
compete with the Dutch there. Also, the Japanese in Nagasaki used to apply an 
insulting pressure on foreigners during negotiations....’587 Von Siebold returned 
to Europe. After that, he tried to promote his plans with Napoleon III in France. 
This proved a forlorn hope and he died while residing in Munich in October 
1866.588 
 
 
Opinion in the Netherlands about the murder of Heusken  
 
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant which frequently discussed Japanese affairs as we 
have seen, also devoted much attention to the murder of the Dutchman Harry 
Heusken, who had served as the interpreter of the American envoy. Here 
follow some excerpts:  
‘Heusken had a moderate character and the Foreign Consuls in Edo were 
proud of him. He was born in Amsterdam and he went to Japan with Harris in 
1855 as a Dutch translator. He had a good command of Japanese. He could 
speak and understand it as well as the Japanese. Therefore, in the negotiations 
the Japanese could not ask whether Heusken could understand. This much 
irritated the Japanese diplomats. Moreover, he had worked as the translator for 
England, France and more recently Prussia…Heusken hunted down every 
source to locate problems [that might stall the diplomacy] in Japan. His logical 
method of negotiation was very difficult for the Japanese, who were very 
sceptical and faithless, to cope with as they could not deny his logic. They hated 
him and as a consequence, they murdered him. He was sacrificed for his firm 
confidence and eagerness.’  
  After these sentences, the article went on to criticize the involvement of 
the Japanese Government in this incident. Foreign Representatives left Edo for 
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588  Miyazaki Michio, ‘Shîboruto no Nihonkaikoku kindaika heno kôken’ (‘Siebold’s 
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Michio(red.), Shîboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindaika, p. 305. 
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Yokohama in order to show their strong opprobrium to the Japanese 
government. However, only Harris did not leave Edo. The article comments on 
this issue, as below. 
‘Harris’ behaviour is incomprehensible. He remains in Edo alone, even 
though his fellow-national has been murdered. After the death of Heusken, 
Harris hatched a wonderful ploy that he (Heusken) should revert to being 
Dutch again. Heusken had been born in Amsterdam and had never acquired 
American nationality. Under Dutch law, however, a Dutch person cannot work 
for a foreign military service or a foreign government without the assent of the 
Dutch king. Hence Heusken had forfeited his Dutch nationality. Therefore 
Harris wanted to exploit this wonderful plan to make him Dutch again because 
he wanted to circumvent this situation. However it did not work. After all, 
American diplomacy is very special in Japan. Therefore if a linguist should 
want to express this kind of American diplomacy in words, he would have to 
create new words for it.’589  
Harry Heusken, had indeed greatly contributed to the handling of the 
Japanese affairs of the United States, the strong rival of the Netherlands in the 
negotiations with Japan. This article in the NRC daily displays how complicated 
the evaluation in Europe of the extremely intricate and critical situation in 
Japan had become. 
After the murder of Heusken, the Dutch Vice-Consul in Edo, Van 
Polsbroek took charge of the Entente’s relations and left Edo with the British 
and France representatives. Van Polsbroek had worked in the Netherlands East 
Indies before he went to Nagasaki as a secretary to Donker Curtius. He was 
promoted to Consul and became well acquainted with Japanese affairs. He was 
generally thought of as an independently minded person: ‘Since he recognized 
that the Japanese government attached importance to England, the United 
States, France and Russia and thought little of the Netherlands, he always 
adopted measures to maintain Dutch influence by co-operating with England 
and France.’590 This impression is indeed confirmed by his diary. De Graeff had 
a fresh look at the developments within Japanese society and he was very 
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unhappy with the passive behaviour of Consul-General De Wit in Nagasaki. 
Harris remained in Edo alone, because he did not want to force the Bakufu 
into a tight corner, saying, ‘Since I have changed the system of seclusion that 
continued over 200 years, this has aroused anti-foreign feeling among the 
Japanese. Therefore the United States has to strongly support the Japanese 
government in order to reach its aim: its opening.’  
Reminiscing about those days, one of the mounted policemen, Ebara 
Soroku (江原素六, 1842-1922) said that Harris did not stop his daily customary 
ride from his consulate (Zenpuku Temple in Azabu麻布の善福寺) to Ohoribata 
(城濠端) throughout this dangerous period. On every occasion, a group of 
mounted policemen（別手組） was obliged to escort him in a cluster.’591 Harris 
therefore was remaining in Edo alone.  
The credit and popularity of Harris carried more and more weight with 
the Japanese. Finally, the Japanese always asked his advice in difficult 
diplomatic problems.’592 ‘When Harris returned to his country, the shogun 
conferred a Japanese sword on him. Later, Harris presented it to General Grant, 
‘who saved our fatherland, the United States, from devastation in the Civil 
War.’593 The Japanese Government granted ten thousand taels of silver to 
Heusken’s mother.594 
The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the British Government 
that the Dutch Government wished to reach as strong a mutual understanding 
as possible among the representatives of the signatory powers to the treaty in 
Edo. The British Government completely agreed with this proposal and 
promised to offer information concerning Japan to the Dutch Government. On 
this occasion, the Dutch ambassador in London, Bentinck, advised his 
government to inform the British that the Netherlands was generally in 
agreement with the decisions of the British Cabinet.595 
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The significance of Triple Entente 
 
In 1862 the European signatory powers to the treaty with Japan were waiting 
for the Japanese envoy to arrive in Europe. The British Foreign Secretary, 
Russell, had received a letter from the plenipotentiary in Edo, Alcock, which 
reported that it would be impossible to start new negotiations with this envoy. 
In view of this information, the British Government informed Bentinck that it 
had no intention of negotiating with the Japanese envoy and it would receive 
the envoy warmly, but only ceremonially. Furthermore, it informed him that it 
would be very pleased for its government to know that the Dutch 
representative would co-operate with the British and French representatives.596 
As a result of this letter, the Dutch Government informed the French 
Government about this plan forged by the Entente.597 
Because the Netherlands took the initiative in the Triple Entente, by 
examining only Dutch documents concerning this issue, it may be difficult to 
recognize how much importance the other major powers England and France 
attached to it. In view of the British reply to this Dutch plan for the Entente, it 
does not seem that England considered this Entente very important. But in 
consideration of the difficult situation for Western powers in Japan at that time, 
I believe this Entente was useful to both England and France. After the opening 
of Japan, the Japanese Government experienced many problems inside and 
outside its country. Inside Japan, the anti-foreign movement had to be 
suppressed, and outside, it had to deal with the many demands made by the 
Western powers. In particular, it was very difficult for the Japanese 
Government to deal with the multifarious demands made by various countries 
immediately. In this situation, the most effective course was for Western 
powers to decide upon common demands for Japan, because its Government 
would more easily agree to these cut.and.dried   demands by the West. 
Certainly, the ‘Entente’ was the best means for the Netherlands to secure 
its own interests in Japan. It should be remembered that the Netherlands was 
afraid of completely losing its influence in Japan, if its own diplomacy should 
unexpectedly cause a disagreement with other great powers and it suffered a 
serious failure. Such a disaster should be avoided at all costs as long as the aim 
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of the Netherlands was to restore its former influence in Japan, or rather expand 
it by exploiting what remained of the friendly sentiments towards the 
Netherlands.  
The Netherlands, however, tried not to become involved in the political 
side of Japanese affairs with great Western powers, and took measures to 
restrict its Japanese affairs to trade, because Japan was very important as a new 
market for colonial products from the Netherlands East Indies, or indeed for all 
its Asian trade, especially the Chinese trade that had recently been revitalized, 
including the markets of Korea and Russia. Setting its sights firmly on this 
policy, the Dutch Government dealt only with political problems in Japan when 
these happened to concern trade. Hence, the Netherlands concentrated on its 
own trade in Japan and tried to make as much profit there as much as possible, 
while maintaining its relationship on the basis of the ‘Entente’ with England 
and France. In such a situation, the Dutch bonded warehouse in Deshima 
became the most important issue for the Netherlands. 
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Chapter 12 
 
The endeavor to acquire vested rights 
 
 
Deshima as a Dutch bonded warehouse  
 
Mindful of the relationship enshrined in the Dutch-British-French triple Entente, 
the Netherlands avoided as much as possible political issues that might lead to 
difficulties in Japanese affairs. Of course, the Netherlands tried to increase its 
profits on trade. An example of this Dutch diplomacy towards Japan is that the 
Dutch Government tried to acquire of bonded warehouse for Deshima for 
goods imported by the Dutch. Since Deshima was leased, this artificial island 
was not Dutch property, even though the Dutch did have exclusive use of the 
island in the period of seclusion, the so-called Sakoku. After the opening of 
Japan, the function of Deshima changed according to the conventions and 
treaties that were concluded between the Netherlands and Japan. 
The development in the function of Deshima will be analyzed briefly. 
The Dutch Government wanted to conclude a treaty with Japan in order to 
secure its interests on the basis of its long relationship. On the other hand, the 
Japanese Government was always reluctant to take this step. After a temporary 
agreement between the Netherlands and Japan that was concluded in advance 
of the treaty, the Dutch-Japanese treaty was finally concluded in 1856. The 
Dutch Government acknowledged that Deshima had the function of a bonded 
warehouse in these agreements.  The following year the supplementary Treaty 
of 1857, which became part of the treaty of 1856, was concluded. This treaty 
contained commercial regulations, which stipulated that the trade would be 
carried out in such a way as to expand the existing trade in Nagasaki. 
Nevertheless, the regulations did not restrict the amount of trade and the 
number of ships, and also admitted the free trade of other foreign countries. It 
seemed that the Dutch right to Deshima would offer a great advantage in the 
Japanese market and that this was the sole privilege that the Dutch could derive 
from the long relationship with Japan. The Dutch Government intended to 
increase profits in Japanese trade and in other markets in Asia too, by exploiting 
this right. However, differences arose on both sides about the interpretation of 
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the stipulation regarding Deshima in the additional Dutch-Japanese treaty. The 
Dutch Government continued its efforts to ensure this old Dutch privilege after 
the treaties of 1858 which had regulated free trade and had no provision for 
privileges for particular countries. 
 
 
Criticism in Dutch pubic opinion about Dutch Government 
diplomacy  
 
Dutch public opinion exerted a strong influence on the endeavors of the Dutch 
Government to maintain its position in Japan. The nation was greatly 
disappointed in the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan. This was illustrated in 
various ways either in journals or in letters written by the business communities 
of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. An article with the ironic title ‘Altruistic Policy 
in Japan’ in Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië, pointed out that the editor of this 
journal had advised the Government to follow different course of diplomacy 
towards Japan. This advice had been arrogantly rejected with the statement that 
the Netherlands should exercise its initiative in civilizing the Japanese nation 
and not in pursuing its own interests by setting a good example with ‘Altruistic 
Policy’. As a result the Dutch government had expressed no desire for anything 
and no monopoly on trade, but only expected a reasonable return for the shown 
kindness. The author of this article concluded that this doctrine had been 
propagated in vain. He decried that opportunities had been missed: ‘Actually 
our position in Japan was ideal for making profits during the abolition of its 
seclusion. Only the Netherlands among all the European powers had been 
admitted into Japan for over two centuries. The Dutch language was the sole 
European language there and only Dutch goods and our national flag were 
admissible in the Japanese markets and its ports. England and the United States 
were not concerned about entering Japan, when the Japanese Government 
changed its opinion and came to believe that civilized counties should be 
admitted into Japan.’ …‘What a great position could we have acquired at that 
time!  
Curiously enough owing to the inflexible diplomacy pursued by the 
Ministers of Colonial Affairs towards Japan, the Netherlands was among the 
countries that were admitted into Japan, the last to have concluded a 
treaty. ..‘Various new facts come to light every day. We do not want to repeat 
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previous history. Nevertheless we have to remember the very fact that although 
a temporary treaty with Japan was submitted to our representative, our 
privileges fell far short of those that were granted to other countries. After a 
long time we managed to acquire the same conditions as other countries, while 
we gave Japan a huge present and fulfilled a great number of Japanese 
demands. The more contact the Japanese had with Western civilization, the 
more they demanded from us. Although the Netherlands gave the Japanese 
more things than other powers did, it acquired less in return. While the slogan 
‘Our navy is in decline’ was making a most painful impression on the 
Government and the whole population, a warship of ours -the Soembing-was 
presented to Japan free of charge. All this expense, including that of other 
presents, made heavy inroads into the budget of the Netherlands East Indies. 
Someone says that the Japanese had incurred millions of guilders’ worth of 
debts to us.  Even so, our officers, engineers and soldiers were sent to Japan in 
order to transfer technology. The Kambang trade was sold for a few tons of gold 
belonging to the leaseholder.’ Rather dramatically this author asked: ‘After all 
what did we gain?’ 
He then went on to criticize that the first Japanese mission overseas 
departed for the United States for the purpose of exchanging instruments of 
ratification and not to the Netherlands, and that the English language was 
driving Dutch more and more out of Japan. The debts that had been incurred 
by the Japanese at Nagasaki were in this author’s eyes another problem:  
‘If the Japanese need something, they ask the Dutch Commissioner, 
namely ‘the Chief Merchant’, as the Dutch representative is known, for it. What 
should we assume from this? We had been endeavoring to take the initiative in 
transferring Western civilization to Japan for a very long time. The Japanese 
Government purchased ships, machines, books and many goods from the 
Netherlands. This was at the expense of the Netherlands East Indies budget. 
When the budget was discussed a few years ago, a statesman asked the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs whether it was true that we were owed a large sum 
by the Japanese Government, and whether it was so difficult to collect such 
debts. The Minister of Colonial Affairs could not deny the latter and he 
answered that we had insisted on the payment of this sum. This year, in the 
report concerning the budget, the same issue was raised again. What was the 
answer? ‘The signatory regrettably has to report. We received bad news about 
the payment of the Japanese Government debts…Therefore, Batavia suffered a 
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loss….. ’’ 
‘From this report it is to be understood that the Dutch Government 
receives glasses and dishes from the Japanese Government and so on in 
exchange for Dutch articles. The Japanese still regard us as a merchant or broker 
whom they need not respect… Anyhow, what a shame! We have sacrificed our 
trade. Camphor and copper were once sent to the Netherlands. However, at 
present… We repeat the words of Van der Linden, the Governor-General in the 
Netherlands East Indies should  pass on to the Dutch Commissioner ‘Oh, do 
not send any more glasses or dishes!’’ 
  ‘We may be reading this conclusion with a laugh. Nevertheless it is a 
very important issue. That the Japanese treat us badly unfortunately results 
from our diplomacy. Meanwhile Japan does not always clear off its debts to us. 
The income of the Netherlands East Indies has considerably decreased, while 
Java has many costly matters. Under these circumstances the Japanese 
Government invites us into the garden and makes us recommend our wise 
‘Altruistic Policy’’.  
‘Although we reiterate it, the responsibility rests with the colonial 
administration that always takes half measures and is incompetent in its affairs. 
The North Americans, the British and French sent a fleet to India. The 
Netherlands poured a great deal of wealth into the reconstruction of its navy. 
However, only one ship, the Groningen, appeared there; not to represent us but 
to work for the Japanese. The Dutch Commissioner in Japan, Donker Curtius, 
was ‘the chief of the Dutch merchants’ before. We insisted on his replacement, 
when Japan took another political direction. The Netherlands should be 
represented in Japan in another way. What happened next? His title was 
changed. The person, however, still held a very low rank. This measure had a 
bitter outcome, because appearance is very important in all Asian countries 
including Japan. Therefore, the Dutchman is always a merchant or a broker in 
their eyes. In short, the appearance has not been changed.’ 
‘Now finally two persons with another title have been sent to Japan. We 
have reported a few remarks about this recent appointment. We had hoped that 
a political representative and an expert in commerce should be in Japan, in 
consideration of our commercial interests. This did not happen. Meanwhile, 
thanks to it, we once again have realized how important this affair was to us. 
Our Government purchased the right of leaseholder in the Kambang trade in 
order to abolish the Japanese monopoly trade and to open its trade to civil 
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merchants. This trade should have eliminated self-sacrifice. What did we see? A 
petition had already been submitted to the Government a long time ago. The 
important merchants and the representatives in Japan asked the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs to give them more protection. Actually their position is 
unenviable. A few covetous Western investments aroused Japanese anger. The 
low level of trade in Japan has led to a dangerous situation. The Japanese 
Government did not want to open its ports and demanded a retraction of some 
compromises to do with currency. In fact the Japanese Government seriously 
damaged its relations with foreign countries and trade. Some Europeans have 
been murdered. On the pretext of protection, the Japanese keep other 
Europeans under severe control and in isolation. Two Dutch captains have also 
been murdered. Under these circumstances our trade in Japan needs the firm 
support and protection of our Government. The importance of support is clear 
from the second address concerning this trade in the Lower House which is 
published in this newspaper today.’ 
  ‘How should we view this affair? The author bitterly asked after having 
poured out all this criticism against the government: ‘We shall not stop 
repeating that the people in charge of the Government did not promote our 
interests in Japan properly. It is regrettable that we have to confirm our present 
situation. Our Japanese trade could have led to a splendid future. Probably, 
however, it is too late. Meanwhile, we cannot do anything about it. Our position 
in Japan may be lost at present. Dutch commerce and industry had great 
expectations of the opening of Japan to world trade. Recently an entrepreneur 
sent two ships loaded up with articles directly there. Unless our Government, 
however, seriously adopts a positive measure as soon as possible, trade will not 
flourish until the opening of Japan is an accomplished fact. This present 
situation frightens people. Hence the failures of Government officials are 
damaging the National Treasury. If the good behavior of our representatives 
can usher in a profitable dawn for our colonial interests and it is not too late, 
people can probably also do something about our affairs in Japan. The petition 
of our nationals in Japan should under no circumstances go unheeded.’ 598 This 
author was not the only one to vent his gall in frustration. Also the business 
community in the Netherlands and Japan commented on the failure of Dutch 
politics. 
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Opinions in business circles about Deshima as a bonded 
warehouse 
 
After the treaties of 1858 had been concluded, it became impossible for the 
Netherlands to pursue its own privileges won on the basis of its long 
relationship. Under these circumstances, how would one be able to attain the 
aim of turning Deshima into a bonded warehouse? This question will be 
examined below. The Minister of Colonial Affairs asked business circles their 
opinions about this matter. In reply to his request, the president of the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry in Amsterdam expressed his opinion as follows: 
‘Naturally, in the first place -as your Excellency pointed out- placing our goods 
in bond here has been taken into consideration. This would be very valuable for 
our trade, if the Japanese Government itself would undertake the construction 
of bonded warehouses in every opened harbor, from where goods could be 
freely imported and exported at its own expense. Such a measure would 
generally provide a great convenience for this trade and it would offer a great 
advantage; it would set the rule, which the Japanese Government had failed to 
implement anyhow, that every merchant can place his goods, as it were, in a 
civilian bonded warehouse, null and void. 
The lack of regulations concerning such bonded warehouses is a large 
lacuna that should be dealt with in present treaties, and our Government would 
act not only to its own advantage, but also in the interest of other European 
countries, if the construction of such bonded warehouses were officially 
requested of Japan. Our first step would be to request the support of your 
Excellency for this general regulation. At the same time, we would also want to 
add the regulation that the island, Deshima, should be clearly treated as a 
bonded warehouse. 
We share the opinion of your Excellency on this matter. So far, we see no 
reason to abandon the favorable position in Japan that our long commercial 
intercourse with Japan has given us in comparison to the other European 
nations completely. We would not act in the best interest of our trade, if we did 
not exploit the position which we de facto have obtained. Indeed, we do not 
intend to establish even one regulation in which only the goods from the 
Netherlands or the Dutch colonies would enjoy this privilege. Such a limitation 
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is not appropriate in the current times. No, we only wish that Deshima will be 
given the status of a bonded warehouse, so that the Dutch can freely import and 
export all goods from Deshima. At the same time, it is necessary to take into 
consideration that the free commercial intercourse with Nagasaki is not 
disturbed. This briefly is our opinion about placing goods in a bonded 
warehouse in Japan. In case, suitable measures for these two demands not be 
found, we would still wish that the paid tariff was at least returned in case of 
re-export.’ 
  Thereupon the president of the chamber of commerce asked the 
minister to promote, the issue of the opening of Osaka.: ‘The advantageous 
position of this city on the shores of the Inland Sea as well as the circumstances 
in which rich merchants live and that a canal connects the city with the 
immense, populous city Miaco are the reasons the opening of Osaka to general 
trade is very important. The commercial policy is the measure which makes the 
traffic fruitful for both parties.’599 
The president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Rotterdam 
also pointed out the importance of a bonded warehouse in order to simplify 
commercial transactions. He advised the Minister of Colonial Affairs that ‘It 
would probably be unfeasible and inadvisable to require this right of a bonded 
warehouse exclusively for the Netherlands, because it would stir up extreme 
envy among other countries. If anything, this measure will succeed through the 
co-operation with great seaborne powers.’ He also pointed out the importance 
of Osaka rather than of Edo. Besides, he claimed that it was necessary to station 
one or more warships in the Japanese waters, because it was very difficult to 
maintain even the slightest Dutch influence in Japan without them. Moreover, 
since Dutch shipping in Chinese waters was increasing, he demanded that the 
Dutch naval force in these waters be reinforced in order to suppress pirates and 
to make the Dutch name familiar there.600 His request to reinforce the Dutch 
naval force in Chinese waters was based on this situation, that the Netherlands 
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did not have the same rights in China as England, the United States, France, or 
even Prussia and even the Hanseatic cities which seemed to have little 
connection with commerce in the regions.601 
Having received these requests from the presidents of the two most 
important Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs also consulted the NHM. The NHM replied to his questions and, 
furthermore, submitted a lengthy report to him.  
Concerning the bonded warehouse which was only granted to the 
Netherlands under the Dutch-Japanese treaty of 1856, the president of the NHM 
answered that he felt that it was always the principle of treaties concluded with 
Japan by the Dutch Government that privileges conceded to other countries 
should also be enjoyed by the Netherlands. Therefore he regarded it as 
inadvisable to acquire exclusive privileges as specified by the article provided 
in the former treaty, but never applied in reality.’ The NHM highly valued the 
idea that the Japanese Government would establish a bonded warehouse in its 
open ports, which was the next question of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The 
reason was that the idea was considered useful not only to the Netherlands but 
also to the signatory powers of a treaty with Japan. The NHM also pointed out 
that Japanese trade was very important on account of Japan being close to 
China.602 
This lengthy NHM report was written in preparation for the negotiations 
with the Japanese mission which would also be visiting the Netherlands soon. 
The NHM wrote that it welcomed the prospect of availing itself of the presence 
of this mission in the interest of trade between the Netherlands and Japan. 
Regarding the openings of the ports in Japan, the NHM was of the opinion that 
the postponement in the opening of Niigata, would not entail great losses. 
Neither had the NHM had objections to postponing the opening of Edo on 
account of the antipathy towards foreigners there at present, and in view of the 
prospect that the Dutch trade would develop on a large scale from Kanagawa 
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near in Edo. On the other hand, the NHM greatly welcomed the opening of 
Hyôgo and Ôsaka for trade, because these places were located in the most 
productive regions, that produced silk, tea, oil etc., and their locations were 
suitable to shipping. Here the same arguments were used as those already 
uttered by the presidents of the chambers of commerce. The swift opening of 
Ôsaka would have a great advantage, because domestic transportation was so 
expensive that it has prevented the sale of products of Dutch commerce and 
industry:  
‘These products can be distributed throughout the country from Osaka 
less expensively. Furthermore, the importance of the Dutch import trade in 
these regions is obvious from the fact that twelve ships arrived here directly 
from the Netherlands and two from Java, filled to capacity with Dutch 
industrial products, in two and a half years.  Moreover, Dutch ships sail these 
seas frequently and effectively. Since there is no danger in Hyogo and Osaka, 
we wish the Government would promote these openings. We are acquainted 
with the system of intimidation which the Japanese Government is wont to use. 
The Japanese Government exaggerates the danger of contingencies and 
attributes its refusal to open these harbors to our security.’603 
The NHM saw Osaka as the Japanese commercial city par excellence. Since 
this point was worthy of serious consideration, the NHM asked the Minister of 
Colonial Affairs how long Japan proposed to postpone the opening of the two 
harbors. 
Regarding the English proposal to open a harbor at Tsushima near Korea, 
the NHM believed that the British Government proposed this concession ‘more 
in the British political interest than in its economic interest.’ England aimed at 
opening that harbor to hold Russia in check604 
On the subject of the bonded warehouse, the NHM said that it would be 
preferable to encourage the establishment of a national bonded warehouse by 
the Japanese Government, rather than of a civilian bonded warehouse as had 
been suggested by the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The NHM was of the 
opinion that it would be appropriate to the Dutch to demand that as many 
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commercial obstacles be removed as possible in places which were already 
opened for foreigners in Japan, if the Japanese wish was granted that the 
opening of new harbors were postponed. Therefore, it was suggested that ‘We 
might draw attention to the lack of sufficient suitable landing places in 
Yokohama (Kanagawa).’  
Regarding tariffs the following was remarked: ‘We must acknowledge 
that for some articles, which include linen, the import articles are to be regarded 
as very reasonable, as they do not exceed 5 per cent. All goods were subject to a 
20 per cent tariff, except some goods of a little lower tariff mentioned in the 
treaty and the liquor at a 35 per cent tariff.’ The NHM considered glass, china, 
medical supplies, horn, soap  as well as all products produced in the 
archipelago of the Netherlands East Indies as Dutch export goods, and it noted 
that ‘by the increase in trade which is expected for colonial products, it would 
not seem improper that a tax cut be introduced, at least for some goods, and it 
is highly suitable that the Dutch Government should make an effort in this 
direction, because not only has it set the example of a generous tariff rate to the 
other European nations for several years, but also is trying to apply the system 
of generous tariff to markets of the Netherlands East Indies as much as 
possible.’ 
Furthermore, the NHM pointed out to the Minister of Colonial Affairs 
the following problem relevant to the Japanese trade: ‘While the Netherlands 
has lost a privilege that we enjoyed for several centuries through the abolition 
of the exclusive trading rights in Nagasaki, [and moreover] competition with 
other nations has arisen through the opening of this harbor in which every 
nation is free to do its utmost, surely it need not surprise us that Russia, 
England, France, and America have already immediately overshadowed the 
Netherlands by the large scale of their trade and their display of force. 
Furthermore, if against our wishes and expectations the necessity should occur 
to enforce the demands of foreign countries through the display of force and 
through military intimidation, the Netherlands shall always occupy an 
extremely subordinate rank.’ The NHM appealed to the Minister for 
demonstrations of Dutch naval power in Japanese waters.  
At the end of this report, the NHM set out a future course for a unique 
Dutch diplomacy towards Japan: ‘It is fortunate that our nation carries some 
weight in another area. We allude to the area of the arts and sciences. It offers a 
better foundation for international relations than getting things done by the use 
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of sheer force. The Japanese owe their experience of European civilization 
exclusively to our nation: both its navy and its steam engine were shaped by us, 
and so was the knowledge of medicine and shipbuilding. It is inevitable that 
materials of scientific and artificial knowledge will flow [into Japan] which 
were acquired only by our agency before, proportionately as the relation with 
foreign nations increases. Besides this precedence, which will never lose its 
value, however, we still possess the privilege that up to present the Dutch 
language is the only [foreign] language known. It is the native language, so to 
speak, in the intellectual world of Japan, and it shall retain a certain 
predominance for many more years. It is surely an honorable task to maintain 
this influence and to retain as many teachers as possible in Japan, including in 
fields other than shipbuilding, military affairs, and mining. Therefore, we were 
extremely gratified that the Japanese Government applied to us through the 
agency of our representative to acquire a master shipbuilder and an engineer 
from the Netherlands last year. We flatter ourselves that we have fulfilled these 
requests. It seems that we may understand from this request that the 
Netherlands has not yet completely lost its cachet in Japan. At present, it seems 
that the Dutch have lost the opportunity to maintain or expand this influence 
by formal means, because the regulation of the relationship between the Dutch 
and Japanese Governments was changed. We do believe, however, that ways 
can be found to be active in this spirit indirectly.’ 
Finally, the NHM emphasized that the status of the Dutch representative 
in Japan should not be inferior to those of other countries, especially the French, 
British, and American ones. It worried that trouble might occur in collaboration 
with other representatives because of this problem. Moreover, the NHM 
pointed out the importance of Deshima: ‘Because the branch at Deshima offers 
the Dutch so many conveniences, it is understandable that they have a certain 
predilection for it. This branch, however, need not suffer under a change of seat 
for the Dutch representative.’ For this reason, the NHM noted that ‘The only 
difference will be that our representative, instead of being posted in a remote 
corner of Japan and receiving only occasional messages from the center of 
diplomatic world, shall henceforth be able to give his instructions to the consul 
or vice-consul in Deshima, Kanagawa and elsewhere. Since we also highly 
value the security and the interests of the residents at Deshima, these shall 
never be at risk at all through a reorganization based on our report about 
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Deshima.’605 
Requests lodged by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the 
NHM regarding Dutch trade in Japan make clear that the Netherlands had 
surely lost its past privileges and that its influence had grown weaker; however, 
vestiges of the special influence that only the Dutch had still remained, and the 
Netherlands intended to maintain and expand such a special influence as much 
as possible, and by doing so expected to gain commercial profits. These 
business circles were of the opinion that they did not intend to pursue the 
Dutch national privilege, but their own economic interests in Japanese affairs, 
therefore, they were not going to take big risks in an attempt to expand the 
market. They had answered the questions put by the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs on the basis of their economic interests, which is quite understandable.  
The ways of these business circles, however, were at variance with those 
of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. He wanted to acquire ‘economic interests’ in 
the Japanese market, and also to safeguard the Dutch ‘national privilege’ in the 
additional treaty of 1857. Even the Consul-General in Japan, De Wit, who was 
supposed to  watch over Dutch national privilege, had also reported that ‘It 
seemed better to me not to conceal the matter of the bonded warehouse, but to 
try directly to gain a privilege for all harbors, which should not be restricted to 
Deshima. This would have more chance of success.’ 606 Therefore, these reports 
were likely to greatly disappoint the Minister. 
 
 
The Dutch headquarters remain in Nagasaki, and a sea route is 
planned between Nagasaki and China 
 
Despite everything, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was determined to secure 
Dutch predominance and its privileges in Nagasaki, and to turn the city into a 
center for the Dutch Asian trade. The unequivocal proof of this intention is 
found in a report by De Wit. He reported that ‘Trade is very active in Nagasaki, 
                                            
605 NA BuZa, 6 June 1862 N16 (exh.). A letter from the NHM to the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs dated 10 May 1862 N30 on 12 May 1862 N88.  
606NA BuZa, 18 June 1862 N19 (exh.). A letter from the Dutch Consul-General to the 
governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies dated 18 February 1862 on 17 June 1862 
N32. 
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owing especially to the export of goods to Shanghai for the Chinese market 
such as coal, charcoal, wood, fish, and marine products in the last month.’ 
Japanese trade was closely linked to Chinese trade. The Netherlands had a plan 
to establish a Nagasaki-Shanghai route for shipping. It was expected that in the 
future it would become easier to bring Chinese products to Japan and Japanese 
products to China. Moreover, this line could develop into a large Dutch trading 
area in Asia by connecting the markets of the Netherlands East Indies, Russia 
and Korea.607 In finding an answer to the reason the Netherlands continued to 
have its headquarters in Nagasaki, there was and still is the following 
explanation in Japan: ‘After the opening of Japan, the Netherlands continued to 
maintain its headquarters in Nagasaki where it had been for 200 years. The 
reason was that the Netherlands East Indies only rarely took an interest in the 
international politics that had to do with Japan and that the Consul-General in 
Japan was something of a coward and, moreover, was unwilling to undertake 
an excessive burden.’608 
  It was suggested that Consul-General De Wit remained in Nagasaki 
because he did not like Japan and was frightened of being assaulted like other 
foreigners.609 Certainly, the importance of Nagasaki was lost, after Yokohama 
was rapidly developed.610 There is evidence to suggest that this development 
advanced more swiftly than the Dutch had expected. Be that as it may, this 
decision to settle in Nagasaki was an outcome of Dutch Asian policy at that 
time. The Dutch had good reasons for it, which have already been explained in 
the report of the Dutch merchant in Chapter 10. Checkland has also pointed out 
the geographical advantage of Nagasaki, but she says that ‘By the 1870s, in 
commercial terms Nagasaki was losing ground. Its residents believed that this 
was the fault of the Japanese officials there.’611 This Dutch policy was also 
                                            
607 NA BuZa, 17 June 1862 N41 (exh.). A report in April by the Dutch Consul-General on 16 
June 1862 N8.  
608 Nihon kingendaishi-1, Ishin henkaku to kindai Nihon (‘A modern and contemporary history 
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611 Foreigners claimed that ‘the Guard houses erected last year are unworthy attempts to 
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justified by the comment of the Swiss Consul Rudolf Lindau (1829-1910), that 
‘Nagasaki, the large commercial center next to Shanghai, is the place where 
Europeans making plans to visit the Japanese coasts can prepare their journey 
in the most suitable conditions.’612  On the basis of this Asian policy, the 
Netherlands refrained from taking political initiatives in Japanese affairs, trying 
instead to have its opinions reflected in British and French policies and, through 
this, to gain as much commercial profit as possible.  
There are various good contemporary reports about Nagasaki, stating not 
only that ‘Nagasaki is one of the most beautiful harbors’613 but also that ‘In 
1860, the trade of Nagasaki remarkably increased.’614 Conversely, elsewhere 
there were pejorative comments made about Yokohama and Kanagawa, for 
instance, that ‘Kanagawa is not a good port, because the depth of water in the 
coast is shallow, these places have an advantage as one of post-towns in the 
Japanese national road.’615This also shows that those involved were not quite 
sure which place would be best for international trade in the future. This fact 
should be taken into consideration. 
At that time, the plan to connect Nagasaki with China by trade was 
mentioned in the report by De Wit: ‘The plan of the Japanese Government to 
connect [Nagasaki] with China for commercial relations which I have reported, 
has still not been carried out; first a Dutch ship was employed for the purpose 
of taking a committee of Japanese officials to Shanghai. In the meanwhile, it was 
sent there temporarily with a load of coal and charcoal. However, since the 
Japanese Government in Edo has not confirmed this committee, the charter of 
this ship was canceled. Nevertheless, it seems that the plan might be revived. A 
British ship has been already purchased in Nagasaki at the expense of the 
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Japanese Government, which the Japanese intend to turn to this purpose.’616 
While the plan for the Shanghai-Nagasaki line did not work out too well, 
Dutch trade in Japan was actually very good. In the overall total amount of its 
Japanese trade, the Netherlands stood second place, next to England.617 De Wit 
reported that the Japanese Government had ordered a warship with a steam 
engine of 350 hp and its accessories from the Dutch Government. On this 
occasion, he added to his same report that ‘I am pleased to be able to inform 
your Excellency of this proof of the good relationship between Japan and the 
Netherlands.’ After this sentence, De Wit continued with the following 
sentence: ‘…., while, moreover, the desire to preserve [this good relationship] is 
obvious from the announcement which I received at same time, namely, that 
the Japanese Government is intending to send some young people to the 
Netherlands before long in order to study shipbuilding there for a certain 
period.’618 This report by De Wit must surely have pleased the Netherlands. 
Later De Wit received an order for various plants. About this order he wrote 
that ‘Your Excellency will probably be of the opinion that it may promote good 
relations, if this request were to be fulfilled by the Government.’ He also wrote 
that he dared to demand to receive the order about this matter from the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.619 
  From this evidence, it seemed that the Netherlands would take 
advantage of the special feelings that still remained in Japan. The Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs, at least, did have such a plan. However, other institutions in 
the Netherlands did not share this opinion. Therefore, against its will, the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs refrained from promoting its original view and 
acquiesced in the opinions of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 
                                            
616 NA BuZa, 17 June 1862 N41 (exh.). A report in April by the Dutch Consul-General on 16 
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617 NA BuZa, 29 April 1862 N16 (exh.). 
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the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies dated 3 April 1862 on 12 June 1862 
N47. 
619 NA BuZa, 4 July 1862 N6 (exh.). A letter dated 3 July 1862 N.3.  
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Summary provided by the Minister of Colonial Affairs 
 
In consultation with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam and with the NHM, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs made a 
detailed report, entitled ‘Points concerning which demands or requests will 
have to be made to Japan in the interest of the proper implementation of the 
treaties, or, more generally, the promotion of good relations with the Japan 
empire’. Since, from now on, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would take charge 
of Japanese affairs, as decided at the Cabinet meeting, the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs sent this report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the government 
agency concerned.620 
This report was made on the basis of the above-mentioned consultations 
with the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the NHM, and a common 
report by the ministries of Colonial and of Foreign Affairs dated 20 March 
1862. 621  For this reason, most of its contents coincided with the earlier 
documents. The report said that the ‘Entente’ with England and France was 
important in order to formulate a policy towards the demand of the Japanese 
Government for the postponement of the opening of Edo, Osaka, and Hyogo. 
Although this policy was mentioned in the earlier document, in this report the 
Dutch Government confirmed that the Netherlands should try to obtain some 
concessions from Japan in exchange for the concessions it had made to Japan in 
the matter of the requested Postponement of the port openings, and the Dutch 
decision would more or less depend on other countries. On the other hand, 
since the term of postponement conceded by the British was too long, for the 
time being, it was considered unwise for the Dutch to approve of this British 
proposal. 622  The Dutch Government decided not to follow other powers’ 
decisions that were not profitable for either the Netherlands or Japan. Hence, 
the Netherlands was not merely content to follow in the footsteps of great 
powers. Concerning an earlier demand by the British that a harbor near 
                                            
620 NA BuZa, 11 June 1862 N21 (exh.). A report entitled: ‘Punten, waaromtrent aan Japan 
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Tsushima or Korea be opened as compensation for the postponement of the 
opening of Hyogo and Osaka, the Dutch Government thought that England 
would no longer insist on Tsushima, now that Russia had abandoned its 
settlement there.  
Concerning the Dutch bonded warehouse, which was after all the most 
important issue for the Netherlands, the report states the following: Deshima 
already has the character of such a bonded warehouse. As instances of proof, it 
cites Article 18 of the provisional treaty dated 18 November 1855 and Article 17 
dated 30 January 1856, where it is mentioned that ‘The inspection of goods only 
takes place when these goods are imported from Deshima to Japan or are 
carried from Japan to Deshima as has been the conventional way so far, and not 
when these goods are carried from ships to Deshima or from Deshima aboard 
the ships’. Referring to the development of treaty negotiations, the report says 
that ‘Although the then commissioner [Donker Curtius] had declared he 
attached great value to the position of Deshima as a bonded warehouse, this 
Article 17 of the former treaty was not inserted [into the treaty of 1858]. 
Moreover, it caused some surprise and dissatisfaction in the Dutch Government, 
all the more so, because it was asserted from this commissioner’s side that the 
Edo treaty of 1858 had abolished the special position of Deshima. The 
Government does acquiesce in this [Donker Curtius’] assertion…At the end of 
last year [1861], the Dutch Government again instructed the Governor-General 
of the Netherlands East Indies to inquire whether Article 17 of the treaty of 1856 
was still considered valid, or whether the principle of a civilian bonded 
warehouse had been approved and regulated by further consent of the Japanese 
Government.623 This is an indication that the Dutch have a good reason to 
suppose that they would be able to appeal to Article 17, should it prove 
necessary to do so. People in the Netherlands, however, regard the former 
special position of Deshima as having been de facto abolished.’  
This last sentence seems to have been the outcome of the advice given by 
the NHM and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry that considered 
adhering to this privilege not very desirable. Referring to the Japanese position 
regarding the bonded warehouse of Deshima, the report by De Wit says:  
‘I [De Wit] pointed out to the magistrate of Nagasaki that the most 
important point regarding Article 17 was that he, at the time when the new 
                                            
623 In the margin, the note ‘the first is considered to be desirable by far’ is added.  
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treaty came into effect, had admitted a civilian bonded warehouse on Deshima, 
and that he had thus demonstrated that he regarded this principle as valid. 
Consequently, other measures had always been taken temporarily, on account 
of temporary circumstances such as the removal of the Land- and Water gate 
[on Deshima]. The reply [of the Japanese Government], however, was that it 
had not been its intention to admit the principle, since it had always been 
convinced that that sort of thing was not consistent with the articles of the new 
treaty; and that it had only admitted the civilian bonded warehouse in order to 
facilitate trade in general, not only for the Dutch on Deshima, but also for all 
other foreigners in Nagasaki, and then this measure could never be considered 
as a temporary substitute for, or as the result of the former position of Deshima. 
- [and moreover] that the Japanese Government  made haste to repudiate and 
withdraw this measure, because its Government had established general 
regulations about this matter in view of all the articles in the new treaty, and 
these regulations conflicted with this measure. - that formerly Deshima, closed 
as it was by the Land-and Water Gates which offered protection against 
smuggling, could be considered a ship, but since Article 2 of the new treaty 
removed these gates, the former position on Deshima is naturally abolished; 
[and] furthermore, that the Japanese Government would have added an 
exception to the commercial regulations in this sense, should it would have had 
the intention to continue the former position of Deshima under the new treaty. 
And finally, that the Japanese Government had wanted to maintain the whole 
treaty of 1856 as a commemorative document, merely because of its solemn 
Preamble, but the Japanese Government thinks that all matters were 
satisfactorily regulated in the later treaty. Therefore, such a measure should 
have been specially inserted in the later treaty, if the Japanese had wanted to 
maintain a special privilege for the Netherlands.’  
Even though the reply De Wit received from the Japanese authorities was 
negative, he remarked that ‘although my attempts in the main issue have not 
succeeded, yet I flatter myself that they have done some good, namely, that 
they have made the Japanese Government generally aware of the idea of a 
bonded warehouse. If the Dutch Government relinquished its policy to make 
the Japanese Government accept the special position of Deshima, and required 
instead that a bonded warehouse for trade should be established in all open 
ports, I do not believe that there shall be any reason to regret the loss of a 
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privilege on Deshima.’624 
This situation made the Minister of Colonial Affairs cogitate that ‘By 
reverting to the present [arrangements], it would seem as if something new was 
required which was exclusively in the Dutch interest’. Therefore, he remarked 
that ‘this militates against the advice of the Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and of the NHM. In their 
recommendations, a preference was expressed for the suggestion that had been 
made in the course of the consultation, to promote, the establishment of bonded 
warehouses in all Japanese ports that were opened to trade on a wider scale.  
Should this idea be realized it would be rewarded with a high estimation [by 
other countries] of trade, especially if it was executed as much as possible in 
accordance with regulations admissible to civilized nations in this matter. If the 
Netherlands - either immediately or, in view of the Entente with England and 
France that had been formed in principle, after consultation with these 
countries - proposes the condition of the establishment of the national bonded 
warehouses as a concession for the postponement of the execution of Article 2 
in the treaty [of 1858] to the Japanese Government, then the Netherlands would 
surely have to be considered as acting in the spirit of the altruistic policy which 
it had pursued towards Japan for a considerable time, and as promoting the 
interests of trade in general.’ As a consequence, although it seems to have been 
against his will, the Minister wrote that ‘preferably no such conditions should 
be imposed as would be in the general interest, leaving aside, for the time being, 
as something to be dealt with separately, such conditions as would be in the 
exclusive interest of the Netherlands.’625 
  A few days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a report 
entitled ‘In treaties concluded with Japan [the following] has been agreed:’ to 
the Dutch Cabinet in order to obtain assent for these above-mentioned 
measures as national policy. The content of this report coincides with that of the 
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report of 11 June 1862 N.21.626 This report says that the Dutch Government 
would co-operate with other powers in Japanese affairs again, but it did not 
need to abide by decisions which were not in the best interests of the 
Netherlands or of Japan. The following statements that express the Dutch 
diplomatic attitude are important: ‘In consideration of the Japanese preference 
for the Netherlands (which is clear from the orders placed here and from the 
plan to send young people here in order to learn shipbuilding), it would be 
advisable for the Netherlands to show some measure of compliance. This 
compliance would not harm us relative to the other powers, because Article 9 of 
the treaty (most-favored-nation treatment) always remains in force.’ Therefore, 
it was decided that ‘If we take into account the British concession [to the 
Japanese demand for the postponement of the opening of its harbors] at present 
and the small force which we can have at out disposal to maintain our rights, it 
would be hardly in agreement with a good policy to persist obstinately in 
insisting on the rights acquired by the former treaties [of 1856 and 1857].’ The 
proposals of the Dutch Government, as formulated in a Dutch Cabinet 
document of 25 July 1862, were a reaction to the fact that the treaties of 1856 and 
1857 had never been put into effect. The document has an attached table in 
which the Dutch demands listed are compared to those of the British. This table 
makes it easy to understand the differences in their demands.627 
This matter, however, came to a sudden end, because the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs informed the Ministry of Colonial Affairs that the matter of the 
bonded warehouse on Deshima would have to be settled by accepting the 
principle of a bonded warehouse in all open ports in Japan. Moreover, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that ‘it would be desirable that, as of 1 
January 1863, the Dutch Government no longer pay the rent for the ground and 
buildings on Deshima, but that the rent should be paid to the Japanese 
Government by the civilian merchants who use them’; furthermore that ‘a 
definite decision that buildings on Deshima belonging to the Dutch 
Government were no longer necessary, would probably be made, because the 
Consul-General would be appointed to Edo.’628 
                                            
626 A report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch Cabinet.  
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628 NA BuZa, 26 July 1862 N29 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
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  Later the Minister of Foreign Affairs also informed the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs that ‘it seems to me, also in accordance with talks with your 
Excellency about this matter, that both these articles629 have to be considered 
superseded, since Deshima had been open to any settlement [by foreigners] 
through the removal of the gates, and Dutch ships to Deshima like [ships of] 
other foreigners in Nagasaki are cleared and pay duties there.’ Therefore, he 
accepted the principle of the establishment of a bonded warehouse in all open 
ports, while the Netherlands would not insist on the maintenance of the bonded 
warehouse on Deshima in the negotiation with the Japanese delegation. At the 
end of this document, he wrote that ‘if in his negotiations about this matter, Mr 
De Wit could succeed in the persuading the Japanese Government to begin 
implementing on Deshima at present what the Japanese delegation promised 
among other nations to the British Government, namely establishing a s bonded 
warehouse in all open ports, he would thereby contribute greatly to trade.’630 
Thereupon the Minister of Colonial Affairs decided to inform the Consul in 
Japan of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ opinion.631 
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Chapter 13 
 
The end of autonomous Dutch diplomacy in Japan 
 
 
What was it that, as of 1 January 1863, swept away the acquisition of a bonded 
warehouse on Deshima as a diplomatic goal of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
towards Japan? It was the change of the charge of Japanese affairs from the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thereby, Dutch 
diplomacy towards Japan reached a turning point.  
The matter had already been discussed before in the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs. It was then decided that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs would assume 
responsibility for Asian affairs too in future, because it was more efficient that 
the Netherlands East Indies deal with these affairs.632 The matter was put on 
the agenda again by the series of treaties concluded in 1858 between Western 
countries and Japan. The reason was that formal diplomatic channels were 
necessary for drawing up and negotiating treaties. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had actually carried out the negotiations for the postponement 
of the treaty with the Japanese delegation to Europe (1862-63) which had visited 
the Netherlands.633 
  
 
Criticism of the Dutch Government diplomacy towards the 
Japanese delegation 
 
The Japanese delegation had no plan to visit the Netherlands. Since the 
Netherlands, however, regarded the relationship with Japan as important, it 
persuaded the delegation to visit the country at the expense of the Netherlands. 
In some respects, the population was supportive of the Dutch Government’s 
action in this matter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had encountered bitter 
criticism from the nation in general and from statesmen for its method of 
                                            
632 NA Koloniën no.5898, 17 April 1858 N.153, Geheim. 
633 Regarding this delegation in detail, see Miyanaga Takashi, Bunkyû ninen no yôroppa 
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negotiation with the Japanese delegation. The article on the debate in 
Parliament written about by H. Nijgh of Rotterdam could be read in the NRC 
newspaper the next day. The content of the debate was mostly a rehashing of 
what was published as a supplement in the Nederlandsche Staats-Courant (Bijblad 
van de Nederlandsche Staats-Courant), namely, Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1e 
& 2e kamer. The greatest part of it, however, was summarized. Therefore, the 
series of relevant discussions from the Handelingen der Staten-Generaal 1e & 2e 
kamer will be examined more in detail below.   
W. Baron Van Lynden was the parliamentarian who took the word and 
posed various questions about the visit of the Japanese delegation which had 
visited the Netherlands that summer. The aim of this delegation was to discuss 
the amendment to the Dutch-Japanese treaty. The Netherlands certainly had 
taken good care of the Japanese delegation. When the delegation was received 
at The Hague, the Government decorated the town with Japanese and Dutch 
flags. Three flags carried the crests of three important members in the 
delegation which showed that some prior research had been made into their 
backgrounds. The delegation was served Japanese tea and presented with 
documents written in Japanese. The Japanese visitors were filled with 
admiration and very satisfied with their treatment. Regrettably the result, 
however, was questioned by the general public. The delegation remained for a 
long time in Holland before it departed for other countries with the same aim to 
seek amendments to the signed treaty. Baron Van Lynden wanted to know 
from the Government ‘whether this was really the true aim of the delegation 
and, if this is right, whether the aim was achieved.’ 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jhr. Paul Therèse van der Maesen de 
Sombreff (1827-1902）admitted that the aim of the Japanese Government was 
the amendment of the treaty and he answered by and large as noted below,  
‘The Dutch Government agreed to the request of the Japanese Government 
that we would attempt not to upset the Japanese nation’s feelings by alluding to 
the greatly changed situation in which the treaty came in effect. Also other 
European powers that have concluded treaties with Japan have agreed to this or 
will do so. Other requests were not agreed to by the Netherlands or England 
either, because these were not concerned with the nation’s sentiments and it 
was clear that the Japanese Government wanted to repeal its trade or to take the 
decision to repeal   unilaterally. We agreed that the Article about the opening 
of ports in the treaty would be postponed for a period. England decided that 
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the period would be five years. The Netherlands did not specify a particular 
period, because this development is still unsure in this present situation.’634  
The Dutch Government has formed a ‘Triple Entente between the 
Netherlands, England and France’. The Dutch Government respected its 
relationship with these two powers, because it did not want to lose its interests 
in its Japanese affairs through any discord with major European powers. 
Moreover, it intended to oppose the common enemy in the Japanese affairs, the 
United States. England agreed that the period of postponement should be five 
years. The Netherlands, however, would not accept this period. It is proof that 
the Netherlands did not always follow the decisions of other great powers. 
Meanwhile, it was also a clear signal that the management of the Triple Entente 
was difficult. 
In addition to the above-mentioned question, Jhr. Willem Boreel van 
Hogelanden (1800-1883）criticized the Government, saying that the second 
complaint leveled against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was about the 
behavior of the Government towards the Japanese delegation. The Government 
was quite aware of the aim of the delegation and had already planned not to 
accede to the request of the delegation at once. The delegation was none the less 
enthusiastically received in the Netherlands causing its members to 
misinterpret the reception and assume that the Dutch would honor their 
demands. Yet after all those banquets in The Hague and other places, the 
delegation recognized that this visit to the Netherlands was a failure and would 
have to leave without achieving its aim. According to Boreel, the Japanese 
visitors ‘had left the Netherlands disappointed, displeased,  and angered,  
instead of appreciating the special treatment and the great deal of expense  
dispensed in the Netherlands.’635 
Then Willem Anne baron Schimmelpenninck van der Oije (1800-1872） 
took the rostrum, saying that he did not know much about Japan, and that it 
was not his idea to adopt a different policy from Holland’s mighty neighbors. 
But he still had a problem: ‘The Netherlands used to be an ally of Japan. 
Namely we were the sole European power that had not been excluded like 
other Europeans from Japan and had maintained a relationship with it. In short, 
we were a pioneer who introduced Japan to all Europeans. Therefore, we had 
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the appointed task of adopting autonomous measures. I, however, am not 
angry about this non-fulfillment. If I have to believe the answer of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, especially the assertion that the delegation was content with 
this visit to the Netherlands, I am not infuriated about it. Certainly I could not 
understand what was actually requested from the Japanese delegation, if I had 
not been well informed on this issue.’636  The gist of Schimmelpenninck’s 
remarks was to criticize Dutch diplomacy towards Japan for its lack of clarity 
and indecisiveness, even if so far he himself had shown little interest in 
Japanese affairs.  
The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that the Japanese delegation 
had been received in the same way as other Asian delegations, with the same 
etiquette as that which would be accorded Dutch representatives in another 
country. There was nothing wrong with that. How could one insist that all 
requests of the Japanese delegation should be granted in view of the old 
relationship with Japan, especially as they wished to repeal the treaty. France 
had sent them to England without appending any reply and in England the 
same situation would repeat itself, unless a special person with a special charge 
for Japanese affairs would arrive far from Asia. The minister said: ‘We were 
already aware that one of this delegation’s requests was to postpone the 
opening of ports. We were still ignorant of the other requests. Moreover, this 
problem was the kind of matter on which we could not make a decision 
without being informed of the opinions of other powers. Therefore the decision 
was postponed. This measure has never put our good relationships with Japan 
in an awkward situation, because the Japanese have clearly expressed their 
content to this Government in words and writing.’637 
The remarks of the Minister of Foreign Affairs can be taken as truly 
representative of the Government. However, because they were rather 
commonplace, they seemed less credible and were criticized. The liberal 
parliamentarian M.H. Godefroi（1813-1882）then joined the discussion by saying 
something about the government’s attitude towards the Japanese delegation. 
How come one was not better prepared about its intentions?  
‘The delegation visited France and England before arriving here. It seems that 
what it had attained in these places was known. The delegation came here and 
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remained for a considerable time. What happened to it? We allowed the 
Japanese delegation leave without results. At first it was uncertain if this is 
what had really happened. Therefore the information about this matter was 
sought in the Parliament. The Minister answered that our reply had not been 
presented while the Japanese delegation was still here. His answer could 
confirm to us the fact that the Government allowed the delegation to leave 
without achieving any result. It is a considerable heedless blunder. Moreover 
this conduct has made an indecisive and unstable impression on us. Also it 
seems that the Japanese delegation gained the same impression. That is, 
although the delegation was very content with its reception by the Dutch nation, 
it was not satisfied with the Government’s attitude. In view of this fact, this 
impression is even more regrettable, because this indiscretion has occurred in 
the relationship with the nation which had respected our country and in which 
country we had won honor. This honor should have been maintained and 
strengthened through a firm attitude with the delegation.’…‘Why did the 
Government allow the delegation leave? Beforehand, the Government was 
desirous of acquiring information about places where the Japanese delegation 
was intending to visit and submit the proposals. The delegation visited two 
major powers, France and England. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and our 
diplomats were extremely keen to acquire information about it. The answers of 
France and England to the proposals were already known. We could have 
known the answers, indeed we should have, because, if this were not so, is our 
diplomacy functioning? The Minister’s reply to the question as to why the 
Government allowed the delegation leave without an answer is no adequate 
reason.’…‘If this situation had occurred because the Government wanted to 
learn the decisions of other countries, it is all the more incomprehensible. What 
sort of result is this? The Government did not act as the other counties had. It 
would be eminently sensible to follow the guideline of other countries in 
Japanese political affairs. A wise policy intimates to us to co-operate with other 
countries like ours that have political and commercial relationships with Japan. 
If we, however, do not pursue such a wise policy, we have to go our own way. 
The major power, England, agreed to the Japanese proposal for postponing the 
opening of ports for a certain period. We, however, abandoned our right 
without agreeing to the period. The Minister of Foreign Affairs does have the 
decency to mention this measure. He, however, tries to justify it with an 
inadequate reason.’…‘The Government explained that we did not want to miss 
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a good opportunity. Needless to say, it is an illusion for us to assume that we 
would be able to acquire what other countries could not demand, while the 
postponement agreed to by other countries is still valid. If we have an adequate 
reason, do we adopt pressure measures against Japan or is it possible to do so? I 
do not think so. I think it wrong that the Government has departed from the 
guidelines of the other countries. It would be a wise political decision to follow 
the guideline. It is regrettable that evidence of the pursuit of a wise policy in 
our foreign affairs is not visible in this matter at all.’638 
  Looking back on what Godefroi brought forward, one can only say that 
his opinions had much to recommend. The Netherlands formed ‘a Triple 
Entente with England and France’ in its Japanese affairs. As a result of this 
Entente, the Netherlands wanted to collect information about the affairs 
pertaining to England and France as soon as possible and it informed them of 
its plan, expecting that their plan would be reflected by the Dutch demands. 
This maneuver was to ensure that the Netherlands avoided bearing the brunt in 
the affair, namely of running into difficulties with large European powers, and 
it would obtain its rights safely. In this respect, there was some problem that the 
Government could not gain all the proper information it needed from these 
powers. According to the Dutch documents, the Netherlands did take an 
initiative in this matter. It thought that five years as the period of postponement 
was too long and half this period would be acceptable. Therefore, the 
Netherlands did not set the term of the postponement at the former time. The 
Netherlands was anxious to ascertain the decisions of major Western Powers, 
such as the UK, and especially French and Russia but at that time these had not 
yet crystallized. These kinds of mistakes, or rather passive and negative 
attitudes in Dutch foreign policy, were harshly criticized.  
But there were also some parliamentarians who defended the 
Government. Christianus Joannes Antonius Heydenrijck (1832-1911） , the 
depute from Nijmegen, did so by remarking that in the case of the 
postponement of the ports the Dutch government first wanted to ascertain the 
attitude of its allies. He saw no problem there: ‘Moreover, as it was said, the 
Japanese delegation recognized that we wanted to ascertain the attitude of 
other countries. None the less, would it cause any harm were we ourselves to 
take an autonomous decision in this?’ 
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Heydenrijck’s opinion deserves some attention, as it is indicative of an 
evasion of responsibility. By this ploy, he was saying that should diplomacy in 
a matter not succeed, the Government did not need to bear the responsibility 
for it, because the matter was not important. This is in relation to the pursuit of 
Dutch diplomacy in Japanese affairs. Consequently this way of thought was an 
elaboration of the prevailing theory, that ‘because the Netherlands East Indies 
was the most important region for the Netherlands in Asia. Japanese affairs did 
not hold much interest for it.’ It seems that this way of thinking has not been 
eradicated up to the present day. It was, however, erroneous because Japanese 
affairs were in my view very important to the Netherlands. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs was also forced to reply to a series of 
critical questions about the Japanese delegation in the Netherlands. What he 
had to say is summarized as below. ‘Finally I will say something about the 
Japanese. The Member of Parliament from Amsterdam maliciously told me that 
the Government attitude towards the Japanese delegation was disappointing. 
His argument was, however, vague. He stated that the Japanese delegation had 
visited England and France, before it came to The Hague. Therefore in his 
opinion we should have known what both these countries had agreed with the 
delegation through the normal diplomatic channels and we should have 
adopted the decisions of other countries. This argument is the outcome of his 
ignorance of the matter. When the Japanese delegation left France, as when they 
left for Russia over the border of the Netherlands, it still had not yet received 
the decisions of the French. The Japanese delegation only finally learned what 
the French Government would agree to, when it returned from St Petersburg.’ 
  The minister affirmed that England had agreed to the Japanese request. 
This fact was widely known the Netherlands. On the one hand, the 
parliamentarian said that the Netherlands should have co-operated with other 
countries. On the other hand, he suggested that in this case the Netherlands 
also could have chosen its own way. This is what the Netherlands actually had 
done.  
‘Indeed we did want to know what other countries had agreed to in the 
Japanese requests. If we had known, it would have been possible for us to make 
our decision. Under these circumstances the Netherlands assumed an 
autonomous attitude, because this was best suited most of its interests. We did 
not set the term of the postponement to the five years set by England. We never 
forced Japan to grant us more privileges than other countries’, because it had 
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set its face against the most favored nation treatment. Through our 
representative in Japan, however, we have maintained the chance to insist that 
the Japanese Government will adopt every measure to promote the opening of 
its country for foreign countries. The role as the pioneer in Japan has ever been 
ours, because we introduced European civilization to Japan. We are still 
endeavoring to fulfill the task’…Finally the minister said that the government 
was loyally cooperating with the other two European countries in acquiescing 
in the postponement of ports, but that it still adopted a degree of autonomous 
diplomacy by insisting on another, shorter term in this matter.639  
The reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs may seem to have been quite 
reasonable, but it was a typical response from a government, that could not 
defend a really autonomous Dutch policy in this case. Therefore, Godefroi 
returned to the issue of the Government’s attitude towards the Japanese 
delegation. ‘I notice the lack of a firm attitude in the fact that the government 
allowed the delegation leave without making it come up to the starting line. 
Our Government was already informed about the Japanese requests and the 
British decision on this matter too. Consequently the Government could indeed 
have replied to these Japanese requests during their stay here. Under this 
circumstance no reply was made. This fact must have made an indecisive 
impression on this delegation.’…‘I regret this fact, especially when our former 
relationship with Japan to which the Minister himself alluded to in his speech is 
taken into consideration. A firm attitude should have demanded the requests of 
the delegation here were given a response. I persist in this point. Not to respond 
to the Japanese requests even after their departure is not evidence of a wise 
policy. This was made worse, because the Government relinquished following 
an independent course while it dithered waiting for the decisions of other 
countries. At present how has the Minister concluded this matter? His answer 
implies that we wanted to maintain our right not to set a term in order to retain 
a degree of pressure on Japan. This Minister, however, did not reply to my 
question of whether we could or would adopt this pressure or not. Therefore, 
although the Netherlands did not set a term for the postponement, we put 
ourselves of being towed into line（à la remorque）by the countries that did set a 
term. Because, as long as this postponement continues, we cannot, or will not, 
do anything independently to fulfill the treaty without co-operation with other 
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countries. In this matter, in these negotiations and the subsequent decisions, 
when it is all said and done, in each and every aspect, a firm and discreet 
attitude is conspicuous by its absence. Since this Minister detailed the measure 
for this matter with the discussion about Article 5, I shall not go into this foreign 
system at present.’640 
      Certainly, Godefroi struck the Government at its most vulnerable point. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to set a two- or three-year term for the 
postponement. It was not sure whether Japan would fulfill the treaty after the 
term. Therefore, it could not set a definite term if it wanted to avoid repeating 
the same problem later. If, however, it was to be avoided that the Japanese 
delegation should regard this Dutch attitude as vague and indecisive, that is, 
the Japanese Government formed the impression that the Netherlands was a 
dependent state which always had to follow the major European powers, then it 
would have been better if the Netherlands had not held back in this respect and 
had clearly stated its own autonomous demands. 
 Actually the British Plenipotentiary in The Hague had these thoughts on the 
matter: ‘The Netherland Government have not yet given an answer to the 
Japanese proposals and as the Envoys consider it necessary that they should 
receive one at the Hague they have decided on leaving tomorrow for Berlin and 
St. Petersburgh, and will return to the Hague after their visit to these courts in 
the hope that by that time the Netherland Government may be prepared to give 
them an answer but they can accept as satisfactorily.’641      
Moreover, in Paragraph 9 in the interim report by the committee of 
reporters （ Voorloopige Verslagen der Commissiën van Rapporteurs ） the 
above-mentioned discussion is summarized. The conclusion says that an 
awkward situation might occur without this pressure, if the Dutch were to 
make a new demand on Japan; and the Netherlands could properly offer the 
same compromise as the British, since a strong maritime power such as England 
had set the term.642 In Paragraph 9 in the subsequent memorandum of reply to 
the interim report by the committee of reporters (Memoriën van Beantwoording 
van het Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs) details of the Japanese 
delegation in the Netherlands are mentioned. The version of what occurred is 
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the same as that presented by the Government. Moreover, the record says that 
the expense for lodgings and the reception of the Japanese delegation should be 
borne not by the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by that of the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs in this year.643 From 1863, Chinese and Japanese 
affairs were to be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the 
decision seems to have been that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs should be 
charged with the responsibility for the Japanese affairs until 1863. To be saddled 
with this expense was unsatisfactory to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, because 
he was not in a position to negotiate with the delegation and his plan to derive 
benefit for the Netherlands did not succeed. 
  The transition of the responsibility for Japanese and Chinese affairs to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which so far had shown little interest in Asian 
affairs, was inspired by the criticism leveled by merchants about the negative 
style of Dutch diplomacy towards Japan and the disappointment in Japanese 
affairs in the Government. At that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave an 
exposé of the matter in which it stated that: ‘The Government settled this 
problem because it is useful that the consulates in China and Japan shall fall 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, it is desirable 
that our consuls in these countries should continue to follow the orders of the 
Governor-General in the Netherlands East Indies. This seems appropriate for 
the efficient running of matters. The present situation is changed in as far as the 
political reports from consuls shall be sent not to the Ministry of Colonial 
Affairs but to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’644 and ‘It seems unnecessary for 
the Government to change the position of consul in Japan, until the situation in 
Japan is more tranquil. It, if anything, is more desirable for the sake of efficiency 
that the consul in Japan is under the direction of the Governor-General in the 
Netherlands East Indies.’645 Hence, the Ministry was taking the opportunity to 
stress that there would be no internal changes to the consulate in Japan for the 
time being. 
Later, in order to introduce some changes in the Dutch relationship with 
Japan, which was awkward for the Netherlands because some Western powers 
felt that the Dutch had been prepared to endure demeaning treatment for the 
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sake of financial gain, the Ministry mentioned that ‘It seems necessary that the 
Netherlands control the relationships between our Government and the 
Japanese and that this affair be put under the discretion of the Dutch 
Government. It is also completely desirable for other reasons. Only if the Dutch 
representative is directly responsible to the Dutch Government, can his proper 
influence and true significance as representative be acquired. Some Members of 
Parliament report that the Dutch representative shall assume a more 
autonomous diplomatic character in Japan than those in other regions at this 
moment.’646 
This remark contradicted the former plan. Later on, with regard to this 
matter the Government mentioned, ‘It does not seem that an opportunity to 
establish a good relationship with Japan is any more lost at present than it was 
before. The Netherlands has repeatedly advised Japan to relinquish its system 
of seclusion and to have relationships with all civilized countries. We have had 
to wave farewell to thoughts of Dutch superiority in Japan with the giving of 
our advice which Japan gradually followed. The importance of the 
Dutch-Japanese relationship in comparison with the relationship between other 
counties and Japan depends on the fact that Dutch entrepreneurs and 
merchants can seek there a market for their goods, and also on the degree to 
which they know that they can carry on profitable trade. The opinion expressed 
in the paragraph concerned has strayed far from that which urges that the good 
old relationship could be kept in Japan, only if self-interests are promoted. 
Otherwise, it never seems that the Dutch Consul-General is neglected by us in 
comparison with other representative of signatory countries in Japan. The 
Government, however, always considers that this issue is solved when we 
instruct the representative to settle in Edo. The correspondingly higher rank of 
the British, France and American representatives has not been accorded him. 
When this plan goes into effect, the relationship of the Dutch representative 
with the Government shall be changed. Consequently, the Netherlands shall 
deal with Japanese affairs and the Dutch representative shall be directly under 
the charge of the Dutch Government….. In future, the directions concerning the 
Japanese and Chinese affairs shall be entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.’647 
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These remarks show the changing of the plan about the transition of 
Japanese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In short, these remarks 
reflect the decline in interest in Japanese Affairs. This is understandable, 
because, especially after the establishment of the Entente, it was crucial that the 
Dutch Government co-operate with the other signatory powers to the Japanese 
treaties on this matter. Against this background, the Dutch Government would 
have considered it impossible for the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to have been 
able to pursue an autonomous Dutch diplomacy towards Japan, especially 
should it militate against the interests of other powers. 
 
 
Transfer of Japanese and Chinese affairs to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
This matter was taken up in a letter from the Minister of Colonial Affairs to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 16 June (1862 N.52). Written at the top of this 
document, in pencil, are the words ‘Transfer Japanese and Chinese Affairs to 
this Department’.648 In this letter, the Minister of Colonial Affairs set out as 
important subjects, whether the Dutch representative could stay in Edo and 
whether he should be given a higher position than at present, in accordance 
with the positions of other representatives of countries which had concluded 
the treaty with Japan. The Minister of Colonial Affairs explained that a 
memorandum had been drawn up on these subjects entitled ‘Memorandum on 
the issue that the Dutch representative does not reside in Edo with the same 
status as the representatives of any of the other signatory countries to the treaty’. 
Furthermore, he added that he could not refrain from expressing his hopes for 
the future in view of the colonial interests, on the occasion of the transfer of 
Japanese and Chinese Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his letter, the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs explained his expectations to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs item by item: 
  
‘a. General relations between Japan and China with the Netherlands East 
Indies. 
What kind of a relationship between the Netherlands, Japan and China is good 
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or desirable? There is no doubt that the Netherlands East Indies will continue to 
have a good relationship, especially with China, because such a relationship is 
the best way to promote the interests of the Netherlands East Indies in Japan 
and China appropriately; and that the Dutch representatives in both countries 
will not only receive sufficient information on important matters, but will also 
serve the Government of the Netherlands East Indies for the purpose of 
informing this Government of matters relevant to its interests that occurred in 
Japan and China. 
 
b. A naval force shall be stationed in China or in Japan in order to show the 
[national] flag and to protect our nation, or should the need arise to make 
protests, or bring pressure on the Japanese Government in treaty negotiations.  
Up to the present, warships for service in Japanese and Chinese affairs have 
been borrowed from the fleet under the command of the Governor-General in 
the Netherlands East Indies. The expenses have been partly paid from the 
budget of the Netherlands East Indies. This regulation is consistent with the fact 
that the direction of Japanese and Chinese affairs were resting with the 
Governor-General. 
Now the question arises how this matter can be regulated in the future: 
without burdening the budget of the Netherlands East Indies with extra 
expenditure, especially that it should not be expected to meet any more, 
without trespassing on the authority of the Governor-General in his right to 
command the naval forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies; and 
without weakening the authority of either the commander of the fleet in the 
Netherlands East Indies or the Governor-General.  
This matter should be discussed between Your Excellency and the Minister of 
the Navy. 
 
c. Terms of employment.  
The personnel of the consulate-general in Japan shall be considered as being in 
the employ of the Netherlands East Indies in every respect; they will continue 
to be officials of the Netherlands East Indies with all the rights and duties 
thereof. To some extent, the Dutch consuls in China shall also be considered 
officials of the Netherlands East Indies. The expenses, which are charged to the 
Dutch Government, will be allocated from the budget of the Netherlands East 
Indies. Your Excellency will be cognizant with the amount for the current year 
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from the enclosed extract of the budget. The Governor-General should be given 
timely information of the consequences which the transition of Japanese and 
Chinese affairs will entail also in respect to the personnel, and consequently 
when the personnel, especially personnel assigned to Japan, can again be 
considered available for other duties; when the appropriations for the Japan 
and China assignments at present included in the budget of the Netherlands 
East Indies will be removed from its budget. 
 
d. Exchanged documents regarding Chinese and Japanese affairs.  
In dealing with Chinese and Japanese affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
will need to know what has been done previously. Many of the relevant 
documents have already been reported to Your Excellency’s Ministry in the 
course of the last year. When Your Excellency will take charge of Japanese and 
Chinese affairs, these questions will arise: whether Your Excellency desires an 
arrangement to be made regarding the availability to his department of what 
has been found in the archives of the Department of Colonial Affairs concerning 
Japan and China, and whether it is not desirable that the principal clerk of the 
Department of Colonial Affairs, whose duties now have consisted mostly of 
drawing up the documents sent out by this Department, be transferred to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs.’649 
 
In this fashion, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs informed the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of various problems connected with the transition to its 
Ministry of the responsibility for Japanese and Chinese affairs. It should, 
however, be pointed out that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was not to leave 
these affairs completely to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This measure 
resulted from the changed nature of Dutch relations with Japan and China, 
especially after the treaty of 1858. The relations were no longer a section of the 
colonial affairs of the Netherlands East Indies, and therefore, it was no longer 
appropriate that the Netherlands East Indies, although it was the executive 
organ of Japanese and Chinese affairs under the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, 
should continue to deal with them not in the interests of the Netherlands East 
Indies, but of the Netherlands. Moreover, this situation was inefficient, because 
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it required double consultation on these matters, that is, between the 
Netherlands East Indies and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, and between the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs proposed that the Dutch Government should take 
over the direction of these Asian affairs. As a result of this measure, the 
Government would be able to deal with these matters more quickly and 
smoothly. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs would be able to pare down its 
budget, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would share the sundry 
expenses which the Netherlands East Indies had borne until then. This, 
however, was not acceptable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and matters 
took a turn that militated against the intentions of the Minister of Colonial 
Affairs. 
In reply, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs to take over the drafting of the Royal Decree and the joint 
report on this matter to the king by the Ministers of Colonial and Foreign 
Affairs.650 The Minister of Colonial Affairs acquiesced in submitting this joint 
report to the king, while agreeing that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should 
take the initiative in dealing with this matter. The Minister of Colonial Affairs 
expressed his intention that he begin consultation on this matter with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the king had assented in principle of the joint 
report.651 
By submitting this joint report to the king, the two Ministers requested 
for the king’s assent in this matter as following: ‘The relations between Western 
countries and China and Japan have increased considerably as a result of the 
events of recent years. It is expected that these relations will expand 
considerably in future. This situation has called this country’s attention to the 
necessity of securing good relations with China and Japan. In recent years 
Dutch traders have begun to send trading expeditions to China and Japan and 
they will continue their efforts to promote the sale of Dutch industrial products 
in China and Japan. Consequently, from the commercial aspect, Dutch relations 
with Japan and China are less and less a matter of the interest to the 
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Netherlands East Indies, and have become more and more a matter of the 
interest of the Netherlands. The direction of the relations with Japan and China 
can therefore no longer be left to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East 
Indies, but must come to lie with Your Majesty’s government. The 
Governor-General has continually asked the opinion of the supreme 
government about what measures to take to deal with matters which have 
occurred in these countries, although a part of responsibility for Japanese and 
Chinese affairs was left with him, according to your Majesty’s Cabinet 
resolution of 17 June 1858 (N.47). Furthermore, the conclusion of treaties with 
countries such as China and Japan requires the king's authorization and the 
appointment of a plenipotentiary.’ 
The king's letter of approval, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
already drawn up, says that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take over the 
charge of Japanese and Chinese affairs, and the appointment, promotion, 
dismissal of the personnel too.652 Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
informed the Minister of Colonial Affairs that the present Dutch officials in 
China and Japan would have to be transferred to the Dutch Government 
because these officials would lose their status as employees of the government 
of the Netherlands East Indies. They would have to be reappointed on new 
salary-scales and so forth and the removal of the Consulate-General from 
Nagasaki to Edo would be discussed.653 This joint report was submitted to the 
king.654 The Royal Decree on this matter formally determined that Japanese 
and Chinese affairs should be taken over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.655  
After the promulgation of the Royal Decree, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs requested the Ministry of Colonial Affairs for an explanation of the 
issues pertinent to this matter. The Minister of Colonial Affairs explained these 
issues item by item. These issues are summarized, as following:  
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‘a. Consul-Generals and Consuls in Japan and China respectively 
Consul-Generals and Consuls shall take their instructions directly from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their position shall be not for the handling of 
colonial matters but for those of the Netherlands. Consequently, Dutch 
representatives in the countries of East Asia shall serve the general interests of 
the Netherlands in future. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs intends that 
Japanese and Chinese affairs be expanded rather than reduced. Concerning a 
curtailment of expenditure, however, it is suggested that the positions of the 
chief clerk (‘kanselier’) and of the interpreter of the Consul-General in Japan can 
be unified into one position. 
   
b. The revenue to be assigned. 
It seems that the budget of the representative in China cannot be reduced, since 
the life-style in China requires a large amount. The budget of the Netherlands 
East Indies does not cover the expenses of the Consul-General in Japan and the 
Consulate-General is to be transferred to Edo. A memorandum has already 
been submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it is explained that 
the Consul-General in Japan shall assume the same high status as that of other 
representatives of the signatory powers to a treaty. It will be possible to 
economize on the expense of the personnel. It would be difficult to reduce the 
expenditure as our representative should assume the same position as that of 
the British and French representatives, because a life of Edo entails many more 
expenses than that in Nagasaki.   
 
c. Expenses of moving the Consulate-General to Edo 
The voyage from Nagasaki to Edo would entail few expenses. On the other 
hand, it would be extremely expensive if a warship stationed in Japan is used 
for this purpose.  
 
d. The rent of the building of the Consulate-General in Edo 
The Ministry of Colonial Affairs had received De Wit’s monthly report for July 
which mentioned this matter, but it has not received any more recent reports 
from him.’ 
  
Besides these above-mentioned issues, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs 
demanded that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would comply with the limits of 
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the budget for 1863 which had been already approved. Therefore, it was 
mentioned that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take over the expense of 
6500 guilders for the publication of a Dutch-English-Japanese dictionary, and 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would include this matter in its budget; 
furthermore, that new regulations should be enacted with regard to a salary for 
Professor Johan Joseph Hoffmann (1805-1878), who was a Japanese interpreter 
in the Netherlands East Indies and the first professor of Japanese at Leiden 
University (appointed in 1855) at that time, as well as paying for the tuition fees 
of the Japanese interpreter of whom Hoffmann took charge.656  
As presented above, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs explained some 
issues of this transition but it pertinently insisted on its rights in view of its 
personnel and its interests. This measure should benefit not only the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, but also the Minister of Colonial Affairs. In response to these 
requests of the Minister of Colonial Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent 
it a letter, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to discuss some 
points regarding this matter in more detail. This letter said  first that the date 
of the transition of responsibility would be agreed as January 1 1863; secondly, 
no special pension would be granted to persons whose duties would be 
changed from the aegis of the Netherlands East Indies to that of the Dutch 
government; thirdly, concerning the Dutch-English-Japanese dictionary which 
had been begun as an initiative of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the said 
ministry should continue to bear the expense in the future, because this project 
benefited exclusively the interests of the Netherlands East Indies; and lastly, the 
training of the Chinese interpreters would be left to Hoffmann in the budget of 
the Netherlands East Indies, although his position as a Japanese interpreter in 
the Netherlands East Indies would be abolished after consultation with the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs.657 
It is clear that this letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not meet 
                                            
656 NA BuZa, 28 July 1862 N12 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 July 1862 N31.  
657 NA BuZa, 2 August 1862 N24 (exh.). A letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
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The post of Hoffman as the Japanese interpreter of the Netherlands East Indies was 
abolished. NA BuZa, 8 October 1862 N3 (exh.). A document from Willem III on 30 
September 1862 N84. 
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the demands of the Ministry of Colonial affairs. It seems that the latter was 
disappointed with this reply but had no choice other than to follow the decision 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, at the request of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Colonial Affairs informed the Governor-General 
of the Netherlands East Indies of the following: the rent of Deshima and of the 
buildings there would no longer be paid for by the Dutch Government, and, 
therefore, the civilians who used them would pay this directly to the Japanese 
Government, if possible, from 1 January 1863; that, at the same time, the Dutch 
Government buildings on Deshima would be no longer of use to this 
Government, as the Dutch consulate in Japan would be transferred from there 
to Edo; furthermore, that the Dutch could not demand the right to a bonded 
warehouse  just for this small island, because the principle of a bonded 
warehouse in all open ports in Japan was accepted.658   
 
 
Indifference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Japanese affairs 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected many of the demands made by the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs in this matter. This is quite understandable, 
because these demands were simply not in the interests of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Conversely, it is also understandable that the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs would endeavor to take care of its own interests and its 
personnel. Despite its best intentions in this field, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs did not deal in a gentlemanly way with the personnel, but stuck strictly 
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to the established regulations, bearing its own interests firmly in mind. 
Moreover, the attitude displayed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that 
this Ministry did not consider Japanese affairs as having any great importance 
to the Netherlands.  Such an attitude towards Japanese Affairs as that adopted 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, which pursued the 
interests only in Europe, is comprehensible. Another good example that makes 
this attitude clear is that when treaties with Japan were gazetted in het Staatsblad 
(‘the National State Journal’), the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs that he wished him to assume the responsibility for 
publishing the treaties of 1856 and of 1858; moreover, that it seemed to be 
superfluous to publish the additional treaty of 1857 in the journal, because it 
had been nullified by the treaty concluded in 1858.659 
Although the Minister of Colonial Affairs complied with the other 
measures taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this matter, in this case he 
expressed his strict objection to these remarks as follows: ‘I must respect your 
opinions, but I should observe the following remarks about this point that I 
alone should adduce the necessary proposal on publication in het Staatsblad to 
the king to draw it to his attention. The Minister of Colonial Affairs has 
exclusively been concerned with Japanese affairs, because their management 
was placed entirely in his hands. In spite of this above-mentioned situation, the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs did consult with his colleague in Foreign Affairs 
about Japanese matters and all documents concerned have been countersigned 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another remark which should be made is 
that to carry out your proposal would deviate from customary rules, if I am not 
mistaken. I mean that the essential Royal Decree has always been proposed 
only by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in all the numerous cases of publication 
of treaties in het Staatsblad. Therefore, I must ask whether these remarks should 
not induce Your Excellency at least to lend your co-operation to publication in 
het Staatsblad, if Your Excellency is indeed of the opinion that you can not, in 
your own name, make the required proposals. Although I seize this 
opportunity to take the liberty to express the wish that your thoughts may help 
to bring to a speedy conclusion the matter of consular jurisdiction which has 
been pending for such a long time, I must say that I fail to see how in this 
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matter a reason may be found for Your Excellency to refuse to co-operate in 
publishing in the het Staatsblad the treaties that have been concluded with a 
former Japanese regime.’660 
Furthermore, in contradiction of the opinion of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs which was that it was unnecessary for the additional articles of 1857 to 
appear in het Staatsblad, the Minister of Colonial Affairs has explained that this 
additional treaty actually had effect as a part of the treaty of 1856 until the 
treaty of 1858 was ratified. He also strongly asserted that this treaty had a 
special significance and it could be justified by the facts; firstly, that this treaty 
contained the regulation that Deshima be a bonded warehouse and secondly 
that this regulation was the step towards free trade. Therefore, the Minister 
stressed that the Netherlands could be proud of this additional treaty as the first 
commercial treaty with Japan, because foreigners intending to trade with Japan 
could enjoy the benefits of this treaty’s regulations, namely, they could enter 
Nagasaki to trade, before the treaty of 1858 came into effect. In consideration of 
these facts, the Minister of Colonial Affairs strongly insisted on the special 
significance of these former treaties. Therefore, this is expressed in his last 
words of this letter; that ‘If I cannot unexpectedly obtain co-operation from 
Your Excellency in the publication of the treaties discussed in het Staatsblad, I 
shall subject this matter to the issue of the Cabinet.’661 
It seems that the Ministry of Colonial Affairs  was not willing to  
approve the transfer of  responsibility  for Japanese affairs to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, because Japanese affairs actually had a close relation with its 
colonies in Asia and, moreover, was a special issue in its Ministry, in particular 
from the viewpoint of Dutch ‘National prestige and economic interests’. The 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs, however, had to understand that the Dutch 
Government should deal with Japanese affairs for the sake not of the 
Netherlands East Indies, but of the Netherlands itself, especially after the treaty 
of 1858. Therefore, the Ministry had to give up dealing with this affair, and that 
this measure was essential. On the other hand, the Ministry intended to 
co-operate with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in this affair also in the future. 
Moreover in this transference, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs wished to 
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emphasize its former distinguished service in its handling of difficult Japanese 
affairs. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no consideration at 
all for its wishes. In the above-mentioned letter (27 September 1862), the deep 
disgruntlement of the Minister of Colonial Affairs is obvious.  
Through the transference of the charge of important Dutch-Asian affairs 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the same reason, the management of 
relations with Siam was also handed over to this Ministry. This was established 
by Royal Decree. For this purpose, the joint report to the king by the Ministers 
of Colonial and Foreign Affairs was drawn up again.662  This matter was 
formally approved by Royal Decree on 4 December 1862.663 The standard 
explanation for these transfers in Dutch-Asian affairs is always ‘for the sake of 
the interests of the Netherlands in Europe’.664 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
however, had few interests in Asian affairs. Consequently, autonomous Dutch 
diplomacy towards Asia, as the Ministry of Colonial Affairs had conducted it, 
disappeared completely. It was thereafter entrusted to the diplomacy of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which regarded co-operation with the European 
countries as most important. 
  The pursuance of such negative diplomacy by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the structure accorded to it, elicited at the time criticism from all 
over the nation. The parliamentary historian C.A. Tamse has also pointed out 
the inadequacy of the quality of the staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
its negligence in promoting economic interests in the 1860s.665 In an article with 
the title ‘Our examination system for diplomats’ in the NRC of 23 October 1862 
the selection of diplomats by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was criticized as 
follows:666 ‘The examination for the service is not open to the public. In actual 
fact it does not seem that men of ability are appointed. Applicants who obtain a 
doctorate are exempted from the examination. However, a doctorate does not 
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guarantee capacity as a diplomat. Hence, sons of the aristocracy, who have 
obtained a doctorate academically, do not even have the knowledge required of 
an ordinary lawyer. In reality, these people work in our diplomatic crops 
without taking any further examination or tests. The examiners should not 
accept unqualified applicants, even if they do come from an aristocratic 
background. If the examination, however, is not open to the public, influential 
distinguished families will adopt various means to acquire appointments for 
their sons. Therefore, the examiners find themselves in a most awkward 
situation. As a result, the Netherlands is increasingly acquiring poorly qualified 
diplomats. In a nutshell, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the refuge for sons of 
our aristocracy who cannot obtain work anywhere else. The Netherlands, which 
needs qualified and shrewd diplomats, is faced with the fact that interest in 
foreign affairs is more and more neglected. Therefore, it is necessary: 1, the 
examination shall be open to the public; 2, strict examinations for diplomats; 3, 
stricter examinations, when they are transferred to the legation staff’.  
Moreover, another article titled ‘Contribution – the activity of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affair for always 
being late in issuing directives; not all Dutch consulates were provided with 
information from the Government in the right way; and therefore, sometimes a 
consulate had to obtain information from the civilian merchants. Moreover, this 
same problem happened repeatedly without measures being taken to prevent 
it.667 
 
 
Decreasing interest in Japanese affairs in the Netherlands 
 
It seems that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had problems with adopting 
diplomatic measures. Certainly, Japanese affairs posed a difficult problem for 
the Government at that time. The trade in Japan was expanding rapidly. The 
situation, however, was uncertain, because the Bakufu could not find a solution 
to the problems concerning foreign and internal affairs. Murders of foreigners 
occurred frequently. In this situation, demonstrations by the Dutch navy were 
strongly desired by the Dutch merchants in Japan as a means to protect the 
nation as well as to heighten Dutch prestige in Asia. The Government 
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dispatched warships to Japan in order to fulfil this request. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs reported the development of the Japanese Affairs in the Lower 
House in 1864. Graaf (Duke) C.T. Van Lijnden van Sandenburg (1826-1885) 
replied to it as follows:  
 ‘At the end of the report concerning the Japanese affairs, the 
Government mentions that the Citadel van Antwerpen and the Djambi arrived at 
Japan to assist in making ourselves felt there. ‘Meanwhile, in the relationship 
with the naval power in the Netherlands East Indies, the Ministry of Navy has 
adopted the measure to strengthen our military force in Japan, because it 
unexpectedly had to take an urgent measure. Now I should like to pose the 
Government some questions; how far should the military force be strengthened; 
what is the perspective aim; whether we will co-operate in British and French 
diplomacy; whether we shall remain in our centuries-old position in Japan. Our 
relationship with Japan is not the same as that of the British and French.’668 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied as summarized below.  
  ‘This Government, as well as other European Governments, is 
unquestionably dealing with developments in Japan. In general, our long and 
good relationship with Japan was reaffirmed by the treaty of 1858. Thanks to 
our old relationship with Japan, which existed before the treaties of England 
and the United States were concluded, the Japanese Government shows us 
consideration. This is more than obvious because it shows various evidences of 
the friendship and shows a preference for our industry. The Dutch Government 
recognizes that our interests demand this good relationship be maintained…. 
Generally, if negotiations with Japan are conducted to maintain the 
rights  set out in the treaty, the Member of Parliament from Arnhem regards 
this as necessary to benefit the interests especially of the Netherlands, and 
however, to benefit the same interests of all Europeans in Japan. This, however, 
is not the case. This policy is not new to the Netherlands. Hence, with the aim of 
promoting good relationships between Japan and Europe, we shall continue to 
pursue the guidelines which King Willem II used to follow. The Netherlands 
will co-operate with other countries, if Dutch prestige is promoted by their 
measures. Regarding to this necessary reinforcement of our military force, I 
point out the reference to chapters concerning the Navy, the Army and the 
Colonies, because more detailed information shall be provided from Ministers 
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in charge of them than I am able to.’669 
 In short, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought highly of the idea of 
co-operating with the European great powers. As a result, through this 
transference of Japanese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch 
diplomacy in Japan underwent a complete change. Autonomous Dutch 
diplomacy in Japan had drawn to a close. 
                                            
669 Ibidem, p.178(3). 
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Epilogue 
 
 
By the 1860s, the long tradition of intimate relations between the Netherlands 
and Japan had become a relic of a bygone age. The transition of Japanese affairs 
from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs marks 
the end of autonomous Dutch diplomacy in Japan. Besides this measure, as 
matters stood, it seemed very unlikely that the Netherlands would be able to 
pursue its policy of autonomous diplomacy towards Japan after the treaty of 
1858; or rather it seemed unnecessary to do so. Japan continued to order 
steamships and requested technical experts from the Netherlands too. 670 
Furthermore, it sent young people there in order to learn the techniques of 
modern shipbuilding and the principles of Western law and other useful skills. 
These were fruits of Dutch diplomacy, because the Dutch Government invited a 
Japanese delegation to visit the Netherlands at its expense. On this occasion the 
delegation visited factories in the main cities and assessed the level of 
technology as very high.671 The Dutch Government was very pleased with the 
fact that Japan was requesting the Netherlands as well as other Western great 
powers to help with its Westernization. Actually at that time, Dutch activities 
had a great influence in Japan. Hendrik Hardes, who was a member of the 
Dutch maritime teaching program in Nagasaki, remained in Japan after the 
program had ended. He contributed greatly to the establishment of modern 
Japanese industry.672 These circumstances seem to be an indication that the 
long-standing Dutch-Japanese relations appeared set to continue, even if the 
Dutch Government did not actively encourage it. However, in spite of this 
expectation, the relationship faded away as time passed. 
Meanwhile, however, even if the Dutch Government would have wanted 
to adopt active measures towards Japan, a difficult situation was looming. A 
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wave of anti-foreign sentiment swept through Japan. Incidents arising from this 
movement greatly disappointed Western people. Under the headline ‘General 
survey’ a Javanese newspaper reported: ‘Political affairs in Japan are still 
dangerous and an anti-foreign movement also still strongly prevails. At present 
we live in a politically insignificant time for the colonies, because difficult 
incidents or important events are absent. The recent blow (the incident of 
Shimonoseki) has resulted in dull trade. Trade is not getting better.’ …‘The 
question should be posed whether Japan could be of use as a gateway to our 
colonies… Shall this affair add honour to the mother country? Moreover, shall 
this affair finally make profits for the mother country? We are looking for an 
expected remedy just like a medical doctor would prescribe. In the Netherlands 
we observe with interest the harmful results of grappling with this affair for the 
Netherlands East Indies. Moreover we see Ministers of Colonial Affairs appear 
and then rapidly resign. When we observe the continuous changes in 
government, and the sound of golden harp strings, that is, Will surplus in the 
Netherlands put the welfare, interests and prosperity of the Netherlands East 
Indies aside? We will not agree completely with the opinion of some of the 
more anxious elements in this country, but we have to agree in principle: 
‘Behold, when the storm rages in this mother country, colonies are shaken here 
and there as if a reed in a desert.’’…673  
 It seems that this article expresses contemporary common Dutch 
opinion. The colonial affairs in the Netherlands East Indies, that were expected 
to make big profits if effectively managed, were much more important than 
Japanese affairs that offered dubious trade benefits. This way of thinking, 
namely Japanese affairs were secondary to the Netherlands, grew in popularity 
and is still accepted at present. Meanwhile, it has already been reported that 
‘according to the Dutch representative in Japan, after the incident concerned 
[the incident of Shimonoseki), the Netherlands was not as highly esteemed in 
Japan as before.’674 
  Moreover, Dutch diplomacy towards the United States concerning the 
Japanese affairs was supported by some historical coincidences. For example, 
after the conclusion of the Japan-American treaty in 1854, steamships had not 
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yet crossed the Pacific Ocean.675 Furthermore, it seemed that the results of 
Perry’s expedition to Japan were not greeted with universal approval.676 ‘As 
Perry was to find out, from Washington the Ryûkyûs and Japan appeared of 
little consequence, and his plans for quasi-colonies, protectorates over a number 
of Asian nations, and a strong regional presence to counter the threat of a 
‘British monopoly’ of East Asia were neither understood, nor if they were, 
welcomed.’677 The low level of interest in Asian affairs resulted from the 
domestic problems concerning slavery in the United States.678 Then, ‘If the 
government was not going to recognize his achievements, then Perry would 
himself.’679 Perry decided to publish accounts of the expedition. ‘The criticism 
most often leveled at Perry was that he failed to negotiate a commercial treaty 
with the Japanese.’680 After all, Harris had concluded a commercial treaty in 
1858. However, the domestic problems in the United States worsened.  
The main country concerned in the opening of Japan was the United 
States. In the first year of trade in Yokohama, however, 80 per cent of all its 
trade was done by England.681 Moreover, the number of British offices of 
foreign trading firms was fifty-one, while they grew only to eighty-five in the 
period of 1859-1868. Japanese trade was monopolized by the British 
merchants. 682  Bearing this fact in mind, it can be assumed that the 
Dutch-British-French Triple Entente plan against the United States succeeded.  
It was said that the Netherlands had more influence in Japan than other 
foreign countries in the early years of the Meiji period. After that, however, its 
influence rapidly dwindled.683 It was symbolic to withdraw from Deshima in 
Nagasaki as a result of the Dutch-Japanese treaty. Questions were asked about 
why the Dutch Consul-General should leave Deshima, which had been a special 
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place for the Dutch for over two centuries.684 Thereby, ‘This event tore our old 
letters with Japan to pieces’. 685  The special relationship between the 
Netherlands and Japan was completely a thing of the past. It, however, seems 
right that the Dutch contribution to the opening of Japan should not be 
forgotten.686 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis discusses Dutch diplomacy with respect to Japan in the period 
1850-1863, predominately on the basis of Dutch primary sources and works. 
The principal aim of this study was to analyze the role of the Netherlands in the 
opening of Japan from the point of view of its foreign relations with other 
Western powers and with Japan in this period. So far this was a subject that 
attracted little attention. Dutch diplomacy towards Japan has been discussed in 
connection with the theorem of neutrality and free trade that is generally 
accepted in the Netherlands. In this light, such diplomacy was regarded as a 
passive and defensive. This study, however, examines Dutch diplomacy 
towards Japan from the theory of Dutch imperialism, in which the Dutch 
diplomacy can be re-interpreted as autonomous and positive.  
  In the middle of nineteenth century, the Netherlands had vast colonies 
in Asia, namely the Netherlands East Indies (present-day Indonesia), and 
ranked second only to England in the whole world in terms of the size of its 
colonies. The Netherlands, however, was not regarded as one of great powers 
in this period, because in Europe the realm was not large in comparison with 
other Western powers. Moreover, the Netherlands had a marked aversion to 
the power politics of Western great powers and it rigidly maintained a policy of 
neutrality towards them. This policy was combined with the economic theory 
of a free trade regime. Furthermore, adopting a humanitarian viewpoint, the 
Netherlands propagated not an expansive military but a peace-loving principle 
in its colonial policy. The upshot of this was that Dutch influence did not look 
powerful in the international relations. In this context, it was accepted among 
the Western great powers that the Netherlands would or could adopt no 
autonomous diplomacy. Accordingly Dutch diplomacy in the nineteenth 
century was characterized as an endeavour to pursue neutrality and a free trade 
regime.        
  As a corollary to this accepted theory of the Dutch foreign policy in the 
nineteenth century, up to the present Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the 
middle of this century has never been thoroughly examined academically. The 
prevailing view was accepted fairly uncritically; after the opening of Japan in 
1854 the Netherlands would or could not adopt an autonomous diplomatic 
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course towards Japan at variance from that of the Western great powers; and 
consequently thereafter Dutch influence in Japan soon evaporated. Moreover it 
seemed to be readily accepted that the Netherlands had little interest in 
Japanese affair, because the main Dutch interests in Asia were tied up in the 
Netherlands East Indies. Given this background there are few works that 
address Dutch diplomacy in Japan in the Netherlands. 
  The recent theory of Dutch imperialism in which the Netherlands also 
adopted its own particular kind of imperialist policy has afforded an 
opportunity to re-interpret Dutch diplomacy in the Far East as a more 
autonomous process. In general, Dutch diplomacy was regarded as peaceable 
and based on the principles of humanism. Such an interpretation is sometimes 
wide of the mark. The Netherlands in its colonial policy did not resort to 
undertaking military expansion in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
because this was unnecessary: its peaceful policy worked effectively enough. It 
should, however, not be overlooked that the Netherlands always had the option 
of resorting to military force when peaceful means turned out to be ineffectual. 
Concerned with profit, the Netherlands strove to maximize profits in the 
colonies, while trying avoiding acquiring an aggressive image. Bearing in mind 
that the Netherlands could formulate a policy to maximize profits, it would 
indeed be fair to say that this country was adopting a course of autonomous 
diplomacy. In this respect it is important to recognize that the Netherlands 
should be regarded as a middle-size power and that it participated in the 
political and economic interests of the Western great powers. This thesis 
re-interprets Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the context of international 
relations in Asia in this period. It argues that the Dutch diplomacy in Japan 
should be regarded as an autonomous and active policy. 
 It was only the Netherlands among Western powers that had 
maintained a commercial relationship with Japan during what was known as 
the Sakoku period (1641-1854). This fact of its very nature meant that Japanese 
affair were special to the Netherlands. The significance of its relationship with 
Japan can be fully understood from the aspect of national prestige and 
economic interest. Territorially speaking, the Netherlands still is a small 
country in Europe but the special Dutch commercial relations with Japan recall 
the Dutch proud past as a great maritime power. Moreover only the 
Netherlands possessed the various collections of rare Japanese articles in its 
Museums and also had been able acquire knowledge of Japanese matters 
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because of this unique trade link. Therefore in this period Japanese studies in 
the Netherlands were the most advanced in the world which to a certain extent 
gave the Netherlands a prestige among other Western powers.  
           In reality the Dutch relationship with Japan had even more 
significance in view of both political benefits and economic profits. The first 
was related to maintenance of the international influence in Asia in order to 
manage the Netherlands East Indies most effectively. As far as the economic 
profit was concerned, the central issue was the system of forced cultivation of 
cash crops, the ‘cultuurstelsel’, the Cultivation System which Governor-General 
Van den Bosch introduced there in 1831. The system worked very well and 
produced large profits. Consequently new markets for the colonial products of 
the Netherlands East Indies were sought and the Netherlands hoped to expand 
its trade in these with Japan, because of its geographical proximity to the colony. 
Against this background the Dutch relationship with Japan was one of most 
important contemporary issues in terms of political and economic interests. As 
a matter of course, the Netherlands dealt positively with the affair, when it 
learned about the plans to send an American mission to Japan around 1850.      
 
 
The main features of this thesis are;       
 
1, A re-interpretation of the Dutch diplomacy towards Japan 
 
Dutch foreign policy depended enormously on circumstances in Europe. For 
this reason Dutch diplomacy is generally not regard as autonomous. This 
somewhat negative image is indiscriminately applied to all domains of its 
diplomatic relations. Therefore, Dutch diplomacy towards Japan has also has 
never been discussed as one which followed an autonomous path. This thesis 
accentuates the autonomous Dutch diplomacy towards Japan in the context of 
Western imperialism in Asia. This is discussed principally on the basis of Dutch 
primary sources and works. The outcome unequivocally shows that the 
Netherlands did adopt an autonomous diplomatic course towards Japan, and 
that the relationship with Japan was special and one of the most important 
concerns of this country in view of its Asian interests.   
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2, The feasibility of the Dutch diplomacy in Asia in the context of the 
Dutch-British relations. 
 
 In the nineteenth century the Netherlands was a small country in Europe 
compared with the Western great powers. At the same time the Netherlands 
was a great colonial power, but lacked sufficient military force to secure the 
colonies. The navy of the Netherlands East Indies was too small to effectuate an 
effective management of the Indonesian Archipelago. This has led to the 
assumption that there was little opportunity left for the Netherlands to play an 
influential role in Japanese foreign relations too. In this context, this thesis has 
examined Dutch relations with England which the Netherlands regarded as 
‘our most natural ally’ in Europe, and has demonstrated conclusively that, in 
co-operation with England, the Netherlands did adopt an autonomous 
diplomacy in Asia to a certain extent. England had a preference for co-operating 
with the Netherlands rather than other European countries in its Asian affairs. 
This relationship resulted from the political situation in Europe and also from 
the special relation deriving from their mutual status as ‘Lords of the East’ in 
Asia. Until recently, the relationship between the Netherlands and England in 
the middle of nineteenth century was generally regarded as one of 
confrontations. The analysis adduced in this thesis, however suggests that this 
matter should be understood as a mixture of political co-operation and 
economic competition. Secure in its co-operation with England, the Netherlands 
could pursue its interests in Asia as much as it wanted to, even in the situation 
in which the USA as an aggressive newcomer and other Western great powers 
made a palpable entrance on the scene.     
 
 
3. Autonomous, active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan – in relation to the 
USA 
  
The Netherlands adopted an autonomous, active course of diplomacy towards 
Japan when apprehension was raised about the possibility that the USA was 
aiming to break the unique commercial relationship between the Netherlands 
and Japan. The Netherlands did not contemplate abandoning its interests in 
Japan when it was confronted with the American intrusion. Using Dutch 
primary sources this thesis offers solid proof that Japanese affairs were of the 
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utmost importance to the Netherlands from the point of view of its national 
prestige and economic interests, and in this context it discusses how the 
Netherlands adopted autonomous, active diplomacy towards Japan quite 
separate from that of the new imperialistic powers gathering around Japan. 
 
 
4, The feasibility of adopting autonomous, active diplomacy towards Japan 
by the Netherlands.  
 
One important question arises from the accepted theory on the matter of 
whether or not the Netherlands could become a good partner for Japan after its 
opening; and whether or not Japan could fully depend on the Dutch 
support.The Netherlands was a relative small power and it had had to endure a 
humble position in Japan before the opening of this country to international 
trade. This situation, however, changed completely after the opening of Japan. 
By coming into contact with the Western civilization, the Japanese realized that 
their country was underdeveloped. By the same token, the political leaders 
chose to adopt the path of modernization on the model of Europe and strove to 
acquire knowledge of the Western civilization. Japanese traditionalism, 
however, was still very strong and it was very difficult for the Government to 
reform its country. In this situation, Western large powers, not least the USA, 
continued to make demands that it liberalize itself even further on Japan. These 
were exorbitant demands in the eyes of the contemporary Japanese. Against 
this background the anti-foreign movement in Japan began to assume particular 
form. The Dutch diplomatic measures, however, were relatively acceptable to 
the Japanese, because they were compiled taking Japanese policy and custom 
into proper consideration. This peaceable Dutch diplomatic behaviour was very 
attractive to Japan. The Netherlands belonged to the Western world and 
appeared to be counted among the large colonial powers because it possessed 
the Netherlands East Indies. As a result, Japan asked the Netherlands as an old 
and confidential friend to support this country in its reconstruction and 
modernization. This thesis discusses this topic and demonstrates that the 
Netherlands had a well-grounded opportunity to adopt an autonomous course 
of diplomacy towards Japan in order to establish and to expand its influence 
and interests there.         
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5, The difficulties in adopting Dutch diplomacy towards Japan – the 
confrontation between the Minister of Colonial Affairs and the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies.   
 
The Ministry of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands was ultimately responsible 
for the diplomacy towards Japan. The Government of the Netherlands East 
Indies, as an executive organ in an overseas territory, could deal only with the 
commercial matters concerning Japan. The Government in Batavia was 
subordinate to The Hague in matter pertaining to political affairs concerning 
Japan. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs pursued a positive diplomacy towards 
Japan when Duymaer van Twist was Governor-General. He, however, had no 
interest in Japanese affairs and would have preferred to adopt a passive course 
of diplomacy towards it. Consequently a confrontation between The Hague and 
Batavia took place and thereafter Duymaer van Twist tendered his resignation.  
Remarkably enough, the then Minister of Colonial Affairs, Pahud de 
Montanges, himself became the new Governor-General. This fact seems to 
indicate that Japanese Affairs were highly important to the Netherlands at that 
time.       
 
 
6, The plan to establish the new economic relationship between China 
(Shanghai) – Japan (Nagasaki) – the Netherlands East Indies.  
 
The capital city of Japan, Edo (present-day Tokyo) was opened to foreigners 
after the country had made itself accessible. The Western great powers lost little 
time in establishing diplomatic representatives there. The Dutch diplomatic 
agent, however, continued to reside in Nagasaki which had been the Dutch 
settlement for such a long time. Up to now, this fact was regarded as evidence 
that the Netherlands was not particularly bothered about Japanese affairs. 
Moreover, it was thought that this kind of Dutch perfunctory, passive 
diplomatic behaviour had damaged its interests in Japan. Such opinions tend to 
overlook the Dutch plan to establish a new large market linking Shanghai 
–Nagasaki – the Netherlands East Indies. This plan was originally prompted by 
a request from the Japanese Government that the Netherlands should take 
charge of regularly transporting Chinese articles to Japan. Consequently, this 
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decision to remain in Nagasaki was taken with due consideration of the 
political and economic implications. While limiting the political struggles 
among other Western powers, by dint of satisfying Japanese commercial 
demands, the Netherlands should have been able to establish a new, large 
market in Asia with its centre at its old settlement, Nagasaki, a port situated 
very favourably in relation to China and the Netherlands East Indies, and it 
made great strides towards maximizing its economic profits there.   
 
 
7, Deshima as a Dutch bonded warehouse 
 
It became more difficult for the Netherlands to exploit its privilege based on the 
basis of its centuries-old special relationship with Japan after the Japan-America 
treaty of 1858. Nevertheless then too the Netherlands stuck to its privilege as 
the vested right and strove to realize it. Its design was to transform Deshima 
into a Dutch bonded warehouse. This plan grew from the Japanese concession 
to the Netherlands which allowed it to bring articles to Deshima tax-free. The 
Netherlands wanted to promote the Japanese trade and the future Asian large 
market as effectively as possible by exploiting this right. This thesis sets out this 
plan in the context of the autonomous, active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan.   
 
 
8, The Triple Entente between the Netherlands, England and France in 
relation to the USA 
 
The establishment of the Triple Entente between the Netherlands, England and 
France was born of a Dutch proposal. The aim of the Netherlands was that 
Japanese affairs could be smoothly managed with the co-operation of these 
three countries only. Therefore the Netherlands did not ask the USA to 
participate in it. The Netherlands regarded the latter as a newcomer in Asia that 
did not respect the Dutch vested position in Japan. The Netherlands, however, 
recognized that it could not oppose the USA alone, because ‘The United States 
of North America can compare with one of the greatest countries in Europe’. 687 
                                            
687 NA Koloniën no 5837, Opmerkingen van Raad van Indië naar de gouverneur-generaal, 
den 25 Junij 1852 Batavia in 6 Januarij 1853 (Exh) N.2, Geheim. 
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Therefore, the Dutch Government invented this skilful, concerted diplomacy 
with some of the great European powers. Because the Netherlands adhered to 
the principle of maintaining its position in Japan, this study argues that the 
Netherlands adopted an active diplomacy towards it.           
 
 
9, The Transfer of Japanese affairs from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
The Western powers built a diplomatic and commercial relationship with Japan 
by concluding the treaty in 1858. In this instance it was the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that negotiated with a Japanese mission that visited in the Netherlands 
in 1862. Although the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was officially responsible for 
Japanese affairs, the relationship with other countries concerning the Japanese 
affairs impinged so closely on the terrain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
it felt it should take over Far Eastern policy. In principle it was preferable that 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should deal with the Japanese affairs, because 
the relationship with Japan had become a matter of interest not only to the 
Netherlands East Indies but also to the Netherlands and its position in the 
European and wider international arena. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs had 
adopted an active diplomacy towards Japan. After this transfer, the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs would also co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
dealing with Japan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had little interest in Asian 
affairs. As a result, this ministry eradicated the influence of the Ministry of 
Colonial Affairs in Japanese Affairs and adopted a passive policy towards this 
country, keeping a weather eye on the attitudes of the other Western great 
powers. This thesis sets out the course of this process and describes how 
autonomous, active Dutch diplomacy towards Japan came to end. By analyzing 
primary sources, this thesis demonstrates that the special relationship between 
the Netherlands and Japan became completely a thing of the past after this 
transfer. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Dit proefschrift behandelt het Nederlandse diplomatieke beleid ten opzichte 
van Japan van 1850 tot en met 1863, en is met name gebaseerd op onderzoek 
van Nederlandse bronnen en literatuur. Het hoofddoel van deze studie is het 
verrichten van een analyse van de rol die Nederland gespeeld heeft in de 
toenmalige buitenlandse betrekkingen van Japan, een onderwerp dat tot nu toe 
weinig aandacht heeft gekregen. Het Nederlandse diplomatieke beleid ten 
opzichte van Japan wordt van oudsher gezien als voortkomende uit de 
principes van neutraliteit en vrijhandel, en als gevolg daarvan als een 
voornamelijk passieve, defensieve politiek. Deze studie echter plaatst het 
Nederlandse Japan-beleid in de context van het imperialisme, en evalueert het 
als een zelfstandige en actieve diplomatie.  
In het midden van de negentiende eeuw was Nederland - na Engeland - 
de tweede koloniale mogendheid in de wereld, dankzij het bezit van 
Nederlands Indië, het tegenwoordige Indonesië. Maar doordat Nederland zelf 
klein van omvang is - in vergelijking met andere Europese staten - wordt het 
land zelden gezien als een van de vooraanstaande koloniale mogendheden van 
deze periode. Hierbij zij aangetekend dat Nederland bewust niet meedeed aan 
de vigerende Europese machtspolitiek die was gebaseerd op concurrentie 
tussen de grote staten. In plaats daarvan streefde het land naar strikte 
handhaving van de neutraliteit. Dit politieke streven werd gecombineerd met 
het volgen van een economisch beleid van vrijhandel. Bovendien propageerde 
Nederland het humanitaire uitgangspunt van een vreedzame, niet op militaire 
expansie gerichte, koloniale politiek. Als gevolg van dit buitenlandse beleid 
werd de Nederlandse invloed internationaal niet als groot gezien. In deze 
context ligt de aanname voor de hand dat Nederland ten opzichte van de grote 
mogendheden geen zelfstandig buitenlands beleid wilde of kon volgen. De 
Nederlandse diplomatie van de negentiende eeuw wordt daarom doorgaans 
gekarakteriseerd door het streven naar neutraliteit en vrijhandel.    
Door het bestaan van deze overkoepelende visie op de Nederlandse 
diplomatieke geschiedenis in de negentiende eeuw is tot nu toe het beleid naar 
Japan in het midden van negentiende eeuw niet het onderwerp geweest van 
serieus academisch onderzoek. Altijd is aangenomen dat Nederland na de 
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opening van Japan in 1854 geen autonome diplomatie wilde of kon volgen ten 
opzichte van de grote mogendheden, en dat dientengevolge de Nederlandse 
invloed in Japan snel verdween. Door de aanname dat betrekkingen met Japan 
volledig onbelangrijk waren in vergelijking met het Nederlandse koloniale 
belang in Nederlands Indië, zijn er in Nederland nauwelijks studies verricht 
naar de Nederlandse diplomatie ten opzichte van Japan.   
Recente inzichten in de rol van Nederland als imperialistische 
mogendheid leiden echter ertoe de Nederlandse diplomatie in Azië opnieuw te 
evalueren als een meer autonoom proces. Traditioneel wordt vaak gewezen op 
de humanitaire principes waarop het vreedzame Nederlandse buitenlandse 
beleid gestoeld zou zijn. Deze visie is echter niet altijd correct. Nederlandse 
koloniale beleid was in het midden van de negentiende eeuw niet gericht op 
militaire expansie, omdat dit ook niet nodig was: een vreedzame politiek was al 
voldoende effectief. Dit verhult het feit dat Nederland wel steeds militaire 
machtsmiddelen achter de hand had en kon inzetten wanneer een vreedzame 
politiek uiteindelijk geen uitkomst bood. Nederland slaagde erin in zijn 
Indië-beleid het eigen belang te maximaliseren, en tegelijk een agressief imago 
te vermijden. Het feit dat Nederland in staat was het beleid te voeren dat voor 
zichzelf de meeste voordelen brachten kan gezien worden als een uiting van 
een autonomie in het buitenlandse beleid. Dit benadrukt de noodzaak 
Nederland te beschouwen als een middelgrote mogendheid, die deel uitmaakte 
van de groep van Westerse mogendheden. Dit proefschrift biedt een nieuwe 
beoordeling van de Nederlandse diplomatie ten opzichte van Japan in de 
context van de toenmalige internationale betrekkingen in Azië. Deze studie 
betoogt dat het Nederlandse beleid betreffende Japan als een autonome, actieve 
politiek moet worden gezien. 
Tijdens de periode van Japans afzijdigheid (1641-1854) had Nederland als 
enig Westerse land commerciële betrekkingen met Japan. Dit maakte de 
betrekkingen met Japan voor Nederland bijzonder. De betekenis voor 
Nederland van deze speciale relatie met Japan kan het beste worden begrepen 
uit het oogpunt van nationaal prestige en economische belang. In territoriaal 
opzicht is Nederland een klein land in Europa. Maar de bijzondere Nederlandse 
handelsrelatie met Japan herinnerde aan het trotse Nederlandse verleden als 
grote maritieme mogendheid. Bovendien verschafte het bezit van diverse 
collecties van zeldzame Japanse producten en het voortbrengen van 
academische verhandelingen over Japan Nederland een grote invloed op de 
 319 
beeldvorming over Japan in Europa, en daarmee een zeker aanzien en prestige.   
Tevens was de relatie met Japan belangrijk voor Nederland in verband 
met meer tastbare politieke en economische belangen. In politiek opzicht was 
het uitoefenen van invloed in de internationale betrekkingen in Azië voor 
Nederland van belang ten einde zijn beheer van Nederlands Indië te kunnen 
handhaven. Wat betreft de economische belangen stond het cultuurstelsel 
centraal, dat op Java door Gouverneur-Generaal Van den Bos was ingevoerd en 
dat resulteerde in een sterke toename van de productie en export naar Europa 
van tropische landbouwproducten. In het midden van de negentiende eeuw 
leverde dit cultuurstelsel Nederland een enorm 'batig slot' op. Tegen deze 
achtergrond werden door het Nederlandse bestuur plannen gemaakt om 
nieuwe markten voor deze producten te zoeken. Daarvoor was Japan een 
geschikte optie omdat het relatief dichtbij Nederlands Indië was gesitueerd en 
een grote bevolking had. Het was in deze context, waarin de relatie met Japan 
voor Nederland aanzienlijke politieke en economische belangen 
vertegenwoordigde, dat Nederland rond 1850 werd geconfronteerd met 
plannen van de Verenigde Staten om een missie naar Japan te sturen, met als 
doel de openstelling van dit rijk voor de internationale handel.            
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